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Fixing a Local Aid Glitch Discretionary Decisions in the Implementation of 2006 Education Aid Reforms.

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Presentation on theme: "Fixing a Local Aid Glitch Discretionary Decisions in the Implementation of 2006 Education Aid Reforms."— Presentation transcript:

1 Fixing a Local Aid Glitch Discretionary Decisions in the Implementation of 2006 Education Aid Reforms

2 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Pre Reform Foundation Budget Less: Required Local Contribution based on historical growth model Less: Required Local Contribution based on Aggregate Wealth model Equals: Education Aid Equals: Education Aid (grandfathering and transition) Formula tweaked annually since 2002 Formula tweaked annually – bigger tweaks since 2010

3 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Results still unfair in FY13 WalthamWellesley Combined Effort Capacity as % Foundation Budget 102.6%176.7% H2 Aid as % of Foundation Budget (no chg. from FY12) 12.9%15.9% Aid Increase – FY06 to FY %127.2% Note, other similar examples can be found – e.g., Belmont vs. Watertown.

4 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger The Transition Gap

5 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

6 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

7 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

8 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

9 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Dropping Down Payment Aid in the Financial Crunch FY07FY08FY09FY10FY11FY12FY13 Aid CategoriesF D G M FF MFF Down Payment %20%30%33%n/a Effort Reduction %20%25%33%15%30%20%15% Low RLC IncreaseNone1-2% Floor1-2% Min. Increase PP$50 n/a$25n/a Base Reduction+SF+ Job $- Job $ Cap on RLC % of FB150%n/a 100% FB Inflation5.9%4.7%5.2%3.0%-2.2%1.8%3.7%

10 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Waltham has fared poorly because (a) it was among the most disadvantaged under the old formula and (b) in the crunch, we chose Effort Reduction over Down Payment. WalthamWellesleyBrookline 13 Cap/FB 102.6%176.7%160.7% 06 RLC/FB 173.7%108.8%154.0% 13 Target 82.5%82.5%82.5% 13 RLC/FB 91.1%85.5%85.8% 13 FA/13FB 8.9%14.5%14.2% 12 Act/13FB 12.9%15.9%11.0% 12 to 13 Chg 0%0%29.9%

11 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Options to get Waltham to 13.25% of FB Add to H2 Comment Increase Effort Reduction from 15% to 58.1% $40.9m Windfall if above target with FY12 Aid < F. Budget Add Down Payment Aid at 8% of Gap $4.0m Helps many who are not far under target aid Implement Aid Floor as 13.25% of Foundation Budget $3.6m Helps only if well under target, but also only if wealthy Implement aid floor as max point gap under target (same as 13.25% of F. Budget if at 17.5% target, but includes all below target) $10.8m Helps those most under target at all wealth levels (13.25% gets Waltham $203,549 increase or 2.9% on $7,068,165 FY12 Aid.)

12 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Options to Offset $10.8m in Cost Eliminate Effort Reduction % factor (in favor of working the gap down directly) $5.8m (if gap capped at 4.25%; savings greater if no cap). In combination with gap implementation, targets effort reduction funds to communities most disfavored by previous implementation decisions Limit Required Local Contribution gap below Target to 10 points maximum (i.e., raise lowest RLCs) $5.1m (savings do not interact with cap) Accelerates slow moving catch up in RLC towards target from below – affects 13 communities

13 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

14 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

15 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

16 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger

17 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Summary of Analysis Elimination of Down Payment Aid while continuing effort reduction disproportionately disadvantaged those communities that (a) have above-target RLC and (b) were most disadvantaged by pre-reform aid model (Waltham, others), especially those (c) at the maximum target RLC of 82.5%. Elimination of Down Payment Aid while continuing effort reduction disproportionately disadvantaged those communities that (a) have above-target RLC and (b) were most disadvantaged by pre-reform aid model (Waltham, others), especially those (c) at the maximum target RLC of 82.5%. Fairest solution is to place a ceiling on the gap between target contribution and required local contribution, so increasing aid for those furthest below target aid level at all wealth levels. Fairest solution is to place a ceiling on the gap between target contribution and required local contribution, so increasing aid for those furthest below target aid level at all wealth levels.

18 February 27, Sen. Will Brownsberger Funding Options Summary Change over incremental cost of H2 (which is $145.3m above FY12) Effort Reduc- tion Max RLC Points < Target Max RLC Points > Target Grandfather vs. H2 $0 – H2 configuration 15% No Max Yes Add $10.8m – Add max points over target rule 15% No Max 4.25Yes $0 – Add max, offsets No Save Net $32m – Use low max, deep offsets 002.5No Add $43.9m – go fully to target RLC 100% (irrel.) 00No Add $110.6m – go fully to target but require >= H2 100% (irrel.) 00Yes Note: All options shown provide standard grandfathering of FY12 aid. A 2% initial base cut would cover the $43.9 million cost of going fully to target RLCs.


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