2. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 National Forest Programmes Opportunities and limits of co-ordination in policy networks Karl Hogl Forest Tourism Industry Environment

3. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Demands, Problems and Approach Demands: Demands: National Forest Programmes shall... --> co-ordinate several levels of governance, --> co-ordinate all relevant sectors, --> involve private actors, --> proceed iterative, adaptive, long term Problem: Problem: Decision systems comprising many interdependent actors and arenas tend towards deadlock Question: Question:Approaches to co-ordinate –> Strengths / Weaknesses

4. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Outline Theory, empirical evidence Meaning of „C-ordination“ Co-ordination by hierarchy Co-ordination through negotiations Opportunities and Limits of Co-ordination in actor networks

5. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Theoretical Approach Theories Approaches of multi-level governance Joint-Decision Theory („joint-decision trap“; F. W. Scharpf) Generally, approaches about (policy-)co-ordination (e.g. negotiations-, administrations-, and organisation theories)

6. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Empirical Approach Empirical evidence Own research and cases from literature NFP processes in European countries / regions; reports to this action EU policies, in particular regional policy and rural development policy

7. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 The meaning of „co-ordination“ Redundancy Incoherence, contradictory policies Policy gaps Forest Tourism Industry Environment Forest Environment Tourism Industry Co-ordination State / degree of c-ordination: Co-ordination as a process: Co-ordination as a process: sectors, time frame, stages,...

8. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 How to co-ordinate ? (markets) hierarchy negotiations Basically by

9. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Hierarchy Co-ordination by Hierarchy Motivational problem (“misuse of power”) Informational problem  Risk: decision do not meet the problems  Limited range of coverage, in particular in case of complex problems that effect many different domains within hierarchical structures

10. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations Co-ordination through negotiation If Side payments are allowed And transaction costs are ignored  Egoistic rational actors exploit the potential welfare gains BUT:multi level problems / “joint-decision trap” “negotiators’ dilemma” “problem of high numbers”

11. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations Negotiators’ dilemma Actors shall at the same time a) Find the best common solutions b) and solve distributional problems a) and b) evoke incompatible actor orientations (co-operative vs. competitive).  blockade + Problem of high numbers --> co-ordination through negotiations has narrow limits!

12. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations Solutions suggested by theory and political practice: a) negotiations embedded in hierarchies b) negotiations in actor networks a)Negotiations in the „Shadow of Hierarchy“ In principle, decisions would be finally taken by a superior entity Archetypes of interaction “negative” co-ordination “positive” co-ordination

13. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations MoF MoZ MoY MoX NGO c NGO b NGO a MoF MoZ MoY MoX NGO c NGO b NGO a positive co-ordinationnegative co-oordination central actor; low density; bilateral; -> Pareto Criterion; cumulation of veto positions „more co-operation“, high density, multilateral, -> Kaldor Criterion; narrow limits as regards # of actors

14. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations b) Negotiations in actor networks Governance theory Co-operation in actor networks as a certain kind of co-ordination Networks Medium degree of coupling Mutually dependent stability over time Regularly exchange

15. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Negotiations b) Negotiations in actor networks within stable actor networks voluntary co-operation becomes rational („shadow of the future“) Advantages of co-operation in actor networks Mutual trust can develop High density of information flow, good access to information --> mutual learning

16. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Co-operation in networks Preconditions depends on the kind and the number of topics common motive / problem reference “favourable” topics at the start with Number of topics (broad or narrow)

17. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Preconditions Arena and sufficient opportunities for interaction Hardly occurs without „external“ incentives “weight” only if relevant actors participate legitimation needed Co-operation in networks

18. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 Weaknesses participation voluntary --> only if potential gains outweigh losses Costs are clear soon, benefits often arguable Fear for loosing autonomy and influence need to compromise --> tendency towards symbolic results --> conflicts adjourned Co-operation in networks

20. I N S T I T U T F Ü R S O Z I O Ö K O N O M I K D E R F O R S T - U N D H O L Z W I R T S C H A F T Karl Hogl, September 2003 A Actor A Actor B Status Quo Kaldor- Criterion Pareto- Criterion A B C E D