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Socio-Environmental Impacts of Large Projects in Drainage Sector Naseer Memon.

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Presentation on theme: "Socio-Environmental Impacts of Large Projects in Drainage Sector Naseer Memon."— Presentation transcript:

1 Socio-Environmental Impacts of Large Projects in Drainage Sector Naseer Memon

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3 Irrigation in Sindh Cultivable command area (CCA) is about 12.8 million acres. Cultivable command area (CCA) is about 12.8 million acres. More than 95% of the irrigation is from canal water. More than 95% of the irrigation is from canal water. The irrigation system comprises of The irrigation system comprises of 3 Barrages 3 Barrages 14 canals 14 canals 1,462 branch canals/distributaries/minors 1,462 branch canals/distributaries/minors More than 40,000 water courses More than 40,000 water courses

4 Water Logging And Salinity Sindh has serious problems of water logging and salinity due to flat topography flat topography inadequate salt exit inadequate salt exit traditional watering of crops traditional watering of crops late implementation of drainage programme late implementation of drainage programme In 1999, the waterlogged area was million acres out of the total CCA of million acres in Sindh. In 1999, the waterlogged area was million acres out of the total CCA of million acres in Sindh.

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7 Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) The LBOD project commenced in 1984 The LBOD project commenced in 1984 The Stage-1 of LBOD project was aimed to benefit 0.35 million Culturable Command Area in Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas (map). The Stage-1 of LBOD project was aimed to benefit 0.35 million Culturable Command Area in Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas (map).map Project started with initial estimate of 8.5 billion rupees which ended up with over 31 billion rupees. Project started with initial estimate of 8.5 billion rupees which ended up with over 31 billion rupees. IDA and ADB were the major donors of the project. IDA and ADB were the major donors of the project.

8 Project Finances (Dec 1997) Donor Agency Amount (m. US$) The World Bank ADB169.4 OPEC8.8 CIDA11.9 ODA/DFID32.6 SDC10 Islamic Development Bank 8.7 Saudi Fund for Devel M&E Trust Fund 4.6 Borrower414.9 Total (963 in 2002)

9 Salient Features of Project Area served (3 districts) 1.27 million acres (0.35 CCA) Surface Drains 1,623 kms Standard Tube wells 1,667 No Scavenger Tube wells 357 No Transmission lines 4,133 kms Spinal Drain 285 kms Tidal Link 42 kms

10 Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) District of Badin was used as conduit for the Spinal Drain of the project for ultimate disposal to the Arabian Sea through a 42 kms long Tidal Link Canal. District of Badin was used as conduit for the Spinal Drain of the project for ultimate disposal to the Arabian Sea through a 42 kms long Tidal Link Canal. The major challenge for the project designers was to provide safe disposal of effluent to sea. The major challenge for the project designers was to provide safe disposal of effluent to sea. Outfall was designed and executed without proper consultation with stakeholders and their concerns were also not considered Outfall was designed and executed without proper consultation with stakeholders and their concerns were also not considered

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12 Outfall Options

13 Shakoor Lake

14 Outfall Options Most viable option of Shakoor lake was rejected due to political pretext Most viable option of Shakoor lake was rejected due to political pretext it was decided to transport the effluent to sea through a natural lake complex of very high ecological significance. it was decided to transport the effluent to sea through a natural lake complex of very high ecological significance. Two of the four lakes Nureri and Jubbo were recognized as Ramsar sites. Two of the four lakes Nureri and Jubbo were recognized as Ramsar sites. The lake eco-system, also supported livelihood for about 15,000 fishermen from about 40 villages The lake eco-system, also supported livelihood for about 15,000 fishermen from about 40 villages An embankment with a 4.5 ft high and 1800 ft wide Cholri weir was provided to maintain water level in lakes An embankment with a 4.5 ft high and 1800 ft wide Cholri weir was provided to maintain water level in lakes

15 The Disaster Cholri Weir collapsed during the night of 24th June 1998 Cholri Weir collapsed during the night of 24th June 1998 Authorities made cosmetic efforts to repair the weir but within 4 months the breach became 450 ft wide from southern side and authorities capitulated. Authorities made cosmetic efforts to repair the weir but within 4 months the breach became 450 ft wide from southern side and authorities capitulated. It unleashed an unprecedented environmental havoc on fragile lake system converting them in saline sink. It unleashed an unprecedented environmental havoc on fragile lake system converting them in saline sink. At one stage salinity of Pateji dhand was measured as horribly high at 68,000 ppm previously measured at 15,000 ppm. At one stage salinity of Pateji dhand was measured as horribly high at 68,000 ppm previously measured at 15,000 ppm.

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17 The Disaster A disastrous cyclone lashed the area on 21 May A disastrous cyclone lashed the area on 21 May It caused 54 breaches in the embankment of the tidal link rendering it completely irreparable. It caused 54 breaches in the embankment of the tidal link rendering it completely irreparable. The breached structure unleashed an unprecedented disaster on nearby settlements of fishermen communities and according to official figures about 75 people died in Badeen The breached structure unleashed an unprecedented disaster on nearby settlements of fishermen communities and according to official figures about 75 people died in Badeen Tidal Link became dead and sea water found a regular inlet to lake system Tidal Link became dead and sea water found a regular inlet to lake system Local drains started backflow destroying land and aquifer in Badeen Local drains started backflow destroying land and aquifer in Badeen

18 Causes of Failure In 1983 when project was at preparation stage soil samples analyzed along the Tidal link show stiff cohesive clay with 85% silt content. In 1983 when project was at preparation stage soil samples analyzed along the Tidal link show stiff cohesive clay with 85% silt content. At design stage soil testing carried out by Foundation Engineering Ltd. depict the soil with much smaller silt and clay, frictionless cohesive soil. At design stage soil testing carried out by Foundation Engineering Ltd. depict the soil with much smaller silt and clay, frictionless cohesive soil. In spite of knowing that the soil in the channel bed is not sufficiently cohesive, no protection was provided at the bed of Cholri Weir, which was exposed to active erosion during tidal fluctuation. In spite of knowing that the soil in the channel bed is not sufficiently cohesive, no protection was provided at the bed of Cholri Weir, which was exposed to active erosion during tidal fluctuation.

19 Causes of Failure Outfall system was designed without proper consultation with stakeholders specially local communities and fishermen Outfall system was designed without proper consultation with stakeholders specially local communities and fishermen Tidal Link was constructed against wind direction which reinforced wave impact Tidal Link was constructed against wind direction which reinforced wave impact Proper environmental and socio-economic studies were not conducted Proper environmental and socio-economic studies were not conducted An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for LBOD was carried out in 1989, which was not very comprehensive, limited only to biological aspects ignoring socio-economic and cultural aspects. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for LBOD was carried out in 1989, which was not very comprehensive, limited only to biological aspects ignoring socio-economic and cultural aspects.

20 The Inspection Panel A group of affectees and an NGO Action Aid Pakistan approached World Banks Inspection Panel on 10th September A group of affectees and an NGO Action Aid Pakistan approached World Banks Inspection Panel on 10th September After investigating the issue, the Panel submitted its report on 6 th July 2006 After investigating the issue, the Panel submitted its report on 6 th July 2006 The WB responded in Nov 2006 and chalked out a Plan of Action The WB responded in Nov 2006 and chalked out a Plan of Action

21 The Inspection Panel Findings Serious flaws were detected at key stages of the project i.e. planning, designing, execution, supervision and monitoring. Serious flaws were detected at key stages of the project i.e. planning, designing, execution, supervision and monitoring. The decision of the Bank to categorize the Project as Category B, rather than Category A was not appropriate. The decision of the Bank to categorize the Project as Category B, rather than Category A was not appropriate. Project documents did not assess how the Project might affect wetlands or identify required mitigation measures at the critical stage of Project design and appraisal. Project documents did not assess how the Project might affect wetlands or identify required mitigation measures at the critical stage of Project design and appraisal. The Bank did not comply with policy provisions on consultation and participation of affectees The Bank did not comply with policy provisions on consultation and participation of affectees

22 The Inspection Panel Findings The selected alignment for the Tidal Link was politically attractive, however technically and environmentally risky The selected alignment for the Tidal Link was politically attractive, however technically and environmentally risky There were no provisions for an emergency closure of the Tidal Link. No facilities were in place to warn the population and mitigate flood impact. There were no fail-safe provisions in the design There were no provisions for an emergency closure of the Tidal Link. No facilities were in place to warn the population and mitigate flood impact. There were no fail-safe provisions in the design As a result of shortcomings in the Environmental Assessment, decision making on environmentally- crucial elements under the Project became less systematic, less informed and more ad hoc. As a result of shortcomings in the Environmental Assessment, decision making on environmentally- crucial elements under the Project became less systematic, less informed and more ad hoc.

23 Future Outlook The Bank has developed an Action Plan in response to the Inspection Plan. No stakeholder consultation was carried out while developing this action plan. The Bank has developed an Action Plan in response to the Inspection Plan. No stakeholder consultation was carried out while developing this action plan. The Bank wants to compensate affectees through two project i.e. Coastal Area Development Program (CADP) and Water Sector Improvement Project (WISP). The Bank wants to compensate affectees through two project i.e. Coastal Area Development Program (CADP) and Water Sector Improvement Project (WISP). Both CADP and WSIP are financed under loans of World Bank respectively of US$ 90 million and US$ 140 million. Hence it is not compensation but an additional loan Both CADP and WSIP are financed under loans of World Bank respectively of US$ 90 million and US$ 140 million. Hence it is not compensation but an additional loan

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