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Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal Intercultural Pragmatics ‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’ Shanghai,

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Presentation on theme: "Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal Intercultural Pragmatics ‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’ Shanghai,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal Intercultural Pragmatics ‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’ Shanghai, June 2008 Pragmatic Inference and Default Interpretations in Current Theories of Discourse Meaning Kasia Jaszczolt University of Cambridge, U.K.

2 2 Lecture 4 Principles of Default Semantics

3 3 Default Semantics (DS, Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, forthcoming a, b) is a radical contextualist theory. Objective: to model utterance meaning as intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee. Where context and inference need not be employed, they do not figure in the construction of meaning.

4 4 Going beyond contextualism: DS does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively justified construct. To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role among various carriers of information (contextualists’ mistake).

5 5 (1)Child: Can I go punting? Mother: You are too small. (A) The child is too small to go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting.

6 6 (1)Child: Can I go punting? Mother: You are too small. (A) The child is too small to go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting. (2)Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries. Mother: You are not going to die. (A) The boy is not going to die from the cut. (B1) There is nothing to worry about. (B2) It’s not a big deal.

7 7 (1)Child: Can I go punting? Mother: You are too small. (A) The child is too small to go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting. (2)Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries. Mother: You are not going to die. (A) The boy is not going to die from the cut. (B1) There is nothing to worry about. (B2) It’s not a big deal.

8 8 DS takes as its object of semantic representation the primary, salient, intended meanings and hence allows for the B interpretations to be modelled. Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted.  The representation of the primary meaning need not be isomorphic with the representation of the uttered sentence or with a development of that syntactic form. It need not constitute an enrichment/modulation of the proposition expressed in the sentence.

9 9 The syntactic constraint of post-Gricean contextualism is rejected. The kind of meaning that is modelled in the theory of meaning is the primary meaning. The primary meaning is the main message intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee.

10 10 Experimental evidence: Nicolle and Clark 1999 Pitts 2005 Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 & forthcoming

11 11 Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.

12 12 Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

13 13 Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

14 14 Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, integrating information coming from various sources that interacts according to the principles established by the intentional character of discourse.

15 15 Sources of information for  : (i)world knowledge (WK); (ii)word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii)situation of discourse (SD); (iv)properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v)stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC).

16 16 SC (3)A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week. (3a)A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week.

17 17 WS – lexicon and grammar SD – context-dependent inference

18 18 WK (4)The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and the lake froze. (4a)The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and as a result the lake froze.

19 19 IS (5)The author of Cloud Atlas has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination. (5a)David Mitchell has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.

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21 21 The model of sources of information can be mapped onto types of processes that produce the merger representation  of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings.

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23 23 Mapping between sources and processes WK  SCWD or CPI SC  SCWD or CPI WS  WS (logical form) SD  CPI IS  CD In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of  with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

24 24 Unresolved question: What counts as effortful processing (CPI) vis-à-vis automatic utilization of knowledge of culture and society (SCWD)? Assumption: utterance interpretation makes use of automatic, default interpretations which figure as salient and strong interpretative probabilities unless the context dictates otherwise. But: it may never be possible to make generalizations on this matter, due to the interpersonal differences in assumed common ground.

25 25 (3)A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week. (3a)A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week. CPI or SCWD?

26 26 There is a need to distinguish the two kinds of processes: the conscious, inferential one and the automatic, subdoxastic one. Theoretical distinction: Model Addressee and Model Speaker Levinson’s (2000) presumptive meanings & Recanati’s (2002, 2004) truth-conditional pragmatics retain the common intuition that the primary meaning is built both out of automatic, associative, unreflective components and conscious, inferential ones.

27 27 Compositionality of Primary Meanings Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): compositionality is not a necessary property of semantics; composition of meaning may simply reflect compositional reality. Meaning supervenes on the structure of the world. Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to enriched, modulated propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ approach to compositionality. DS: compositionality utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning.

28 28 Merger representations are compositional structures.

29 29 Compositionality is a necessary prerequisite for any theory of meaning. Compositionality should not be seen as a methodological requirement on the syntax and semantics of sentences. DS agrees with Jackendoff (2002: 293) that there is no ‘strictly linguistic meaning’.

30 30 Global or local defaults? The more ‘local’ the enrichments, the higher the likelihood that they have to be cancelled later on in discourse when more information becomes available. Frequent cancellation is not a satisfactory feature of defaults in that it is costly. Grice’s global defaults vs. experimental evidence of incremental processing)

31 31 Default and inferential interpretations are construed in DS as operating on a unit that is adequate for the case at hand, ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.

32 32 [1a] Defaults belong to competence.  [1b] Defaults belong to performance. X Merger representation  is construed as a semantic representation; [2a] Defaults are context-independent. X [2b] Defaults can make use of contextual information.  Salient, short-circuited interpretations arise through repeated exposure to scenarios and to information about culture, society and physical world;

33 33 [3a] Defaults are easily defeasible. X [3b] Defaults are not normally defeasible.  Frequent cancellation goes against the economy and thereby rationality of communicative behaviour;

34 34 [4a] Defaults are a result of subdoxastic, automatic process.  [4b] Defaults can sometimes involve conscious pragmatic inference. X -- because of the very nature of what constitutes a default interpretation; [5a] Defaults are developments of the logical form of the uttered sentence. X [5b] Defaults need not enrich the logical form of the sentence but may override it.  -- following the rejection of the syntactic constraint;

35 35 [6a] Defaults can all be classified as one type of pragmatic process. X [6b] Defaults come from qualitatively different sources in utterance processing.  Default interpretations are classified in DS as (i) CD, pertaining to the source IS, and (ii) SCWD, where SCWD pertain to two sources: WK and SC (see Figs 1 and 2);

36 36 [7a] Defaults are always based on a complete proposition.  [7b] Defaults can be ‘local’, ‘sub-propositional’, based on a word or a phrase. X -- as a temporary methodological measure

37 37 [8a] Defaults necessarily arise quicker than non- default meanings. Hence they can be tested for experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance.  [8b] Defaults do not necessarily arise quicker than non-default meanings because both types of meaning can be based on conscious, effortful inference. Hence, the existence of defaults cannot be tested experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance. X -- logically following [4a] and hence in virtue of the very nature of what constitutes a default interpretation.

38 38 Selected applications of DS Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, Parsimony of Levels (POL) Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002). Recent applications: presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2005; forthcoming; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 and forthcoming).

39 39 Languages: English, Korean, Thai, Russian, French, German

40 40 Definite NPs in English (6)The architect of this church was an eccentric. (6a)The architect of Sagrada Família (whoever he was) was an eccentric. (6b)Antoni Gaudí was an eccentric. (6c)Simon Guggenheim was an eccentric.

41 41 Degrees of Intentions (DI) Principle: Intentions and intentionality allow for degrees. Primary Intention (PI) Principle: The primary role of intention in communication is to secure the referent of the speaker’s utterance. Jaszczolt (1999: xix)

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45 45 Future-time reference in English (7)Lidia will play in a concert tomorrow evening. (8)Lidia will be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (9)Lidia is going to play in a concert tomorrow evening. (10)Lidia is playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (11)Lidia plays in a concert tomorrow evening.

46 46 (12)Lidia must be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (13)Lidia ought to/should be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (14)Lidia may be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (15)Lidia might play in a concert tomorrow evening. (16)(doorbell) That will be the delivery man.

47 47 ACC Δ ├ Σ ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

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51 51 Present-time reference in English (17)Lidia is playing in a concert now. (18)Lidia will be playing in a concert now. (19)Lidia must be playing in a concert now. (20)Lidia may be playing in a concert now. (21)Lidia might be playing in a concert now. (22)Lidia will always play the piano when she is upset.(dispositional necessity present)

52 52 Past-time reference in English (23)Lidia played in a concert yesterday evening. (24)Lidia was playing in a concert yesterday evening. (25)Lidia would have been playing in a concert then. (26)Lidia must have been playing in a concert yesterday evening. (27)Lidia may have been playing in a concert yesterday evening. (28)Lidia might have been playing in a concert yesterday evening.

53 53 Conclusions: Main advantages Modelling of the main, intended meaning. Psychology of utterance processing: no syntactic constraint on . Pragmatic compositionality: accounting for the interaction of meaning coming from different sources.

54 54 Future prospects: Algorithm for the compositional interaction of lexicon, syntax, pragmatics (WS, WK, SD, SC, IS) The default/inference boundary Application to more types of constructions and to pragmatics-rich languages

55 55 End of Lecture 4 Thank you!

56 56 References van der Auwera, J. and V. A. Plungian ‘Modality’s semantic map’. Linguistic Typology Carston, R ‘How many pragmatic systems are there?’. In: M. J. Frápolli (ed.). Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati’s Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Culicover, P. W. and R. Jackendoff Simpler Syntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davis, W. A ‘How normative is implicature’. Journal of Pragmatics Donnellan, K. S ‘Reference and definite descriptions’. Philosophical Review Hamm, F., H. Kamp and M. van Lambalgen ‘There is no opposition between Formal and Cognitive Semantics’. Theoretical Linguistics

57 57 Jackendoff, R Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M Belief Sentences and the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. D.Phil. thesis. University of Oxford. Jaszczolt, K. M ‘The Default De Re Principle for the interpretation of belief utterances’. Journal of Pragmatics Jaszczolt, K. M Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Jaszczolt, K. M Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M ‘Variadic function and pragmatics-rich representations of belief reports’. Journal of Pragmatics

58 58 Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming a. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming b. ‘Psychological explanations in Gricean pragmatics and Frege’s legacy’. In: I. Kecskes and J. Mey (eds). Intentions, Common Ground, and the Egocentric Speaker-Hearer. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Jaszczolt, K. M. and J. Srioutai. forthcoming. ‘Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai’ In: F. Brisard and T. Mortelmans (eds). Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect and Modality’. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. Kamp, H. and U. Reyle From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Lee, H.-K The Semantics and Pragmatics of Connectives with Reference to English and Korean. PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge.

59 59 Levinson, S. C Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Nicolle, S. and B. Clark ‘Experimental pragmatics and what is said: A response to Gibbs and Moise’. Cognition Pelczar, M. W ‘Forms and objects of thought’. Linguistics and Philosophy Pitts, A ‘Assessing the evidence for intuitions about what is said’. Manuscript. University of Cambridge. Recanati, F ‘Unarticulated constituents’. Linguistics and Philosophy Recanati, F Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F ‘Reply to Carston 2007’. In: M. J. Frápolli (ed.). Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati’s Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

60 60 Saul, J. M ‘What is said and psychological reality; Grice’s project and relevance theorists’ criticisms’. Linguistics and Philosophy Schiffer, S ‘Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics?’. In: B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Schiffer, S ‘A paradox of meaning’. Noûs Schiffer, S The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Srioutai, J ‘The Thai c1a: A marker of tense or modality?’ In: E. Daskalaki et. al. (eds). Second CamLing Proceedings. University of Cambridge Srioutai, J Time Conceptualization in Thai with Special Reference to D1ay1II, Kh3oe:y, K1aml3ang, Y3u:I and C1a. PhD thesis. University of Cambridge.

61 61 Sysoeva, A. and K. Jaszczolt ‘Composing utterance meaning: An interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg. Sysoeva, A. and K. Jaszczolt. forthcoming. ‘More than radical pragmatics: Primary meaning without syntactic constraint’. Traugott, E. C ‘Historical aspects of modality’. In: W. Frawley (ed.). The Expression of Modality. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter


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