Presentation on theme: "Vigilant State 3 COLLECTION INTELLIGENCE. Vigilant State 3 2 Types of Problems for Analysts Bureaucratic Pathologies Psychological Dissonance Lecture."— Presentation transcript:
Vigilant State 3 1. Politics of Intelligence Analysis common forms - Interest Groups e.g. agencies fight for budget share and influence Bargaining Systems e.g. compromise for producing national estimates Political Interference e.g. called for to support entrenched policies Procurement & Industry e.g. employed to justify large defence spends
Vigilant State 3 2. Democracies and Autocracies In autocracies - ideological problems and power problems But politicisation no less strong in democracy ? social choice over budget government and opposition – the infamous gap debates public opinion and mass media in fp making - ISC's question – our own project prone to investigation – e.g. Franks Report, FAC, Butler
Vigilant State 3 3. Responses – A) IDEALISM OR PUSH – O.N.E. Sherman Kent, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Ray Cline - more recently S.R. Ward insulate/distance from unethical pressures - set the agenda
Vigilant State 3 B) REALISM OR PULL – D.I.A. to survive ‘go with the flow’ - agency competition will deliver objectivity Carmen Medina serve the customer’s requirements + new IT must have own policy as input e.g. Nixon and China – not told
Vigilant State 3 4. Problem of Politicising Questions Politicisation is easy because – Competing agencies provide alternative answers Because no-one knows what the right question is e.g Iraqi missile numbers ? range ? production ? or aircraft ? Secrecy prevents investigation Example of Johnson and Vietnam CBS vs. General Abrams - Sam Adams – War of Numbers Remit of Butler Enquiry
Vigilant State 3 5. Bureaucratic Politics No real DCI/DNI even with Mike McConnell NIE process = bland /coaltions A Team / B Team each change introduces new pathologies Committee process is very slow Each Bureau grows its own - 14 in Saigon Even struggles within intelligence orgs Iran SI vs. SO Vietnam SI vs. SO
Chairman (Cabinet Office) DUS(Defence & Intelligence) and Whitehall Liaison Department Foreign Office Director General Security Service Chief of the Assessments Staff (Cabinet Office) ‘C’ (SIS) Director HM Treasury Director GCHQ Policy Director Ministry of Defence DFID CDI (Ministry of Defence) Joint Intelligence Committee Director of Export Control & Non-Proliferation Department of Trade & Industry DG Org & Int Crime Directorate Home Office The UK Joint Intelligence Committee PM’s Foreign Policy Advisor (Hd OD) Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator (Cabinet Office) Policy Collection Analysis
Vigilant State 3 6. Role of the Individual Military values Loyalty – Tenacity - Speed of decision - Wisdom resides with rank/experience Academic values Flat hierarchy - Unorthodox thinking – Reflective - Disrespectful Civilianize? Non-career ? Osmosis/Strategic Culture Individuals rarely have to be told about values Analogies - the weight of the shadow of the past
7. Intelligence at the Top John Scarlett Chair of JIC 2003
Vigilant State 3 7. Intelligence at the Top Personality key at the top - Interface with decision-makers Must have credibility Must be able to inspire action Hitler’s entourage clearly impossible Churchill, Johnson, Nixon also difficult Blair's Ministerial Committee on Intelligence How pressurised was the UK JIC in 2003?
Vigilant State 3 8. Problem of Deception 2 forms of deception A) Counter-intelligence deception Paralyse by creating security problems James Jesus Angleton Spycatcher & Roger Hollis
Vigilant State 3 B) Strategic Deception Need to monitor the bait Exploit the enemy good intell system Exploit the enemy presumptions Reinforce what they want to believe - eg Iraqi WMD
Vigilant State 3 Q. How do analysts guard against these problems bureaucratic problems? A. Endless re-designing of machinery Q. How do analysts deal with psychological problems? A. Endless training to think outside the box Q. So why does it still fail? A. I will explain next week!!!