1. Dave Ahmad Jeremy Rauch Network Infrastructure Insecurity The authentication, management and routing protocols that run your network

2. Topics u Overview u Basic protocol flaws u Network allocation flaws u Routing protocol flaws u Authentication flaws u Network Management and other fun flaws u Application of attacks

3. The Network Router Printer Radius Server Hub Switch DMZ Internet Host Firewall

4. The Network Router Printer Radius Server Hub Switch DMZ Host

5. The Network Router Printer Radius Server Hub Switch Host

6. The Network Router Printer Radius Server Hub Switch

7. Overview u Network Infrastructure –The building blocks of a network »basic network protocols »network management »authentication »routing »other random things u switches, hubs u printers u routers

8. Overview u Does this stuff matter? –Absolutely - the network depends on these »Basic protocols - obvious »network management & allocation u simplify network design and machine deployment »Authentication u access control »Routing u Getting from A to B »Other stuff u The network RUNS on these

9. Overview u Impacts –Attacking protocols can allow for hijacking, spoofing and impersonation –control network devices –elevate access –change network flow –hide connections –sniffing –…and more

10. Basic Protocols u Security at the IP layer discussed over and over u Security at the link layer ignored

11. ARP u Address Resolution Protocol –Used for mapping network IP addresses to physical (in the case of ethernet, MAC) interface addresses. –Broadcast at the link layer.

12. ARP Security Flaws u Lack of Authentication u Limited Table Entries –ARP caches can be overpopulated and flushed

13. ARP Authentication Flaws u Lack of Authentication –Arp replies are typically accepted and cached without concern for origin when received. –No method to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate messages

14. ARP Lack of Authentication u Invalid ARP replies –When an ARP who-is is broadcast on the wire, anyone can reply and be mapped to the associated network address. u Gratuitous ARP replies –ARP replies without requests can be sent out and cached, diverting traffic from the compromised network address to the attacker.

15. ARP Attacks u Replace entries in arp caches for existing addresses –Denial of Service –Reply to requests with compromised host adress as router or nameserver. –Non-blind traffic hijacking –Exploitation of host-based trusts.

16. ARP Attacks u ARP Cache Overpopulation –Sending too many gratuitous ARP replies flushing the target ARP cache in some implementations. »Reach cache maximum, can cause devices like switches to re-enter “learning mode”

17. DHCP u Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol –Popular amongst pc users for ease of installation and configuration –UDP transport –To broadcast, from 0.0.0.0

18. DHCP Security Problems u Unauthenticated –Anyone can request an address u Undirected –Anyone can respond u Limited ACL capabilities –Limit addresses per mac

19. DHCP Attacks u Get all addresses –Denial Of Service –Reply to requests with compromised host set as router or nameserver u Deregister hosts –hijack ip’s, connections

20. DHCP Fixes u Authentication –ISC is adding authentication in their 3.1 implementation –Others have implemented proprietary authentication mechanisms u Don’t allow dynamic assignment of DNS servers or routers –Statically define these

21. Gateway Protocols u IGP –RIPv1 –RIPv2 –OSPF u BGP

22. RIP u Routing Information Protocol –Widely used distance-vector IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) within autonomous systems. –Exists in two forms, Version 1 and the backwards compatible Version 2. u RIPv1 is extremely vulnerable to serious attack.

23. RIP Security Flaws u Transport Method u Authentication

24. RIP Transport Method Flaws u Based on UDP, utilizing port 520 for sending and receiving messages. –UDP is unreliable, no sequencing of packets. Easy to send arbitrary data to target. –Since sequencing is not a concern, forging source address can be very effective. –May be able to receive data from anywhere on the internet.

25. RIP Authentication Flaws u Lack of any authentication in RIPv1 u Cleartext Authentication recommended in RFC 2453 RIPv2 Specifications u MD5 Key/KeyID Digest Based Authentication described in RFC 2082.

26. RIP Attacks u Forging RIP messages –Spoofing source address and sending invalid routes, altering traffic flow. »Traffic Hijacking »Traffic Monitoring »Redirecting traffic from trusted to untrusted. –Obtaining Cleartext RIPv2 "password" when sent across network. »Using retrieved password to send authenticated updates to RIPv2 routers, altering traffic flow with consequences listed above.

27. RIP Solutions u Disabling RIPv1 and using RIPv2 with MD5 authentication. u Enabling MD5 based authentication for RIPv2 u Disabling RIP completely and using OSPF with MD5 authentication as interior gateway protocol. OSPF is the suggested IGP.

28. OSPF u OSPF - Open Shortest Path First –Link-State Interior Gateway Protocol. In wide use within autonomous systems. –OSPF is the recommended IGP, intended as a replacement for RIP.

29. OSPF Security Flaws u Authentication

30. OSPF Authentication Flaws u Default Lack of Authentication –By default in some implementations, OSPF authentication may be off. u Cleartext "simple password" Authentication –Commonly a default setting, clear-text password included in OSPF message used to authenticate peers. u Type of authentication determined by "CODE" field in the OSPF message header.

31. OSPF Attacks u Forging OSPF messages –Can be somewhat difficult but theoretically possible if no authentication required or cleartext password obtained.

32. OSPF Solution u Enable MD5 Authentication in OSPF implementation.

33. BGP u BGP, The Border Gateway Protocol –Successor to EGP, the Exterior Gateway Protocol. Used primarily for connecting autonomous systems.

34. BGP Security Flaws u Transport Mechanism u Authentication

35. BGP Authentication Flaws u Default lack of authentication –In some operating systems/network devices supporting BGP, authentication may not be used by default. u Default "simple password" cleartext –Password sent in cleartext across the network by default.

36. BGP Transport Mechanism Flaws u BGP uses TCP transport. –Communication occurs on TCP port 179. –Vulnerable to TCP Security Problems such as Syn flood, sequence number prediction. »Denial of Service »Advertisement of Invalid Routes

37. BGP Transport Method Flaws u Uses TCP –Reliable, sequenced control protocol. –Trusts Initial Sequence Number (ISN) generation –If ISN generation is weak, vulnerable to ip- spoofing/hijack attacks. –Vulnerable to attacks affecting TCP, ie, Syn Flood »Denial of Service

38. BGP Attacks u Sending forged UPDATEs to AS Gateways –Possible if the ISN generation on the target is weak. –No sequencing in BGP other than TCP sequence –Must be authenticated (if authentication req) u Hijacking BGP connection between peers –If password is known or no-authentication u Denial of Service –Syn flooding port 179

39. BGP Attacks (cont) u Dictionary attack –Simple-Password Authentication (cleartext password) vulnerable to a basic dictionary attack. u If properly authenticated, a malicious UPDATE can alter the outward flow of network traffic for an entire AS. –Routes for address space not belonging to the BGP speaker can be advertised and stored in tables.

40. BGP Attacks (Cont.) u Compromised BGP Source –If a router supporting BGP is compromised, it is certainly possibly to begin advertising invalid routes with little to stop it. –This can divert the traffic from other AS routers who trust the routes advertised by the compromised one. –Traffic can be intercepted, hijacked or monitored.

41. BGP Solutions u Enable md5 authentication u Limit access to the service (TCP port 179) u Configure route filters

42. Authentication Flaw Overview u Authentication is a means for verification and granting of access u Problems range from denial of service to active and passive attacks leading to total compromise –gain access –elevate access

43. Authentication Mechanisms u Radius u TACACS, XTACACS, TACACS+ u NIS/NIS+ u LDAP

44. RADIUS u Remote Authentication Dial In User Service u RFC 2138 & 2139 u Used to authenticate users u Off-machine/device authentication –Central authentication server called a NAS –Popular implementations from Livingston and Merit

45. Radius Security Model u UDP Based transport u Each packet contains an authenticator –Access-Requests »md5(secret + authenticator) ^ user password –Access-Reject & Access-Accept »md5(Code + ID + Length + Request-Auth + Attributes + Secret)

46. Radius Flaws u Gaining the shared secret –Send Access-Request with all known values »Authenticator = 0 »User-Password = 0 »Code = Access-Request »ID = 0, length = known, Attributes = none »Reply will come back with the following u md5(1 + 0 + length + 0 + 0 + Secret) »Dictionary attack for Secret u radbrute.tar.gz

47. Radius Flaws... u Passive attack –Knowledge of a user password will allow attack if sniffing is possible –Request-Access uses user password + authenticator + shared secret »md5(authenticator + shared secret) ^ user pass »obtain md5 by ^ userpass »brute force dictionary attack with known authenticator

48. Radius Flaws... u Replay –Radius servers must not reuse authenticator »if authenticator isn’t cryptographically random, repeat authentications until an authenticator is reused, and replay server Request-Accept u Failure limits and logging limit the effectivity »Predictable authenticator u If authenticator can be predicted, replay attacks become easier and more effective

49. TACACS, XTACACS and TACACS+ u Terminal Access Controller Access Control System?? –Old protocol developed by BBN for Milnet u Similar in concept to RADIUS –Central authentication server moves authentication off device or host u RFC 1492, Internet Draft “The TACACS+ Protocol”

50. TACACS, etc Flaws u TACACS & XTACACS –UDP Transport »spoof RESPONSE messages from server trivially –Cleartext authentication normal »User names and password sent exposed u MD5 in newer implementations –Good way to crack passwords online »Easy, fast way to grind for accounts with bad passwords

51. TACACS+ u TCP Transport –Doesn’t suffer from easy spoofing; may be hijackable u Authentication and Encryption –May be possible to conduct attacks similar to RADIUS u Defaults and failure modes may pose problems –tacacs-server last-resort succeed

52. NIS and NIS+ u Network Information Service u Originally from Sun u Popular scheme for distributing password, name service, etc u RPC based transport

53. NIS and NIS+ Flaws u NIS transports in plaintext u NIS is only protected by a domainname –easily guessed u Many vulnerabilities in implementations –quick search for NIS and NIS+ vulnerabilities resulted in over a dozen individual problems u NIS+ is sufficiently complex to install that no one uses it

54. NIS and NIS+ Solutions u Run NIS+ if at all possible u Investigate alternatives like LDAP

55. LDAP u Lightweight Directory Access Protocol u Operates on distinguished name (DN) and attribute pairs or collections

56. LDAP Flaws u New and relatively untested u Unfamiliar u Default ACL’s are typically poor u Authentication mechanisms still not fully implemented –CA based authentication still only part there u DoS attacks –Flood with requests

57. Network Management and Other Fun Flaws u SNMP u printers

58. SNMP u Simple Network Management Protocol –The most popular network management protocol –Hosts, firewalls, routers, switches…UPS, power strips, ATM cards -- ubiquitous u “One of the single biggest security nightmares on networks today”

59. SNMPv1 Security Flaws u Transport Mechanism –Data manipulation –Denial of Service –Replay u Authentication –Host Based –Community Based u Information Disclosure

60. SNMP Transport Mechanism Flaws u UDP Based –Unreliable - packets may or may not be received –Easily forged - trivial to forge source of packets

61. SNMP Authentication Flaws u Host Based –Fails due to UDP transport –DNS cache poisoning u Community Based –Cleartext community –Community name prediction/brute forcing –Default communities

62. SNMP Popular Defaults u Popular defaults –public –private –write –“all private” –monitor –manager –security –admin –lan –default –password –tivoli –openview –community –snmp –snmpd –system –and on and on...

63. SNMPv1 Information Disclosure u Routing tables u Network topology u Network traffic patterns u Filter rules

64. RMON and RMON2 Security u SNMPv1’s flaws u additional hazards by introducing “action invocation” objects u collects extensive info on subnet u packet captures

65. SNMP Fixes u Disable it u ACL It u Read-Only

66. Printers Flaws u Actually a very large potential problem u Laundering of hacking spoils u bounce attacks u Denial of service

67. Printer flaws... u Many printers have FTP servers –Allow anonymous access »store as much data as memory or disk space in the printer - great place to store hacking tools, sniffer logs, and other stolen things –Most are poor implementations »easily used in more complex attacks u ftp bounce u Berkeley lpd flaws

68. Printer flaws... u Denial of Service –Used as a tool to conduct DoS »most love to respond to broadcast pings u smurf –Service denied »poor tcp/ip implementations u crash easily »poor service implementation u SNMP u ftp

69. Printer fixes? u Disable everything you can

70. Example applications u Defeat sniffing –Race hosts on ARP replies –reply to ARP’s with broadcast address –overpopulate caches »some switches will flush their caches –alter routing on the host you want to sniff

71. Examples u Defeating things like SSH –Alter routing –Create SSH proxy »Client will note key mismatch, but who ever pays attention? u Gaining router access –Obtain auth protocol key via brute force –Extract passwords on the wire –Just plain old sniff

72. What to do? u Maintain good perimeter defenses –At least you only have to trust your employees… u Use cryptographically secure transports –Crypto is good »But crypto fails without good policy u Disable unneeded services –Not using SNMP?

73. What to do... u Disable things like routed on hosts –99% of the time, static routes work fine on end machines u Use the strongest authentication methods possible –Long keys, strong crypto

74. Questions? Dave Ahmad <da@securityfocus.com Jeremy Rauch