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The Comprehensive Approach

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1 The Comprehensive Approach
Logo: JIMPC connects the Defense / Diplomatic / Developmental efforts to stabilize and reconstruct countries subject to complex contingencies. EUCOM NR JOPP Course Mar 2012 1

2 Comprehensive Approach
“… integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” FM 3-07 Stability Operations Key Elements: Interdependence Cooperation Prioritization Nesting Flexibility Measurements of Progress Of all the aspects of a Comprehensive Approach, these were the most enduring aspects. The EU, NATO and others use this term. There is still a lack of clarity about this idea, but there are aspects -- or “fundamentals” -- of this approach that are important enough to be included. Interdependence: “Everything is connected to everything else.” All end states and conditions are part of an interlocking system of systems. EX: Security requires the rule of law, delivery of essential services requires good governance, a functioning rule of law system depends on security, sustainable economies need a functioning rule of law. Cooperation: Requires constant communication, dialogue among all actors. A shared strategic vision enables different actors to work cooperatively. Prioritization: Priorities are necessary but must be flexible. Focus first on sources of conflict/stability, political settlement, and providing basic services. Nesting: Short-term objectives should be nested within longer-term goals. (EX: Immediate needs may call for role of international police. But in the long term, the goal is to have routine law enforcement conducted by local police.) Flexibility of sequencing and timing: Any plan based on sequenced or timed and phased actions is a notional understanding of how events might proceed. This plan will depend on the context. Locally led input on sequencing and timing is essential for success. Measurements of progress: A system of metrics translates lofty goals into measurable outcomes. It allows continuous adjustments to strategy and implementation to improve success.

3 Today’s National Security Challenges and Development Solutions
The Convergence of the Three Ds Decisive Efforts on Today’s Battlefield Diplomacy Defense Development From the Global Strategies Group. This slide talks to the convergence of the three Ds on the battlefield and the future we, as a military, can expect in the future as evidenced by Sec Gates’ quote. “We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature and require the application of all elements of national power” - Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, October 10, 2007 6 April 2017 3

4 National Security Challenges
Unemployed young men / economic decay in failed states Poorly functioning and disorderly environments / ungoverned territories Lack of access to healthcare and education Global Strategies Group. 3 specific challenges that are but a group of many non-traditional challenges the USG currently faces and will face in the future. “…failed or failing states that are unable or unwilling to maintain control over their territory can provide safe havens for terrorist organizations to export terror regionally or around the world.” - Gen. George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, October 9, 2007 6 April 2017 4

5 + + = + + = The conflict equation
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework The conflict equation + + = O2 Core Grievances + Key Actors + Windows of Vulnerability Violent Conflict = Before we delve into the theory of the conflict equation I want to ask you a simple question lets say you want to start a fire you generally start with wood, but what else do you need for fire? Answer: accelerant and something to ignite it. A critical point is that you need all three. They are additive. . Fuel and accelerant without the matches will not result in a fire. Turns out that the metaphor of starting a fire is a perfect fit for describing conflict. To reorient this equation to what we are talking about you can rephrase the metaphor as motives, means, and opportunity. This is borrowed from the language of criminal justice system it may sound familiar to you if you watch Law and Order. This just underlines again that the tools we are presenting you with today are not brand-new USAID-patented tools. They are based on a body of academic work, field experience, and even draw on other disciplines.

6 Comprehensive Approach Expanding Professionalism
WHOLE-OF- GOVERNMENT MULTINATIONAL The basic depiction of Joint Operations. This may be presented as a board drill vice a slide. Start by asking what are some tools available to better synchronize/plan joint operations, then discuss planning considerations and challenges that they have encountered The model will expand to “International Operations” on the next slide. JOINT SERVICE

7 Interagency – “Whole of Government”

8 Interagency “Dynamics”
Process PERSONALITY IDEAS / PREFERENCES BACKGROUND People Libya Afghanistan Iraq Darfur? TURF HISTORY RESOURCES PERSONALITIES SITUATIONAL NATIONAL POLITICAL HISTORICAL Organizations POLICY/STRATEGY The interagency “process” consists of three main components: People, institutional Processes, and Organizations. The People or leaders involved will bring to the table their personalities, experiences or background, ideas/preferences, etc; These People will come from Organizations steeped their own unique beliefs, goals, history, culture, etc; Add to this equation the particular crisis/situation with unique historical, political, and nation-state relations with others; and stir gently in a Process having its own turf issues, history, “group mentality,” and stakes: and Try to formulate national or regional policies and strategy for Implementation. OK. I’ll give it a shot. [next slide] BELIEFS/GOALS CULTURE HISTORY POWERS Implementation

9 Instruments of National Power
Law Political Military Diplomatic Economic The Situation Financial It takes a coordinated effort of the interagency to synchronize our instruments of national power. Different agencies and departments have responsibilities within each of the realms shown here. Obviously we handle our business well as the “military” instrument of national power; we have little or no control over other instruments other than through influence and consensus building efforts. So, essentially, this is our greatest challenge—or opportunity. [next slide] Informational Socio-Cultural Intelligence

10 Seven Degrees of Interagency Partnering
Visibility De-confliction (preventing interference) Coordination (accommodate) Cooperate (actively seek out civilian partners) Collaboration (synchronize) Integration (unified action) Unity of Effort/Unified Action Visibility: Agencies make each other aware of their presence and independent operations. When you don’t have visibility, back to Herding Cats scenario… De-confliction (preventing interference): Agencies plan operations in isolation and only meet to make sure the activities of another agency do not hinder their own operations. De-confliction is a minimal requirement but insufficient to achieve civilian and military goals. Coordination (accommodate): Officials still plan their agency operations in isolation, but try to stitch together seams between them, attempt to fill gaps, and link overlapping efforts. It makes some progress toward unity of effort, but inadequate to overcome challenges of complex environments and allows for inefficiencies like duplication of effort and wasted resources. Cooperate (actively seek out civilian partners): In the absence of clear direction and accepted frameworks for cooperation, many individuals revert back to the basic definitions of Unity of Effort/Unified Action to guide conversations or developing relationships. Promote Cooperation Conferences hosted by CCDRs have seen an upsurge in support and attendance by General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) and civilian senior executive service (SES), senior intelligence service (SIS), and senior foreign service (SFS) equivalents. Collaboration (synchronize): Civilian and military activities are guided by top-down direction to be mutually supporting to achieve common objectives. Agency planners share info and agree on coordinating mechanisms to be mutually supportive. This provides a minimum level of unity of effort, but is still not good enough for many of the complex and multifaceted situations requiring integration. (MNFI / Embassy Baghdad 2007) Integration (unified action): A genuine partnership among agencies at all levels, and can only be achieved when civilian and military activities are woven together into a common strategy and executed in unison. Planners work together side-by-side in developing their agencies’ plans, and operations are conducted under the unified direction. Integrated joint civilian and military operations implement a common strategy to achieve goals. (CORDS) Unity of Effort/Unified Action: When all members recognize the benefit of individual organization contributions and value/ integrate their capacity to accomplish USG end states and objectives, you have achieved true interagency partnering. De-confliction. De-confliction means that agency officials plan their operations in relative isolation, and only meet to make sure the activities of another agency do not hinder their own operations. For example, military planners will seek information from relief planners on whether any humanitarian relief activities will use the same airways, ports, and roads at the same time as the military. De-confliction is a minimal requirement but alone is insufficient to adequately integrate civilian and military operations in complex emergencies, particularly those involving conflict. Coordination. Coordination means that civilian and military officials try to stitch together seams between their operations and link overlapping efforts among various agency activities. Officials still plan their agency operations in relative isolation, but they meet with other agency officials occasionally to share information on their separate activities and to fill gaps. For example, a relief planner will want to know from the military planner where the military intends to provide a secure area so that relief operations do not venture into harmful areas that are not secure. Mere coordination makes some progress toward unity of effort, but it is inadequate for overcoming the difficult challenges of armed spoilers who will seek to undermine the international effort. Coordination alone also allows for inefficiencies (e.g., duplication of effort, wasted resources) that could be reduced by more integrated planning efforts. Synchronization means that civilian and military activities are guided by top-down direction to be mutually supporting to achieve common objectives for the intervention. Guidance is provided from the top to all civilian and military agencies. For example, military planners meet regularly with civilian planners to get guidance from higher authorities and to clarify the common objectives for the overall mission. Agency planners share information and agree on coordinating mechanisms to ensure that agency plans unfold in a mutually supportive manner. Synchronization does provide the minimum level of unity of effort for an armed intervention, but it is still not good enough in many difficult interventions. Integration This is the highest degree of interagency collaboration. It involves building a genuine partnership among agency planners at all levels. Integration relies having mutually supporting efforts for integration, but it can only be achieved when civilian and military activities are woven together into a common strategy through a joint planning process. This process needs to begin at the strategic level. Military and civilian planners work together side-by-side in developing their agencies’ plans. These plans are crafted to ensure that all efforts are married into a strategy that will bring about the desired outcomes. Civilian and military planners meet not to simply share plans to achieve common objectives; they gather to meet the needs of the other and incorporate them in their own agency plans. Operations are prepared jointly through both face-to-face interaction and using a common communications (or collaborative) system that brings together both civilian and military planners who work under the unified direction from the higher coalition headquarters. Integrated joint civilian and military operations implement a common strategy to achieve composite civil-military objectives to overcome the difficult and complex challenges of the crisis situation. CORDS = Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support CORDS and the Vietnam Experience Adopted from JFCOM/J9 “The Multinational Interagency Group Concept Paper, V.5, 24 May 2006

11 Layers of Interagency Coordination
Federal / Agency (Strategic) National Security Council and agency to agency White House and DC “beltway” agency HQs Regional (Theater / Operational) Geographic CCDRs, State/AID regional bureaus Country Level (Nation-State / Tactical) Country Team; bilateral relations Field (Tactical / Provincial) PRTs, CCC, CMOC / JCMOTF Others? Domestic FBI, DHS, NORTHCOM (Dept of Homeland Security) FEMA regions (Federal Emergency Mgt Agency) State Govt State Fusion Centers FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Local Govt First Responders This slide is meant to provoke discussion around different “families” of interagency ideas. Need to discuss equities at all levels to prepare student’s for the “turf” discussion in slide 11.

12 National Policy-Making
Built on Consensus PRES. Interagency Policy Committees Deputies Committee Principals This is the intent of our National Security Council Process. Building consensus on national security issues is the process. I will briefly summarize each of the levels of the process shown in the hierarchy depicted in this slide. [next slide] The Intent is to take the interests of all Agencies, work the details, and come up with a way that is best for the Nation.

13 Presidential Policy Directive PPD-1
Defines NSC role – “to advise and assist [the President] in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States – domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic.” Defines NSC process – “…along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy.” National Security Presidential Directive – 1 addresses the organization of the NSC System. NSC provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with the administration’s senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. The NSC’s role as defined by the current administration and statutory guidance is to advise the POTUS on matters related to defense of the US, protection of its government and advancement of US interests around the globe. The NSC process is designed to coordinate and develop options for Presidential decisions on policy matters.

14 Presidential Policy Directive - 1
Organizes the National Security Council System for the administration - Membership (statutory/non-statutory, others) - Principals Committee - Secretary-level - Deputies Committee - Deputy Secretary-level - Interagency Policy Committees - Manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG - Day-to-day for IA coordination of policy Replaces the Bush administration NSPD-1. See PPD-1 for specific membership in various situations (economics, etc) 6 April 2017

15 Presidential Study Directive
PSD – 1: Results Full integration of NSC and HSC staffs (the new “National Security Staff”) Ends artificial divide between White House staff who have been dealing with national security and homeland security issues. Maintain HSC as principle venue for IA issues such as terrorism, WMD, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza. New directorates and positions within the National Security Staff to deal with 21st Century challenges - Cybersecurity, WMD terrorism, transborder security, information sharing, resilience policy. Retain AP/HSCT as principle advisor. Create a Global Engagement Directorate See “POTUS statement on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism” 26 May 2009 in MCP 12 “Additional Readings” – this is not in eBook, but is in the faculty / student SPP MCP 12 Additional Readings folder. It is not an assigned reading in the lesson plan, but will be for class 10-1, pending other updates. 6 April 2017

16 National Security Staff
President NSA AP/PDNSA DAP/DNSA for Operations and COS AP/HSCT, DNSA DAP/HS Strategic Planning Legislative Affairs Legal Advisor WH Counsel Executive Secretariat International Economics/ Development International Democracy & Stabilization Economics Environment & Energy Press. Speech & Comm Global Engagement Communications Africa Asia Central Europe Russia Central Asia Western Hemisphere ML & Human Rights Defense WMD Coordination Intel Cyber CT Trans Border Security Resilience Middle East South Gulf Arms Control Threat Reduction Capabilities Policies & Partnerships Info Sharing Response Preparedness

17 National Security Council
Statutory Advisors: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of National Intelligence Non-statutory Members: National Security Advisor (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) Chief of Staff to the President Secretary of Homeland Security Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Secretary of the Treasury The Attorney General UN Representative Others are required/invited NSC President Vice President Secretary of Defense Secretary of State The National Security Council is chaired by the President and is called into session at the President’s discretion. Its statutory members are the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member, but is responsible for determining the agenda in consultation with the other regular attendees of the NSC, ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared, recording NSC deliberations, and disseminating Presidential decisions. See PDD 1 for amplifying information. Secretary of Energy 6 April 2017

18 IPC

19 The Embassy Country Team
Joint Forces Staff College National Defense University

20 What does an American Embassy Do?
Represents American Interests Overseas Promotes democracy and stability Keeps Washington informed Protects American citizens: births, deaths and visas Sells America: people, products and ideas Who are State People? Small cadre Over 250 missions 26B, 4.5B High Value Target/High Risk Profession

21 Diplomatic Missions In almost all countries in which it has diplomatic relations, the U.S. maintains an embassy, which usually is located in the host country capital.1 The Chief of Mission--with the title of Ambassador or Charge d'Affaires--and the Deputy Chief of Mission head the mission's "country team" of U.S. Government personnel. Note 1: Some U.S. Ambassadors are accredited to more than one country simultaneously

22 The Country Team An in-country interagency group, chaired by the Ambassador and consisting of the heads of all US agencies at post, and the heads of major embassy sections Point to remember: Agencies inform Ambassador of their planned activities, who ensures these activities are in harmony with U.S. policy and in sync with other agency efforts John Fox (JFSC State Dept Chair) Note: On one level, it’s nothing more than the Embassy’s senior staff.  On another level, though, it’s a body with an importance of its own.  When the Ambassador sends a telegram back to Washington saying “this is my view,” it can add additional weight if the Amb is able to say “and it is also the view of my country team.”

23 State Department (Ambassador Direct Authority) Non-State Department
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Public Diplomacy (PAO) Political Section Economic Section Manage- ment USAID Regional Security (RSO) General Services Budget and Finance Consular Section Marine Security Detachment Political Military DATT - Defense Attache FCS - Foreign Commercial Service SAO - Security Assistance Office ODC/OMC - Office of Defense/ Military Cooperation MAAG - Military Assistance Advisory Group ECON - Economic Officer POL - Political Officer CONS - Consular Officer USIS - US Information Service now part of State CAO - Cultural Affairs Officer PAO - Public Affairs Officer, Press Attache USAID - Agency for International Development now part of State AGR - Foreign Agriculture Service LEGATT - Legal Attache (FBI) RSO - Regional Security Officer ADMIN - Administrative Officer PER - Personnel Officer GSO - General services Officer B & F - Budget and Fiscal Officer CLO - Community Liaison Officer (a spouse on contract) Number of members in country team depends on size of Embassy. Not all agencies are represented at every Embassy. Some larger Embassies can have over 30 agencies on the Country Team. Community Liaison Sr Defense Official (SDO) Other USG Agencies Legal Attache Defense Attache Defense Cooperation State Department (Ambassador Direct Authority) Non-State Department

24 Chief of Mission (COM) The Ambassador
President’s representative to Host Nation Government Responsible for overall bilateral relationship Directs US State Department and other U.S. government (executive branch) agency operations Formulates country objectives and strategy Leads in crisis management response Coordinates with Combatant Commanders’ U.S. military role in country Self explanatory.

25 The Ambassador “while the Ambassador can not direct military activities, he/she may request, approve, and in some cases deny military actions.” (Title X authority) Approximately 2/3 of Ambassadors are career foreign service officers with the remainder political appointees. A few political appointee Ambassadors may have stronger ties to the President than the Combatant Commander, CJCS or the SECDEF. An Ambassador has authority over all U.S. personnel in country including any visiting U.S. officials or U.S. military officers except those “under the command” of a Combatant Commander. The Ambassador has the authority to deny any U.S. official civilian or military personnel, including those reporting to a Combatant Commander, permission to enter the country (“country clearance”). At the same time, Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders understand that they must work with each other. John Fox (JFSC State Dept Chair) Comment: Most political appointees got their jobs by contributing money to a presidential campaign, and would have no chance of picking up the telephone and talking to SecState, let alone the President. And, on top of that, they are usually unfamiliar iwth the State bureaucracy, so don't know how to get things done.

26 President Obama’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission
R Z JUL 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS UNCLAS STATE As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Executive Branch employees in [country], regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. With these exceptions, you are in charge of all Executive Branch activities and operations in your Mission. You will report to me through the Secretary of State… All Executive Branch agencies under your authority, and every element of your Mission, must keep you fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. You have the right to see all communications to or from Mission elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or Executive decision. An excerpt from a presidential letter to an ambassador outlining his responsibilities and authority.

27 Security Challenges Threats are Transnational & Adaptive
Crime/urban gangs Narco-terrorism Illicit trafficking Transnational terrorism Logistical support / fundraising for Islamic Radical Groups Forgery/money laundering Mass migration Natural disasters CONDITIONS Poverty and corruption are preconditions that allow these threats (except natural disasters) to fester and threaten all democracies in the hemisphere 40% of Latin Americans live under the poverty line—less than $2 per day. 16% in extreme poverty—less than $1 per day. (ECLAC) Inequality- Most unequal sub-region. Inflexible income distribution. There is wealth, but it is distributed poorly – worse than Africa or Asia. Corruption A tax on most daily transactions Saps economic initiatives A leading Colombian think tank assesses that waste, Fraud, and graft cost the Colombian Government $4 billion annually, an amount equal to 3% of GDP Private sector corruption is taking a similar toll. In Honduras, for example, tax evasion reaches $600M annually, an amount equal to 9% of GDP, according to a 2002 IMF country survey. INCREASING INTERAGENCY NATURE OF Challenges Important to note what the threat is NOT. It is not military forces poised to attack their neighbors Important to note that the threats are not purely military or conventional – fall into many categories, including law enforcement – It is possible to say the threat is “interagency” approaches must be interagency. (Not on slide but good background – Growing Anti-US sentiment is compounded by sanctions imposed by the American Service Members’ Protection Act (ASPA) which restricts FMF and IMET to countries that have signed and ratified the Rome Accord, but that have not signed and ratified an agreement with the US according to Art. 98 of the Rome Accord (International Criminal Court – ICC)) The fact that the threat is not purely military or conventional... Asymmetrical. Need for interagency cooperation... Must work within our constitution and with Partner Nations’ forces within the authorities of their constitutions – Roles/missions/functions for military and police forces in the areas of CT and civil disturbances, for example. Cite Chile (CT); CENTAM/HND (mil spt to law enforcement); BRA (mil spt to law enforcement); CD.....every nation is different in this respect. Audience take away: Threat is not traditional military threat; Often interrelated, state and non state actors and conditions that require interagency approaches; SC mission uses interagency approach and security cooperation – must continue to evolve in this direction; many PN militaries redefining roles and missions to face threat; SC must tailor security assistance to help them in this effort; Limited resources to face an immense problem; Need to be able to use all resources and continue relationships –sanctions limit some of the types of resources available to carry out SC mission and achieve vision (‘partner of choice’). Threats are Transnational & Adaptive We need Interagency, International, Private-Public Solutions

28 Transnational Illicit Trafficking US European Command (EUCOM)
The US European Command (EUCOM) has established the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC) to align resources and facilitate US Interagency foreign support activities Transnational illicit trafficking includes drugs, weapons proliferation, precursor chemicals, money, people, threat financing and terrorism. This threatens global security. Using a “whole of government” approach we can reduce its impact and disrupt its effect.

29 The Problem Strategic planning for crisis response among military and civilian agencies is disconnected: - structural differences among agencies - competing bureaucratic interests - differences in what “planning” is all about - information sharing practices - time pressures - lack of understanding of planning by other agencies We lack a coherent approach to strategic planning that is multi-agency in nature and extends planning and coordination to multinational and multilateral partners for implementation. Here is our challenge. As I showed you earlier, People, Organizations, and Process make up this thing we call the interagency. We take planning for granted. We in DoD invest time and money in training planners and developing processes and planning tools. The planners nor the process is inherent in most other agencies. Information sharing is a major hurtle. Classification of information remains to be a major issue. Interoperability across information systems hinders effective interagency coordination. We lack an agreed upon methodology or process for IA. [next slide] JFSC / JCWS

30 JIACG Models Counterterrorism vs Full Spectrum
The original JIACG concept developed by JFCOM was the full-spectrum model in which JIACG members would coordinate on the full range of issues requiring interagency coordination at the CoCom. With the start of the War on Terrorism, however, all JIACGs were implemented in the counterterrorism (CT) model, with JIACG members focusing on coordination in CT and related efforts. Following National Security Council (NSC) Deputies approval in January 2002, JIACGs were formed at all five regional (at the time) and two functional CoCom headquarters (TRANSCOM and SOCOM), to enhance interagency coordination and unity of effort in the war on terrorism. The Joint Staff coordinated an assessment process that solicited input from combatant commanders and partner agencies on JIACG status and recommendations for the future. While implemented differently at each command, assessment feedback revealed that combatant commands and partner agencies voiced strong support for the JIACG initiative.

31 JIACG CT Model Operations
The JIACG-CT facilitates a series of shadow operations such as the arrest of Jemaah Islamiya, a Southeast terrorist network with links to al Qaeda, in Singapore and Malaysia. In December 2001, evidence of operational planning against the US and allied targets in Singapore was confiscated from the Afghanistan residence of Mohamed Atef. Rapid interagency coordination with coalition nations led to a series of actions that allowed for the discovery of a videotape in Afghanistan, tracked as actionable intelligence. The responses generated by the targeting process ensured that all regional players had access to the information and the requisite actions and coordination. Prior to interagency coordination efforts, positive action based on such an intelligence find would have been difficult. The December 2001 effort was crisp and nearly frictionless.

32 full-spectrum JIACG A full-spectrum JIACG functions as an advisory and coordinating directorate, involved in the Regional Combatant Command (RCC) security cooperation plan, deliberate planning, crisis action planning, and transition planning. The JIACG role in this model is broader in scope than those provisionally fielded for the limited purpose of the global war on terrorism and operates across the full spectrum of interagency activities. As a coordinating directorate, the full-spectrum JIACG serves as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington DC, the country teams, the CoCom’s staff, and other multinational and multilateral bodies within the region. JIACG functions as the combatant commander’s lead proponent for the interagency process and provides the civilian perspective on military operational planning and execution.

33 This short lesson is designed to introduce you to the concept of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or “JIACG.” JFSC / JCWS

34 JIACG Composition While each JIACG is unique, most are relatively small staff elements: Comprised of mid-level military and civilian personnel assigned to JIACG for a specified period of time. Comprised of representatives that usually include personnel from various USG Departments and Agencies and composition varies based on command mission and area of responsibility (AOR). Located in various areas within the CoCom headquarters. Some JIACGs are located within the command J-3 (Operations Directorate), J-5 (Plans and Policy Directorate), some report to the Chief of Staff, or may report directly to the Combatant CDR. The JIACG maintain relationships and use technology to enable a coherent assessment of all external civilian planning and implementation. Further, the JIACG coordinates and trains with potential crisis response organizations during peacetime, reducing the time needed to bring a crisis response force to full operational capability. Capable of being augmented with virtual or additional collocated members.

35 JIACG Variations (a moving target)
PACOM: JIACG moved around from independent, to being a part of J3, then J5, now J9 [7 non DoD representatives] SOUTHCOM: Started as a virtual and part time enterprise; now a independent Interagency Coordination Directorate called J9 [27 non DoD reps] EUCOM: JIACG-CT to CEIG to J9, focused on partnership and outreach [8 non DoD reps] CENTCOM: J3 Interagency Action Group (IAG) [11 non DoD] AFRICOM: NO JIACG; interagency embedded in staff Every COCOM has approached JIACG differently, and they keep moving around within COCOM staffs. EUCOMs JIACG-CT started in the J3, became an independent element for a period, and as of Dec 2009 is not called the J9 “Interagency Partnering Directorate”. See back up slides The notes about the number of non-DoD reps in each JIACG is from the COCOM manning documents/phone rosters as of Sept 2009 [Original AFRICOM interagency participation only reached 50%, they are now at 75% of reduced goal with 33 non DoD] Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations

36 International Governmental Organizations

37 Definitions Multinational Operations: A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16) Combined: Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (JP 3-16) Alliance: a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-16) Coalition: an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 3-16) Post the “Book” definitions after the students have discussed in their own words. Allow students time to reflect; continue discussion as required. Multinational Operations is the overarching term encompassing both Coalition and Alliance. Combined Operations is very similar--don’t get hung up on it. A Combined Joint Task Force though is usually a NATO term used when you have an integrated staff. You will hear combined a lot, i.e. Combined Task Force (CTF) which means two or more nations working together for a single mission. It can be joint or not.

38 International Organizations
Established by a treaty Subject to international law IOs are organized in two primary categories – membership and function. United Nations - Open to all Nations OPEC - Open to petroleum producing nations Various Regional Organizations – OAS, AU, NATO, EU, etc. Tsunami Example: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as lead, worked closely with the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, the Indonesian Red Cross Society, and the Myanmar Red Cross Society.

39 United Nations Founded in 1945 after the Second World War
Originally 51 countries maintaining international peace and security developing friendly relations among nations promoting social progress ,and better living standards and human rights. Powers vested in its founding Charter Forum for 192 Member States to express their views, through the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees. 6 April 2017

40 United Nations Charter, Chapter 8: Regional Arrangements
Leveraging existing regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security …must be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Members of the United Nations …shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements The Security Council shall … utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall utilize regional arrangements or agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state Benefits: ???

41 NATO Mission is Peace and Security Consensus Decision-making
Current Operations: Operation Unified Protector – Libya ISAF – Afghanistan KFOR – Kosovo Operation Ocean Shield - HOA Counter Piracy Operation Active Endeavour - Med. NTM-I Support to AU

42 African Union (AU) Establishment
September 9, 1999 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity Sirte Declaration issued establishing the AU Purpose: Accelerate integration in the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy Addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems

43 STRATEGY MEANS WAYS ENDS……Save lives, Save nations, Save regions…. NSS
UN CHARTER INTERNATIONAL ACCORD OR TREATY CHAPTER VI NSS MANDATE NMS CHAPTER VII CHAPTER VIII WAYS UNMIBH UNIKOM How Do Peace Operations and Related Missions Affect the U.S. Armed Forces? It is true that U.S. forces sometimes "backstop" U.N. peacekeeping missions, representing in effect the 911 rescue squad in case peacekeepers get into trouble. However, this is not always the case by any means. It is also true that U.S. military forces and those of allies have run a number of humanitarian missions authorized by the United Nations in the 1990s. All told, these efforts have cost about $3 billion a year in the 1990s, about 1% of U.S. defense spending. They have also placed serious strains on the men and women of the U.S. armed forces, on American military equipment, and on policymakers. Specifically, the United States military has spent about $10 billion in Bosnia, $8 billion in Iraq, $5 billion in Kosovo, $2 billion in Somalia, $1billion in Central Africa, and $1 billion in Haiti, according to CBO and Pentagon data. It has also spent money on unanticipated deployments to Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere. About one-third of these costs, most notably most of those for Iraq as well as those for Korea and Taiwan, were not for humanitarian missions as the term is generally used. They were for traditional military missions such as deterrence or containing Saddam Hussein. They may have had some humanitarian benefits (e.g., no-fly-zones may have reduced Saddam's ability to suppress indigenous populations somewhat), but they were not principally humanitarian or peace operations. UNTAET K UNMIK UNOMISL ENDS……Save lives, Save nations, Save regions….

Factors: UN Presence Requested Parties Support UN action Parties Control Population Cease Fire in Effect Low Risk to Peacekeepers Factors: Absence of consent by all Rogue players Absence of political control Cease Fire absent/tenuous High Risk to Peacekeepers “Gray Area” The Gray Areas. PKO and PEO are distinct operations, the dividing line being determined by the variables of consent, impartiality, the use of force, and decisions by the NCA. The existence of a cease-fire to the conflict among the parties and a demonstrated willingness to negotiate on their part are indicators of the presence of consent. Other variables are more clearly within the control of outside actors. environment in which these operations take place, gray areas can develop. Such operations foist on commanders and policymakers the potential for uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity, which requires extremely close political-military communication. LOW RISK HIGH RISK

45 Issues: The United Nations—How It Operates
EACH AGENCY HAS DIFFERENT FUNDING SOURCES AND PRIORITIES WHO WHO’S IN CHARGE? CSF/CSG WFP UNHCR OCHA ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE TRANSPORTATION UNICEF UNHAS The reality is that the UN operates as a loose confederation of agencies. Each agency responds to different donors, has its own agenda and puruses its own interests. -While OCHA and UNJLC LNOs are very helpful in military efforts, this does not mean that other agency reps should be excluded. The LNO requirement is significant. -Similar to USAID/OFDA, in a crisis, many UN personnel will operate with agencies that they are not usually associated with. (a UN PKO Office military LNO on loan to OCHA ends up working for UNJLC) -Different NGOs are associated with different UN agencies. -The ability of OCHA and UNJLC to effect coordination is limited. -The UN does very little of what the military would consider deliberate planning—its very ad hoc and relies on constant crisis action procedures. UN agencies: OCHA-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs WHO- World Health Organization—medical focus WFP- World Food Program—the “800 lb gorilla” of the UN. Has the most money and resources. Serves as parent for the UNJLC and controls UNHAS (UN Humanitarian Air Service) when its set up. UNJLC- UN Joint Logistics Center Established by WFP to coordinate all logistic (transportation/distribution) efforts of UN agencies. Genesis was that other UN agencies always had to come to WFP for help, so UNJLC provides a forum to coordinate that help. UNJLC only works as much as agencies want to let it help. UNHAS and WFP don’t always cooperate. UNJLC most effective on the local level providing a forum for NGO transportation coordination and running air operations. UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund UNHCR- UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Mainly involved for refugees and displaced personnel UNJLC

46 UN Cluster Approach – Construct for HA
Predictability and accountability in international responses to HA Clarifying the division of labor among organizations Defines roles and responsibilities within the different response sectors Assigns lead entities to coordinate response efforts for specific mission areas (examples): Agriculture – UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Camp Coordination and Camp Management – (UNHCR) Emergency Shelter – (IFRC) Emergency Telecommunications –(OCHA) Health – World Health Organization (WHO) Logistics – World Food Program (WFP) Protection – UNHCR Origins of the Cluster Approach Adhoc and disjointed responses to multiple humanitarian emergencies prompted the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to initiate an independent Humanitarian Response Review. As a result of the review, the Cluster Approach was proposed to address gaps and strengthen the Effectiveness of humanitarian response through better coordination and collaboration between disaster response organizations. The UN Cluster Approach assigns lead entities to coordinate response efforts for specific mission areas. Requirements are identified by participating organizations, in collaboration with the Affected State, and UN member organizations volunteer to fulfill them. Cluster leads have no authority to assign missions; they must meet requirements using coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and communication.

US UNILATERAL OPERATIONS MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS Extend a Communications Umbrella over Multinational Forces Interoperability of Communications is Critical to Success UNITY OF EFFORT US CIVIL AUTHORITIES FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES LEAD NATION OPTION COMBINATION No single command and control option works best for all peace ops. Joint force commanders and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided. Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation. In US unilateral operations, command and control arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign operations. Command and control arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2d) Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained and operated together. In order to provide joint force commanders with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2a) PARALLEL OPTION REGIONAL ALLIANCE OPTION

48 Typical JTF Staff Organization
Patient Movement Requirements Center Personal Staff Joint Communications Control Center Joint Blood Program Office Joint Reception Center Deputy CJTF J-1 J-6 Surgeon Chaplain Joint Interrogation Facility MNIG Joint Planning Group Joint Document Exploitation Center Legal Advisor Comptroller IPC Chief of Staff JECC (CE) J-2 F2C2 J-5 JIACG Joint Intelligence Support Element Captured Material Exploitation Center Joint Visitors Bureau Public Affairs National Support Team Joint Mortuary Affairs Office Joint Information Bureau Joint Search and Rescue Center J-4 J-3 Sub Area Petroleum Office Civil Military Operations Center Joint Movement Center Joint Operations Center Logistics Readiness Center Joint Targeting Coordination Board Facilities Utilization Board CJTF Determines Staff Relationship AFSC 960416 AS Required Recommended G:ROG\CJCS

49 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)
Just as interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the USG to accomplish an objective, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination forge a similar link between the USG and external organizations.

50 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)
Usually non-profit organizations with some funding from private sources Transnational organizations independent of governments or states Estimated that over 15% of overseas development aid is channeled through NGOs. Value-based organizations rooted in altruism and volunteerism. Basic principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, and integrity. Collaborate with organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) A good introduction to this is the video that you can get to in the attached link.

51 Nongovernmental Organizations – Cont’d
Play an important role in both the domestic and international realms. Social, economic, and health issues. Provide aid long before the deterioration of security situations. Already on the ground and provide a source of knowledge regarding local conditions. Considerable influence in the interagency arena. Maintain their presence after the departure of military forces Background information

52 World Bank and UN with NGOs
The World Bank classifies NGOs in two primary categories – operational and advocacy. Operational NGOs design and implement development related projects. Advocacy NGOs defend or promote a specific cause and seek to influence policies and practices of other organizations. NGOs have collaborated with UN since founding. NGOs have Consultative Status with the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NGOs work with UN includes : Disseminate information, Raise awareness on important issues, Provide development education, Promote joint operational projects, and Offer technical expertise. Provided for instructor background information However, the two categories are not mutually exclusive and a growing number of NGOs engage in both categories of activity.

53 Examples Doctors without Borders Africare CARE American Red Cross YMCA
Religious groups Provided for

54 NGOs – Considerations for Planning/Operations
DOS - lead foreign affairs agency USAID Role - NGOs must register to receive US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to assure they meet certain standards Geographical Unified Commander – Focal point of policy planning for military/NGO especially for movement JIACG/J9 – Responsible for POL-MIL planning and harmonization for W-O-G approach. Inter-Action – a US-based consortium of NGOs NGOs need to remain impartial…but can be a source of info (situational awareness) The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise very greatly from one NGO to another NGOs are frequently on-scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually; they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation

55 Issues: Combined Coordination
                             UNOCHA IHC OFDA CSF-536 CCC RFA Process -The Combined Coordination Center served to put the “C” into CSF and provided the only venue for regional coordination for interagency, UN/NGO, and multinational military coordination. -The establishment of the CCC was assisted by the work previously done under PACOM’s aegis with the MPAT/MNF SOP process. For that reason, PACOM’s MPAT was given the initial responsibility for standing up and running the CCC (building on already existing personal relationships). -The CCC provided a forum and a “seat at the table” for all the multinational military LNOs and interagency/UN LNOs without giving the impression that they were part of the CSF. In fact, the CSF basically just provided the central place for all to meet without overtly pushing U.S. leadership. Its noteworthy that as the U.S. pulled out, none of the other partner nations with participating military efforts were willing to take on the CCC role. -The CCC RFA process took requests from the host nation, UN agencies and NGOs and placed them in front of the combined representatives of the U.S. and foreign militaries. The request could then be discussed and then accepted by the military who was willing and was best able to fulfill the request. The request then went to that military (in the case of the CSF, to the C-3), and the CCC tracked the response and fulfillment. -The CSF CCC worked well, but the real coordination efforts were at the CSG level (each CSG had its own version). The CSF CCC worked relatively few RFAs as compared to those at the CSGs. This was due to the fact that only those few big regional-level RFAs were addressed at the CSF CCC. -The CCC also provided a forum for the CSF to coordinate and socialize its plans for transition and redeployment. This was especially important in getting agreement with the UN for the withdrawal of U.S. military capability (through the fulfillment of a set of UN RFAs) DETAILED LESSONS LEARNED

56 Operation Unified Response-Haiti - Example
The following slides are taken from the USSOUTHCOM OPORD. January 2010

57 USSOUTHCOM Mission Statement
USSOUTHCOM conducts Foreign Disaster Relief operations in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support the GoH and MINUSTAH by providing localized security, facilitating the distribution and restoration of basic human services, providing medical support, and conducting critical engineering operations in order to alleviate human suffering and provide the foundation for long term recovery of Haiti The mission statement.

58 USSOUTHCOM Role in a Comprehensive
Haiti HA/DR Campaign Phase III (Restoration) Phase II (Relief) Phase V (Recovery) Phase I (Emergency Response) Phase IV (Stabilization) Distribution Critical Engineering Medical Deploy Port Opening/Ops Partner/Donor Nations GOH MINUSTAH Security Restore to Pre-Earthquake Conditions Redeploy Peace Enforcement MINUSTAH and Other UN Agencies NGO/PVO, IO USAID / Interagency USSOUTHCOM Enhanced Security Cooperation TSC+ OFDA DART JTF-HAITI HACC UN OCHA UN Clusters Food Health Shelter WFP WHO/PAHO IOM/IFRC Water Logistics UNICEF WFP Long-term Reconstruction Development Mitigate Suffering Meet Basic Needs Immediate Lifesaving SAR DoD-unique capabilities for Ph II Relief efforts no longer required USAID Telecom OCHA/WFP Camp Mgnt UNHCR/IOM Early Recovery UNDP Agriculture FAO Education UNICEF Transition Comprehensive “Whole of Effort” Phases Protection UNHCR Nutrition

59 Commander’s Intent Purpose:
Synchronize DoD support to OFDA,USAID, and UN HA/DR efforts to mitigate human suffering and accelerate recovery in Haiti. Method/Key Tasks: Conduct security operations to enable distribution of HA/DR Develop situational understanding to speed delivery of essential relief supplies (water, food, medical) Establish C2, security and logistics architecture Enable mobility for USG and other HA/DR delivering elements Support unity of effort in delivering HA/DR assistance to affected areas Execute a pro-active Strategic Communication program Endstate : Immediate human suffering minimized: survivors provided food, water Critical health situations controlled: survivors have essential medical care MINUSTAH and GOH authorities capable of maintaining civil order. GoH, UN and USAID capacity in place to sustain long term recovery The Joint Task Force Commander’s Intent is expressed with an overall Purpose, and eleboration of the Method to be pursued, including Key Tasks critical to overall mission accomplishment, and the Commander’s desired Endstate. (pause to allow group to read) Jan 10

60 International COP KEY ACTIVITY
HA Support (Security, Movement Control, Warehousing and MHE support to WFP Joint Reception Staging and onward movement Force Buildup support and services Assessments and EN support (pier reconstruction) Medical Support (USNS Comfort) Airfield and Seaport Operations Strategic air and Sealift support Rotary Wing Support Inter-Agency and UN Logistics Planning Support NO CHANGE TO THE OVERALL JTF FORCE ARRAY. SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE NORTH AND SOUTH WEST REGIONS OF HAITI. UN FORCE DESIGNATIONS AND AREAS OF OPERATION ARE NOW ILLUSTRATED ON THE MAP NEXT SLIDE 60

61 Request for Assistance Process
Clusters: -- Emergency shelter and non-food -- Food aid -- Health -- Logistics -- Nutrition -- Water, sanitation, & hygiene

62 Haiti Nodal Integration
UN Interagency Coord Military LEAD US Federal Agency The lead agency is USAID OFDA. In the case of Haiti, The UN Cluster system was found to need a central coordinating body, so the JOTC it was formed (Joint Operations and Tasking Center under the lead of the UN-by a Canadian Officer). There was a HACC at the Embassy and a HACC forward at the airfield, co-located with the JOTC. The blue lines show coordination between the JOTC, HACC elements, other UN elements (OCHA and the UN Mission in Haiti), and other US Government agencies responding. **Caveat: This is an example from a specific case in Haiti. How a HACC will be set up and operate will vary by situation. HCT: Humanitarian country Team

63 Comprehensive Approach Initiatives

64 The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) and Civil Military Overview (CMO) Concept

65 The Gap in Civilian “Doctrine”: We know how to go to war, but how do we get to peace?
As of 2009, more than 12 U.S. agencies were deploying assets for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. U.S. civilian planners and practitioners from these agencies operate without any unifying framework or common set of principles to guide their actions. “Deploying assets” means these agencies are investing people, money and equipment, both at headquarters and in the field. The absence of a unifying framework or set of principles will continue to impede cooperation and cohesion needed across the peacebuilding community, and produce ad-hocery each time. STAT: # of civilians currently deployed.

66 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Beth Cole, USIP September 2009

67 These are the Cliff Notes Version / Summary Graphic / Dummies’ Guide / Big Picture
This is a tool for strategic mapping/planning. If we had it when at the Dayton Accords or at Bonn, it might have led to more success. STRATEGIC MAP ANALOGY: In these missions, there are many possible paths to take in trying to reach an objective. The framework presents the map or “big picture” of a mission, showing all possible roads and highlighting key obstacles that may exist along those roads. It is a mapping tool to help planners/practitioners think about WHERE we are going and HOW to get there. CROSS-CUTTING PRINCIPLES. These principles apply to every action by every individual in every situation on the ground. Host nation ownership/capacity: Means the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities, even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Ownership requires capacity. Political Primacy: Means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility for forging a political agreement. Legitimacy: Has 3 facets. The degree to which: 1) the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; 2) the government is accountable to its people; 3) regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government. Unity of Effort: Begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures. Security: Is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts an S&R mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development. Conflict Transformation: Guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. Requires reducing drivers of violent conflict and strengthening mitigators of conflict across all end states. Regional Engagement: Entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development.

68 Purpose & Contribution “This is rocket science”
To help fill this gap, the Guiding Principles manual provides a roadmap for sustainable peacebuilding. It presents: The first-ever, comprehensive set of shared principles, built on the lessons of past S&R missions. An unprecedented overarching strategic framework for S&R missions based on a construct of End States, Conditions and Approaches. FIRST-EVER CIVILIAN “DOCTRINE” Compared with their military counterparts, civilian planners and practitioners have no strategic-level “doctrine” to guide their actions in S&R missions. STAT: In the last 3 years alone, the military has published x doctrinal manuals. The civilians have published none. COMPREHENSIVE IN NATURE Current doctrinal guidance is often stove-piped and incoherent across agencies, states and organizations. There’s no place where you can find guidance on all end states in one place. There is also a fundamental incoherence between certain communities (stabilization vs. development, military vs. civilian). The GP manual seeks to present comprehensive guidance in one place based on shared lessons drawn from across the peacebuilding community. A TOOL FOR THE US GOVERNMENT The GP manual offers a new tool that can guide civilians in all phases of S&R missions, including decision-making, assessments, strategic planning, training and education, implementation and metrics. (USIP and the Army Corps of Engineers have developed a set of metrics for S&R missions -- MPICE)

69 Built on Experience These shared principles & end states are distilled from 15 to 20 years of lessons that have emerged in past S&R missions: Based on a comprehensive review of hundreds of official strategic documents from key institutions, including state ministries of defense, foreign affairs and development, along with major intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Underwent an extensive vetting process, drawing the informed input of planners and practitioners from these institutions. See APPENDIX A for a list of the hundreds of core documents we reviewed (ex: Sphere, UN Capstone, UK Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note, JICA). These are all “doctrinal” documents, we just don’t call them that. This rich collection of doctrinal resources already exists across the peacebuilding community and gives us important rules of the road. REF #s in the manual: UN (217); USAID (132); UK Government (66); World Bank (32); OECD (23); Sphere (23). See APPENDIX B for the key institutions whose representatives were involved in the vetting process (UN, EU, NATO, U.S., British, French, German and Dutch governments, ICRC, ICVA, and other non-governmental agencies) We learned about doctrine from our military. The GP rollout is taking place near the first anniversary of the Army’s FM 3-07 Stability Operations doctrine. From their process, we learned that the doctrine is enriched by allowing people to do “line-in/line-out” comments over a period of time. This is not a book with “authors” but with “writers.” There are really hundreds of authors -- those who direct missions, command troops or mount humanitarian operations, etc.

70 A Shared Strategic Construct
The manual presents an overarching Strategic Framework for S&R based on: Cross-Cutting Principles apply to all 5 End States 5 End States Necessary Conditions to achieve each of the 5 End States Major Approaches by which to establish the Necessary Conditions Trade-offs, Gaps and Challenges A SHARED F/W: This strategic framework is based on a comprehensive review of other frameworks -- to ensure that the construct is shared. See Appendix C+D for a few charts on this review. People may quibble over terms (Democracy vs. Governance, Justice vs. ROL). Public Order ex: Belonged in two places because it’s a condition that contributes to both end states. TRADE-OFFS: Defined as “inherent conflicts that exist between objectives. They involve making concessions between those objectives and understanding the impact on stability.” They are important concepts that are not typically found in strategic documents. GAPS: Defined as “weaknesses that exist in knowledge and that recur from mission to mission.” CHALLENGES: Defined as “shortfalls in practice, even when best practices have already been identified.” If you read institutional guidance, it usually says, “Here’s what we’ve learned.” When you read academic/scholarly works, it usually discusses things we don’t know and need to pursue. For the first time, the GP highlights what we don’t know and offers a research agenda.

71 The 5 Golden Rules Build host nation ownership and capacity
Act only with an understanding of the local context Prioritize to stabilize Use a conflict lens Recognize interdependence These are the common “rules” that have risen to the top in our reviews of the five end states. They essentially put the major cross-cutting principles into action for each of the end states. If users of the manual decide to peel off one chapter, we wanted everyone to be looking through the same lens -- essentially the 5 Golden Rules. Build host nation ownership and capacity: This is the first thing you think about in planning a mission. Act only with understanding of local context: There is no single template for all conflicts. Understanding context is key. Prioritize to stabilize: There may be one million things that need to be done - but the key challenge is in prioritizing those things. Stability will be the overarching priority in these environments. Use a conflict lens: This is not development as usual. Need to always pay attention to the potential impact on violence. Recognize interdependence: Gen. Zinni’s “10 Mistakes” were prescient. Notion of “interdependence.” EX: In the decision-making process, the agricultural adviser must be in the same room as the economics advisers or the people responsible for building roads.

72 A Sample Construct: End State: SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
Necessary Condition: Cessation of Large-Scale Violence Approach: Separation of Warring Parties ex: Separate forces to create time and space for the peace process. Approach: Enduring Ceasefire/Peace Agreement ex: Understand that stopping armed conflict requires political, not military, solutions. Approach: Management of Spoilers ex: Anticipate obstructionists and understand their motivations. Approach: Intelligence ex: Local intelligence is a must, but be very aware of sensitivities. Trade-off: Prioritizing short-term stability vs. confronting impunity. Gap/Challenge: Civilian oversight of the security forces. WHAT IS A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT? A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting, an adequate level of public order, the subordination of accountable security forces to legitimate state authority, the protection of key individuals, communities, sites and infrastructure, and the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of undue harm to life and limb. TRADE-OFF: Dealing with groups or individuals who prosecuted the conflict may be necessary early on to bring certain factions into the fold or to mitigate tensions. But turning a blind eye to continued use of political violence against rivals or exploitation of criminal networks to generate illicit revenue will enshrine a culture of impunity that threatens sustainable peace. GAP/CHALLENGE: SSR strategies have focused overwhelmingly on developing the security forces, while giving short shrift to improving civilian oversight over those forces. Building the forces is important, but keeping them accountable over the long run requires deeper reforms of the institutions that govern the security sector.

73 A Sample Construct: End State: RULE OF LAW Necessary Condition: Just Legal Frameworks Approach: Legal Framework Assessment ex: Realize the inherent constraints of new laws if they are not enforced. Approach: Short-Term Law Reform ex: Undertake discreet legal reform in the short term if necessary. Approach: Law Reform Process ex: Support and engage in a transparent and participatory process. Approach: Content of New Laws ex: Consider the relationship between formal and informal justice sectors when determining new content. Trade-off: Peace vs. justice. Gap/Challenge: Engagement with non-state or religious justice systems. WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? Rule of law refers to a condition in which all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. Laws must be consistent with international human rights norms and standards; legally certain; legally transparent; drafted with procedural transparency; and publicly promulgated. This end state requires equal enforcement and equality before the law; independent adjudication of the law; fairness in the application of the law; and avoidance of arbitrariness. Access to justice - the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice - is a mutually reinforcing component of rule of law. The rule of law requires the separation of powers and participation in decision-making. Rule of law is the ideal that states strive for; stabilization requires urgent focus toward this end. TRADE-OFF: There is a strong call for justice after conflict for conflict-related abuses. At the same time, the imperative of peace needs to be protected. In some instances, measures to ensure that justice is administered against certain individuals may ignite tensions and may negatively impact a fragile peace. The question often arises about whether or not to prosecute and ensure justice or not to prosecute and preserve peace. Any decision on whether to pursue justice against individuals whose prosecution may impact peace, should be carefully considered. GAP/CHALLENGE: While it is agreed that there needs to be engagement with the non-state justice system to promote the rule of law, the international community does not fully understand these systems, how they operate, what to do with regard to human rights issues and even less so, what assistance measures promote the rule of law. Empirical, comparative research is needed. In addition, research is needed to look at how to deal with nonstate, religious systems of justice and how to integrate religious considerations into rule of law assistance overall.

74 A Sample Construct: End State: STABLE GOVERNANCE
Necessary Condition: Political Moderation and Accountability Approach: National Constituting Processes ex: Focus on the process for writing the constitution as much as what the constitution says. Approach: Political Governance and Conflict Management ex: Bring the widest range of leaders into the political process and seek to include voices of moderation. Approach: Systems of Representation ex: Consider the timing and impact of elections on the stability of the host nation. Approach: Legislative Strengthening ex: Strengthen legislative bodies to counterbalance the executive branch and help bolster representative and accountable governance. Trade-off: Early elections vs. maturation of politics and processes. Gap/Challenge: Subnational governance. WHAT IS STABLE GOVERNANCE? Stable governance refers to an end state where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources, government officials are held accountable through political and legal processes, and the population can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media and political parties. Stable governance is the mechanism through which the basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes and competition for power occurs nonviolently. National and subnational government institutions may work with a range of nonstate partners to provide some of the government functions. TRADE-OFF: Elections are necessary to provide representative governance and bestow legitimacy on a new government. Running the country for too long with government appointees can reduce domestic and international legitimacy for governance institutions. However, rushing to hold elections before the necessary conditions exist can undermine the political process and create barriers to future political development. Carefully balance the pressures to hold elections with the patience needed in doing the job right. GAP/CHALLENGE: Decentralizing governance by strengthening and empowering of subnational institutions can have destabilizing effects, particularly when insecurity or threats to the central government persist and emanate from specific regions. The potential for spoilers to control local governments raises concerns for continued conflict. Address this challenge through greater accountability and oversight of subnational governance institutions, incremental steps towards decentralization, and choosing decentralization options based on local conditions.

75 A Sample Construct: End State: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
Necessary Condition: Macroeconomic Stabilization Approach: Monetary Stability ex: Build the institutional capacity of an independent and credible monetary authority. Approach: Fiscal Management ex: Prioritize transparency in contracting and procurement practices to combat corruption. Approach: Legislative and Regulatory Framework ex: Promote predictability, open markets and fair competition through commercial laws. Trade-off: Economic efficiency vs. political stability. Gap/Challenge: Managing the informal sector without hurting ordinary citizens. WHAT IS A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY? A sustainable economy is one in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. Such an end state is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy and employment generation. Economic governance refers to the collection of policies, laws, regulations, institutions, practices, and individuals that shape the context in which a country’s economic activity takes place. TRADE-OFF: Because S&R missions are not development as usual, political considerations will typically trump economic ones. This means that the best approach may not be the most optimal or efficient from an economic perspective. It follows that the success of economic programming should be measured not purely by its economic criteria as it would be in a normal development scenario, but whether it supports its peace and reconciliation. GAP/CHALLENGE: Connections between those in power and ill-gotten wealth often develop during conflict and continue in its aftermath. This nexus can be detrimental to the legitimacy of the government and can undermine sustainable peace and development by diverting vital resources from the people. An integrated political-economic security strategy is an essential mechanism for dealing with this nexus.

76 A Sample Construct: End State: SOCIAL WELL-BEING
Necessary Condition: Access to and Delivery of Basic Needs Services Approach: Appropriate and Quality Assistance ex: Prioritize immediate relief, but do not neglect the impact on long-term development. Approach: Minimum Standards for Water, Food and Shelter ex: Use shelter construction processes as an opportunity to build host nation capacity and promote livelihood development. Approach: Minimum Standards for Health Services ex: Treat those with the most immediate health risks while restoring basic health services for the broader population. Trade-off: Rapid return of displaced populations vs. instability. Gap/Challenge: Transition from relief to development activities. WHAT IS SOCIAL WELL-BEING? Social well-being is an end state in which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. This end state is characterized by equal access to and delivery of basic needs services (water, food, shelter and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of social fabric and community life. TRADE-OFF: Having displaced populations return to their homes creates a positive sign for the prospects of peace. However, encouraging large populations to return without proper groundwork can simply create greater problems, including further internal displacement. Prepare receiving communities for the influx, provide security guarantees, establish property dispute mechanisms and offer economic and humanitarian assistance to prevent instability. GAP/CHALLENGE: A major S&R challenge involves facilitating a smooth transition from relief activities focused on short-term survival needs to development activities that promote long-term growth. Better coherence, coordination and collaboration between relief and development strategies can ensure a seamless transition between the communities of practice. This is particularly true in the education sector, where a variety of humanitarian and development programs occurs simultaneously.

77 Overarching Takeaways
Unity of effort Bridging stabilization and development Primacy of politics/Conflict lens UNITY OF EFFORT: Unity of effort is the outcome of coordination and cooperation among all actors. While full integration among actors may be ideal in an S&R environment, it is a difficult challenge that has yet to be achieved. Striving for cooperation and coherence in actions may be a more realistic and effective goal. Ultimately requires two starting points: 1) A Shared Understanding 2) Shared Goals. BRIDGING STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT: The transition and relationship between stabilization and development communities have not yet been fully defined or understood. Address short-term requirements while also recognizing the impact of all actions on long-term peace and development. PRIMACY OF POLITICS/CONFLICT LENS: The distinguishing characteristic of a stabilization mission is the recent or current presence of violent conflict. All actions, well-intentioned or not, can tip the delicate political balance in the era of fragile peace. Because of this, paying close to political impacts is a top priority.

78 Overarching Themes Reducing drivers, strengthening mitigators
Ownership and capacity Terminology Gaps REDUCING DRIVERS, STRENGTHENING MITIGATORS: War-torn countries are flooded with actors of all kinds with various motivations. Transforming the conflict requires identifying and marginalizing those who oppose peace or refuse to renounce violence or participate lawfully in the political process. Transformation also requires identifying and supporting those who mitigate conflict and seek to promote the peace. OWNERSHIP AND CAPACITY: There is often a tension between international actors driving and implementing S&R processes versus empowering host nation actors to do so. Lessons have shown time and again that host nation actors must be the primary drivers of S&R goals and processes, while international actors should focus on providing the support they need. TERMINOLOGY: Definitions across institutions are all over the map. Many stop short of offering definitions for terms. Getting all actors to use the same terms may be unrealistic, but understanding and communicating with one another can increase the potential for successful cooperation. GAPS: We’ve identified gaps that can serve as an important research agenda in moving forward.

79 The Comprehensive Approach
Lesson 8 The Comprehensive Approach D JIPC Logo: JIMPC connects the Defense / Diplomatic / Developmental efforts to stabilize and reconstruct countries subject to complex contingencies. NYARNG JIPC MTT Nov 2011 79

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