Presentation on theme: "Negotiating EU-Australian Engagement: the 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements Lachlan McKenzie PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Sciences The."— Presentation transcript:
Negotiating EU-Australian Engagement: the 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements Lachlan McKenzie PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Sciences The University of Melbourne
The 1994 and 2008 Wine Trade Agreements 1994 and 2008, two agreements, one process. Concerning geographical indicators (GIs), traditional expressions (TEs) and winemaking practices and labelling. Driven by bargaining leverage and respective relationship to industry.
Getting to the negotiation table EU share of global wine exports was 58% in the early 1990s An industry of significant cultural and economic importance to many member states. Europe's strong and coordinated wine lobbies perceived protection of their GIs and TEs as essential to their success. No domestic (Australian) legal recourse for the French industry. The EU was compelled to negotiate an agreement to protect wine GIs and set a precedent.
Objectives and concessions Pre-negotiation objectives Pre-negotiation point willing concession to concede EU Gain protection of important GIs and TEs. Establish a precedent for future negotiations with New World wine producers. Recognition of Australian wine- labelling and winemaking practices (and therein unrestricted market access). Australia Stop EU restriction on Australian wine exports to Europe. Recognition of some European wine GIs and TEs, but faced opposition from industry. “The French were so offended with us using Champagne, and the denigration of their brand, that it would have overcome any reservations they would have had.” – Australian negotiator
1. Constraints on bargaining: the EU, a hard bargainer “the Europeans were the slow ones to come to the table, because they had sixteen people (member states) they had to get to the table”. – Australian negotiator Another Australian negotiator described the negotiations as “pedantic, we couldn’t get anything through, the negotiations were very difficult”.
2. Constraints on bargaining: explaining the EU’s diminished inflexibility “their (the EU’s) links back to industry were different to Australia’s … the wine industry is controlled much more than in Australia so it was more the case for the industry to accept the laws of the EU” – Australian negotiator Conversely Australians had to sell agreements to industry, which “was a real constraint for negotiators” – Australian negotiator
Number of Australian uses of the GI Champagne Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Figure 2: Number of Australian uses of the GI Red-Burgundy Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Figure 3: Number of Australian uses of the GI Chablis Source: Steven Stern, Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Concessions The EU conceded access for Australian wine to its market. This included access to the UK market, one of the largest wine importers globally. Australian conceded use of European GIs and TEs, with the ‘best endeavours clause’. EU negotiators “would have played a bit harder had they known how well Australian wine would penetrate the UK market” – Australian negotiator
The outcome Objectives achieved/ GainsConcessions EU Guarantee of eventual phase out of its wine GIs (final phase out GIs 1 September 2011) Over 2,500 GIs recognised by Australia Recognition of Australian winemaking techniques, ontological practices an wine labelling (effective free market access) Australia EU recognition of Australian winemaking techniques, ontological practices and wine labelling (effective free market access) EU recognition of Australian wine GIs Protection of European GIs with a phase out period Gains and Concessions
Australian Wine Exports to Europe Source: Stephen Stern, Coors Chambers Westgarth. Australian Wine Exports to the UK In , Australia exported 382 million litres of wine to the EU worth $863 million. (DAFF)
Conclusion The negotiations demonstrate – The potential benefit of negotiating with the EU in areas of common interests, as opposed to issues like agricultural protectionism. – The importance of understanding EU policy processes. – The impact that domestic institutions and structures can have on bargaining behaviour.