Presentation on theme: "LNG Prospects and Gas Supply Security in Europe"— Presentation transcript:
1 LNG Prospects and Gas Supply Security in Europe Can LNG reduce Energy Security Risks such as Supply Interruptions and Gas Producer Cooperation?Presentation at the Political Economy of Energy in Europe and Russia (PEEER) Workshop Higher School of Economics Moscow State UniversityMoscow, 15 September 2009Marcel Dietsch, MPP (Harvard) DPhil Student International Relations University of Oxford
2 ‘Energy Security’ and Core Questions Energy Security: the absence of physical delivery interruptions of reasonably-priced energy supplies.Does LNG contribute to Europe’s energy security overall?Can LNG reduce short-term risks such as physical supply interruptions?Does LNG contribute to more competitive (usually means lower) gas prices in the short- and long-run?
3 European Concerns about Security and Affordability of Gas Supplies (I) Long-standing dependence on gas imports from (super-)giant fieldsEuropean indigenous gas reserves and production in decline – holding only 2% of world gas reservesgrowing demand and hence even higher import dependence on Russia, the Middle East and AfricaFew new discoveries are made, with a consequent decline in reserves, and EU25 now holds only 1.4% of total known gas resources.with the current production level, EU25 will have consumed its reserves in 13 years, without new discoveries.
4 Net EU imports in by country of origin European Concerns about Security and Affordability of Gas Supplies (II)growing gap between consumption and production in Europe covered by imports from very few countriesMost imports via inflexible pipelines - problematic since Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006, 07 and 09Net EU imports in by country of originChart: European Commission Report, July 2009
5 1. Mitigating the Risk of Supply Disruptions? LNG considered a valuable tool to diversify European gas imports in addition to winning new suppliers (e.g. Iran, Turkmenistan, …) and establishing alternative pipeline routes (Nabucco)Geopolitical distribution of LNG suppliers different from pipeline supplies, which is both good and bad newsLNG share of gas imports is still low at about 47 bcm or 15% in EU - hence LNG adds to, but does not dominate, the supplier base
6 Western Europe: LNG beneficial... Largest LNG consumers in EU are France (about 25% of imports) and Spain (approx. 50%) - both countries least affected by recent gas cut offs, not just because of their locationHence: in some countries LNG contributes to diversification of energy supply; acts as backup supply and improves security of supplyIncreased use of LNG buys Europe time to finish Nabucco pipeline to access Middle Eastern and Central Asian resources
7 ... but only up to a point (I) Regasification capacity expansion until 2015 mostly predicted to be at existing terminals mostly in the UK, France, Spain, Italy and GermanyProjected LNG Regasification Capacity Atlantic Basin, bcmover 80% of LNG currently tied up in long-term contracts – in case of supply disruptions, there are flexible quantities available – which will go to the highest bidderJensen Associates
8 ... but only up to a point (II) Most of the LNG quantities come to Europe locked up in long- term contracts; less than 20% is non-committed LNGThese flexible, tradable quantities (3% of Europe’s gas needs) could increase security of supply to the extent that buyers in Europe could outbid others, especially the US, Japan and South Korea depends on the competitive situationConstruction of regasification capacity worldwide far ahead of liquefaction capacity existence of regasification terminals does not always mean availability of actual suppliesover 80% of LNG currently tied up in long-term contracts – in case of supply disruptions, there are flexible quantities available – which will go to the highest bidder
9 Eastern Europe – LNG nonexistent Eastern European states are highly or fully dependent on one gas source (Russia) and one transportation method (pipeline)Considered highly undesirable especially after repeated gas cut offs in 2006, 2006 and regardless of whether Gazprom, Ukraine or both are to blameYet, no existing LNG regasification terminal, partly because countries are landlocked or there is no easy access to the Atlantic or the MediterraneanNeed for diversification to reduce impact of supply disruptions – LNG not a suitable solution?
10 Share of Russian Gas for Importing Countries’ Consumption Needs Share of Russian Gas for Importing Countries’ Consumption Needs LNG receiving all via pipeline, for 2008, in bcm terminals in EuropeCountryImport ShareConsumption ShareBulgaria100%95%FinlandLithuaniaSlovakia98%Greece68%67%Romania78%24%Hungary77%74%Czech Republic76%Poland73%52%Turkey63%65%Austria72%61%Germany50%44%Italy32%France18%20%Switzerland11%Table: Marcel Dietsch; data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009.
11 Eastern Europe: increasing security of supply without LNG Diversification through use of LNG or different pipeline suppliers not possible/optimalInstead: integration into European gas grid, investment in interconnectors (with reverse flow technology)Eastern European countries and the Baltic region remain at the periphery of the European transmission systemJuly 2009: European Commission initiates Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan and includes €310 million in EU Infrastructure Spending plan for regional gas interconnection projects linking Slovakia-Hungary; Slovenia-Austria; Bulgaria-Greece; Slovakia-Poland; Hungary-Croatia; Bulgaria-Romania and Romania-Hungary.
12 Initial question: Can LNG reduce risk of physical supply interruptions? Yes, to an extent, mainly in Western European countriesEspecially in countries with existing receiving facilities since capacity expansions are expected to be realised at existing terminals rather than through the construction of new terminalsNot in eastern Europe since there is practically no LNG infrastructure for various reasonsIntegration into European grid by building interconnectors between countries more importantOverall: LNG useful, but no a panacea for European energy security in general
13 2. Gas Pricing and the Geopolitics of Supply Algeria, Norway and Russia derive some market power—i.e. being able to sell gas above their (marginal) production cost—due to two factors1. high market concentration in their export markets (Russia as quasi- monopolist in Eastern Europe, oligopoly structure elsewhere except UK and Netherlands)2. inelastic demand for natural gas as a result of widespread household use (cooking, heating) gas prices above competitive levelDoes LNG contribute to more competitive gas prices in short-run?In the absence of a fully integrated European gas grid: differences between those EU members states with LNG access and those without
14 ... in the short-runLNG creates competition to Russian pipeline gas in Western Europe for two reasonsCountries in western part of EU are relatively far from Russian fields (cost advantage of LNG only over very long-distance pipelines)UK, Netherlands, Spain and France already have infrastructure in placeincreased use of LNG could well strengthen bargaining power of some EU gas importers vis-à-vis pipeline suppliers by reducing de- pendence on pipe- line gasTransportation costs and the effects of scale2,0004,0006,0008,000MILES$0.00$1.00$2.00$3.00$4.00$/MMBTUCrude Oil TankerOnshoreCrude LineSingle Train LNG36" LP OffshoreGas Line (1,000)56" LP OnshoreGas Line (3,085)36" LP OnshoreGas LineJensen Associates
15 Gas Pricing in the Long-Run – LNG cartel? LNG contributes to the globalisation of regional gas markets – increasingly susceptible to cartelisation?Important to look at global distribution of gas reserves and production – and to examine the potential for cooperation among LNG producers and exportersRussia, Iran and Qatar control about 55% of global gas reservesEU Commission notes: “Iran holds the second largest reserves of both oil and gas worldwide, with 11% and 16% respectively. Russia, Iran and Qatar might be the only large providers of gas worldwide by So far, the geopolitical implications of such a scenario do not seem to have been subjected to a thorough study.”
16 Cooperation among Gas Producers “An association of some kind among LNG exporters is likely.” (Daniel Yergin, CERA)Unclear if and when such an association can be effective since gas trade is different from most commodity markets (storage, transportation costs)Current gas price collapse might be catalyst (Jonathan Stern, OIES)Motivation for closer cooperation perfectly understandable from producer point of view: raise or maintain high prices to extract value from their resourceLoose cooperation beginning to take shape in the GECF (next page)
17 The GECF Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) created in 2001 Gathers the world’s leading gas producers to promote mutual interestsIncludes measures aimed at maximising the value GECF member countries can derive from their gas reservesGECF members exchange views and information on project development, supply and demand balances, exploration, production and transportation costs, etcGECF’s share in global pipeline gas trade at about 38%More impressive share in LNG production and exports: around 85% (2007)GECF membersGECF observers
18 GECF and LNG in EuropeAll of the EU’s LNG suppliers are part of the GECFEuropean Commission report argues that the “likelihood of GECF being able to exercise control over all gas movements worldwide seems unrealistic [...] but the Forum might take quite a firm grip on LNG.” (July 2009)GECF does not engage in OPEC-type quota setting at the moment, but measures to achieve greater control and “preferred” price levels, the GECF may use “softer tools:”Managing capacity expansion (Saudi-style spare capacity too expensive)(re)-introducing destination clausesPursuing vertical integrationUsing delivery swaps to use price arbitrage opportunities Medium- and long-term risk (especially for highly import- dependent EU consumers) of cartelisation of LNG market
19 The known Unknown: Unconventional Gas Resources in the US Significant changes in the gas resource base in the US: discovery of new shale gas formations and arrival of new technology to exploit shales (hydraulic fracturing)US reserve-to-production ratio previously at about 10 years, between 30 or 40 years (EIA, June 2009)Consequence: growth of US production reduces LNG import needsIndication of unconventional impact: operator of a LNG regasification terminal in US earlier this year tried to change the licence to a liquefaction facilityIf US can exploit new unconventionals as planned1, this may render GECF completely ineffectiveWhy? For long time, it looked like US was going to depend on LNG imports, but now may become exporter again after new discoveriesSafe to assume that the US would counteract any cartelisation efforts by other LNG exporters1 depends on US Federal and State regulations since hydro-cracking affects groundwater supply
20 Gas Pricing - SummaryLNG is a competitor for pipeline gas in Europe and (may) contribute to the erosion of market power that Algeria, Norway and Russia enjoy in parts of EuropeGlobal distribution of gas reserves highly concentratedCooperation among gas producers and exports, especially those using LNG for transportation, likely and taking shape in form of GECFGECF countries control 85% of LNG exports worldwide and all shipments to EuropeRisk of cartelisation of globalising gas market in medium- and long-run (and hence higher prices – above the competitive level)Possible mitigating factor: US re-emerges as an LNG exporter as a result of unconventional gas reserves that are now exploitableFuel switching, alternatives as way out
21 European Energy Security: Natural Gas Gas Supply Security1. Reliability (low impact of physical inter ruptions)2. AffordabilityGeographic SourcesDiversificationLiberalisationInfrastructure and StorageLNG contributes to geographic diversification by making availablesources previously not accessible by pipeline (e.g. Qatar, Nigeria, ...)Transport Routes and ModesDiversification: through increased use of a) renewable resources, b) new transport routes and c) new geographical sources of conventional supplies such as oil and natural gas.Liberalisation: more competition and market mechanisms especially in the existing natural gas marketAlso: deeper integration and better interconnection of national markets in Europe. The increased use of LNG is related in many ways to the first and second pillars of the European energy security strategy.Hence, the moderate use of LNG does contribute to the security and diversity of EU gas supply at present. However, the benefits may not be so pronounced if LNG becomes more widely used in the coming decade since cartelisation of the LNG market (i.e. higher prices) will become a real risk for consuming countries in Europe.As a new form of transportation for natural gas, LNG providesa flexible alternative to pipeline
22 Discussion / Q&AMarcel Dietsch MPP (Harvard) DPhil student, International Relations University of Oxford University College, Oxford | OX1 4BH | UKmarcel.dietsch (at) politics.ox.ac.uk