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International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric, SPR-09 Donostia, 6-8 May 2009 Pragmatic compositionality, Syntactic Direction Principle,

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Presentation on theme: "International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric, SPR-09 Donostia, 6-8 May 2009 Pragmatic compositionality, Syntactic Direction Principle,"— Presentation transcript:

1 International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric, SPR-09 Donostia, 6-8 May 2009 Pragmatic compositionality, Syntactic Direction Principle, and the contextualism/minimalism debate Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge

2 2 Contextualism without the syntactic constraint (Syntactic Direction Principle) Contextualism without the syntactic constraint (Syntactic Direction Principle) Merger representations of the revised version of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2009, forthcoming) Merger representations of the revised version of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2009, forthcoming) Two selected applications: propositional attitude reports and tense-time mismatches Two selected applications: propositional attitude reports and tense-time mismatches Compatibility of contextualism and semantic minimalism Compatibility of contextualism and semantic minimalism

3 3 Explicit/implicit meaning (what is said/what is implicated) vs primary meaning/secondary meaning

4 4 Syntactic constraint-based contextualist accounts are ‘minimalist at heart’ Syntactic constraint-based contextualist accounts are ‘minimalist at heart’

5 5 Available options: from radical contextualism (including meaning eliminativism) to radical minimalism (including anti-propositionalist accout) Available options: from radical contextualism (including meaning eliminativism) to radical minimalism (including anti-propositionalist accout)  new radical contextualism

6 6 (1) Everybody is going to Egypt this spring. (2) All of the speaker’s close friends and family are going to Egypt this spring. (3) Egypt seems to be a popular holiday destination among the people the speaker knows. (4) The interlocutors should consider going on holiday to Egypt this spring.

7 7 Cognitive salience of primary meanings Cognitive salience of primary meanings Primary/secondary meaning distinction as orthogonal to the explicit/implicit distinction Primary/secondary meaning distinction as orthogonal to the explicit/implicit distinction ? Question: What meaning should a theory of utterance meaning model?

8 8 Semantic analysis takes us only part of the way towards the recovery of utterance meaning. Pragmatic enrichment completes the process. Enrichment: and +> and then, and as a result some +> some but not all everybody +> everybody in the room, every acquaintance of the speaker, etc.

9 9 Modulation (Recanati 2004, 2005): The logical form becomes enriched/modulated as a result of pragmatic inference and the entire semantic/pragmatic product becomes subjected to the truth-conditional analysis.  Syntactic Direction is obeyed here: what is modelled is the development of the logical form of the sentence

10 10  what is said (Recanati)  primary meaning (Jaszczolt)

11 11  what is said (Recanati)  primary meaning (Jaszczolt) ? Question: How far can the logical form be extended? ‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?

12 12 The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representations in Default Semantics. There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations. The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representations in Default Semantics. There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations.

13 13 Object of study of the theory of meaning: Object of study of the theory of meaning:  Discourse meaning intended by Model Speaker and recovered by Model Addressee (primary meaning)

14 14 (5) You are not going to die, Peter. (5a) There is no future time at which you will die, Peter. (5b) You are not going to die from this cut, Peter. (5c) There is nothing to worry about, Peter. Default Semantics: (5c) – substituted proposition (primary meaning)

15 15 Going beyond contextualism: Going beyond contextualism: DS does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively justified construct. To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role among various carriers of information (contextualists’ mistake).

16 16 (5) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries. Mother: You are not going to die. (5a) The boy is not going to die from the cut. (5b 1 ) There is nothing to worry about. (5b 2 ) It’s not a big deal.

17 17 (6) Child: Can I go punting? Mother: You are too small. (6a) The child is too small to go punting. (6b) The child can’t go punting.

18 18 (5) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries. Mother: You are not going to die. (5a) The boy is not going to die from the cut. (5b 1 ) There is nothing to worry about. (5b 2 ) It’s not a big deal. (6) Child: Can I go punting? Mother: You are too small. (6a) The child is too small to go punting. (6b) The child can’t go punting.

19 19 Empirical evidence: in 60-80 per cent of cases speakers communicate the main message through an implicature Empirical evidence: in 60-80 per cent of cases speakers communicate the main message through an implicature (Nicolle and Clark 1999; Pitts 2005; Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007)

20 20 Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.

21 21 Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.

22 22 Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

23 23 Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, integrating information coming from various sources that interacts according to the principles established by the intentional character of discourse. They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, integrating information coming from various sources that interacts according to the principles established by the intentional character of discourse.

24 24 Sources of information for  : (i) world knowledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) situation of discourse (SD); (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC).

25 25 SC (7) A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week. (7a) A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week.

26 26 WK (8) The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and the lake froze. (8a) The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and as a result the lake froze.

27 27 IS (9) The author of Cloud Atlas has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination. (9a) David Mitchell has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.

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29 29 The model of sources of information can be mapped onto types of processes that produce the merger representation  of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings. The model of sources of information can be mapped onto types of processes that produce the merger representation  of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings.

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31 31 Mapping between sources and processes WK  SCWD or CPI SC  SCWD or CPI WS  WS (logical form) SD  CPI IS  CD In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of  with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

32 32 Psychological plausibility of rich (contextualist) semantic content: ‘I think that it is agreed on all sides that if it is a fact that P is the semantic content of S (perhaps relative to context), then this fact must be grounded in natural psychological and/or sociological facts concerning the abilities and practices of competent speakers and interpreters. If the alleged facts concerning semantic content are not somehow grounded in such natural facts, then semantics would not fit into Chomsky’s cognitive paradigm in linguistics, nor even into the broader project of “naturalizing epistemology”.’ Clapp (2007: 251)

33 33 Compositionality of Primary Meanings Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): compositionality is not a necessary property of semantics; composition of meaning may simply reflect compositional reality. Meaning supervenes on the structure of the world. Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): compositionality is not a necessary property of semantics; composition of meaning may simply reflect compositional reality. Meaning supervenes on the structure of the world. Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to enriched, modulated propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ approach to compositionality. Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to enriched, modulated propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ approach to compositionality. DS: compositionality of utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning. DS: compositionality of utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning.

34 34 Merger representations are compositional structures.

35 35 Compositionality is a methodological principle: ‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’ Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

36 36 Selected applications of DS Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Parsimony of Levels (POL) Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Parsimony of Levels (POL) Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002). First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002). Recent applications: presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2005; 2009; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007). Recent applications: presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2005; 2009; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007).

37 37 Languages: Languages: English, Korean, Thai, Russian, French, German

38 38 Propositional attitude reports (10) Ralph believes that Fido is a dog. (10a)(  m) (Φ*m & Bel (Ralph,, m)) from Schiffer (1992)

39  Fig. 3: Merger representation of the de dicto reading of (10) x y  ’ [Ralph] CD (x) [Fido] CPIpm (y) [[x] CD [believes] CPIpm ΣΣ ’ ] WS  ’ : [[y] CPIpm is a dog] WS

40 40

41 41 Tense-time mismatches (11) Peter goes to a meeting on Monday. ACC  n ├ Σ' ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that Σ' to the degree  triggered by expression n’ ACC  n ├ Σ' ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that Σ' to the degree  triggered by expression n’ modelled on Grice’s (2001) sentential operator Acc ├ p

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43 43 Contextualism and minimalism: compatibility? Contextualism about syntactically unconstrained primary meanings is compatible with minimalism. Contextualism about syntactically unconstrained primary meanings is compatible with minimalism. Contextualism restricted by the Syntactic Direction conflates the two programs in that it is still, so to speak, ‘minimalist at heart’: it adheres to the structure of the sentence instead of modelling the main intended meaning. It tries to reconcile the irreconcilable and is therefore defunct. Contextualism restricted by the Syntactic Direction conflates the two programs in that it is still, so to speak, ‘minimalist at heart’: it adheres to the structure of the sentence instead of modelling the main intended meaning. It tries to reconcile the irreconcilable and is therefore defunct.

44 44 Conclusions Shifting the methodological requirement of compositionality from the level of sentences to the level of utterances is not only compatible with the contextualist stance but also helps justify the latter by offering an analysis of many problematic types of expressions, exemplified here by propositional attitude reports and tense-time mismatches.

45 45 Conclusions Shifting the methodological requirement of compositionality from the level of sentences to the level of utterances is not only compatible with the contextualist stance but also helps justify the latter by offering an analysis of many problematic types of expressions, exemplified here by propositional attitude reports and tense-time mismatches. At the same time, contextualism, when construed radically as freed from the Syntactic Direction Principle and modelled by merger representations , is fully compatible with the objectives of semantic minimalism, in that the latter can be understood as an independent analysis of one of the contributing sources, namely WS.

46 46 Conclusions Shifting the methodological requirement of compositionality from the level of sentences to the level of utterances is not only compatible with the contextualist stance but also helps justify the latter by offering an analysis of many problematic types of expressions, exemplified here by propositional attitude reports and tense-time mismatches. At the same time, contextualism, when construed radically as freed from the Syntactic Direction Principle and modelled by merger representations , is fully compatible with the objectives of semantic minimalism, in that the latter can be understood as an independent analysis of one of the contributing sources, namely WS. The Syntactic Direction currently leaves other contextualist approaches sitting mid-way between modelling primary intended meaning and modelling the hybrid of the logical form and pragmatic enrichment/modulation.

47 47 Select references Bach, K. (1994). ‘Semantic slack: What is said and more’. In: S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.). Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. London: Routledge. 267-91. Bach, K. (2006). ‘The excluded middle: Semantic minimalism without minimal propositions’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73. 435-42. Bach, K. (2007). ‘Regressions in pragmatics (and semantics)’. In: N. Burton- Roberts (ed.). Pragmatics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 24-44. Borg, E. (2004). Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Borg, E. (2007). ‘Minimalism versus contextualism in semantics’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339-59. Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. (2005a). Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell. Cappelen, H. Lepore, E. (2005b). ‘A tall tale: In defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 197- 219. Clapp, L. (2007). ‘Minimal (disagreement about) semantics’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 251-277. Engemann, H. (2008). ‘The concept of futurity: A study with reference to English, French and German’. M.Phil. thesis, University of Cambridge.

48 48 Grice, P. (2001). Aspects of Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof. (1991). ‘Dynamic Predicate Logic’. Linguistics and Philosophy 14. 39-100. Jaszczolt, K. M. (1992). Belief Sentences and the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. D.Phil. thesis. University of Oxford. Jaszczolt, K. M. (1997). ‘The Default De Re Principle for the interpretation of belief utterances’. Journal of Pragmatics 28. 315-36. Jaszczolt, K. M. (1999). Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Jaszczolt, K. M. (2005). Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. (2007). ‘Variadic function and pragmatics-rich representations of belief reports’. Journal of Pragmatics 39. 934-59. Jaszczolt, K. M. (2009). Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. (forthcoming). ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. and J. Srioutai. (forthcoming). ‘Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai’ In: F. Brisard and T. Mortelmans (eds). Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect and Modality’. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

49 49 Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. (1993). From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Lee, H.-K. (2002). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Connectives with Reference to English and Korean. PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge. Nicolle, S. and B. Clark. (1999). ‘Experimental pragmatics and what is said: A response to Gibbs and Moise’. Cognition 69. 337-54. Pitts, A. (2005). ‘Assessing the evidence for intuitions about what is said’. Manuscript. University of Cambridge. Recanati, F. (1989). ‘The pragmatics of what is said’. Mind and Language 4. 295- 329. Reprinted in: S. Davis (ed.). (1991). Pragmatics: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 97-120. Recanati, F. (2002). ‘Unarticulated constituents’. Linguistics and Philosophy 25. 299-345. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. (2005). ‘Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 171-96. Schiffer, S. (1991). ‘Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics?’. In: B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. 181-99. Schiffer, S. (1992). ‘Belief ascription’. Journal of Philosophy 89. 499-521. Schiffer, S. (1994). ‘A paradox of meaning’. Noûs 28. 279-324.

50 50 Schiffer, S. (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Srioutai, J. (2004). ‘The Thai c 1 a: A marker of tense or modality?’ In: E. Daskalaki et. al. (eds). Second CamLing Proceedings. University of Cambridge. 273-80. Srioutai, J. (2006). Time Conceptualization in Thai with Special Reference to d 1 ay 1 II, kh 3 oe:y, k 1 aml 3 ang, y 3 u: I and c 1 a. PhD thesis. University of Cambridge. Sysoeva, A. and K. Jaszczolt. (2007). ‘Composing utterance meaning: An interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg.


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