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Ari Juels RSA Laboratories Marty Wattenberg 328 W. 19th Street, NYC A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
Biometric authentication: Computer Authentication through Measurement of Biological Characteristics
u Fingerprint scanning u Iris scanning u Voice recognition Types of biometric authentication u Many others... u Face recognition u Body odor Authenticating...
Enrollment / Registration Template t Alice
Enrollment / Registration Alice Server
Authentication Alice Server
Server verifies against template ?
Limited password changes First password Second password
Templates represent intrinsic information about you Alice Theft of template is theft of identity
Towards a solution
password UNIX protection of passwords password h(password) Password
Template protection? h( )
Fingerprint is variable u Differing angles of presentation u Differing amounts of pressure u Chapped skin Don t have exact key!
We need fuzzy commitment ( )
Seems counterintuitive u Cryptographic (hash) function scrambles bits to produce random- looking structure, but uFuzziness or error resistance means high degree of local structure
Error Correcting Codes
Noisy channel Alice Bob Alice, I love… crypto s
Error correcting codes Alice Bob 110
g 111 111 000 Function g adds redundancy Bob M 3 bits C 9 bits c Message space Codeword space g
Error correcting codes Alice Bob 111 111 000 0 1
101 111 100 111 111 000 f c C Function f corrects errors Alice f
Alice uses g -1 to retrieve message 9 bits C M 3 bits Alice g-1g-1 c Alice gets original, uncorrupted message 110
Idea: Treat template like message W g C(t) = h(g(t))
What do we get? uFuzziness of error-correcting code u Security of hash function-based commitment
Problems Davida, Frankel, and Matt (97) u Results in very large error-correcting code u Do not get good fuzziness u Cannot prove security easily u Dont really have access to message!
Our (counterintuitive) idea: Express template as corrupted codeword u Never use message space!
Express template as corrupted codeword W t w t = w +
t = w + h(w) Idea: hash most significant part for security Idea: leave some local information in clear for fuzziness
How we use fuzzy commitment...
Computing fuzzy hash of template t u Choose w at random u Compute = t - w u Store (h(w), ) as commitment (h(w), )
Verification of fingerprint t u Retrieve C(t) = (h(w), ) u Try to decommit using t: –Compute w = f(t - ) –Is h(w) = h(w)? ?
Characteristics of u Good fuzziness (say, 17%) u Simplicity u Provably strong security –I.e., nothing to steal
Open problems u What do template and error distributions really look like? u What other uses are there for fuzzy commitment? –Graphical passwords
Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching Ari Juels RSA Laboratories 10th CACR Information Security Workshop 8 May 2002 LABORATORIES.
Fuzzy Stuff Lecture 24, Outline Motivation: Biometric Architectures Motivation: Biometric Architectures New Tool (for us): Error Correcting.
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Error-Tolerant Password Recovery Niklas Frykholm and Ari Juels RSA Laboratories.
Fuzzy Commitment Ari Juels RSA Laboratories DIMACS Workshop on Cryptography: Theory Meets Practice 15 October 2004.
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Encryption provides confidentiality Information is unreadable to anyone without knowledge of the key Hashing provides integrity Verify the integrity.
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1 Lect. 20. Identification. 2 Entity Authentication (Identification) Over the communication network, one party, Alice, shows to another party, Bob,
Last Class: The Problem BobAlice Eve Private Message Eavesdropping.
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