Presentation on theme: "RAN Force Protection CMDR Jason Hunter - Master Attendant"— Presentation transcript:
1RAN Force Protection CMDR Jason Hunter - Master Attendant LCDR Stewart Bankier – Staff Officer Force Protection27 Feb 09
2RAN FORCE PROTECTION Fleet Responsibilities Authorities and References Lessons LearntMajor Exercise ConsiderationsIn order to keep this this short presentation at its lowest security level I have omitted details such as actual Threat Assessments and specific names particularly on the slide labelled Lessons Learnt.
3FLEET RESPONSIBILITIES Ensure the Fleet is at the appropriate FP State and capability commensurate to the ThreatOverseas (MEAO) and AustraliaLiaison with all AgenciesAUSFLTOPS WebsitesCoord FB FP CapabilityMonitor Naval Port SecuritySupport STG, CSO(W), SYSCOM and TAMWAssess Force Protection Implementation Plans (FPIP’s)What is the responsibility of Fleet and in particular AUSFLTOPS with regard to Force Protection?Primarily to ensure the Fleet is at the appropriate FP State and capability commensurate to the Threat overseas and Australia.In doing so we:Liaise with all Agencies such as NTAC via DIO,DSA, Local Enforcement Agencies, Port Authorities, US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Defence Attaches and RAN Intelligence.We maintain two websites dedicated to FP – DRN and DSNWe coordinate our primary ports FP capability and monitor Naval Port Security in general.We support Sea Training Groups, Warfare or Policy Division, System Command for SAFEBASE and Training Schools.We assess Force Protection Implementation Plans (FPIP’s) - with the exception of a few smaller Northern Ports, all visits have to be pre-empted with a FPIP which ensures that the ship has considered all FP related factors.
4RELEVANT REFERENCES AND AUTHORITIES International Maritime Organisation- IMOInternational Ship and Port Facility Security - ISPSMaritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Act – MTOFSAWarship Security PlansPort Integrated Vulnerability Assessments - PIVA’s (USN)DIPCLEAR and Defence ApprovalDSA Security AssessmentA reminder of Port Security considerations:In response to the global maritime risk of terrorism, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the principal international maritime industry body, developed the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in December 2002, and the Australian Government enacted the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 and associated regulations.This legislation recognises the importance of detecting and deterring any unauthorised activity within security regulated ports, safeguarding against unlawful interference with maritime transport, and requires that port operators and ships have a Maritime Security Plan. These plans outline the measures and procedures that port operators, port facility managers, and ships undertake to protect vessels that trade in Australian seaports.Sovereign recognised warships have part exemption to ISPS as it is recognised that they make provision for their own Security Plans, however, security arrangements for visiting warships (notwithstanding DIPCLEAR instructions) are generally a combination of both.Port Integrated Vulnerability Assessments – NCIS provision of security related information for ports visited by the USN.Maritime Commitments (Military Commitments Branch) signal Defence Approval and DIPCLEAR. Emphasises sovereign rights and any restrictions such as ships powers of arrest/detention ashore versus onboard, posture and issue of weapons. More importantly the inherent right of self-defence, again restrictions and limitations alongside or at anchor.Defence Security Threat Assessments – These are in place as generic TA’s for RAN Units in and around Australia, but can be tailored to specific events and requirements i.e. Talisman Sabre 09.
5RAN V Foreign Warships – Priority of Protection RECENT LESSONS LEARNTRAN V Foreign Warships – Priority of ProtectionResponse by Local SecuritySecurity at Civilian PortSecurity at Naval PortThreat AssessmentsRAN V Foreign Warships – Priority of Protection:During a recent major exercise, RAN and numerous foreign ships (including HVU’s Submarine and Tanker), priority of protection was provided to a solitary USN ship as they had contracted for 24 hour local police support.Response by Local Civilian Security:Example 1: RAN Unit (Submarine) in a commercial port had a jet-ski approach but local maritime police support was slow to respond.Example 2: USN Unit (Carrier) had a small craft approach but could not immediately obtain a response from contracted security vessel/picket boats.Security at Civilian Port:A major Australian port allowed a taxi to pass through the security gate to drop occupants at a RAN ship (during heavy rain), occupants were not thoroughly checked. This allowed a civilian to enter the port compounded by the fact he even managed to get onboard (the wrong assumption by gangway staff was that if he was allowed through the main gate then he must have displayed a pass).Security at Naval Port:Unknown female drove past contracted security and gained access to a major warship. Gangway staff also at fault.Threat Assessments:A major exercise provided assessments for ground and air forces but had not considered the Navy.
6ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS Recognition of FP Controlling Authority - Use Ex TS09 as an exampleGiven the numerous differing units and spread of involvement it would be prudent to have an overall ADF FP Controlling Authority. Each Service -Army, Navy, Air Force, US/ADF and/or Port Liaison Team would liaise back through the FPCA. Responsibilities and considerations should be coordinated and should reflect:The Threat – The TA for all units and personnel, AU&US, afloat and ashore in and around Australia prior to and for the period of TS09.Early Consideration and Coordination for Maritime FP Requests – The USN in particular have additional security requirements and generally request picket/patrol boats, additional container barriers and shoreside/seaward stand-off distances/perimeters (generally through their own FPLO or NCIS). Can the respective ports make provision through their own security organisations or would they be required to call upon local police, particularly maritime? Do not forget that there will on occasion be ships anchored thus drawing upon additional resources such as a secure landing point for liberty personnel and stores.There will be a significant draw upon local security in supporting and meeting contractual requirements, in doing so, are we limiting our responsibility and capability to other participating units i.e. the RAN?Communications Plan (COMPLAN) – How do RAN and USN ships communicate not only with each other but with civilian port authorities and security agencies?FP Coordination Unit - With multiple units there must be consideration to a FP Coordinating unit who can direct responses and coordinate support. For example, US units may not put a RHIB away and may be reliant upon local security (the picket boat) or possibly nearby RAN units; someone needs to take charge or ownership. In the event of a IED or bomb threat where adjacent ships are required to support, who directs and/or coordinates?Recognition of differing SOP’s – There would be nothing more embarrassing than to have a small boat incursion (albeit harmless) where a US Ship presents alarms, lights, warnings and escalates to the highest state, whilst our adjacent RAN ship simply remains low key and in doing so presents an easier option for the potential aggressor. Obviously in depth knowledge of SOP’s between differing nationalities may not be possible but at least a basic understanding will go a long way, particularly for local enforcement agencies responding to lets say the bomb threat on adjacent US and RAN ships.Exercise Talisman Sabre 09 – different approach?Recognition of FP Controlling AuthorityThe ThreatEarly Consideration and Coordination for FP requestsCommunications Plan (COMPLAN)FP Coordination UnitRecognition of differing SOP’s
8Ports and DefenceThe primary purpose of Australian ports is to facilitate and enhance trade and operate on a commercial basis.In order to fulfil its role of defending Australia, Defence needs access to Australian ports for fuelling, victualling, embarking or disembarking troops, equipment and munitions, conducting maintenance and repairs and to provide crew rest.
9Ports and Defence - Benefits Routine Defence access to ports delivers an enhanced working relationship with port authorities, which may facilitate operations during disaster reliefProvides other assistance to the civil community through engagement initiatives i.e. ship open days, assistance to charity organisations.Provides economic benefits to local communities surrounding ports.
10Guiding PrinciplesDefence and Ports Australia have agreed to a strategic level approach to the relationships between Defence, ports and the owners or operators of individual ports, to ensure that Defence requirements are met where possible. The last agreement was signed on 16 July 2007Whilst not a legally binding document, it provides a basis for mutual understanding and development of individual agreements where necessary.
11Defence Undertaking in relation to Security Work with Ports to ensure that RAN Force Protection Measures can be readily implemented at each level of threat as required.Ensure Navy Port Service Managers participate in Port Security, Emergency Response Plan and Port User Group Committees. Navy’s emergency plans should look to complement local port, state and national plans.
12Defence Undertaking in relation to Security Discuss Port operational matters and security posture with Harbour Masters, prior to ship visits, to ensure Navy Force Protection Measures are consistent with security measures in place in the port.Provide early advice to ports of any proposed community engagement activity and work with Harbour Masters to meet security and safety requirements.
13Ports Undertaking in relation to Security Work with Defence to ensure that Port obligations complement the separate nature of RAN Force Protection Measures.Encourage Navy Port Service Managers to provide advice to Port Security, Emergency Response, and Port User Group Committees and to better understand each Port's legislative and community obligations.If ADF has different assessment of threat and or security levels, then discussion will be done to achieve a common approach.
14Ports Undertaking in relation to Security Advise the Port's security level, including general and berth specific activity at the time of individual ship visits, to assist Navy in determining the force protection level to adopt.Work with Defence to achieve community engagement initiatives, such as Ship Open Days, through safe and secure community access to Defence vessels.
15Maritime Security Identification Card (MISC) ADF Personnel are Exempt from carrying a MISC – however, must display their service Identity Card.Visitors to RAN ships, including official receptions and open days, are exempt from carrying a MISC when escorted by an ADF member
16Carriage of WeaponsThere is no restriction against ADF personnel carrying weapons in a restricted port area in respect of their duties.Section 123(1), Defence ActSOFA will also dictate when weapons may be authorised by ADF
17Controlled Access Zones Under MTOFSA Ship Security Zones (SSZ) may be established around (at and below the water level) a security regulated ship while in port or near an offshore facility.As MTOFSA does not apply to any ship operated by Australia or a foreign state, for military, customs or law enforcement purposes, SSZ’s do not apply to the RAN.
18Controlled Access Zones (CAZ) No Commonwealth legislative basis exists for CAZ’s around RAN vesselsOnly in New South Wales, the Management of Waters and Waterside Land Regulations – NSW provides that:- a person, whether or not conveyed on a vessel, must not, in navigable waters, be any closer than:- 200 metres from the bow and 60 metres from the sides and stern of a naval vessel that is underway; or- 60 metres from a vessel that is moored, anchored or berthed.
19Self DefenceA warship CO may act in unit self defence to protect his or her vessel, provided there is an ‘instant and overwhelming necessity for self defence …’.In considering the “necessity”, those actions may only be undertaken in response to a hostile act or demonstration of a hostile intent.
20Pursuit, capture and arrest of unauthorised persons onboard a naval vessel Rights depend on location and authorisation of ADF memberADF members generally have no further rights than ordinary ‘Citizens Arrest’ under relevant state or territory legislationADF personnel only rely on citizen’s arrest in exceptional circumstances, where there is a clear threat to the life or safety of a person and police assistance cannot be obtained in time.UoF Continum is fully briefed to all ADF personnel when on duty as sentries or guards or when armed.
21General powers to search and detain All ADF members have implicit right to search on ADF premises.ADF makes it a Condition of Entry to a defence establishment or ship that one must consent to such search through signageIf no consent, person(s) are denied entryIntruders can be searched for weapons if suspicion of such weaponsAssistance from state or federal police is sought in all other instances where personal search is required (i.e. suspected stolen goods)
22Pursuit, capture and arrest of unauthorised persons Naval waters –The Superintendent of Naval Waters has powers to remove a vessel which had contravened a notice of a restriction or prohibition of entry under the Control of Naval Waters Act 1918, Regulation 4.NOTE: ADF members do NOT have a general power to pursue, capture or arrest unauthorised vessels in Naval waters. Rely on police
23ConclusionThe RAN has concerns that legislation within the various States and Territories does not provide sufficient legal powers to support Navy’s FP capabilities, requirements, and operations inside Australia in a post-9/11 environment.A robust Navy FP policy has been developed to provide CO’s and FP personnel with the legal guidance required to undertake their duties