Presentation on theme: "Getting A’s on the three F’s: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization Lant Pritchett Varad Pande."— Presentation transcript:
1Getting A’s on the three F’s: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization Lant PritchettVarad Pande
2Outline (but with several big “asides”) Decentralization and Primary Education Reform in India: The Two QuestionsAn Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First PrinciplesFiscal issuesA ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform
3Decentralization And Primary Education Reform in India India is Trying to DecentralizeIndian Needs Primary Education Reform73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution devolve political power to local governmentsStates modify Acts and hold elections to local governmentsFunctions in XI and XII Schedules devolved to local governmentsContinued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionatelyQuestion 1: How to Do Education Delivery in this Decentralizing ContextQuestion 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
4Decentralization in India Has to date been Unbalanced and Incomplete Unbalanced Decentralization in India in an International Context510UPRajasthanMPAPKeralaPolandChileColombiaFiscalAdministrativePolitical‘Unbalanced’ DecentralizationPolitical Decentralization has happened (election of PRIs) but…Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization remains weakDecentralization Index (0-10)Source: World Bank (1999)
5Decentralization and Education Decentralization is no panacea—there are enormous risks to decentralization that could worsen service deliveryBadly designed decentralization also has fiscal risks (and missed opportunities)Getting the “three F’s” properly aligned is difficult
6Decentralization is Neither a Necessary nor Sufficient Condition for High Quality Education Correlation between Decentralization Indicators and Primary Education OutcomesSource: Analysis based on data from Governance and Service Delivery Indicators Dataset, Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, (2004)No evidence of high correlation between decentralization and education outcomes in cross-country analysis
7The problem that a State Finance Commission Faces Assign“vertical shares”(revenues)CentralStateLocalAssign functions(across tiers)EducationHealthRoadsWaterFunctionsFinance?
8A plausible sounding procedure: Assign functions (across tiers of PRI) by sector and activity (including mandates for minimum standards—e.g. universal primary education)Cost those functions at the standards demanded/expectedCalculate the vertical share to transfer adequate resources to each tier to carry out its functions—make revenue assignments
9Our Analytical Approach To Effective Decentralization First Principles of Public Finance and AccountabilityFunctional Allocation and RecommendationsStatus quo AnalysisUnbundlingWhat are the key functions and activities in Primary Education?Who provides these functions and activities today in India?How to decide who should provide which functions and activities?What changes are required to the current system of service delivery?Disaggregate into functions and activities:Logical, mutually exclusive and exhaustive (MECE) functional classificationConsistent with Indian public administration delivery systemAnalyze de jure functional allocation of each tier by studying existing legislationAnalyze de facto functional allocation (on-the-ground picture) by conducting surveys and interviewsUse First Principles of Public Finance find optimal allocation from public finance perspectiveUse First Principles of Accountability to address the accountability issuesBased on this systematic analysis, propose changes to current systemDevelop a detailed proposal for reform of primary education that draws on the findings of our analytical approach
10Step 1: UnbundlingQuestion: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?Functions and Activities in Government Primary Schooling in Rural IndiaOutput: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and Activities
11Step 2: Status Quo Analysis Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE JURELessonsCurrent system is highly centralized with little role for PRIs / User GroupsSchools / teachers have little or no autonomy… or accountabilityFunctional Allocation in Primary Education – DE FACTO
12Heterogeneity of Demand Step 3: Use First Principles: Public FinanceWhat are the First Principles of Public Finance?PrincipleExplanationImplicationActivities with significant economies of scale should be done by a higher level of governmentUnit Cost of production declines as scale of production increasesEconomies of ScaleThe actions of one agent affects other agentsActivities with significant externalities should be done at a higher level of government, so that the ‘external’ effect can be ‘internalized’ in the systemExternalitiesNeed for equitable spread in inputs, process or outcomesEquity may imply financial support to education at a large enough geographic scope to allow for redistributive transfers to equalize across smaller unitsEquityVariation in local needs and preferences between regionsThe more heterogenous the demand for the activity is likely to be, the more locally it should be doneHeterogeneity of Demand
13Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance Economies of ScaleWhat is the size of ‘optimally sized catchments area’ of a service provider to jurisdiction?StatePopulation: millionZilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 millionBlock PanchayatPopulation: 60, ,000Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000
14Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance Economies of ScaleOptimal Catchments Areas for LEVELS of EducationUniversitiesStatePopulation: millionZilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 millionWhereas the optimal catchments area for a primary school is at village level (GP jurisdiction)……the optimal catchments area for a University is district / state level (State jurisdiction)Block PanchayatPopulation: 60, ,000Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000Secondary SchoolsPrimary schools
15Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance Economies of ScaleOptimal Catchments Area for FUNCTIONS of Primary EducationSetting learning achievement standardsMonitoring and Evaluation (process and outcome)StatePopulation: millionWhereas the optimal catchments area for Operations is at village level (GP jurisdiction)……the optimal catchments area for a Setting Learning Standards is state level (State jurisdiction)Zilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 millionPlanningBlock PanchayatPopulation: 60, ,000Asset CreationGram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000Primary SchoolOperation
16Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance Economies of ScaleFunctional Allocation according to Economies of Scale Criterion`
17Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance EquityEquity Concerns are ImportantGross Enrolment Rate - UP ( )Gross Enrolment Rate - Kerala ( )Source: DPEP MIS DatabaseMajor inequity / variations in primary education levels exists between districts within statesThis creates equity rationale for centralization of education deliveryEquity Doesn’t Require CentralizationThis does not imply all functions in primary education should be done by higher levels of government….As long as Standard Setting and M&E are done by higher level of governments, AND redistributive equalizing fiscal transfers are done, goal of equity can be achieved
18Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance EquityFunctional Allocation according to Equity Criterion
19Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Public FinanceStandard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and Asset Creation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective
20Transaction-Intensity Inferring Performance Step 3: Use First Principles - AccountabilityWhat are the First Principles of Accountability?DiscretionaryTransaction-IntensityInferring PerformanceActivities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local contextActivities that require several repeated transactions at the local levelWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technicallyExamplesDoes the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountabilityImplication
21Aside on Accountability: Quality of Government Primary Schooling in India is very low…especially for the PoorFramework for Judging QualityEnrolmentCompletionAchievementPercent of 6-14 yr olds currently in school ( )Percent of yr olds completed at least Grade 8 ( )Percent of children with Inadequate Primary Learning Achievement for Math of Age for Class 5 or in Grade 5Average 78.8%Not reaching Grade 581.7%Scoring < 50% in Grade 5 (Govt School)Average 49.6%67.6%69.7%53.8%Note: Framework adapted from Warwick and Reimers (1995); Enrolment and Completion data from ‘Educational Attainment and Enrollment Profiles’, Filmer (2004); test scores analysis for government and government aided schools only based on data from Singh, Jain, Gautam and Kumar (2005)…+ Anecdotal Evidence of low quality (Pratichi Trust, PROBE Report, etc.) …+ Evidence of student migration from government to private schools
22AOA: Learning achievement from Baseline study in AP Mechanical learning to a large extent.Single digit addition : 18% of students (for example 3+3)Single Digit Subtraction: 12% of students (for example 9-2)Counting Kites : 54% of StudentsHighest percentage in any class is 77% of Students (which is low)Best performances are in number concepts in maths and in following instructions and recognising letters/sounds associated in languageMechanical learning taking place to large extent. But conceptual/applying to new situations is low…. Single digit addition is being answered by about 18% of children, and single digit subtraction by 12%. Only 54% were able to count 3 kites!NO QUESTION in Maths - that includes writing the number between 5 and 7 and 3+3, has been answered correctly by more than 77% students!
23AOA: Learning by age* Data based on the testing of 17,608 children in 4 random blocks in the District of Jaunpur, UP. Child tests are weighted by total number of children in village divided by number of children tested in village.
24AOA: The low quality is caused by ‘systemic’ and not ‘managerial’ failures; and thus requires an institutional solutionEvidence%Teacher Absence Rates by Country“Best practice” level of absenceTeacher AbsenteeismCountrySource: Kremer et al (2004), pg 9Level of Parental Dissatisfaction (West Bengal)Grades given by Parents to Child’s school (USA)Level of Parental SatisfactionSource: The Pratichi Education Report (2002); Berliner and Biddle (1994) pg 113Other Evidence‘Non’ Teaching: “Teaching practices have been reduced to a minimum…it has become a way of life” (PROBE)Growth of Private Schooling…which meets the differentiated (quality) demand…even among the poor (Tilak et al.)
25Result: People voting with their feet (and pocketbooks) out of the sectors:
26Example 1: Buying a Sandwich Example 2: Going to a Doctor AOA: What is ‘Accountability’? – Demystifying the Elements of the Accountability RelationsThere are Five Features to Any Accountability RelationshipFeatureWhatExample 1: Buying a SandwichExample 2: Going to a DoctorDelegationYou give a task to the accountable ‘agent’You ask for a sandwichYou go to the doctor to be treatedFinancingYou give the ‘agent’ the money to do the taskYou pay for the sandwichYou pay the doctor for the treatmentPerformingThe ‘agent’ does the assigned taskThe sandwich is made for youThe doctor treats you to try cure your ailmentInformingYou find out how well the ‘agent’ has done the workYou eat the sandwich which informs you of its qualityYou see if you are feeling better – you assess the performance of the doctorEnforcingYou reward good performance and punish bad performanceYou choose whether to buy a sandwich from the seller the next time, affecting his profitsYou go to him next time (if he was good) or choose to go somewhere else if not
27Relationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first leg Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate AccountabilityRelationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first legPolicy MakersCitizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality of public services they receive (VOICE)…But, Citizens…may vote along ethnic / ideological lines (DELEGATION)may not be able to attribute service to appropriate Policy-Maker (INFORMING)may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short (ENFORCING)VOICECitizens
28Relationship 2: COMPACT, long route second leg Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate AccountabilityRelationship 2: COMPACT, long route second legPolicy MakersWell-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve service delivery performance (COMPACT)…But, Policy Makers…may not be able to specify exact contracts (DELEGATION)may not be able to monitor Service Providers (INFORMING)may not be able to alter incentives of Service Providers (ENFORCING)COMPACTService Providers
29Relationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short Route Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate AccountabilityRelationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short RouteClients can play major role in tailoring service-mix to their local needs and monitoring Service Providers (CLIENT POWER)But, Clients…often do not have choice (lack of competition)often cannot infer provider effort (INFORMING)often do not have powers to discipline bad Service Providers (ENFORCING)CitizensService ProvidersCLIENT POWER
30Pratichi Trust (A. Sen’s NGO) report on West Bengal: “According to you what are the main problems of primary schooling?”The Sabhapati of a Panchayat Samiti in Puruliya needed no time to reply:“Teachers do not teach.”
31AOA: Accountability at the local level…Pratichi Trust report: We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”Says a villager in Puruliya
32AOA: local client power? “We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”Says a villager in PuruliyaResult of this attempt at local accountbility?“He slept, got his body massaged by the children, and read the newspaper. How long can you watch him leaving aside your own work?”
33The Three Relationships of Accountability in Service Delivery Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate AccountabilityThe Three Relationships of Accountability in Service DeliveryPolicy MakersVOICECOMPACTCitizensService ProvidersCLIENT POWERSource: World Development Report, 2004
34AOA: The key missing accountability relations in Primary Education between parents and teachers are Informing and EnforcingFeature of AccountabilityIs this the Key Problem?EvidenceDelegationIs it important for your child to be educated?Somewhat: Diffused objectives but Parents want to delegate (i.e., send children to school)Source: PROBE Report, pg 14Yes 89%Yes 98%Average Salaries as multiple of Income per capita by RegionAverage = 6.1Financing8-13.5Note: Uttar Pradesh figure is for ; all others are quoted from Carnoy and Welmond (1996); Source: Mehrotra and Buckland (2001)No, teachers are paid very well relative to other countriesInforming% Households Aware of Existence and activities of Community StructuresYes, no usable info on class performance; parents not actively involved in school / teaching mattersSource: CAG Report (2001)EnforcingYes, parents have little or no powers to discipline or reward teachersKremer et al (2004) find only one case of teacher dismissal ever in 3000 government schools surveyedNo monetary incentives possible for high performing teachers under current government teacher terms of employmentPerformingTeacher Absence Rates by Indian StatesYes, many teachers are not performing adequately%All India Average 25%
35AOA: Alternative Explanations for Low Quality are Unlikely to be Sufficient Enrollment rate among 5-11 year olds1%Budget expansion approaches don’t seem to have worked in India – e.g.: District Primary Education Program (DPEP)Lack of Adequate Public ExpenditureDPEP DistrictsNon-DPEP Districts (with same criteria)Source: Jalan and Glinskaya (2003)2Presence and Demand for Child LaborChild labor is not big enough – NSS (1993) shows only 8 percentMost child laborers work as family labor, so their time is fungibleEven if child labor is ‘high’, direction of causality is not clear3Parents’ Attitude to Education in IndiaLack of Parent InterestIs it important for a boy to be educated?Is it important for a girl to be educated?Parents, even poor parents, seem keen to educate their childrenNo Response 1%No 1%No Response 1%No 10%Yes 98%Source: PROBE Report, pg 14Yes 89%
36End of long aside on accountability? Publicly provided primary education is not performing wellAccountability is a key problemDecentralization alone won’t improve accountabilityBut possibly decentralization informed by accountability analysis can improve services
37Transaction-Intensity Inferring Performance Step 3: (back from long aside on accountability) Use First Principles - AccountabilityWhat are the First Principles of Accountability?DiscretionaryTransaction-IntensityInferring PerformanceActivities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local contextActivities that require several repeated transactions at the local levelWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technicallyExamplesDoes the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountabilityImplication
38Step 3: Use First Principles – Accountability Functional Allocation according to First Principles of AccountabilityDiscretionary, Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activities like Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs
39Step 4: Optimal Allocation based on First Principles Analysis First Principles of Public FinanceFirst Principles of AccountabilityKey MessagesFunctional Allocation in Primary Education – Based on First Principles AnalysisStates do Standards Setting and MonitoringPRIs assume responsibility for actual OperationAs much as possible as low as possibleHigher PRI tiers back-up on professionalism, technical
40As discussed, Many Models of Education Decentralization have not worked well 1Decentralize without unbundlingIndonesia ExperiencePushed all functions to district level (below provinces)Bad monitoring systems means that little information about regional performance is available to stimulate competition or disseminate good or bad practices2Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations (But not Teacher Operations)Latin America ExperiencePushed responsibility to local governments……But without enhancing operational control at local level (e.g.: Argentina)3Decentralize Functions, concurrently, without devolving F or FIndia Experience ( )Devolved functions (including primary education) to PRIs……But PRIs do not have adequate finance or control over functionaries to implement their mandate
41The Two Big Messages from Our Analysis But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by Suggesting Countervailing Forces to build accountability via decentralizationThe Two Big Messages from Our Analysis1Strengthen Centre and State for Standard Setting and MonitoringConsistent Standard Setting is Critical To Provide the Guiding Framework for Local Governments to Operate and ManageUniform Monitoring is Essential for Quality Control, Designing Rewards & Recognition Systems and Generating Credibility2Greater Operational Responsibility to PRIs, especially forTeachers
42What we are not saying“just turn schools over to GPs/SMCs”—without clear “delegation” and without strengthening the “information” and “enforcement” this just pushes the problem lower.“Districts play no role”Districts play key role at the technical level in planning and pedagogical support
43Here is where it gets interesting for “finance” Suppose for a minute that a state government has decided to follow these recommendations and is going to devolve primary education to PRIs (for real).What does the “finance” F corresponding to this “function” F look like?It all depends on the “functionaries” F
44Four alternatives:Full-on voucher scheme (a la Chile)—equal transfer per (weighted) student to all schools, public and private (not discussed).“Functionaries” remain a “state” problem so financing is dual (cash and in kind)“Functionaries” are transferred to schools with a cash budget but wages/employment conditions fixed“Functionaries” are transferred and “block grant” financing.
45What is the key fiscal issue? How does one compute the per child “standard unit cost” of a year of school (ignoring capital costs)?[That is, the formula for a block grant could have all kinds of weights—for girls, for SC/ST, for “marginality”—off of a standard unit cost]SUC=Teacher cost + non-teaching costTeacher cost/child= (wage per teacher)*(number of teachers)/(number of children)
46Teacher wages: the key parameter Desiderata: “Level and structure of compensation appropriate to attract, retain, and motivate teachers of desired quality.”Structure is awful (for all goals)Level of compensation?
47Level of teacher compensation? Gov’t vs. organized pvt sector is high.Teachers vs. private sector is high.Existing teachers vs. “contract” or “alternative” teachers is high.International comparisons is high.
48No political fight with teachers Pluses and Minuses of Alternatives: GPs/SMCs don’t H/F/A teachers, teachers are “assigned” and come “in kind”PlusesNo political fight with teachersGPs/SMCs do control “operating” budgets and possibly some gains there.MinusesAccountability won’t work—no gains from decentralizationNo cost savings
49GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages fixed PlusesAccountability might work at the local levelMinuses:No fiscal savingsNo reallocation to more productive uses.With complete control and high wages corruption is inevitable.
50GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages market determined PlusesAccountability might work at the local levelReallocation to productive uses (within education, between education and other uses?)Minuses:No fiscal savings to state
51GPs/SMCs control Assignment, unit costs at “true” cost, wages market determined PlusesBest chance for accountabilityFiscal savings shared state/PRIReallocation to other usesMinusesEnormous political battle with teachers/teachers unions
52One integrated proposal: Functions Centre/state sets curriculum, learning achievement targets and takes responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.District takes responsibility for: planning asset creation (schools), hiring in eligible pool and promoting teachers, technical support (e.g. supervision, in service training) [with block].GP/SMC takes responsibility for all other aspects of the operation of schools (including assignment of teachers from eligible pool).
53One integrated proposal: Finances Single block grant to GPs[SMCs] on a weighted per student basis with “efficient” SUC as the base (plus a transition fund to finance the gap of existing teachers)Set aside block grants to GPs/SMCs for “technical” functions (tied to district?).Slice for district to carry out its single responsibility functions (planning, assets)Slice for state for “high level” functions (especially for monitoring and evaluation).
54One Integrated Proposal: Functionaries The “DTPC”—a mix between existing “contract” teachers and existing “state/district” cadres with eligibility at district level, assignment at GP/SMC level.Tricky issue of “who bears the cost of unassigned ‘permanent’ teachers?”
55Big unresolved issues Block grant fungible across activities? Relationship between GP and SMC?Details of “transition fund”—reconciling supply/demand of existing teachers
56Evidence Suggests The “alternative” schools are Showing Considerable Success Experiment One: SSK Schooling in West BengalStudent Attendance on day of visitTeacher Absenteeism on day of visitDissatisfaction with Teacher (Parent Response)Higher Accountability can offset enormous other disadvantagesGreater autonomy for performance and local responsiveness worksLower wages do not appear to reduce motivation25% higher62% lower43% lowerExperiment Two: Shiksha Karmi (SK) in RajasthanEnrolment and AttendanceTest Scores%15% higher16% higher14% higher27% higherGrade 1Grade 4Grade 1Grade 4Source: Analysis based on data from - West Bengal: Pratichi Education Report 2002; Rajasthan: World Bank PAD for Rajasthan DPEP, 1999, SIDA Evaluation Study and NSSO 52nd RoundMathLanguage
57AOT: But the ‘Para-Teacher’ Model Is Not a Sustainable Systemic Solution to India’s Primary Education Crisis – Its Only a Quick FixIndex of Primary School Teacher Salary in India1Rs.‘Regular’ Government School Teacher (Rs )Variance in Pay for Identical Work is Starkly Visible‘Regular’ Government Teachers get paid 3-6 times more than para-teachersPara-teachers (Rs )2Pressure for ‘ex-post regularization’States under pressure to ‘regularize’ para-teachers when para-teacher lobby becomes substantialUnplanned and ad hoc regularization can bankrupt already fiscally drained states3Quality of instruction varies immensely as no standards are established for hiring, training, performance evaluation and contract duration, e.g.:- Qualification requirement for para-teacher varies across states from Grade 5 pass to Higher Secondary- Training requirement for para-teachers varies across states from 12 days to 2 yearsVariance in Quality of Training, Instruction and OutcomesNote: Analysis of Teacher pay based on survey of para-teacher schemes in Govinda and Josephine (2004) and other studies of para-teacher systems in India
58We Make a Modest Proposal that Combines the Best Elements of the Current Formal and ‘Para-Teacher’ SystemsA District Professional Teacher Cadre (DPTC)Phases of Teacher ProfessionalizationPhases of EmploymentApprentice (Shiksha Karmi)Associate (Adhyapak)Master (Maha-Adhyapak)Initial hiring done on renewable contract basis by ZP on GP recommendationAssignment to schools depends on GPsPermanence granted at end of contract periods, based on comprehensive evaluation - Technical Criteria: training, input indicators, teacher tests, peers Bottoms Up Criteria: Performance review and recommendation by GP/SMCAssignment still depends on GP (match S-D?)Few promoted to ‘Maha-Adhyapaks’ based on consistently exceptional performance evaluation ratings
59Apprentice (Shiksha Karmi) Master (Maha-Adhyapak) The DPTC will have an initially fixed, and then a performance and seniority based compensation system3Step jump if qualify for Maha-AdhyapakCompensation (Rs.)3 Elements of Performance Based PayKey MessagesInitially fixed pay, later performance and seniority-basedBig jumps in salary levels across phases to serve as incentive to performJump to Maha-Adhyapak rare and controlled, most spend career as Adhyapaks1Step jump when qualify for AdhyapakHigh-performing teacher track2Annual increment based on review, when AdhyapakLow-performing teacher trackYears of serviceApprentice (Shiksha Karmi)Associate (Adhyapak)Master (Maha-Adhyapak)
60Existing Formal Government Existing Para-teacher How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack Up Against Existing Systems in India?Existing Formal GovernmentExisting Para-teacherExisting PrivateOur Proposal (DPTC)HiringDone by state governmentDone by GP, criteria variesDone by school managementDone by ZP on criteria + GP recommendationAssignmentDone by state governmentStays within villageDone by school managementDone by ZP on GP recommendation (GP has veto)Done by state government, and district-level line agencyVaries: district line agency or parallel agencyVaries: states have guidelines + large unrecognised sectorOrganized by ZP based on guidelines for phased trainingTrainingFixed (and generous) scale for lifeFixed and small (‘honorarium’)Usually fixed (and somewhere between formal and para-teacher scales)Fixed when SK; seniority and performance-based when AdhyapakSalarySupervisionLittle or none in substanceClosely monitored by SMC/VEC or GPClosely monitored by school managementClosely monitored by GP/SMC + technical criteriaDismissalAlmost never doneAt will for unsatisfactory performanceAt will for unsatisfactory performanceAt will when SK; For cause when Adhyapak stage reached
61Policymaker (State and Central Government) Organizational Provider Accountability Linkages in Existing System: The SSA FrameworkPolicymaker (State and Central Government)HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)‘Client Power’ is particularly weak in the present frameworkProject Approval BoardState GovernmentCOMPACTVOICEOrganizational ProviderState Department of School Elementary EducationMANAGEMENTClient GroupsState Implementation SocietySchool Management Committee (SMC) or VECFrontlineProviderDistrict Education Committee / OfficeSchools (Teachers)CLIENTPOWER (?)Parent Teacher Association (PTA)Block Education Committee / Center
62Policymaker (State and Central Government) Organizational Provider Accountability Linkages in Our DPTC Proposal: Redefining Voice, Compact and Client PowerPolicymaker (State and Central Government)HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)COMPACT strengthened as PRIs get management of TTEsVOICE gets strengthened as clients see importance of participation in governance and service delivery decisionCLIENT POWER gets strengthened as SMCs/PTAs are involved in meaningful performance evaluationProject Approval BoardState GovernmentPolicymaker (PRIs)Zila PanchayatTaluk PanchayatGram PanchayatVOICECOMPACTGram SabhaClient GroupsOrganizational ProviderSchool Management Committee (SMC) or VECState Department of School Elementary EducationCLIENT POWERFrontline ProviderSchools (Teachers)Parent Teacher Association (PTA)
63Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns of the Political Economy of Reform and TransitionIssue / ConcernHow It is Dealt With in Our ProposalOpposition from existing ‘Regular’ Government Teachers‘Grandfathering’: i.e., TTEs of all existing regular government school teachers to remain unchanged – no one is dismissed + salary protectionPara-teachers no longer exploited, as they are given a clear track for tenure (career progression plan) as per technical and bottoms-up criteriaUnfair Exploitation of ‘para-teachers’State gives transitional funds to PRIs to bear premium wage cost of existing ‘regular’ teachersLarge block grants to PRIs to fund their new roleBakrupting the PRIs by making them pay the teachersQuality of Schooling OutcomesBalances local control with higher level support for training, professional standards and monitoring
64Indian Needs Primary Education Reform Not Addressing Question 2: Is a well designed Decentralization the Right Model for Primary Education Reform?Indian Needs Primary Education ReformContinued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionatelyQuestion 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right Model for Primary Education Reform?