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SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT response to the crash and aftermath of Asiana Flight #214 (291 passengers & 16 crew members) Seouls Incheon International.

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Presentation on theme: "SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT response to the crash and aftermath of Asiana Flight #214 (291 passengers & 16 crew members) Seouls Incheon International."— Presentation transcript:

1 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT response to the crash and aftermath of Asiana Flight #214 (291 passengers & 16 crew members) Seouls Incheon International to San Francisco International

2 SFIA Overview SFO is located in San Mateo County, 15 miles South of San Francisco

3 Birdseye View

4 SFO Approach

5 Date/Time of Event: Saturday, July 6, 1128 hours Weather: 72F Visibility: Clear Wind: 6 mph It was a clear, sunny morning with a very mild wind. There was no warning from the aircraft that the landing was going to be problematic. The first information came from an SFPD canine patrol unit that was on the Airfield and witnessed the crash.

6 Initial Response

7 13 minutes into the event…

8 Triage

9 189 passengers were transported to 12 different hospitals located in San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Alameda Counties. 2 Most serious injuries by Air Ambulance Serious injuries by regular Ambulance Minor injuries in bus loads Medical Transport

10 49 Serious Condition 132 Minor Injuries 3 Deceased (2 at Scene, 1 at Hospital) 123 No Reported Injuries Total: 307 Patient Status

11 Survivors moved to the International Terminal G side Customs in-transit area Uninjured passengers accommodated in the hallway with access to restrooms and water Crew members were sequestered in the waiting lounge Evacuation to Customs from Airfield

12 Emergency Operations Center Activated

13 11:28:07 Aircraft comes to rest 11:29 (0.53)First photo sent on Twitter First Passenger Tweet –.53 seconds

14 Original Plan: SFPD – Pre-designated duties according to the Emergency Response Plan involves security and access control Plan for Initial SFPD Response

15 SFPD (18), SFFD (23), and Airfield Safety (5) personnel responded to the scene, initiated a command post and began a rescue operation for 307 people Four SFPD officers remained in the terminals and established security at the family reunification, museum (press location), and patrolled the terminals Initial Response

16 What if the TSA or an airport police officer wants the manifest? Since the events of 9/11/2001, the NTSB and air carriers have agreed that air carriers may give a copy of the manifest to the FBIs Airport Liaison Agent (ALA) at any airport in the United States. The agent will then distribute the manifest, as necessary, to other agencies. If you do not know your ALA, please contact your local FBI office or your airport police department. SFPD officers were able to obtain a copy of the flight manifest very early in the event. This was extremely helpful in accounting for all the passengers and crew members. NTSB Federal Family Assistance Plan for Aviation Disasters Appendix H, Page 58, December 2008

17 What Went Well Challenges we Faced Lessons Learned

18 Airport Bureau On-Duty Staffing on July 6, 2013, 1128 hours. PATROL TRAFFIC 1 – Lieutenant1 – Lieutenant 1 – Sergeant 0 – Sergeants 12 – Officers (3 in each of four terminals) 2 – Officers 2 – Patrol cars on Landside 26 – Police Service Aides 1 – Patrol car on the Airfield 2 – Mobile Canine Units Total: 48 San Francisco Police Department

19 1230 hrs. Started calling in the 1500 shift officers 14 scheduled to work 13 responded to work early 1500 hrs. Started calling in the 2100 shift officers 10 scheduled to work 9 responded to work early * You must begin thinking about the Second and Third Operational Periods immediately so you dont use all of your Human Resources in the First Operational Period. Airport Staffing / Night Watch

20 1 - Supervisor 4 - Airfield Safety Officers Airfield Safety Officers (ASOs) responded to the scene and evacuated the victims in pickup trucks to the ambulance staging area because the scene was too volatile Airfield Safety Officer Response

21 San Mateo Sheriffs Office and Neighboring San Mateo County Police Agencies 1 - Lieutenant 4 - Sergeants 32 - Officers/Deputies Total: 37 Mutual Aid from San Mateo County

22 On-Duty SFPD City units sent to SFO to assist 1 - Captain 2 - Lieutenants 4 - Sergeants 51 - Officers Traffic (12), Tactical (7), Marine (4), Stations (35) Total: 58 Outside Staffing

23 Sworn members dispatched 15 – Initially 20 – Additional Total: 35 U.S. Customs & Border Protection

24 By 1400 hours, there were 165 police officers, sheriff deputies and customs officers on scene. This put a significant strain on law enforcement staffing in both San Francisco and San Mateo Counties. SWORN CIVILIAN San Francisco Police (Airport units) – 22Police Service Aides – 26 San Francisco Police (City units) – 58 San Francisco Police (Off duty) – 13 San Mateo County Agencies – 37 U.S. Customs & Border Protection – 35 Total: 165 However, as the event transitioned from a rescue operation to an investigation, the amount of officers needed on the Airfield Operations Area (AOA) dropped significantly. By 1500 hours, we were able to begin releasing a significant amount of the outside resources. Staffing

25 SFPD Airport units could communicate with San Mateo units on the county channel City units from San Francisco could not communicate with Airport Bureau units because the airport recently switched to a new 700 MHz encrypted system and the City units are still on the former 800 MHz. Airport Communications was able to use the old mutual aid channel to facilitate communication for all SFPD units Radio Issues

26 Located in a Public Area in the International Terminal (No Privacy) Room was too small (Capacity 145 ) No restrooms inside, families used adjacent public restrooms The Reflection Room (Family Reunification Area)

27 California Penal Code (a) Whenever a menace to the public health or safety is created by a calamity including a flood, storm, fire, earthquake, explosion, accident, or other disaster, officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, marshal's office or sheriff's office, any officer or employee of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated a peace officer by subdivision (g) of Section 830.2, any officer or employee of the Department of Parks and Recreation designated a peace officer by subdivision (f) of Section 830.2, any officer or employee of the Department of Fish and Game designated a peace officer under subdivision (e) of Section 830.2, and any publicly employed full-time lifeguard or publicly employed full-time marine safety officer while acting in a supervisory position in the performance of his or her official duties, may close the area where the menace exists for the duration thereof by means of ropes, markers, or guards to any and all persons not authorized by the lifeguard or officer to enter or remain within the enclosed area. If the calamity creates an immediate menace to the public health, the local health officer may close the area where the menace exists pursuant to the conditions set forth in this section. (b) Officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, marshal's office or sheriff's office, officers of the Department of Fish and Game designated as peace officers by subdivision (e) of Section 830.2, or officers of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated as peace officers by subdivision (g) of Section may close the immediate area surrounding any emergency field command post or any other command post activated for the purpose of bating any calamity enumerated in this section or any riot or other civil disturbance to any and all unauthorized persons pursuant to the conditions set forth in this section whether or not the field command post or other command post is located near to the actual calamity or riot or other civil disturbance. (c) Any unauthorized person who willfully and knowingly enters an area closed pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) and who willfully remains within the area after receiving notice to evacuate or leave shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor. (d) Nothing in this section shall prevent a duly authorized representative of any news service, newspaper, or Radio or television station or network from entering the areas closed pursuant to this section.

28 Reflection Room

29 A family member was wired up by media to solicit statements from family/friends in the reunification area A media representative tried to present themselves as a family member to gain access to the reunification area

30 Our Museum in the International Terminal had the necessary space but the location created problems once media ascertained they could get access to the family reunification area that is located at the opposite end of the terminal. Beginning at 1300 hours on 7/6/14, the airport PIO (Doug Yakel) facilitated the first of four briefings. Note: Identify a location that has sufficient space for media personnel and their equipment. Designated Media Area

31 First Press Announcement

32 Joint Media Briefing

33 The first briefing was at 1300 hours. A representative of the Airport announced to the EOC group and Airlines that runways 1L & 1R will be open in four (4) hours with no consultation with LEOs Recommendation: Agency Heads need to meet at 45 minutes to the hour and determined what activities will occur in the next hour and then make the announcement at the top of the hour EOC Hourly Briefings

34 Crime Scene – FBI Assessed the scene to determine if a criminal act was involved in the crash. After they finished their assessment, the crash scene transitioned to the focus of the NTSB. Runways 1L/1R opened on 7/6/14 at 1528 hours. Runway 28R opened on 7/7/14 at 1253 hours. Crash Scene – NTSB The NTSB investigated the scene during daylight hours until 7/10/13 at 2000 hours. Area returned to SFO for Recovery Operation SFO immediately began repairs and re-opened runway 28L on 7/12/13 at 1705 hours. Site Management (Length of two football fields)

35 Landside / AOA: Command Post Vehicle 3 units posted in a triangle around crash site Waterside/Lagoon/Point of Impact: SFPD Marine Unit (Primary) (Mutual Aid from the region was needed to support SFPD) The listed agencies staffed some of the shifts for 5 days: 1) San Mateo Sheriff 2) Alameda Sheriff 3) Oakland Police Site Preservation 24 / 7

36 Crime Scene Management (Land and Sea) Staffing for Regular Patrol Assignments LEO Support for Police Service Aides at AOA Checkpoints A morning meeting at the United Conference Room for access clearance and transportation to the crash site Identify a single point of entry for investigative personnel that arrive during the day Identify access road with cones from the gate to crash site staging area to avoid accidents Secured Area Access Issues

37 Asiana moved the passengers and families to: Crown Plaza Hotel 1177 Airport Blvd, Burlingame, CA (located 5 minutes south of SFO) Issues: Security for the Families Media Management Law Enforcement Jurisdictional Issues Hotel Issues

38 Family Assistance

39 Passengers in the Terminal

40 Critical Incident Response Team (C.I.R.T.) A C.I.R.T. debriefing for SFPD Officers, Police Service Aides, Airfield Safety Officers and Airport Dispatchers was held twice during the week and was facilitated by the SFPD Behavioral Science Unit Customs and Border Protection had established a support network for their own personnel Debriefing

41 Captain Albert Pardini Commanding Officer Airport Bureau, Patrol Division (650) Contact Information


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