Presentation on theme: "Luba Beardsley November 2010. 1. Because judiciary is type of organization that depends very much on individual contributions. 2. In developing countries."— Presentation transcript:
Luba Beardsley November 2010
1. Because judiciary is type of organization that depends very much on individual contributions. 2. In developing countries performance of judicial systems is often based solely on human resources.
HRM is concerned with management of workforce: Selection, recruitment, (re)assignment Job design Remuneration Training Promotion Performance review Discipline (removal, salary decrease, dismissal) Remuneration Dismissal
HR for judges and others should promote EFFECTIVE USE OF HR while recognizing that INDEPENDENCE (& Impartiality) drives court philosophy, structure, decisions.
Recruitment (merit based hiring) Tenure Ius de non Evocando (Legal Judge & Immovability of Judge Remuneration (salary, benefits, pension) Immunities Incompatibilities Performance monitoring Impeachment
Salary To allow to recruit and retain staff Comparative labor market ( within court jurisdictions, vis a vis other legal professionals; vis a vis civil servants) Pillar of independence Legal guarantees (through defining scales & processes in which salaries are decided) Training (is about competence) Strategic focus ( a lack of it) Self-training (underestimation) Opportunities for learning Access to information Specialization Judge generalist vs. judge specialist Benefits of economy of specialization or economy of scale and flexibility Dual loyalties of staff ( civil servants) Who controls management of staff and how it effect quantity and quality of its contribution to overall judicial business
Combination of monopoly on decision- making, high discretion power and formal guarantees of independence Misplaced loyalties Demotivation stemming from constant criticism and bad working conditions Sense of uniqueness and/or isolation Lack of competence
Number of judges & staff and their ratio (measures of input & quality & operational efficiency) Number of judges/court personnel per capita (measure of input) High numbers, especially if combined with backlog ( could be a signal of access issues and low quality) Expenditure for personnel – measure of input (and more if combined with other measures) Ratio judge/staff/case (measure of operational effectiveness, productivity, division of labor[specialization]) Judge & staff per court (measure of court size) Judges per jurisdiction ( measure of specialization)
1. Should be concerned with matching human resources to medium and longer term business needs as defined through court functions and jurisdictions, existing and forecasted workload, court procedures and operations and broader planning documents. 2. Should be strategic -- should combine strategy for a sector with workforce that is needed to achieve objectives Full internal & external integration of HR management into judicial business
1412 judges ( 40 million population); 9 in the SC (36 assistants) – 80% of cases decided there 421 appeal judges ( 34 courts) 807 first instance judges ( 403) Appointed in 6 fundamentally different regimes (50% by current Government); 36,6% does not have university education; 40% have only secondary education; 3% are female judges; 40% does not have an induction training; Judges enjoy life tenure; Some judges decide 2 cases per year; According to law district has at least 3 judges; some districts have no courts some have 1 or 2 judges; Judges are among the most corrupt among public officials and make about 20-60$ per months; Process and criteria for selection of new judges meets int. standards
In Poland in 90’s: 150% increase of case per capita while clearance rate followed the same path; In the beginning of 2000 there was backlog of 30 % of the case inflow; The situation was critical especially in Warsaw where the inflow of cases and backlog grew up to 250%; The increase of judges was only available way to address crisis; 10% of positions in 1 st instance courts and 12 % of positions at the regional courts were vacant; Apprenticeship took 3 years; Appointment process required about 10 additional months; Rules did not allowed to reassign judges and staff from one court to another. At the same time: High number of those who passed exam & sitting judges left for more lucrative private practice (BAR introduced restrictive entrance policies and this was most viable option to meet formal criteria and get accepted); At the same time high number of older private lawyers were joining bench just to retire and get judge pension.