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Homeland Security Presidential Directives

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0 Training Support Package

1 Homeland Security Presidential Directives
Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium

2 Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to:
Learning Objectives Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to: Recall and apply the Homeland Security Presidential Directives to all hazards planning and management in rural communities. Identify localized threats, vulnerabilities, and natural and man made disasters in rural communities. List types of threats specifically addressed in the 24 Homeland Security Presidential Directives and how they relate to rural communities. Summarize guidelines and limitations of federal response to local disasters. Identify government agencies, organizations and programs involved in disaster response and the acronyms that represent them.

3 Background of National Security Presidential Directives
First dated February 13, 2001 Approved for public release by the National Security Council staff on March 13, 2001 November 2008, 59 of these directives had been issued Some were also issued concurrently as Homeland Security Presidential Directives. October 29, 2001, President Bush issued a new series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives governing homeland security policy. Although President George W. Bush and his national security advisers have provided little detail about his directives in this series, the first such instrument, dated February 13, 2001, and approved for public release by the National Security Council staff on March 13, indicates that they are denominated National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) and may serve double duty for both decision and review purposes. The initial NSPD pertained to the organization of National Security Council policy and coordination subgroups. By late November 2008, 59 of these directives had been issued. Some, like NSPD-41 (HSPD-13), NSPD-43 (HSPD-14), NSPD-47 (HSPD- 16), NSPD-51 (HSPD-20), and NSPD-59 (HSPD-24) were also issued concurrently as Homeland Security Presidential Directives. On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued the first of a new series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) governing homeland security policy.

4 25 Presidential Directives
Organization and operation of the Homeland Security Council Combating terrorism through immigration policies Homeland Security advisory system National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Management of Domestic Incidents Integration and use of screening information

5 25 Presidential Directives
7. Critical Infrastructure, Identification, Prioritization, and Protection 8. National Preparedness National Planning 9. Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food 10. Biodefense for the 21st century 11. Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures 12. Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors

6 25 Presidential Directives
13. Maritime Security Policy 15. U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror 16. Aviation Strategy 17. Nuclear Materials Information Program 18. Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction 19. Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States

7 25 Presidential Directives
20. National Continuity Policy Continuity Planning 21. Public Health and Medical Preparedness 23. National Cyber Security Initiative 24. Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security 25. Arctic Region Policy

8 Directive 1-Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1 creates the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and enumerates its functions. The purpose of the HSC is twofold: to coordinate homeland security-related efforts across executive departments and agencies of all levels throughout the country, and to implement the Department’s policies through eleven Policy Coordination Committees. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 1 creates the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and enumerates its functions. The purpose of the HSC is twofold: to coordinate homeland security-related efforts across executive departments and agencies of all levels throughout the country, and to implement the Department’s policies through eleven Policy Coordination Committees. During 9/11 the lessons learned included the loss of first responders’ lives. Failures in interoperable communications and inter-agency cooperation and coordination led the post-9/11 committee, President Bush, and Cabinet level administrators to develop strategy of intervention. State Governors and leaders responded by the formation at state level homeland security councils, councils utilizing agencies within state government to coordinate and facilitate disasters by integration of planning activities. Local state districts, counties and municipalities created homeland security councils or committees to coordinate, administer and purchase items allowed by grants to comply with federal homeland security goals. Through your election or appointment you will be serving on the local homeland security council. You will be responsible for policy, administrative, readiness, response, recovery and the evaluation of your local emergency operations plan.

9 Homeland Security Council
President of the United States Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Vice President Secretary of Homeland Security Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of Defense Attorney General Secretary of Health and Human Services Secretary of Transportation White House Chief of Staff Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency The Homeland Security Council (HSC) is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United States and was created by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1 (HSPD-1) on October 29, 2001.It served as the successor to the Office of Homeland Security, established on September 20, 2001, immediately after to the September 11 attacks. Congress subsequently codified the HSC in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, charging it with advising the President on homeland security matters. On February 23, 2009, the Obama administration released Presidential Study Directive 1 to federal government officials. This memorandum ordered a 60-day interagency review of the White House homeland security and counter-terrorism structure. The review will recommend whether to retain a separate Homeland Security Council or to incorporate some or all of its functions within the NSC. There is an ongoing debate among policymakers and observers regarding whether HSC should be retained as an independent entity or merged with the NSC. On May 26th, 2009, the Homeland Security Council was folded into the National Security Council

10 Homeland Security Council
The Assistant to the Vice President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President Director of the Office of Management and Budget Secretary of State Secretary of the Interior Secretary of Agriculture Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Labor Secretary of Energy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Assistant to the President for National Security Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism

11 Directive 2- Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies
The aim of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 is to prevent the entry of alien terrorist sympathizers and supporters into the United States and to detain, prosecute and deport those already in U.S. borders. HSPD 2 mandates the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to coordinate Federal agencies in the implementation of the aggressive policy outlined above. HSPD 2 also enhances the enforcement capabilities of the INS and Customs Service, as well as implementing measures to combat international student visa abuse. This Directive also mandates coordination with the immigration efforts of both Canadian and Mexican authorities. The aim of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 is to prevent the entry of alien terrorist sympathizers and supporters into the United States and to detain, prosecute and deport those already in U.S. borders. HSPD 2 mandates the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to coordinate Federal agencies in the implementation of the aggressive policy outlined above. HSPD 2 also enhances the enforcement capabilities of the INS and Customs Service, as well as implementing measures to combat international student visa abuse. This Directive also mandates coordination with the immigration efforts of both Canadian and Mexican authorities. State and local officials cannot determine national policy, though their geographical or physical location may be affected by rural border issues. This class will not address the issues of borders or immigration policy.

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13 Directive 3-Homeland Security Advisory System
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 creates a Homeland Security Advisory System to inform all levels of government and local authority, as well as the public, to the current risk of terrorist acts. The System involves a five-level, color-coded Threat Condition indicator to correspond to the current situation. Agency-specific Protective Measures associated with each Threat Condition will allow a flexible, graduated and appropriate response to a change in the nation’s level of risk. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 creates a Homeland Security Advisory System to inform all levels of government and local authority, as well as the public, to the current risk of terrorist acts. The System involves a five-level, color-coded Threat Condition indicator to correspond to the current situation. Agency-specific Protective Measures associated with each Threat Condition will allow a flexible, graduated and appropriate response to a change in the nation’s level of risk. The Homeland Security Advisory System shall be binding on the executive branch and suggested, although voluntary, to other levels of government and the private sector. HSPD-3 provides local Rural Elected and appointed officials a very current national assessment of the threat level and the appropriate protective measures in response. There are five Threat Conditions, each identified by a description and corresponding color. From lowest to highest, the levels and colors are: Low = Green; Guarded = Blue; Elevated = Yellow; High = Orange; Severe = Red. The higher the Threat Condition, the greater the risk of a terrorist attack. Risk includes both the probability of an attack occurring and its potential gravity. Threat Conditions shall be assigned by the Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Except in exigent circumstances, the Attorney General shall seek the views of the appropriate Homeland Security Principals or their subordinates, and other parties as appropriate, on the Threat Condition to be assigned. Threat Conditions may be assigned for the entire Nation, or they may be set for a particular geographic area or industrial sector. Assigned Threat Conditions shall be reviewed at regular intervals to determine whether adjustments are warranted. Refer to attachment 1 for assessment criteria. Refer to attachment 2 for condition color codes. The system has a general threat level and may assign other like airline flight time and etc. as specific needs require.

14 Threats are color coded to improve public recognition.

15 Low Condition (Green) This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures; Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

16 Guarded Condition (Blue)
This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement. Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations; Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.

17 Elevated Condition (Yellow)
An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement. Increasing surveillance of critical locations; Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions; Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.

18 High Condition (Orange)
A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement. Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations; Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation; Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.

19 Severe Condition (Red)
A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement. Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs; Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources; Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and Closing public and government facilities.

20 Directive 4-National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
Applies new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, strengthens alliance relationships, and establishes new partnerships with former adversaries to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. Applies new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, strengthens alliance relationships, and establishes new partnerships with former adversaries to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. HSPD 4 develops a comprehensive policy and planning strategy for the protection of and the strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). New paradigms in emergency preparedness require we examine the dangers and mutagenic effect against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high velocity explosives (CBRNE) events.

21 Chemical C-Chemical: Proper understanding and preparedness require that we examine the potential for harm and potential sources for chemical events. Sources include: Agriculture Manufacturing Transportation Residential Man-Made (Terrorist) Man-Made (Methamphetamine) Agriculture today uses scientific methods to control disease, promote growth, and kill insects. Herbicides and insecticides provide methods to effectively address crop loss and provide economic benefits. With the agricultural gains there are also potentials to contaminate workers with dangerous or deadly agents. To kill mosquitoes, farmers and communities used the agent: organophosphates. When workers are exposed they have the same potential for harm as those exposed to terrorist levels of Saran gas. When exposed to organophosphates, victims must be quickly disrobed and washed (Gross decontamination) to stop the absorption process. After decontamination, they must receive pharmacologic agents (Atropine, 2-Pam Chloride, Valium) to treat live threatening dysrythmias, stop the agent from “aging” and valium to treat seizures. Leaders must quickly recognize these agents because the drugs used as antibiotics are not kept in ambulances, or hospitals in quantities to treat large numbers of patients. MS-B4-PS3 The number of chemicals used to provide products are to numerous to discuss. Chemical manufactures, furniture manufactures, and others use a wide variety of substances in the production, painting, and treatment of a wide variety of products. If accidents or spills occur during the manufacturing process, specific measures must be used to help the worker, and sometimes the communities recover from the accident. MS-B4-PS4 Because rural communities have a wide variety of transportation systems (roads, rail, airways, and water ways) they must prepare for responses to incidents that could be dangerous to the First Responders, the public, and the nearby communities. The federal government and hazardous materials responders developed paired systems to alert and notify others of the contents of containers and allow responders to quickly identify the substances without entering areas deemed dangerous to provide emergency services. First responders must quickly and effectively size-up transportation accidents to access the needs of the responding agencies and determine the best course of action to prevent injury and death. MS-B4-PS5 Today many people have cleaning agents, do it yourself kits, and home pools that require chemical s to maintain their efficiency. These chemicals range from small glass bottles of cleaners to pressurized canisters of chloride gas. First responders must use a guide assessment of the scene to help the victims and protect themselves. Responders must quickly assess whether ventilation will clear the room or if responders must have full protective gear to adequately respond. MS-B4-PS6 With events like the subway attack on the people of Tokyo, we must remember some people have personal or political agendas. As elected or appointed officials you may be required to deal with an incident that has been purposefully perpetrated. In Tokyo, a group of terrorists home-produced a cheap form of Saran gas to release on the public subway. In the Tokyo attack, fatalities occurred with people riding the system, first responders, hospital workers, and people trying to clean up the mess. A full array of hazardous material emergencies could be group in chemical agents, but preparedness can mitigate loss. Most fire departments have plans for hazardous material. Large departments may comply with United Sates Department of Transportation requirements for Hazardous Materials terms. Smaller or rural departments may be required to ask assistance from neighbor communities, fire departments, or other district or state resources. Rural departments can provide gross decontamination until move advanced assistance arrives. MS-B5-PS7 Man-made Methamphetamines Illicit drugs are a problem to most of America today. Rural Americans in the last decade have seen problems from the manufacturing of methamphetamines in clandestine laboratories. State initiatives like placing Sudafed in secure areas at drugstores and businesses have reduced the ability to acquire basic components easily. But the cheap cost to produce methamphetamines has caused and increase in clandestine labs in cars, motels, abandoned homes and barns. The process produces strong chemical odors and manufactures seek rural places because the lack of people reduces the chance of discovery. Methamphetamine is a strong and addictive substance produced in a crude manufacturing process. The productivity process is dangerous and because of accidents, local first responders may be called for help by the manufacturers. Also, police investigations may result in the discovery of the methamphetamine lab and may require hazardous materials experts to effectively clean and dispose of the manufactured products and by-products. The problems of methamphetamines are too numerous to completely discuss, but the discovery of a laboratory will require local elected or appointed officials to a course of action to effectively deal with the problem.

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27 Biological B-Biological
Local elected or appointed officials could be requested to deal with natural and man made disasters dealing with biological agents. Emergencies emerging from biological incidents could be seen in: Military development/manufacturing Transportation Naturally developing Hospitals, nursing homes, corrections Man-Made (terrorist) MS-B4-PS8 Military bases are currently engaged in the development of, production, and defense of agents used for biological warfare. Many naturally occurring agents have previously been used, developed and improved to be used as a military tool. Anthrax has been widely seen in the news. The US Army has a special base at Fort Detrick, Maryland that has worked with anthrax for years. Previously, envelopes have been mailed to the United States Senators containing a white granular substance identified as Anthrax. Naturally occurring in agricultural operations, experts have refined and discovered advanced methods of delivery of this naturally occurring biological agent. When refined and reduced to a powder, anthrax can be delivered in small highly potent doses. The high profile anthrax attracts resulted in deaths of workers of the US Postal Services and required that the offices of the US Senate and media outlets be decontaminated to prevent exposure and sickness. Viral Hemolytic Fever (VHF), also naturally occurring, can be refined to provide an effective dose for sickness and death. VHF causes the victims solid organs to fail and massive multisystem failure. VHF has been found in rat feces and is a contagious killer. Local elected or appointed officials may be required to isolate effected victims and could be required to enact restraints on movement of effected or suspected victims. The elected or appointed official should request assistance from the attorney or from judges when enacting any form of quarantine. Local law allows officials to establish quarantines and restrict movement, but services assessment and analysis are required to prevent violation of constitutional rights of freedom for individuals. Problems can arise as a result of a quarantine like: where do you put the victims; who will enforce the quarantine; who will feed and cloth victims; basic hygiene; basic medical care; and who will pay for these services? MS-B4-PS10 Small pox was once known world wide as a killer and serious health threat for all mankind. Modern medicine produced a vaccine that all people would receive and by the 1960’s and 1970’s the World Health Organization would declare that small pox was eradicated. The government of the United States and the Soviet Republic would manifest live strains of the virus, but would prevent the use or release of these viruses. Military and civilian assessments of the small pox indicated that a few isolated cases of small pox could easily infect large areas and regions of the plant quickly. Because of the high cost of maintenance, most of the supplies of the vaccine were destroyed in the last two decades. Easily detectable people develop pox marks or pimple sores on most of their bodies. Resembling chicken pox, these pox marks can be identified because of characteristics like appearing on the palms and soles as well as all pox marks are at the same level of development. A major concern of smallpox is the airborne nature of virus transmission. MS-B4-PS11 Rural elected or appointed officials could encounter biological hazards as a transportation issue. As military laboratories work to develop new strains, vaccines and antidotes, new problems could arise. As the military uses civilian transportation systems or uses civilian roadways to transport these substances, accidents could result allowing the escape of dangerous materials. When first responders arrive at the scene of an accident most survey the scene to determine if hazards or dangers exist. Most responders do not receive training to deal with biological emergencies. Another transportation danger could involve commercial carriers who transport people. If a Greyhound bus or commercial airline entered your town and reported they were a church group returning from an African mission trip and everyone was ill, this could be a potential danger. Because many third world countries do not have monitoring systems to evaluate diseases and track outbreaks, potential dangers exist. MS-B4-PS12 The United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has recently monitored and prepared for a pandemic flu. History tells us that novel viruses included in bird and swine flu do not regularly affect humans. But flu’s like the 1912 flu quickly became pandemic and affected the world. As a local elected or appointed official you will be trained by your state department of public health in pandemic flu planning. After the extensive flu planning, officials also conceded small pox or other lethal viruses and changed to name of the training from pandemic flu planning to all hazards planning. Many elements of quarantine and logistics supply are the same regardless of the biological agent. Planners developed a strategy for mass clinics in every community in the United States. Local leaders developed strategies for turning schools into clinics, utilizing school buses to transport citizens, and preparing health care and emergency workers to distribute and inoculate all citizens if an outbreak occurs. It is possible that a flu or outbreak could occur in the United States, but it is much more likely that it would emerge in a country that agriculture, animals, and humans dwell in the same area. MS-B4-PS13 Local rural elected and appointed officials could experience a request for assistance from facilities that provide long-term care. Patients, residents, and physicians could develop infections that pose a risk to the public at large. The elected/appointed official could be the required person to declare a state of emergency or request district, regional, state or federal assistance. MS-B4-PS14 In today’s world the place the elected or appointed official may think biological terrorism is as common as opening the morning mail. A white, powdery substance is now a reason of serious concern. If first responding agencies report to the elected or appointed official this leader has the potential to face numerous threats. Although the likelihood of a biological terrorist is low, the potential does exist.

28 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
The nation's premiere health promotion, prevention, and preparedness agency and a global leader in public health. Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness & Emergency Response (COTPER) A division of the CDC Helps the nation prepare for and respond to urgent public health threats by providing strategic direction, coordination, and support for all of CDC′s terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities. COTPER Divisions The Division of Emergency Operations The Division of State and Local Readiness The Division of Strategic National Stockpile CDC′s Mission is to collaborate to create the expertise, information, and tools that people and communities need to protect their health – through health promotion, prevention of disease, injury and disability, and preparedness for new health threats. Today, CDC is the nation′s premiere health promotion, prevention, and preparedness agency and a global leader in public health. It remains at the forefront of public health efforts to prevent and control infectious and chronic diseases, injuries, workplace hazards, disabilities, and environmental health threats. CDC is globally recognized for conducting research and investigations and for its action-oriented approach. CDC applies research and findings to improve people′s daily lives and responds to health emergencies—something that distinguishes CDC from its peer agencies. CDC works with states and other partners to provide a system of health surveillance to monitor and prevent disease outbreaks (including bioterrorism), implement disease prevention strategies, and maintain national health statistics. CDC also guards against international disease transmission, with personnel stationed in more than 25 foreign countries. CDC is now focusing on achieving the four overarching Health Protection Goals to become a more performance-based agency focusing on healthy people, healthy places, preparedness, and global health. CDC is one of the 13 major operating components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness & Emergency Response (COTPER) The Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness & Emergency Response (COTPER) helps the nation prepare for and respond to urgent public health threats by providing strategic direction, coordination, and support for all of CDC′s terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities. COTPER′s mission is to safeguard health and save lives by providing a flexible and robust platform for public health emergency response (proposed). For more information on public health emergency response, please visit the CDC′s Emergency Preparedness & Response Web site. COTPER Divisions The Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) is responsible for overall coordination of CDC′s preparedness, assessment, response, recovery, and evaluation prior to and during public health emergencies. DEO is also responsible for the CDC Director´s Emergency Operations Center, which maintains situational awareness of potential health threats 24/7/365 and is the centralized location for event management when activated. The Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) administers the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement, which supports preparedness nationwide in state, local, tribal, and territorial public health departments. As of 2007, the cooperative agreement has provided more than $5 billion to these public health departments to upgrade their ability to effectively respond to the public health consequences of all hazards, including infectious diseases, natural disasters, and biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological events. The cooperative agreement currently funds 62 grantees including all 50 states, eight U.S. territories and freely associated states, and four localities. DSLR also administers a cooperative agreement for the Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) program. The CPHP program is a national network of colleges and universities that collaborates with state and local public health departments and other community partners to provide preparedness education and training resources to the public health workforce, healthcare providers, students, and others based on community need. The Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) has the mission to deliver critical medical assets to the site of a national emergency. DSNS manages the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, and medical supplies that can be used to supplement state and local resources during a large-scale public health emergency. Welcome to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For over 60 years, CDC has been dedicated to protecting health and promoting quality of life through the prevention and control of disease, injury, and disability. We are committed to programs that reduce the health and economic consequences of the leading causes of death and disability, thereby ensuring a long, productive, healthy life for all people.

29 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-Category A
Definition: U.S. public health system and primary healthcare providers must be prepared to address various biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United States. Agents/Diseases Anthrax Botulism Plague Smallpox Tularemia Viral hemorrhagic fevers High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness. Tularemia is a bacterial zoonosis. Francisella tularenisis is an aerobic, small, nonmotile, gram-negative coccobacillus. It is hardy and non-spore-forming and survives for weeks in moist soil, hay, or decaying animal carcasses. It is a facultative intracellular bacterium The clinical forms of tularemia include ulcerglandular, glandular, oculoglandular, oropharyngeal, pneumonic, typhoidal, and septic. Natural tularemia is almost entirely a rural disease. Epizootics with extensive animal deaths can herald human outbreaks. Most natural cases occur from June to September. Transmission from person to person has not been documented. A tularemia attack should be suspected when (3-5 days later) large numbers of an urban young healthy population develop an acute febrile illness with a significant number of cases of pleuropneumonia. Multiple cases of inhalational tularemia in an urban setting is suspicious for an attack. Smallpox is an infectious disease unique to humans, caused by either of two virus variants, Variola major and Variola minor. The disease is also known by the Latin names Variola or Variola vera, which is a derivative of the Latin varius, meaning spotted, or varus, meaning "pimple". The term "smallpox" was first used in Europe in the 15th century to distinguish variola from the "great pox" (syphilis). Smallpox localizes in small blood vessels of the skin and in the mouth and throat. In the skin, this results in a characteristic maculopapular rash, and later, raised fluid-filled blisters. V. major produces a more serious disease and has an overall mortality rate of 30–35%. V. minor causes a milder form of disease (also known as alastrim, cottonpox, milkpox, whitepox, and Cuban itch) which kills about 1% of its victims. Long-term complications of V. major infection include characteristic scars, commonly on the face, which occur in 65–85% of survivors.[5] Blindness resulting from corneal ulceration and scarring, and limb deformities due to arthritis and osteomyelitis are less common complications, seen in about 2–5% of cases. Smallpox is believed to have emerged in human populations about 10,000 BC. The disease killed an estimated 400,000 Europeans each year during the 18th century (including five reigning monarchs), and was responsible for a third of all blindness. Of all those infected, 20–60%—and over 80% of infected children—died from the disease. In the early 1950s an estimated 50 million cases of smallpox occurred in the world each year. As recently as 1967, the World Health Organization estimated that 15 million people contracted the disease and that two million died in that year.After successful vaccination campaigns throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the WHO certified the eradication of smallpox in December To this day, smallpox is the only human infectious disease to have been completely eradicated.

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31 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-Category B
Definition: Second highest priority agents Agents/Diseases Brucellosis Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens Food safety threats Psittacosis Q fever Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Typhus fever Viral encephalitis Water safety threats include those that are moderately easy to disseminate; result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.

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33 Radiological R-Radiological
Local rural elected and appointed officials must recognize all possible scenarios, even if the likelihood is very small. Radiological incidents would come from these areas: I-Energy II-Medical III-National laboratories IV-Transportation V-Dirty Bomb (Terrorist) A radiological weapon, radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb are terms used to describe any weapon that can spread radioactive material with the intent to kill or create destruction. A radioactive substance in order to be dispersed must be attached to an explosive device. Dirty bombs are not nuclear weapons and do not produce a nuclear chain reaction or the creation of a critical mass. The danger in radiological devices is not the explosion, but the spreading of radioactive contaminates in the food chain or in the water table. The first use of radioactive material as a weapon can be traced to a memo to Brigadier General Leslie Groves of the Manhattan Project. MS-B4-PS16 Energy-The first use of radiological material could be seen are manufacturing of fuel for use in the production of power or as a fuel source for ships and submarines. The products could be in the form of unused fuel or used (spent) fuel. It is possible that produces (who are frequently in rural areas) could have these products stolen. MS-B4-PS17 Medical- Many medical procedures, treatments, and tests utilize the use of radiological materials to assist in identification of conditions and treatment of conditions. These products are located in hospitals, clinics, and carried by some practitioners. The use of these medical products as terrorist tools are limited, but public preparedness and panic association with “radioactive” could cause civil unrest and disturbance. MS-B4-PS18 Natural Laboratories-The United States Department of Energy has natural laboratories located throughout the United States. The research facility also acts as a repository for the long-term storage of much of the radiological material. Although highly guarded, these facilities could be robbed to obtain “radiological material.” MS-B4-PS19 Transportation-Radioactive material can be found on our nation’s transportation systems. Highway, rail, air, and water accidents could allow the unequivocal release of these materials. MS-B4-PS20 Dirty Bombs- A dirty bomb is the dispersion of radiological material with conventional explosives. The military examined “Dirty Bombs” during World War II but felt the effectiveness was not acceptable. The belief is that a conventional bomb would be equal or more effective. The perceived effect is that a “dirty bomb” would cause panic and have an economic impact.

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35 Nuclear N-Nuclear A nuclear weapon refers to an explosive device that is powered by fission, a fusion, or a combination of these reactions. Nuclear weapons are powerful and a “one thousand hologram bomb can produce an explosion comparable to a billion Kilograms of conventional high explosives.” (www.Wikipedia.org )

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39 Explosive E-Explosives Material
After the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, emergency officials added high velocity explosives to the list of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The category of how explosives are generally limited to propellants such as gun powder, pyrotechnics, and illuminated devices (flares). High explosives are normally utilized for mining, demolition, and military purposes. The category of how and high explosives refers to the speed (meters/second) that the explosive compound detonates at. Local rural elected and appointed officials must examine their community to determine risks in areas such as mining, construction, demolition, and military applications of explosives. These rural officials must also examine local farm suppliers where agriculture chemicals can be used to produce explosives. In today’s world, almost anyone can get direction to produce explosive devices from the internet. Many household chemicals can be used to produce a small explosive device, but these directions can be used to produce large devices. In the Oklahoma City event a moving truck was rented to provide a large payload to hold a large explosive device. In examining threats we must realize that non-traditional methods can be used to turn seemingly non-threatening material in to weapons. The use of non-conventional explosives has caused the airline industry to expand its passenger assessment and searches. Rules about liquids that can be carried onto airlines are a result of portable explosive dangers. Passengers are also searched for carry on explosives, including the potential for “shoe bombs.” The United States has not seen the use of strap on explosive devices that have been used in Israel and other mid-eastern countries. “Suicide” bombers use their children, cars, and themselves to gain entry into crowded public areas, schools, hospitals, shopping arenas and government facilities to detonate their explosives and kill people.

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41 3 Categories of Explosives
High explosives normally are employed in mining, demolition, and military warheads. Secondary explosives, also called base explosives, are relatively insensitive to shock, friction, and heat. Tertiary explosives or blasting agents, are insensitive to shock, they cannot be reliably detonated with practical quantities of primary explosive, and, instead, require an intermediate explosive booster, of secondary explosive, e.g. ammonium nitrate/fuel oil mixture (ANFO) and slurry (wet bag) explosives that are primarily used in large-scale mining and construction. High explosives: A high explosive compound detonates at rates ranging from 3,000 to 9,000 meters per second, and are, conventionally, subdivided into two explosives classes, differentiated by sensitivity. Primary explosives are extremely sensitive to mechanical shock, friction, and heat, to which they will respond by burning rapidly or detonating. Examples include mercury fulminate, lead styphnate and lead azide. Secondary Explosives: Dynamite, TNT, RDX, PETN, HMX, and others are secondary explosives. PETN is the benchmark compound; compounds more sensitive than PETN are classed as primary explosives. They may burn when exposed to heat or flame in small, unconfined quantities, but detonation can occur. These are sometimes added in small amounts to blasting caps to boost their power. Note that many, if not most, explosive chemical compounds may usefully deflagrate and detonate, and are used in high- and low-explosive compounds. Thus, under the correct conditions, a propellant (for example nitrocellulose) might deflagrate if ignited, or may detonate if initiated with a detonator.

42 Directive 5-Management of Domestic Incidents
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 serves to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. This management system is designed to cover the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The implementation of such a system would allow all levels of government throughout the nation to work efficiently and effectively together. The directive gives further detail on which government officials oversee and have authority for various parts of the national incident management system, as well making several amendments to various other HSPDs. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 serves to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. This management system is designed to cover the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The implementation of such a system would allow all levels of government throughout the nation to work efficiently and effectively together. The directive gives further detail on which government officials oversee and have authority for various parts of the national incident management system, as well making several amendments to various other HSPDs. Rural local elected and appointed officials from day one face the uncertainty of dealing with a natural or manmade disaster. The federal government in trying to prepare for the potential of an event developed the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS was developed to assist with prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. NIMS is designed to coordinate government at the federal, state and local levels. In the first phases of an incident, all responsibilities fall to local and state agencies. After a determination of the size and scope of an event, local and state officials will decide if federal assistance is required, needed or wanted. Some events that are a part of a crime or terrorist attack will require that the appropriate federal agencies are contacted. In other events the resources of the local or state government may not sufficiently address problems or needs. The NIMS program provides all officials with guidelines and criteria to establish a central command and the protocols to facilitate a united response. Lessons learned from previous events shows the need for cooperation and coordination between agencies and between federal, state, and local officials. Local rural elected or appointed officials share the same responsibilities as all officials in compliance with national standards of dealing with all events small or large. Local emergency managers will provide times and data that new officials can gain certification in NIMS 100, 200, 700, and Timelines are also in place for the 300 and 400 classes. As newly elected or appointed rural officials you will be expected to gain NIMS certification.

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45 Directive 6-Integration and Use of Screening Information
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 concerns the use of information about individuals known or suspected to engage in terrorist activities. United States policy is to develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct related to terrorism. Such information shall be used to support federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector screening processes, and diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and protective processes. The directive will be implemented in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, including those protecting the rights of all Americans. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 concerns the use of information about individuals known or suspected to engage in terrorist activities. United States policy is to develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct related to terrorism. Such information shall be used to support federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector screening processes, and diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and protective processes. The directive will be implemented in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, including those protecting the rights of all Americans. The use of HSPD 6 was utilized to provide local rural elected and appointed officials with a broad base of appropriate information about programs, concepts, and goals to enhance security on the federal, state and local levels. A data base of “known or suspected” terrorists may not apply to local officials as it would state or local officials. The abstract and full text is available for HSPD 6, but HSPD 6 will not be addressed in this RDPC course.

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47 Directive 7-Critical Infrastructure, Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from terrorist attacks. The directive defines relevant terms and delivers 31 policy statements. These policy statements define what the directive covers and the roles various federal, state, and local agencies will play in carrying it out. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from terrorist attacks. The directive defines relevant terms and delivers 31 policy statements. These policy statements define what the directive covers and the roles various federal, state, and local agencies will play in carrying it out. Local rural elected and appointed officials will not make the determination of which infrastructure will receive prioritization but a basic understanding will assist you in your size up of your community. Obviously, nuclear generators, chemical plants, dams, bridges, munitions plants, and military bases would be considered high priority for protection. But consideration must be given for computer systems, banking, and non-traditional infrastructure. HSPD 7 is a plan to neutralize or mitigate threats in order to protect and secure critical infrastructure and key resources. As local officials, you will not be included in the determination of priority, but a basic understanding of this determination will greatly assist you in planning for an event. Rural resources like agriculture operations, drinking water, gas or oil wells could be overlooked as no-priority, or low-priority. The assessment of infrastructure was made by the federal government in 2004, but new or changes in infrastructure could change county prioritization in this assessment.

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50 Directive 8-National Preparedness
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 establishes policies to strengthen the U.S. preparedness in order to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The directive requires a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, with established mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments. It also outlines actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities. This is a companion directive to directive 5. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 establishes policies to strengthen the U.S. preparedness in order to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The directive requires a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, with established mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments. It also outlines actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities. This is a companion directive to directive 5. This course and many of the national goals and strategies are a direct result of the federal government’s planning to respond to incidents. Many of the original plans were specific to a single threat like Pandemic Flu, but as assessments were made officials saw that a variety of scenarios could be addressed through this planning. The plans were then broadened and called all-hazards preparedness to provide systems and structures to a wide variety of threats that could be used with modified protocols developed for one hazard like pandemic flu. The DHS then offered “Federal Preparedness Assistance” through grants, agreements, loans, training and technical assistance to state and local governments to prevent, prepare, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, disasters, and emergency events. When an event occurs, first responders from local governments are typically the first on the scene, appropriate size up, implementation of incident command and determine the extent of incident and determination of resource needed are preformed by these first responders. The request of district, state and federal assistance may be the responsibility of the local chief elected or appointed official. The development of a national preparedness goal my indeed that all local communities (including rural) have in place emergency operational plans (EOP) and require that table-top exercises and full exercise occur annually to ensure that all agencies and department are prepared for an actual incident. The Robert T. Stafford Act (42 US. C. 5122) defines major disaster and emergency for planning and implementation of response. In this course, participants will work through case studies to provide “natural homeland security preparedness-related exercises.” It is important that local officials and first responder agencies plan together and coordinate training and prepare to be able to effectively work together in the implement phase of events. Equipment Lessons learned after 9/11 leads us to work together to coordinate a response between first responders, the private sector, agencies, departments and the leadership. Equipment purchased with Homeland Security funds promotes interoperability, conforming to standards and the ability to be used in a comprehensive effort. Equipment has been researched and developed to work effectively together so all groups are utilizing similar or compatible equipment. Training and exercises Courses and training will be coordinated between federal, state and local agencies to “established and maintain a comprehensive training program for first responders, officials and others with major event preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery roles.

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52 Directive 8-Annex 1-National Planning
This annex formally establishes a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. It is meant to provide guidance for conducting planning in accordance with the Homeland Security Management System in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007. Planning is one of the eight national priorities set forth in the National Preparedness Guidelines and it is a target capability is across all homeland security mission areas. This annex formally establishes a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. It is meant to provide guidance for conducting planning in accordance with the Homeland Security Management System in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of Planning is one of the eight national priorities set forth in the National Preparedness Guidelines and it is a target capability is across all homeland security mission areas. In 2007 HSPD 8 was further developed to include “National Planning Seminars” meetings on events or threat scenarios for national planning by and among all levels and jurisdictions of “strategic guidance statements” a documents that outline strategic priorities. “Strategic plan” defines mission, authorities, roles, responsibilities, task, capabilities, performance, and effectiveness measures. “Concept plan” describes how the Feds will support regional, state, local and tribal plans. “Operations plan” a plan that identifies resource, personnel, and asset allocation. “Tactorial Plan” individual task, actions, and objectives tailored for operational plan. This HSPD outlines federal plans and how they are integrated into state and local plans.

53 There are four critical elements to the National Preparedness Guidelines
President Bush has led a committed effort to strengthen the Nation’s preparedness capabilities. The national preparedness architecture encompasses the full spectrum of prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts to prepare the Nation for all hazards – whether terrorist attack or natural disaster. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of December 17, 2003 (“National Preparedness”) directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. As part of that effort, in March 2005 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the Interim National Preparedness Goal. Publication of the National Preparedness Guidelines (Guidelines) finalizes development of the national goal and its related preparedness tools. The Guidelines, including the supporting Target Capabilities List, simultaneously published online, supersedes the Interim National Preparedness Goal and defines what it means for the Nation to be prepared for all hazards. There are four critical elements of the Guidelines: (1) The National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise statement of the core preparedness goal for the Nation. (2) The National Planning Scenarios, which depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Collectively, the 15 scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal planning, training, exercises, and grant investments needed to prepare for emergencies of all types. (3) The Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios. It presents a common vocabulary and identifies key tasks that support development of essential capabilities among organizations at all levels. Of course, no entity will perform every task. (4) The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific capabilities that communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should collectively possess in order to respond effectively to disasters. The Guidelines reinforce the fact that preparedness is a shared responsibility. They were developed through an extensive process that involved more than 1,500 Federal, State, and local officials and more than 120 national associations. They also integrate lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina and a 2006 review of States’ and major cities’ emergency operations and evacuation plans. iii Protecting America requires constant vigilance and innovation. These Guidelines will shape and support preparedness activities in the months and years ahead, while growing and evolving with the Nation as it strengthens preparedness at all levels of government and within the private sector. Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security (2007, September ). National Preparedness Guidelines. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security Web site:

54 The national preparedness vision, which provides a concise statement of the core preparedness goal for the nation. Citation: Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security (2007, September ). National Preparedness Guidelines. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security Web site:

55 The fifteen National Planning Scenarios, which collectively depict the broad range of natural and man-made threats facing our nation and guide overall homeland security planning efforts at all levels of government and with the private sector. 15 National Planning Scenarios: They form the basis for national planning, training, investments and exercises needed to prepare for emergencies of all types. While preparedness applies across the all-hazards spectrum, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security attaches special emphasis to preparing for catastrophic threats with “the greatest risk of mass casualties, massive property loss, and immense social disruption.” To illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of a range of major events, the Homeland Security Council—in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, tribal, and territorial governments—developed the National Planning Scenarios. The 15 Scenarios include terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. They are listed in Figure B-1. Figure B-1: National Planning Scenarios National Planning Scenarios Improvised Nuclear Device Major Earthquake Aerosol Anthrax Major Hurricane Pandemic Influenza Radiological Dispersal Device Plague Improvised Explosive Device Blister Agent Food Contamination Toxic Industrial Chemicals Foreign Animal Disease Nerve Agent Cyber Attack Chlorine Tank Explosion All levels of government can use the National Planning Scenarios as a reference to explore the potential consequences of major events and to evaluate and improve their capabilities to perform their assigned missions and tasks. Planners are not precluded from developing their own scenarios to supplement the National Planning Scenarios. DHS will maintain a National Planning Scenario portfolio and update it periodically based on changes in the homeland security strategic environment. The current version is available on the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Secure Portal (https://odp.esportals.com) and the Lessons Learned Information Sharing system (https://www.llis.dhs.gov). Use of specific National Planning Scenarios in federally funded training and exercises will be addressed in program guidance. Citation: Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security (2007, September ). National Preparedness Guidelines. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security Web site:

56 Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from the major events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios. Although no single entity will perform every task, the UTL presents a common language and vocabulary that supports all efforts to coordinate national preparedness activities. The UTL provides a menu of tasks required to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events represented by the National Planning Scenarios. Most tasks are common to many, if not all, of the Scenarios, as well as other events not covered by the Scenarios. The UTL serves as a common language and reference system that will support efforts to describe operational tasks, so that personnel from across the Nation can work together effectively when required. No single entity is expected to perform every task. The UTL was developed with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and nongovernmental subject-matter experts and drew on existing sources wherever possible. The UTL will be updated periodically in conjunction with the TCL. The current version is available on the ODP secure portal (https://odp.esportals.com) and the Lessons Learned Information Sharing system (https://www.llis.dhs.gov). 3. Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process The Capabilities-Based Preparedness process (see Figure B-2) involves homeland security partners in a systematic and prioritized effort to accomplish the following: 􀂃 Convene working groups; 􀂃 Determine capability requirements; 􀂃 Assess current capability levels; 􀂃 Identify, analyze, and choose options; Update plans and strategies; 􀂃 Allocate funds; 􀂃 Update and execute program plans; and 􀂃 Assess and report. The process emphasizes collaboration to identify, achieve, and sustain target levels of capability that will contribute to enhancing overall national levels of preparedness. This simple, step-by-step sequence illustrates how processes and tools are combined to identify and prioritize measurable preparedness targets in assessing current capabilities, then allocating available resources and emphasis to the most urgently needed capabilities based on risk. DHS will refine this description over time with user feedback and supplement it with specific instructions in annual program guidance. Citation: Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security (2007, September ). National Preparedness Guidelines. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security Web site:

57 Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific capabilities that states and communities and the private sector should collectively develop in order to respond effectively to disasters. The TCL identifies and defines capabilities that the Nation may need to achieve and sustain, depending on relevant risks and threats, in order to be prepared. A capability may be delivered with any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel that achieves the desired outcome. Entities are expected to develop and maintain capabilities at levels that reflect the differing risk and needs across the country. Each capability includes a description of the major activities performed within the capability and the critical tasks and measures associated with the activity. Critical tasks are those tasks that must be performed during a major event in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. Critical tasks may require coordination among Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and/or nongovernmental entities during their execution. They are essential to achieving the desired outcome and to the success of a homeland security mission. The critical tasks are derived from the tasks found in the UTL. Critical tasks, when linked to operating conditions and performance standards, provide the primary source of learning objectives for training and exercises and provide input to planning and performance evaluation. Operating conditions are variables of the environment, such as the terrain, weather, presence of an adversary, and complexity of multi-agency relationships, that may affect performance. The TCL includes measures and metrics that are quantitative or qualitative levels against which achievement of a task or capability outcome can be assessed. Planners at all levels of government can use the TCL as a reference to help them design plans, procedures, training, and exercises that develop capacity and proficiency to perform their assigned missions and tasks in major events. The TCL was developed with Federal, State, and local subject-matter experts and drew on existing sources wherever possible. It will be updated periodically in conjunction with the UTL. The current version is available on the ODP secure portal (https://odp.esportals.com) and the Lessons Learned Information Sharing system (https://www.llis.dhs.gov). Citation: Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security (2007, September ). National Preparedness Guidelines. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security Web site:

58 Directive 9-Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. America's agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. U.S. agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. The directive lays out policies, including roles and responsibilities, awareness and warning, and vulnerability assessments, to provide the best protection possible against a successful attack on the U.S. agriculture and food system. Local rural elected and appointed officials by virtue of where they live will usually be near agriculture production areas, farmers, markets, and lands dedicated to the production of agriculture products and food. When farmers have crops or livestock that appear to be “sick” or diseased they usually do not contact their local officials. They do contact their agriculture extension agent, farm agent, or veterinarian. Animal or crop problems are not generally a concern for local government. But when an agriculture problem is large, assistance from local officials may be required. As a local official when several farmers complain of similar or interrelated problem it may be appropriate for the local official to contact the State Department of Agriculture. The role of the local official could be to act as facilitator to aid in local, state or federal assistance. Just as humans have the National Strategic Stockpile for medicine and medical equipment; this is a national veterinary stockpile for agriculture animals. Agriculture plants have the national plant disease recovery system (NPDRS). It is not practical for each official to understand all medical and equipment strategically staged for an emergency, but it is appropriate for officials to know of their existence and application.

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60 Directive 10-Biodefense for the 21st Century
HSPD 10 outlines policy for Bio-defense in the 21st century. The United States has pursued aggressively a broad range of programs and capabilities to confront the biological weapons threat. The results of a comprehensive study of our capabilities provide a blueprint for our future biodefense program that fully integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. The pillars of this national biodefense program are Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Recovery. A classified version of this directive contains specific direction to departments and agencies. Local rural elected and appointed officials have actively participated in the US Department of Health and Human Services “Pandemic Flu Planning” and more recently the “All Hazards Planning” because of Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) requirements. Our examinations of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) looked at some biological threats and their relationship with local officials. In HSPD 10, we will examine the strategic national stockpile (SNS) and its implementation for local officials. The SNS is not a component of First Response because it is not a local asset, but the 12-hour push padiages can be transported to local governments within 12 hours of their request by the State Department of Health or the State’s Governor. The following information comes from the CDC website (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/) SNS: What it Means to You C's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) has large quantities of medicine and medical supplies to protect the American public if there is a public health emergency (terrorist attack, flu outbreak, earthquake) severe enough to cause local supplies to run out. Once Federal and local authorities agree that the SNS is needed, medicines will be delivered to any state in the U.S. within 12 hours. Each state has plans to receive and distribute SNS medicine and medical supplies to local communities as quickly as possible. What should you know about the medicines in the SNS? The medicine in the SNS is FREE for everyone. The SNS has stockpiled enough medicine to protect people in several large cities at the same time. Federal, state and local community planners are working together to ensure that the SNS medicines will be delivered to the affected area to protect you and your family if there is a terrorist attack. How will you get your medicine if the SNS is delivered to your area?   Local communities are prepared to receive SNS medicine and medical supplies from the state to provide to everyone in the community who needs them. Find out about how to get medicine to protect you and your family by watching TV, listening to the radio, reading the newspaper, checking the community Web site on the Internet or learning from trusted community leaders. Helping State and Local Jurisdictions Prepare for a National Emergency An act of terrorism (or a large scale natural disaster) targeting the U.S. civilian population will require rapid access to large quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. Such quantities may not be readily available unless special stockpiles are created. No one can anticipate exactly where a terrorist will strike and few state or local governments have the resources to create sufficient stockpiles on their own. Therefore, a national stockpile has been created as a resource for all. In 1999 Congress charged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the establishment of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS). The mission was to provide a re-supply of large quantities of essential medical materiel to states and communities during an emergency within twelve hours of the federal decision to deploy. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 tasked the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with defining the goals and performance requirements of the SNS Program, as well as managing the actual deployment of assets. Effective on 1 March 2003, the NPS became the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Program managed jointly by DHS and HHS. With the signing of the BioShield legislation, the SNS Program was returned to HHS for oversight and guidance. The SNS Program works with governmental and non-governmental partners to upgrade the nation’s public health capacity to respond to a national emergency. Critical to the success of this initiative is ensuring capacity is developed at federal, state, and local levels to receive, stage, and dispense SNS assets. A National Repository of Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals and Medical Materiel The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items. The SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply state and local public health agencies in the event of a national emergency anywhere and at anytime within the U.S. or its territories. The SNS is organized for flexible response. The first line of support lies within the immediate response 12-hour Push Packages. These are caches of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed to provide rapid delivery of a broad spectrum of assets for an ill defined threat in the early hours of an event. These Push Packages are positioned in strategically located, secure warehouses ready for immediate deployment to a designated site within 12 hours of the federal decision to deploy SNS assets. If the incident requires additional pharmaceuticals and/or medical supplies, follow-on vendor managed inventory (VMI) supplies will be shipped to arrive within 24 to 36 hours. If the agent is well defined, VMI can be tailored to provide pharmaceuticals, supplies and/or products specific to the suspected or confirmed agent(s). In this case, the VMI could act as the first option for immediate response from the SNS Program. Determining and Maintaining SNS Assets To determine and review the composition of the SNS Program assets, HHS and CDC consider many factors, such as current biological and/or chemical threats, the availability of medical materiel, and the ease of dissemination of pharmaceuticals. One of the most significant factors in determining SNS composition, however, is the medical vulnerability of the U.S. civilian population. The SNS Program ensures that the medical materiel stock is rotated and kept within potency shelf-life limits. This involves quarterly quality assurance/quality control checks (QA/QC’s) on all 12-hour Push Packages, annual 100% inventory of all 12-hour Push Package items, and inspections of environmental conditions, security, and overall package maintenance. Supplementing State and Local Resources During a national emergency, state, local, and private stocks of medical materiel will be depleted quickly. State and local first responders and health officials can use the SNS to bolster their response to a national emergency, with a 12-hour Push Package, VMI, or a combination of both, depending on the situation. The SNS is not a first response tool. Rapid Coordination & Transport The SNS Program is committed to have 12-hour Push Packages delivered anywhere in the U.S. or its territories within 12 hours of a federal decision to deploy. The 12-hour Push Packages have been configured to be immediately loaded onto either trucks or commercial cargo aircraft for the most rapid transportation. Concurrent to SNS transport, the SNS Program will deploy its Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU). The TARU staff will coordinate with state and local officials so that the SNS assets can be efficiently received and distributed upon arrival at the site. Transfer of SNS Assets to State and/or Local Authorities HHS will transfer authority for the SNS materiel to the state and local authorities once it arrives at the designated receiving and storage site. State and local authorities will then begin the breakdown of the 12-hour Push Package for distribution. SNS TARU members will remain on site in order to assist and advise state and local officials in putting the SNS assets to prompt and effective use. When and How is the SNS Deployed? The decision to deploy SNS assets may be based on evidence showing the overt release of an agent that might adversely affect public health. It is more likely, however, that subtle indicators, such as unusual morbidity and/or mortality identified through the nation’s disease outbreak surveillance and epidemiology network, will alert health officials to the possibility (and confirmation) of a biological or chemical incident or a national emergency. To receive SNS assets, the affected state’s governor’s office will directly request the deployment of the SNS assets from CDC or HHS. HHS, CDC, and other federal officials will evaluate the situation and determine a prompt course of action. Training and Education The SNS Program is part of a nationwide preparedness training and education program for state and local health care providers, first responders, and governments (to include federal officials, governors’ offices, state and local health departments, and emergency management agencies). This training not only explains the SNS Program’s mission and operations, it alerts state and local emergency response officials to the important issues they must plan for in order to receive, secure, and distribute SNS assets. To conduct this outreach and training, CDC and SNS Program staff are currently working with HHS, Regional Emergency Response Coordinators at all of the U.S. Public Health Service regional offices, state and local health departments, state emergency management offices, the Metropolitan Medical Response System cities, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, and the Department of Defense.

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63 Directive 11-Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
HSPD 11 establishes comprehensive terrorist-related screening procedures in order to more effectively detect and interdict individuals known or reasonably suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities. It enhances terrorist-related screening through comprehensive, coordinated procedures that detect, identify, track, and interdict people, cargo, and other entities. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report setting forth plans and progress in the implementation of this directive. The report shall outline a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities. Local rural officials will not be directly involved in the development or implementation of screening procedures, but the states criminal databases through local law enforcement is able to provide intelligence about individuals, cargo, and entities. The abstract and full text are available, but significant time will not be spent on this topic.

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65 Directive 12-Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors
There are wide variations in the quality and security of identification used to gain access to secure facilities where there is potential for terrorist attacks. In order to eliminate these variations, U.S. policy is to enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors (including contractor employees). This directive mandates a federal standard for secure and reliable forms of identification.

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68 Directive 13-Maritime Security Policy
This directive establishes policy guidelines to enhance national and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. This directive establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency maritime security policy efforts. It also underscores the importance of securing the maritime domain, which is defined as: "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances." HSPD directly addresses all area that are “of, on, under, relate to, adjacent to, or on the sea, ocean, or navigatable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances.” Local rural officials do not find under their directives maritime rules and regulations, but as all events are local until state or federal assistance arrives and takes charges, they will deal with events in their jurisdiction. Police departments, fire departments, rescue squads and IMS may use boats to complete their missions, but costal activity is generally overseen by the Federal Government. This RDPC course will not address the maritime issues, but the abstract and full text of HSPD in included.

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70 Directive 15-U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror
U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror-Classified directive The material on this directive is classified. HSPD 15 also attempts to coordinate all elements of the War on Terrorism, including diplomatic, legal, financial and military components of the war.  This coordination will work to meet six goals outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2005.  These six goals are: “deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive; enable partner nations to counter terrorism; deny proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain a capacity for consequence management; defeat terrorists and their organizations; counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. government agencies and partner nations; and contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.”

71 Directive 16-Aviation Strategy
National Security Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16 (NSPD-47/HSPD-16) details a strategic vision for aviation security while recognizing ongoing efforts, and directs the production of a National Strategy for Aviation Security and supporting plans. The supporting plans address the following areas: aviation transportation system security; aviation operational threat response; aviation transportation system recovery; air domain surveillance and intelligence integration; domestic outreach; and international outreach. An over-arching national strategy is necessary to optimize the coordination and integration of government-wide aviation security efforts. The Strategy sets forth U.S. Government agency roles and responsibilities, establishes planning and operations coordination requirements, and builds on current strategies, tools, and resources. Some rural communities have airports, but generally regulations and supervision of airports and aviation is handled by the Federal Government. Therefore, this RDPC course will not address Aviation Security policies. A list of aviation topics is in this text, but general policy and management of the issues is outside local government control.

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73 Directive 17-Nuclear Materials Information Program
Interdiction Deterrence Defense and Mitigation COUNTERPROLIFERATION We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies. Interdiction Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means. We must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations. Deterrence Today's threats are far more diverse and less predictable than those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence. A strong declaratory policy and effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full range of political tools to persuade potential adversaries not to seek or use WMD. The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force -- including through resort to all of our options -- to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. In addition to our conventional and nuclear response and defense capabilities, our overall deterrent posture against WMD threats is reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined capabilities enhance deterrence both by devaluing an adversary's WMD and missiles, and by posing the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such weapons. Defense and Mitigation Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before these weapons are used. In addition, robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used. Active defenses disrupt, disable, or destroy WMD en route to their targets. Active defenses include vigorous air defense and effective missile defenses against today's threats. Passive defenses must be tailored to the unique characteristics of the various forms of WMD. The United States must also have the ability rapidly and effectively to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack against our deployed forces. Our approach to defend against biological threats has long been based on our approach to chemical threats, despite the fundamental differences between these weapons. The United States is developing a new approach to provide us and our friends and allies with an effective defense against biological weapons. Finally, U.S. military forces and domestic law enforcement agencies as appropriate must stand ready to respond against the source of any WMD attack. The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks. As with deterrence and prevention, an effective response requires rapid attribution and robust strike capability. We must accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat WMD-related assets. The United States needs to be prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S. response not only will eliminate the source of a WMD attack but will also have a powerful deterrent effect upon other adversaries that possess or seek WMD or missiles. Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. is an American company that has been a major supplier of fuel for the United States Navy's fleet of nuclear-powered vessels since the 1960s. In recent years it has also processed weapons-grade uranium into nuclear reactor fuel. It operates a 65-acre (260,000 m2) gated complex in Erwin, Tennessee. The company has emerged as America's leader in converting surplus weapons-grade uranium from U.S. Cold War stockpiles into valuable low-enriched uranium fuel material to power commercial nuclear power plants. Known as downblending, the proprietary NFS process is currently being used to covert about 40 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) into fuel material for the Tennessee Valley Authority. In 2007, the company was also awarded a contract by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration to convert 17.4 metric tons of HEU into material for America's Reliable Fuel Supply Program. The company's downblending is also an important resource for the round up of other nuclear materials around the world to reduce the chance of proliferation by rogue nations or terrorists. NFS is also engaged as a team member at important nuclear projects at other DOE sites, such as the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility at Savannah River and the clean up of an old laboratory at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Nuclear technology SciencePhysics · Fission · Fusion · Radiation (ionizing) · Nucleus · Safety · Chemistry · Engineering FuelsFissile · Fertile · Thorium · Uranium (enriched • depleted) · Plutonium · Deuterium · Tritium · Isotope separation PowerReactor technology · Economics · Propulsion (rocket) · Fusion · Isotope thermoelectric (RTG) Fission reactors by moderator : WaterPressurized (PWR) · Boiling (BWR) · Supercritical (SCWR) · Heavy (PHWR · CANDU) CarbonPebble bed (PBMR) · Very high temperature (VHTR) · UHTREX · RBMK · Magnox · AGR Li / BeMolten salt (MSR) None (Fast)Breeder (FBR) · Liquid-metal-cooled (LMFR) · Integral (IFR) · SSTAR Generation IV by coolant: (Gas (GFR) · Lead (LFR) · Sodium (SFR)) Medical: ImagingPositron emission (PET) · Single photon emission (SPECT) · Gamma camera · X-ray TherapyRadiation therapy · TomoTherapy · Proton · Brachytherapy · Boron neutron capture (BNCT) Weapon : Topics: History · Design · War · Race · Explosion (effects) · Testing (underground) · Delivery · Proliferation · Yield (TNTe) Lists: States · Tests · Weapons · Pop culture Waste : Disposal: Fuel cycle · Spent fuel (pool • cask) · Repository · Reprocessing · Transmutation Types: Reprocessed uranium  • Isotopes of plutonium · Minor actinide · Fission product (LLFP) · Activation product

74 Directive 18-Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
HSPD 18 addresses the need for preparation against an attack by terrorist forces using a weapon of mass destruction. It acknowledges that having sufficient resources on hand at all times and at all places is not a realistic possibility. The policy set forth in the HSPD is a two-tiered approach for development and acquisition of medical countermeasures. Tier I is a focused development of Agent-Specific Medical Countermeasures and Tier II concerns the development of a Flexible Capability for New Medical Countermeasures. The abstract and full text of the HSPD is included, but WMD and SNS were addressed in previous discussions. The term “syndromic surveillance” applies to surveillance using health-related data that precede diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an outbreak to warrant further public health response. Though historically syndromic surveillance has been utilized to target investigation of potential cases, its utility for detecting outbreaks associated with bioterrorism is increasingly being explored by public health officials. The threat of terrorism and high-profile disease outbreaks has drawn attention to public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks. State and local health departments are enhancing existing surveillance systems and developing new systems to better detect outbreaks through public health surveillance. However, information is limited about the usefulness of surveillance systems for outbreak detection or the best ways to support this function. This report supplements previous guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems. Use of this framework is intended to improve decision-making regarding the implementation of surveillance for outbreak detection. Use of a standardized evaluation methodology, including description of system design and operation, also will enhance the exchange of information regarding methods to improve early detection of outbreaks. The framework directs particular attention to the measurement of timeliness and validity for outbreak detection. The evaluation framework is designed to support assessment and description of all surveillance approaches to early detection, whether through traditional disease reporting, specialized analytic routines for aberration detection, or surveillance using early indicators of disease outbreaks, such as syndromic surveillance. Public health surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data about a health-related event for use in public health action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health (1). Surveillance serves at least eight public health functions. These include supporting case detection and public health interventions, estimating the impact of a disease or injury, portraying the natural history of a health condition, determining the distribution and spread of illness, generating hypotheses and stimulating research, evaluating prevention and control measures, and facilitating planning (2). Another important public health function of surveillance is outbreak detection (i.e., identifying an increase in frequency of disease above the background occurrence of the disease). Outbreaks typically have been recognized either based on accumulated case reports of reportable diseases or by clinicians and laboratorians who alert public health officials about clusters of diseases. Because of the threat of terrorism and the increasing availability of electronic health data, enhancements are being made to existing surveillance systems, and new surveillance systems have been developed and implemented in public health jurisdictions with the goal of early and complete detection of outbreaks (3). The usefulness of surveillance systems for early detection and response to outbreaks has not been established, and substantial costs can be incurred in developing or enhancing and managing these surveillance systems and investigating false alarms (4). The measurement of the performance of public health surveillance systems for outbreak detection is needed to establish the relative value of different approaches and to provide information needed to improve their efficacy for detection of outbreaks at the earliest stages. This report supplements existing CDC guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (1). Specifically, the report provides a framework to evaluate timeliness for outbreak detection and the balance among sensitivity, predictive value positive (PVP), and predictive value negative (PVN) for detecting outbreaks. This framework also encourages detailed description of system design and operations and of their experience with outbreak detection. The framework is best applied to systems that have data to demonstrate the attributes of the system under consideration. Nonetheless, this framework also can be applied to systems that are in early stages of development or in the planning phase by using citations from the published literature to support conclusions. Ideally, the evaluation should compare the performance of the surveillance system under scrutiny to alternative surveillance systems and produce an assessment of the relative usefulness for early detection of outbreaks. Influenza surveillance is conducted by a network comprising four components, including approximately 700 sentinel providers and approximately 120 U.S. World Health Organization (WHO) and National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) collaborating laboratories (2).

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78 Directive 19-Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
This directive establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a national strategy and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection against, and response to terrorist use of explosives in the United States. It is the policy of the United States to counter the threat of explosive attacks aggressively by coordinating Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks. This RDPC course addressed explosives in the WMD, CBRNE section of the course and text body. The abstract and full text are presented, but presentation of the material occurred in a previous chapter.

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80 Directive 20-National Continuity Policy
This directive establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal Government structures and operations, and also creates the position of a single National Continuity Coordinator responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of Federal continuity policies. This policy establishes 'National Essential Functions,' prescribes continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies, in order to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that will enhance the credibility of our national security posture and enable a more rapid and effective response to and recovery from a national emergency. A policy on natural continuity is not in the control of local leadership. Local governments could be faced with similar decisions after an attack, disaster, or event that would impair or stop functions of the local government. The FEMA requirements and DHS policies do not require this policy. The abstract and full text is included and your instructor will have a limited decision but significant time will not be given to this issue. Responsibilities for “continuation of government” are to be carved out by the Executive branch of the federal government.

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82 Directive 20-Annex A-Continuity Planning
In accordance with NSPD-51/HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy, executive departments and agencies are assigned to one of four categories commensurate with their COOP/COG/ECG responsibilities during an emergency. These categories shall be used for continuity planning, communications requirements, emergency operations capabilities, and other related requirements. All executive branch commissions, boards, bureaus, and members of the Small Agency Council not otherwise identified in Categories I, II, or III.

83 Directive 20-Annex A Category I: Department of State
Department of the Treasury Department of Defense, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Health and Human Services Department of Transportation Department of Energy Department of Homeland Security, including: Federal Emergency Management Agency United States Secret Service National Communications System Office of the Director of National Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency

84 Directive 20-Annex A Category II: Department of the Interior
Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce Department of Labor Department of Housing and Urban Development Department of Education Department of Veterans Affairs Environmental Protection Agency Federal Communications Commission Federal Reserve System General Services Administration National Archives and Records Administration Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Social Security Administration United States Postal Service

85 Directive 20-Annex A Category III:
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Export-Import Bank of the United States Farm Credit Administration Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Credit Union Administration National Labor Relations Board National Science Foundation Railroad Retirement Board Securities and Exchange Commission Small Business Administration Tennessee Valley Authority

86 Directive 20-Annex A Category IV: All executive branch commissions, boards, bureaus, and members of the Small Agency Council not otherwise identified in Categories I, II, or III.

87 Directive 21-Public Health and Medical Preparedness
It is the policy of the United States to plan and enable provision for the public health and medical needs of the American people in the case of a catastrophic health event through continual and timely flow of information during such an event and rapid public health and medical response that marshals all available national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner. It is the policy of the United States to plan and enable provision for the public health and medical needs of the American people in the case of a catastrophic health event through continual and timely flow of information during such an event and rapid public health and medical response that marshals all available national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner. Most public health departments are functions of the State government. Local rural elected and appointed officials do not directly operate or oversee these operations. However a basic understanding of “biosurveillance” could provide helpful in making decision’s effecting local government. “Biosurveillance” is an ongoing system of identification and monitoring for sickness throughout our nation. When someone goes to a physician’s office, hospital, or health department this condition /sickness is being monitored. Assigned physicians or health care workers called “senitals” constantly monitor patient complaints and disease states. Each fall and winter when the flu season arrives sentinels monitor and track the onset, severity and trends of flu outbreaks. Flu type and severity are reported by local sentials to the Regional Health Departments who report to State Health Departments who report to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention for national trends. If a new strand is identified by characteristics or by lab identification the strain is measured and tracked. The biosurveillance is a continuous operation of our nation’s health departmentents and the CDC. The biosurveillance system also monitors for “catastrophic health events” such as small pox, anthrax, botulism, salmonella, and other public health dangers. If a new flu or other catastrophic event is determined the “All Hazards” clinics will be activated.

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90 Directive 23-National Cyber Security Initiative
National Cyber Security Initiative-Classified directive The information in this directive is classified.

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92 Directive 24-Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security
This directive establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy and other legal rights under United States law. This directive establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.

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94 Directive 25- Arctic Region Policy
This directive establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and directs related implementation actions.  This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and with customary international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law of the sea. II.  BACKGROUND A.  The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region.  This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:   Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;   The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;   The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and   A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources. III. POLICY A.  It is the policy of the United States to:   Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;   Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;   Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;   Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);   Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and   Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues. B.  National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests.  These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law enforcement.[1]  Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase further in coming years.  This requires the United States to assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region. The United States exercises authority in accordance with lawful claims of United States sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, including sovereignty within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United States exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in the United States contiguous zone. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority.  The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits.  Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits. Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:   Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;   Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources;   Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic region;   Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential United States interests; and   Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region. C.  International Governance The United States participates in a variety of fora, international organizations, and bilateral contacts that promote United States interests in the Arctic.  These include the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife conservation and management agreements, and many other mechanisms.  As the Arctic changes and human activity in the region increases, the United States and other governments should consider, as appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements. The Arctic Council has produced positive results for the United States by working within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development.  Its subsidiary bodies, with help from many United States agencies, have developed and undertaken projects on a wide range of topics.  The Council also provides a beneficial venue for interaction with indigenous groups.  It is the position of the United States that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed contributions.  The United States is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its subsidiary bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council's work and are consistent with the general mandate of the Council. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the Antarctic region such that an "Arctic Treaty" of broad scope -- along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty -- is not appropriate or necessary. The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic.  Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide.  It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain.  Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans.  And it will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted. Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to international governance, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: Continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic issues through the United Nations (U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; Consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region, including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living marine resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism; Review Arctic Council policy recommendations developed within the ambit of the Council's scientific reviews and ensure the policy recommendations are subject to review by Arctic governments; and Continue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. D.  Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United States may exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is critical to our national interests in energy security, resource management, and environmental protection.  The most effective way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea.  United States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance.  The United States recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources. The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force.  The United States is prepared to enter the agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation. Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to extended continental shelf and boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: Take all actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf appertaining to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent permitted under international law; Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of delimiting the extended continental shelf; and  Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia maritime boundary agreement. E.  Promoting International Scientific Cooperation Scientific research is vital for the promotion of United States interests in the Arctic region.  Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region requires access throughout the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as viable international mechanisms for sharing access to research platforms and timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses.  Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating access to its domain, is particularly important. The United States promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic region in general and potential Arctic change in particular.  This could include collaboration with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Polar Consortium, as well as with individual nations. Accurate prediction of future environmental and climate change on a regional basis, and the delivery of near real-time information to end-users, requires obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating accurate data from the entire Arctic region, including both paleoclimatic data and observational data.  The United States has made significant investments in the infrastructure needed to collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing network through a partnership among United States agencies, academic collaborators, and Arctic residents.  The United States promotes active involvement of all Arctic nations in these efforts in order to advance scientific understanding that could provide the basis for assessing future impacts and proposed response strategies. United States platforms capable of supporting forefront research in the Arctic Ocean, including portions expected to be ice-covered for the foreseeable future, as well as seasonally ice-free regions, should work with those of other nations through the establishment of an Arctic circumpolar observing network.  All Arctic nations are members of the Group on Earth Observations partnership, which provides a framework for organizing an international approach to environmental observations in the region.  In addition, the United States recognizes that academic and research institutions are vital partners in promoting and conducting Arctic research. Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to promoting scientific international cooperation, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, and Commerce and the Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: Continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region; Actively promote full and appropriate access by scientists to Arctic research sites through bilateral and multilateral measures and by other means; Lead the effort to establish an effective Arctic circumpolar observing network with broad partnership from other relevant nations; Promote regular meetings of Arctic science ministers or research council heads to share information concerning scientific research opportunities and to improve coordination of international Arctic research programs; Work with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to promote research that is strategically linked to U.S. policies articulated in this directive, with input from the Arctic Research Commission; and Strengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and build upon the relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other nations. F.   Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region are: To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation; To protect maritime commerce; and To protect the environment. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities, short- and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect the marine environment.  In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooperation. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States promotes strengthening existing measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the marine environment in the Arctic region.  These measures may include ship routing and reporting systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arctic chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response agreements; and environmental standards.  Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in the Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: Develop additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that are likely to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic region; Commensurate with the level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based capability to address hazards in the Arctic environment.  Such efforts shall advance work on pollution prevention and response standards; determine basing and logistics support requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and rescue; Develop Arctic waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted international standards, including vessel traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation standards; accurate and standardized charts; and accurate and timely environmental and navigational information; and Evaluate the feasibility of using access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and humanitarian aid and disaster relief. G.  Economic Issues, Including Energy Sustainable development in the Arctic region poses particular challenges.  Stakeholder input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to promote economic and energy security.  Climate change and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities.  The United States affirms the importance to Arctic communities of adapting to climate change, given their particular vulnerabilities. Energy development in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing global energy demand as the area is thought to contain a substantial portion of the world's undiscovered energy resources.  The United States seeks to ensure that energy development throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner, taking into account the interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and transparent market principles.  The United States seeks to balance access to, and development of, energy and other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic environment by ensuring that continental shelf resources are managed in a responsible manner and by continuing to work closely with other Arctic nations. The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of existing fora, such as the Arctic Council, the International Regulators Forum, and the International Standards Organization.  Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to economic issues, including energy, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Energy, in coordination with  heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:  Seek to increase efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing climate conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the Arctic region.  Such efforts shall include inventories and assessments of villages, indigenous communities, subsistence opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil and gas development projects, alternative energy development opportunities, forestry, cultural and other sites, living marine resources, and other elements of the Arctic's socioeconomic composition;  Work with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationally recognized standards and the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security Principles; Consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production, environmental and socioeconomic impacts, including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the sharing of environmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring programs, and reservoir management in areas with potentially shared resources; Protect United States interests with respect to hydrocarbon reservoirs that may overlap boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their development; Identify opportunities for international cooperation on methane hydrate issues, North Slope hydrology, and other matters; Explore whether there is a need for additional fora for informing decisions on hydrocarbon leasing, exploration, development, production, and transportation, as well as shared support activities, including infrastructure projects; and Continue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations operating in the region to address shared concerns, recognizing that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are located outside of United States jurisdiction.  H.  Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources The Arctic environment is unique and changing.  Increased human activity is expected to bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious consequences for Arctic communities and ecosystems.  Despite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly understood.  Sea ice and glaciers are in retreat.  Permafrost is thawing and coasts are eroding.  Pollutants from within and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region.  Basic data are lacking in many fields.  High levels of uncertainty remain concerning the effects of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic.  Given the need for decisions to be based on sound scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and vulnerability assessments are top priorities.  For example, an understanding of the probable consequences of global climate variability and change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to guide the effective long-term management of Arctic natural resources and to address socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use of natural resources. Taking into account the limitations in existing data, United States efforts to protect the Arctic environment and to conserve its natural resources must be risk-based and proceed on the basis of the best available information. The United States supports the application in the Arctic region of the general principles of international fisheries management outlined in the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and similar instruments.  The United States endorses the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Arctic from destructive fishing practices and seeks to ensure an adequate enforcement presence to safeguard Arctic living marine resources. With temperature increases in the Arctic region, contaminants currently locked in the ice and soils will be released into the air, water, and land.  This trend, along with increased human activity within and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of contaminants into the Arctic, including both persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic pollutants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot). Implementation:  In carrying out this policy as it relates to environmental protection and conservation of natural resources, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: In cooperation with other nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other environmental challenges; Continue to identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources, taking account of the changing ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic.  For species whose range includes areas both within and beyond United States jurisdiction, the United States shall continue to collaborate with other governments to ensure effective conservation and management; Seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the Arctic, including through consideration of international agreements or organizations to govern future Arctic fisheries; Pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and  Intensify efforts to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants on human health and the environment and work with other nations to reduce the introduction of key pollutants into the Arctic. IV.  Resources and Assets A.  Implementing a number of the policy elements directed above will require appropriate resources and assets.  These elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations.  The heads of executive departments and agencies with responsibilities relating to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget, administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements to implement the elements of this directive.

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96 This PowerPoint provides and overview of the Homeland Security Presidential Directives.
A complete copy of the directives can be found in the appendix of the participant manual.


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