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Virtual Switching Without a Hypervisor for a More Secure Cloud Xin Jin Princeton University Joint work with Eric Keller(UPenn) and Jennifer Rexford(Princeton)

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Presentation on theme: "Virtual Switching Without a Hypervisor for a More Secure Cloud Xin Jin Princeton University Joint work with Eric Keller(UPenn) and Jennifer Rexford(Princeton)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Virtual Switching Without a Hypervisor for a More Secure Cloud Xin Jin Princeton University Joint work with Eric Keller(UPenn) and Jennifer Rexford(Princeton) 1

2 Public Cloud Infrastructure Cloud providers offer computing resources on demand to multiple “tenants” Benefits: – Public (any one can use) – Economies of scale (lower cost) – Flexibility (pay-as-you-go) 2

3 Hardware Server Virtualization Multiple VMs run on the same server Benefits – Efficient use of server resources – Backward compatibility Examples – Xen – KVM – VMware VM Hypervisor 3

4 Network Virtualization Software switches – Run in the hypervisor or the control VM (Dom0) Benefits: Flexible control at the “edge” – Access control – Resource and name space isolation – Efficient communication between co-located VMs Examples – Open vSwitch – VMware’s vSwitch – Cisco’s Nexus 1000v Switch Hardware VM Software Switch Hypervisor 4

5 Security: a major impediment for moving to the cloud! Let’s take a look at where the vulnerabilities are… 5

6 Guest VM 2Guest VM 3 Hardware Hypervisor Guest VM 1 Vulnerabilities in Server Virtualization The hypervisor is quite complex Large amount of code ―> Bugs (NIST’s National Vulnerability Database) 6

7 Guest VM 2Guest VM 3 Hardware Hypervisor Guest VM 1 Vulnerabilities in Server Virtualization The hypervisor is an attack surface (bugs, vulnerable) ―> Malicious customers attack the hypervisor 7

8 Vulnerabilities in Network Virtualization Software switch in control VM (Dom0) Hypervisor is involved in communication Hardware Hypervisor Dom0 Software Switch Physical NIC Guest VM 2Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Virtual Interface 8

9 Hardware Hypervisor Dom0 Software Switch Physical NIC Guest VM 2Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Virtual Interface Software switch is coupled with the control VM ―> e.g., software switch crash can lead to a complete system crash Vulnerabilities in Network Virtualization 9

10 Dom0 Disaggregation [e.g., SOSP’11] Disaggregate control VM (Dom0) into smaller, single-purpose and independent components Malicious customer can still attack hypervisor! Hardware Hypervisor Guest VM 1 Dom0Guest VM 2 Service VM Service VM Service VM Service VM 10

11 NoHype [ISCA’10, CCS’11] Eliminate the hypervisor attack surface What if I want to use a software switch? Hypervisor Dom0 Emulate, Manage Hardware Virtualized Physical NIC Physical Device Driver Pre-allocating memory and cores Using hardware virtualized I/O devices Hypervisor is only used to boot up and shut down guest VMs. Guest VM 1Guest VM 2 11

12 Software Switching in NoHype Bouncing packets through the physical NIC Consumes excessive bandwidth on PCI bus and the physical NIC! Guest VM 1Guest VM 3 Hypervisor Hardware Virtualized Physical NIC Physical Device Driver Guest VM 2 Software Switch Dom0 Emulate, Manage 12

13 Our Solution Overview Eliminate the hypervisor attack surface Enable software switching in an efficient way Hardware Guest VM 1 DomS Guest VM 2 Virtual Interface Software Switch Physical NIC Virtual Interface Hypervisor Dom0 Emulate, Manage 13

14 Hypervisor Eliminate the Hypervisor-Guest Interaction Shared memory – Two FIFO buffers for communication Polling only – Do not use event channel; no hypervisor involvement FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Dom0 Software Switch 14

15 Limit Damage From a Compromised Switch Decouple software switch from Dom0 – Introduce a Switch Domain (DomS) Decouple software switch from the hypervisor – Eliminate the hypervisor attack surface Hypervisor FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface DomS Software Switch Dom0 FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface DomS Software Switch Dom0 Hypervisor FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Dom0 Software Switch 15

16 Preliminary Prototype Prototype based on – Xen 4.1: used to boot up/shut down VMs – Linux 3.1: kernel module to implement polling/FIFO – Open vSwitch Hypervisor Dom0 Software Switch Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Native Xen Hardware FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface DomS Software Switch Our Solution Hardware Hypervisor Dom0

17 Preliminary Evaluation Evaluate the throughput between DomS and a guest VM, compared with native Xen Traffic measurement: Netperf Configuration: each VM has 1 core and 1GB of RAM 17 Hypervisor Dom0 Software Switch Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface Native Xen Hardware FIFO Polling Guest VM 1 Virtual Interface DomS Software Switch Our Solution Hardware Hypervisor Dom0

18 Evaluation on Throughput FIFO Size – Polling period is fixed to 1ms – Reach high throughput with just 256 FIFO pages (Only 1MB) Polling Period – Shorter polling period, higher throughput – CPU resource consumption? ―> Future work 18

19 Comparison with Native Xen Outperforms native Xen when message size is smaller than 8 KB. Future work: incorporate more optimization 19

20 Conclusion and Future Work Trend towards software switching in the cloud Security in hypervisor and Dom0 is a big concern Improve security by enabling software switching without hypervisor involvement Future work – Detection and remediation of DomS compromise 20

21 Thanks! Q&A 21


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