2Overview Games capturing strategic decision-making Non-cooperative v/s cooperative gamesExample of ‘Acquiring a Company’Dominant StrategiesNash EquilibriumMaximin StrategiesRepeated games with finite/infinite horizonsSequential gamesAdvantage of moving first
3Games and Strategic Decisions A game is any situation in which players (the participants) make strategic decisions – i.e. decisions that take into account each others actions and responses.Strategic decisions result in payoffs to the players – outcomes that generate rewards or benefits.A strategy is a rule or plan of action for playing the game.The optimal strategy is the one that maximizes the expected payoff.4
4Non-cooperative versus Cooperative Games Players negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategiesExample: Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (e.g., Microsoft and Apple)Binding contracts possible to reach Pareto-superior position for bothNon-cooperative GameNegotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possibleExample: Two competing firms take each other’s likely behavior into account when independently setting pricing and advertising strategy to gain market share6
5Acquiring a Company (study yourself with clues given here) Company A: The AcquirerCompany T: The TargetA will offer cash for all of T’s sharesThe value of T depends on the outcome of a current oil exploration project.Failure: T’s value => $0Success: T’s value => $100/shareAll outcomes are equally likelyT’s value will be 50% greater with A’s management.A must submit the proposal before the exploration outcome is known.T will not choose to accept or reject until after the outcome is known only to T.How much should A offer?10
6Acquiring a Company (study yourself with clues given here) Suppose the amount offered for the firm is F. T accepts the offer if its value (X) is less than equal to F. T’s expected pay-off, as seen by A, is ½F. Under A’s management, F/2 is worth 1/2F.3/2=¾ F, which is still less than the offer amount F. So, A should not acquire the firm.Pdf = 1/100100XF
7Myopic behavior under ‘Pay a Dollar Bill’ (study yourself with clues given here) Rationale for a bid<$1.00 => as long as bid<1.00, net marginal gain>0Rationale for a bid>$1.00 => if a person has lost earlier, he may bid>1.00 in the hope that he would recoup a part of the accumulated loss if he wins the bid this time. The less risk-averse (or, more risk-loving) the person is, this situation is more likely to arise.However, the first time bid will generally be <1.00
8Dominant StrategiesOne that is optimal, no matter what the opponent does.An ExampleA & B sell competing productsThey are deciding whether to undertake advertising campaigns9
9Payoff Matrix for Advertising Game A: regardless of B, advertising is the bestB: regardless of A, advertising is bestDominant strategy for A & B is to advertise, i.e (10,5)Do not worry about the other playerEquilibrium in dominant strategyNote dominant strategy => Nash equilibrium as wellFirm AAdvertiseDon’tFirm B10, 515, 010, 26, 814
10Advertising Game – No Dominant Strategy A: No dominant strategy; depends on B’s actionsB: Advertise as dominant strategyThe optimal decision of a player without a dominant strategy will depend on what the other player does.(10,5) is a Nash equilibrium, though not a dominant strategy, because once it is reached, there will be no for either side to move away from it.So, Nash equilibrium is a much more general concept, of which dominant strategy constitutes only a sub-set10, 515, 020, 26, 8Firm AAdvertiseDon’tFirm B18
11Dominant Strategies Equilibrium vs. Nash Equilibrium Dominant strategies are stable and self-enforcing.However, in many games one or more players do not have a dominant strategyNash equilibrium is a more general conceptA Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that each player is doing the best it can given the actions of its opponents.In the previous table, both firms advertise is the Nash equilibrium.A dominant strategy equilibrium is a special case of a Nash equilibrium.
12Product Choice Problem Examples With A Nash EquilibriumTwo cereal companiesOperate in a market in which two new types of cereal can be successfully introduced – crispy or sweet – only if each type is introduced by only one firm.Each firm only has the resources to introduce one cerealEach firm is indifferent about what it produces, as long as it does not introduce the same product as its competitorThe firms behave in a non-cooperative way22
13Product Choice Problem There are two Nash equilibriums (even though no dominant strategy exists) – the bottom left and top right of the table (both arrows pointing to those two cells)Each is stable because once the strategies are chosen, no one will deviateWithout more information, no way of knowing which equilibrium is likely to result.Firm 1CrispySweetFirm 2-5, -510, 1024
14Beach Location Game (study yourself with clues given here) OceanBBeachA200 yardsCYWhere will the competitors locate (i.e. where is the Nash equilibrium)?27
15Maximin Strategies (Best of a bad bargain!) Firm 1Don’t investInvestFirm 20, 0-10, 1020, 10-100, 0I’s Min-10Maximin for I=-10=no invest-100II’s Min10Maximin for II=10=investiminInvest is a dominant strategy for firm 2. The outcome invest-invest is the only Nash equilibrium.Firm 1’s managers must be sure that firm 2’s managers are rational. If firm 2 fails to invest, it would be very costly for firm 1.If firm 1 is unsure about the rationality of firm 2 then it may play ‘don’t invest’. Then the worst that can happen is a loss of $10 mn, as opposed to a loss of $100mn.Such a strategy is called MAXIMIN – maximizing the minimum gain that can be earned. A maximin strategy is conservative, and not profit maximizing.
16Maximizing the Expected Payoff If firm 1 is unsure of what firm 2 will but can assign probabilities to each possible action of firm 2 then it can maximize its expected payoff.Firm 1’s strategies depend upon its assessment of the probabilities of different actions of firm 2 in the face of uncertainties over market conditions, future costs, competitor behavior etc.
17Prisoner’s Dilemma -5, -5 -1, -10 -2, -2 -10, -1 Prisoner AConfessDon’t ConfessDon’tPrisoner B-5, -5-1, -10-2, -2-10, -1A’s Min-5-10B’s Min-5-10Confessing (-5, -5) is a dominant strategy for each prisoner.Dominant strategies are also maximin strategies. So confess-confess is both a Nash equilibrium and a maximin solution.
18Repeated GamesOligopolistic firms play a repeated game of making output and pricing decisions.With each repetition of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, firms can develop reputations about their behavior and study the behavior of their competitors.Firms search for the strategy that is best in a series of repeated games.39
19Example of a Repeated Game – Pricing Problem Tit-for-tat strategy works best underInfinite repetitions of game – cooperative behavior is the rational responseCumulative loss of profits from under- cutting outweighs any short term gain from first time under cuttingFirm 1Low PriceHigh PriceFirm 210, 10100, -5050, 50-50, 10041
20Example of a Repeated Game – Pricing Problem Even if competitor unsure of tit-for-tat strategy, cooperation is still rational in an infinite period game, because expected gains from cooperation outweigh those from undercutting, even if probability of competitor playing tit-for-tat is small.Finite repetitionsNon-cooperation is the rational outcome, with each one charging a low price every month.Outcome arises because each one strives to be the first to undercut price and make a windfall gain.
21Tit-for-tat StrategyThe mere possibility that you play tit-for-tat is sufficient for competitor to cooperate if the time horizon is long enough.Most managers don’t know how long they will be competing with their rivals, serving to make cooperation a good strategy, except near the end (called end game problem).Thus in a repeated game, prisoner’s dilemma can have a cooperative outcome. Industries where only a few firms compete under stable demand and cost conditions may cooperate even though no contractual arrangements are made. E.g. water meters.Failure to cooperate is the result of rapidly shifting demand or cost conditions, e.g. airlines.
22Sequential Games Players move in turn Players must think through the possible actions and rational reactions of each playerExamplesResponding to a competitor’s ad campaignEntry decisionsResponding to regulatory policy49
23The Extensive Form of a Game ScenarioTwo new (sweet, crispy) cerealsSuccessful only if each firm produces one cerealSweet will sell betterBoth still profitable with only one producerFirm 2CrispySweetNash equilibriumCrispy-5, -510, 2020, 10Firm 1SweetNash equilibrium51
24The Extensive Form of a Game Assume that Firm 1 will introduce its new cereal first (a sequential game).Using a decision tree, work backward from the best outcome for Firm 1.CrispySweet-5, -510, 2020, 10Firm 1CrispySweetFirm 2In this product-choice game, there is a clear advantage to moving first. By introducing the sweet cereal first, firm 1 creates a fait accompli that forces firm 2 to introduce the crispy one.55
27Choosing Output This payoff matrix illustrates various outcomes Move together, both produce 10QuestionWhat if Firm 1 moves first?Firm 17.5Firm 2112.50,56.25,0, 0112.50, 56.25125, 93.7550, 7593.75, 12575, 50100, 1001015CollusionStackelbergCounotStackelberg66
28A Re-look at the same Example There is no dominant strategy for Firm 1, nor for Firm 2, as directions of arrows indicateFor Firm 1, c is a dominated strategy – dominated by strategy b, as directions of red arrows indicate. So, for finding out profit-maximizing strategies firm 1’s c strategy can be deleted.Similarly, firm 2’s c strategy, which is dominated by strategy b, can be deleted.Thus, one can find out profit- maximizing strategies by merely concentrating on strategies a & b only of both firms (i.e., at 2x2 matrix).As both red & green arrows are pointed towards (100,100) cell, it is a Nash equilibrium.However, (112.5,112.5) constitutes a maximin strategy, as arrows in the last row & column, made out of the entire matrix, indicate.Firm 1a=7.5Firm 2112.50,56.25,0, 0112.50, 56.25125, 93.7550, 7593.75, 12575, 50100, 100b=10c=15a=7.5b=10C=15Firm 1’s min56.25Firm 150Firm 2’s min56.255066
29An Additional Example 10,10 100,-30 140,35 -20,30 No dominant strategy Prisoner ANo price risePrice riseFirm B10,10100,-30140,35-20,30A’s MinNo price rise10-20B’s Min10-30No dominant strategy(10,10) & (140,35) are Nash equilibria(10,10) is also maximin strategy