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Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Metafuzz 0.9 Deep Fuzzing MS Word / Office (With Ruby) (rubyrubyrubypythonsucksyayruby!)

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Presentation on theme: "Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Metafuzz 0.9 Deep Fuzzing MS Word / Office (With Ruby) (rubyrubyrubypythonsucksyayruby!)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Metafuzz 0.9 Deep Fuzzing MS Word / Office (With Ruby) (rubyrubyrubypythonsucksyayruby!)

2 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Basic Fuzzer Problems for Word Opening Word is SLOW Success detection is harder than crash detection Dr Watson, Dialog Boxes, Hangs, HDD Grind Lots of internal exception handling Hard to parse file formats Massive Attack Surface means millions of tests My first fuzzer did a blistering tests per minute.

3 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC omgwtfdoc? Each FKP can be viewed as a bucket or bin that contains the properties of a certain range of FCs in the Word file. In Word files, a PLC, the plcfbte (PLex of FCs containing Bin Table Entries) is maintained. It records the association between a particular range of FCs and the PN (Page Number) of the FKP that contains the properties for that FC range in the file. In a complex (fast-saved) Word document, FKP pages are intermingled with pages of text in a random pattern which reflects the history of past fast saves. In a complex document, a plcfbteChpx which records the location of every CHPX FKP must be stored and a plcfbtePapx which records the location of every PAPX FKP must be stored. In a non-complex, full-saved document, all of the CHPX FKPS are recorded in consecutive 512-byte pages with the FKPs recorded in ascending FC order, as are all of the PAPX FKPS. A plcfbteLvcx serves the same purpose for LVCX FKPS. In a full save document, the plcfbtes may not have been able to expand during the save process due to a lack of RAM. In this situation, the plcfbtes are interspersed with the property pages in a linked list of FBD pages.

4 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC General Approach Distributed fuzzing will be essential for speed Use OLE automation to detect success Independent process to kill hung applications and deal with dialog boxes Write a few core parsers that abstract the scut work of the binary format and focus on deep structures Integrate with CDB to catch first chance exceptions and gather information

5 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Things to know about Word.doc Also, check Supporting Technologies link for spec for Compound Binary File Format Specification Basically,.DOC,.PPT and.XLS are OLE Structured Storage files, which means they are more or less a FAT filesystem inside a file. This means that structures you want to fuzz may well be broken into bits and scattered at random throughout the file. ruby-ole gem by Charles Lowe helps a LOT here. Install it, then… require ruby-ole Ole::Storage.open('c:\tmp.doc','rb+') {|ole| ole.file.open("1Table","wb+") {|f| f.write( fuzz(f.read) ) } TSBrowse Demo

6 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Things to know about Word.doc Your guide to the file – the FIB (File Information Block), a 1472 byte page turner. Lots of general info, followed by a long list of offset / length pairs describing structures in the Table Stream. FIBBrowse Demo Parsing it – Binstruct Its little endian. Thats important.

7 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word Rubys Win32OLE gem can be used for the heavy lifting The call to open below raises an exception if it fails, which may or may not be a crash. require win32ole word_app=WIN32OLE.new(Word.Application') word_app.DisplayAlerts=0 word_app.Visible=false word_app.Documents.Open({ "FileName"=>filename, "AddToRecentFiles"=>false, "OpenAndRepair"=>false })

8 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word 1.Open the Visual Basic Editor from inside Word ALT+F11 2.Press F2 for the Object Browser 3.Poke around.

9 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word require win32/registry Win32::Registry::HKEY_CURRENT_USER.open( 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Resiliency', Win32::Registry::KEY_WRITE) do |reg| reg.delete_key "StartupItems" rescue nil reg.delete_key "DisabledItems" rescue nil end

10 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word Word has a massive, horrible array of dialog boxes with which to hang your fuzzer. Do I have dialog boxes to deal with? GW_ENABLEDPOPUP=6 FindWindow=Win32API.new("user32.dll", "FindWindow", 'PP','N') GetWindow=Win32API.new("user32.dll","GetWindow",'LI','I') window_caption=rand(2**32).to_s win32ole_app.caption=window_caption window_id=FindWindow.call(0,window_caption) GetWindow.call(window_id,GW_ENABLEDPOPUP)!=0

11 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word FindWindow=Win32API.new("user32.dll", "FindWindow", 'PP','N') GetWindow=Win32API.new("user32.dll", "GetWindow", 'LI','I') PostMessage=Win32API.new("user32.dll", "PostMessage", 'LILL','I') def kill_dialog_boxes word_hwnd=FindWindow.call("OpusApp",0) # Get any descendant windows which are enabled - alerts, dialog boxes etc child_hwnd=GetWindow.call(word_hwnd, GW_ENABLEDPOPUP) # Get any toplevel dialog boxes that pop up during open before the main window toplevel_hwnd=FindWindow.call(0, "Microsoft Office Word") [toplevel_hwnd, child_hwnd].each {|hwnd| next if hwnd==0 PostMessage.call(hwnd,WM_COMMAND,IDCANCEL,0) PostMessage.call(hwnd,WM_COMMAND,IDNO,0) PostMessage.call(hwnd,WM_COMMAND,IDCLOSE,0) PostMessage.call(hwnd,WM_COMMAND,IDOK,0) PostMessage.call(hwnd,WM_DESTROY,0,0) } end

12 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Working with Word Word creates temp files all over the place This fills up your client disk and fragments it Best thing to do is create a RAMDisk (later) ~$foo.doc gets created next to foo.doc Other temp files may be created in %TMP% or %TEMP% Still more in... Temporary Internet Files/Content.Word and Temporary Internet Files/Content.Office Those directories may be hidden even when show hidden files is turned on, so you may need to type the name into the File Browser.

13 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Integrating the Debugger I used CDB Command line version of WinDbg, just as powerful Instead of painfully wrapping a DLL, I cheated. Take CDB, wrap its STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR Some hoopy code required for Ruby 1.8 since popen doesnt work properly and had to be rewritten Use a Connector class I had already, which manages a read queue from the target and uses blocking writes

14 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Integrating the Debugger When done, it looks like this: debugger=Connector.new(CONN_CDB,"-p #{word_pid}) debugger.puts !load winext\msec.dll debugger.puts sxe -c r;!exploitable -m" av debugger.puts g Some syntax sugar: debugger.registers.eax debugger.send_break debugger.target_running? debugger.crash? debugger.dequeue_all.join => all STDOUT, joined as a string.

15 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Analysis grep -h CLASSIFICATION *.txt | sort | uniq -c 9 CLASSIFICATION:PROBABLY_EXPLOITABLE 429 CLASSIFICATION:PROBABLY_NOT_EXPLOITABLE 64 CLASSIFICATION:UNKNOWN grep -h SHORT *.txt | sort | uniq -c 25 SHORT_DESCRIPTION:ReadAV 429 SHORT_DESCRIPTION:ReadAVNearNull 39 SHORT_DESCRIPTION:TaintedDataControlsBranchSelection 9 SHORT_DESCRIPTION:TaintedDataControlsCodeFlow

16 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Analysis grep -h Hash= *.txt | sort | uniq -c | sed -e "s/\+\S*/+xxx/" 17 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at mso!Ordinal1597+xxx (Hash=0x4e x35484e20) 2 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x47357e23.0x6c7a2b24) 1 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x3a4b3b56) 17 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x3f763e6b) 2 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x703d0b32) 9 BUG_TITLE:Probably Exploitable - Data from Faulting Address controls Code Flow starting at wwlib!wdGetApplicationObject+xxx (Hash=0x6b6b3f1a.0x e) 425 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation near NULL starting at mso!Ordinal8472+xxx (Hash=0x403f7b2c.0x ) 1 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation near NULL starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x47357e23.0x553d3855) 3 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation near NULL starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x47357e23.0x1e2b434c) 3 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation starting at kernel32!RaiseException+xxx (Hash=0x425b1536.0x72b5f4a) 3 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation starting at mso!Ordinal2669+xxx (Hash=0x537e727f.0x28425d2a) 10 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation starting at mso!Ordinal2669+xxx (Hash=0x537e727f.0x d) 8 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation starting at mso!Ordinal2669+xxx (Hash=0x537e727f.0x42271a0d) 1 BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation starting at mso!Ordinal8472+xxx (Hash=0x403f7b2c.0x )

17 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Analysis INSTRUCTION_ADDRESS:0x327f72d7 INSTRUCTION_STACK_FRAME:-1 DESCRIPTION:Read Access Violation near NULL SHORT_DESCRIPTION:ReadAVNearNull CLASSIFICATION:PROBABLY_NOT_EXPLOITABLE BUG_TITLE:Read Access Violation near NULL starting at mso!Ordinal8472+0x1092 (Hash=0x403f7b2c.0x ) EXPLANATION:This is a user mode read access violation near null, and is probably not exploitable.First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. eax= ebx= ecx= edx= esi= edi=0011d894 eip=327f72d7 esp=0011d734 ebp=0011d8b8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl= mso!Ordinal8472+0x1092: 327f72d7 a5 movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi] es:0023:0011d894= ds:0023: =???????? 0:000>

18 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Analysis grep -h Hash=0x b *.txt | sort | uniq -c | sed -e "s/\+\S*/+xxx/" 1 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x3a4b3b56) 17 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x3f763e6b) 2 BUG_TITLE:Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection starting at wwlib!DllGetClassObject+xxx (Hash=0x b.0x703d0b32) grep -l Hash=0x b *.txt | xargs grep -h STACK_FRAME | sort | uniq -c | grep -v 20 | sed -e "s/\+\S*/+xxx/" 36 STACK_FRAME:mso!Ordinal5900+xxx 2 STACK_FRAME:mso!Ordinal5900+xxx 56 STACK_FRAME:mso!Ordinal5900+xxx

19 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Production 1 Production 2 … Production n Fuzz Server /dev/shm (sqlite) /fuzzfiles detail-n.txt crash-n.doc Delivery 1 Delivery 2 … Delivery n Metafuzz Harness

20 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Metafuzz Harness Almost all the code is generic, and could be used for any file fuzzing work (just need to work out how to test for success etc) All components auto-resume, so code can be upgraded on the fly without restarting test streams Very simple, home grown protocol using JSON-serialised hashes over DJB- Netstrings Could write production clients in any language Network based on Ruby EventMachine, single threaded, using the Reactor pattern DB SQLite for now, easy to upgrade /dev/shm on Ubuntu is your friend for DB Writes RESTful web interface (beta) to enable production clients to check results and full debugger output for any test (adaptive fuzzing?)

21 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Optimising Fuzzclients The ideal client for Office fuzzing is – Stable – no disk bloat, no memory leaks etc – Fast – performs as well as Windows will let us – Managable without a GUI (Thanks to #uncon / Ollie Whitehouse for some great tips here...)

22 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Building an XP Fuzzclient for ESXi (or any VMWare) 1024MB RAM, or as much as you can spare 8-10GB Disk, pre-allocated Enhanced vmxnet NIC (just change the.vmx) No background No screensaver

23 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Building an XP Fuzzclient for ESXi My Computer->Properties->Advanced – Visual Effects -> Adjust for best performance – Processor Scheduling -> Programs – Memory Usage -> System Cache – Virtual Memory -> Change to 0MB

24 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Building an XP Fuzzclient for ESXi Install a RAMDisk. I got a free one at: 64MB should be enough, as long as you clear it often Change Temporary Internet Files, and ALL temp files to point to R:\Temp Two User Environment Variables %TMP%, %TEMP% and two System Environment Variables Write your fuzzer tests to the RAMDisk Check your work with Process Monitor (Youll still have a little)

25 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Building an XP Fuzzclient for ESXi Last but definitely not least... gflags /p /enable WINWORD.EXE /full (not sure if that survives a reboot) Full page heap kills performance, but greatly increases the chance of crashing on heap corruption

26 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Building an XP Fuzzclient for ESXi Office Apps want to be logged on. We dont want to type passwords on 72 clients. Disable user passwords when logging on: We used an oldskool.bat in the startup folder: – copy /y all code from a share – (re)-enable gflags just in case – re-create required directories in RAMDisk – start the fuzzer

27 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Our Fuzzpark The Hardware: 5 Servers, Dual Quad-Core Xeon, 16GB RAM, 4 x 300GB SATA disks, one per SATA port (actually not very high spec, these days) GB Switch, MTU 9000, all clients with TSO enabled The Logical Network: 2 Quad Processor Ubuntu bit servers running a Server and several Production processes each 72 XP Fuzzclients Ghetto style shellscripts to restart all clients, power-on, power-off etc from the ESXi command-line

28 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Our Fuzzpark Peak performance ~50 tests/sec Peak with Page Heap ~30 tests/sec Average disk usage per Fuzzclient server ~150KB/sec (for all 16 clients) Average CPU usage per Fuzzclient server 99.99% Ubuntu Server guests ~30% CPU, could probably handle another 32+ clients

29 Private & Confidential Property of COSEINC Beer! But questions may be asked first.


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