Presentation on theme: "‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’"— Presentation transcript:
1‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’ – Mark Twain
2An NFPA study (Fahy, 2002) observed that the death rates for the three major causes of fatal injuries to firefighters while inside structure fires (lost inside, structural collapse, and fire progress) have been rising.Rita Fahy
3This same study points to a lack of experience as a potential cause of fireground fatalities from traumatic injury resulting from rapid fire progress or collapse.
4Training related fatalities have also been on the increase. ANDLive fire training has typically been one of the leading types of training activity resulting in fatalities.(USFA, 2003)
5So......Injuries and fatalities during LF trainingandduring fireground operationsare on the increase!FirefighterExperienceFiregroundOperationsLive FireTraining
6Live fire training policies are defined by three interrelated components: National consensus standards:NFPA 1403,OSHA regulations,Local SOGs or SOPs
7NFPA 1403, 2007 editionNFPA 1403 places emphasis on addressing unsafe acts and conditions directly connected to accidents that have occurred during LF training.Reactive, not proactive
8NFPA 1403, 2007 editionTraining fire suppression personnel engaged in firefighting operations under live fire conditions.Provide a process for conducting live fire training evolutions to ensure that they are conducted in safe facilities and that the exposure to health and safety hazards for the firefighters receiving the training is minimized.Facilities v Structures
9NFPA 1403 is a compliance standard, NFPA 1403, 2007 editionNFPA 1403 is a compliance standard,not acompetency standard.The only competency addressed states... "qualified by the authority having jurisdiction to deliver firefighter training."There is nothing that says that you have to be this good of FF to participate in LF.
10Safe and effective live fire training is dependent on knowledgeable and experienced instructors.
11Instructors must have expertise in fire behavior and tactical operations. They must also understand how to pass this expertise on to their students.
12History of NFPA 1403Memorial outside of Boulder Fire Station 3
13Boulder, Colorado Jan 1982S & R drills in old dirt floor shack/garage/chicken coop. Fire burning in the rear, mazes for searching small objects.Training Lt. not qualified for exercise. Low density combustible fiberboard.Pics: Lt. Dan Cutler receiving medical attention after being trapped in a flashover that claimed his two ff’s lives.Chaos as the structure continues to burn.
142 FFs die during search & rescue drills, Lt seriously injured Combustible Fiberboard, Tires, Motor Oil thrown into burn pit just to produce smokePic: Evidence collection
15Scott Smith’ fiance at the funeral Lt. Dan Cutler in 2007 talking about the events. (25 years)9 surgeries – asked why he came back, he said he had to, couldn’t deal with it by himeself.
17Firefighter severely burned while assisting with search & rescue drills using a burn barrel This is a picture of the FF on the day of the incident, wearing exactly what he had on at the time of the injuryGreg Flagler the day of the accident.S & R drills in an abandoned shed looking for a baby doll.Only fire a barrel in the corner. Room flashed and curtain at door wrapped around Greg as he tried to exit.No hoseline ready or charged.Greg burned for almost 40 seconds.
23Milford, MichiganArson awareness class, AC created several props and tied them together with wax paper. Fire would not light due to being to rich. FF trapped on second floor when mixture hit due to windows being broken.Killed 3 ffs, including the estranged ex-wife of the AC
24Three FFs perish during an attempt at arson investigation training.No accountability and the use of multiple props simultaneously contribute to the fatal incidentArson awareness class, AC created several props and tied them together with wax paper. Fire would not light due to being to rich. FF trapped on second floor when mixture hit due to windows being broken.Killed 3 ffs, including the estranged ex-wife of the AC
25Parsippany, NJFirst live fire exercise for recruits inside of a school bus at a waste water treatment plant. (2 miles from a training center) Objective was to make the students feel heat.Three hurt, one critical, with permanent disabilities.
26Young FF is permanently disabled as a result of live fire training inside of a dilapidated school bus. The training took place two miles from a comprehensive training facility. The objective of the training was “to make them feel some heat.”Couch, truck tire, wooden door, three barrels with kerosene-soaked wood, 5 gallon can of gasoline
28Greenwood, DelawareAssistant Chief dies during burn down while using a pressurized garden sprayer in a room with several fires burning.2000AC Arnold Blankenship killed during burndown of structure Only ff wearing full gear and SCBA.Pic above taken at time of accident.The use of a SCBA contributed to the fatality, since the chief was not used to wearing one during interior live firetraining.
30Lairdsville, New York 9 Sept. 2001 Live victim during S & R drills. Two new ffs, first time in SCBAs.2 jumped out of hole in side of house (pic)
31Rookie FF dies during RIT training The 19 year old had been on the dept for less than 3 weeks before being placed above the inferno.The investigation would reveal that the young man’s SCBA was never turned on. The Assistant Chief that started the fire by pushing a couch and mattress against the bottom of the stairwell was criminally convicted of manslaughter.
32Golden died on second floor, SCBA was never turned on. Barrel on second floor was supposed to be the only fire.
33AC Alan Baird pushed a couch against bottom of stairs and lit it.
34AC Baird on trial. Golden’s SCBA is shown on the screen in the background.
35Baird after the sentence. 1 ½ years, never can serve with a FD again.
36-John Klein Lairdsville Fire Company Vice President “He just joined August 20th. He was only on two controlled burns, and now he’s gone. It’s sad that we have to lose young guys like that.”-John KleinLairdsville Fire Company Vice President
38PoincianaTwo firefighters entered as a crew without a hose line to simulate a search and rescue operation looking for a mannequin dressed as a firefighter.A crew with a hose line was located in the next room by the doorway that led to the fire room.The deaths were the result of ‘smoke inhalation and thermal injuries suffered during the training exercise.The addition of the foam mattress to the fire load is one of many variables that could contribute to a flashover, but is not exclusive.
48Investigative Findings Criminal charges not filed – but not closed.36 specific findings –This was not a BFST Certified Training Facility.Although not approved for gas, a gas-fueled fire was used in this training.NFPA 1402 and 1403 were not complied with. (1403 was required by FAC)
49No Safety Officer, RIT, EMS stand-by or other emergency contingencies in place or planned. Lack of command structure and plans, including no real Incident Commander.Not all personnel assigned to these evolutions had specific training for “live-fire” training or familiarity with the structure.The environment was determined to be excessively hot by the Lead Instructor, but the evolution was not terminated.
50There were two separate fires within the structure burning simultaneously. The exercise was more advanced than for initial recruit training.The Instructor-In-Charge failed to identify and correct safety hazards.Instructors did not closely monitor trainee movement.Instructors did not follow the trainees out to ensure they all reached the outside safely.There was not a means of monitoring the temperature of the environment.
51The ventilation means available in this incident had been rendered unusable. Other, non-organic materials such as polypropylene rope were found in the “fire-box” by investigators.When the two instructors at the “fire-box” left, they failed to notify the Incident Commander.
52Findings 9 M-D Fire Rescue personnel disciplined M-D Acting Training Chief suspended for 30 daysLegal actions resulting in settlements over $2 million, with other lawsuits pending
53Wayne MitchellMarried with children37 Yr Old RecruitFirst Live Fire
54Pennsylvania State Fire Academy 2005 Located in Borough of Lewistown -Mifflin County, PAFacility opened in 1955* PSFAOnly facility owned and operated by Commonwealth of PA
55The Pennsylvania State Fire Academy Current class A burn buildings opened in May 1993Lined with “High Temperature Lining” (HTL) in 2001
56Instructor dies while operating alone inside the basement of a burn building after incurring a catastrophic failure of his facepiece while inside of the burn room. He was unable to escape the room before collapsing, and a delay with the fire attack crew outside meant that a great deal of time would pass before he was finally discovered.
64NFPA Violations: Multiple Fires Set (8) Failure to conduct walk-throughLack of adequate radio communicationsInsufficient safety personnelNo pre-burn plan or pre-burn briefingUse of unapproved materials; (tires mattresses)
65Pre-existing condition of structure; no preparation done prior to burnMisunderstanding of verbal communications – IC / InstructorRIT comprised of recruits;not properly prepared for deployment
66Renowned LP Gas instructor is injured while attempting to fix a leak in his school’s training field
71NCFRC Exceptions:NC Fire and Rescue Commission adopts NFPA 1403 – Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions, 2007 edition.The following exceptions to the national consensus standard are listed:
72Chapter 4, Section 4-3, Fuel Materials, paragraph 4-3.6 “The use of flammable or combustible liquids, as defined in NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, shall not be permitted for use in live fire training evolutions in acquired structures.”The Commission supports the pre-application of small, appropriate amounts of Class 'B' fuel on a fire set, if necessary, before the training fire has been started. The Commission recognizes that the pre-application of Class 'B' fuel, as an option, is a useful tool for the Live Fire Qualified instructor when conducting live fire training.
73Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Structures and Facilities, Paragraph 188.8.131.52 “roof ventilation openings that are normally closed but can be opened in the event of an emergency shall be permitted to be utilized.”The Commission supports the 1997 edition, Section *(g) that states “an adequate ventilation opening(s) shall be made in the roof.” This statement has been removed from the 2002/2007 editions. The Commission supports the Live Fire Qualification course and takes exception to this removal. The Commission requires that all Live Burn courses discuss ventilation openings for increased safety.
74Chapter 5, Section 5-3, Paragraph 1 “….multiplied by the construction classification number as determined by Chapter 4 and multiplied by 1.5”The Commission requires the Live Fire Qualification course to teach a multiplication factor of .5 added to the initial exposure factor for every additional exposure identified in the pre-fire plan.
75Three Other NCFRC Policies: Mandatory re-qualification for LFQ instructors every five year NFPA 1403 revision cycleInjury InvestigationsLive Fire Training Audits: Acquired Structures
76Mandatory Re-qualification Every Five Years(NFPA 1403 Revision Cycle)The Certification Board recommends the Commission adopt a mandatory re-qualification class for all LFQ instructors to be taken every 5 years, as the NFPA 1403 standard is revised.
77Injury Investigations The Delivery Agency shall notify the Fire and Rescue Commission, as soon as possible, within 72 hours, of an injury associated with Live Fire Training.
78Live Fire Training Audits The Delivery Agency shall notify the Fire and Rescue Commission staff at least 15 days prior to a live fire training class, providing the location, time, and the name of the lead instructor for the purpose of random audits.-Fire TrainingNotification Form