Presentation on theme: "SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT response to the crash and aftermath of Asiana Flight #214 (291 passengers & 16 crew members) Seoul’s Incheon International."— Presentation transcript:
1SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT response to the crash and aftermath of Asiana Flight #214 (291 passengers & 16 crew members) Seoul’s Incheon International to San Francisco International-Captain Al Pardini, Commanding Officer of the SFPD Airport Bureau, Patrol Division-I was asked to prepare a presentation that has a specific focus on the Law Enforcement response during the Asiana crash.-In the first part of my presentation, I’m going to provide you with a brief overview of the layout of SFO and the details of the crash.-During the second part, I will cover;>What Went Well>Challenges We Faced>Lessons Learned
2SFIA Overview SFO is located in San Mateo County, 15 miles South of San Francisco SFO is located 15 miles South of the City of San Francisco in San Mateo County and it is surrounded by the Cities of-South San Francisco-San Bruno-Millbrae and-Burlingame
3Birdseye View 1L and 1R 4 intersecting runways 7 Boarding area: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G
4SFO ApproachThe approach28L and 28RParallel runways
5Date/Time of Event: Saturday, July 6, 1128 hours Weather: 72F Visibility: Clear Wind: 6 mph It was a clear, sunny morning with a very mild wind. There was no warning from the aircraft that the landing was going to be problematic. The first information came from an SFPD canine patrol unit that was on the Airfield and witnessed the crash.-As you can see, the weather conditions were excellent and there was no indication the flight was in trouble until it crashed.-The first indication of trouble was when the SFPD canine unit broadcast that an aircraft had crashed on Runway 28L.
6Initial Response-Upon impact, the tail of the aircraft contacted the Seawall and tore away from the aircraft.The impact caused it to bank upward and then downward, make a 360 degree spin and come to rest in the dirt tothe left of the runway.
713 minutes into the event… 13 minutes from time of impact, the aircraft was fully engulfed in flamesSFO has:3 fire stations and is staffed by 23 on duty firefighters9 firefighters are dedicated to ARFF vehiclesThe fire department requested Mutual Aid and units responded from the surrounding fire departments in San Mateo county.The San Francisco Fire department also dispatched a large amount of resources to SFO.Both of the fire department ladder trucks in this picture were part of the response from San Francisco
8Triage-Within a minute of the aircraft coming to rest, the evacuation slides deployed and passengers began evacuating in various directions on the airfield.-The officers immediately began corralling the passengers and moving them to a safe distance away from the aircraft until they could be evacuated from the airfield.
9Medical Transport189 passengers were transported to 12 different hospitals located in San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Alameda Counties.2 Most serious injuries by Air AmbulanceSerious injuries by regular AmbulanceMinor injuries in bus loads-The aircraft had a total of 307 people on board, a few were ejected, others were trapped in their seats and had to be rescued by the police officers.
10Patient Status 49 Serious Condition 132 Minor Injuries 3 Deceased (2 at Scene, 1 at Hospital)123 No Reported InjuriesTotal: 307-This is a breakdown of the injuries.-Many of these people had neck and back injuries that required the use of C-collars and backboards.-Because the scene was so volatile, the officers used the Airfield Safety truck to evacuate the injured a safe distance away where they were triaged.
11Evacuation to Customs from Airfield Survivors moved to the International Terminal “G” side Customs in-transit area Uninjured passengers accommodated in the hallway with access to restrooms and water Crew members were sequestered in the waiting lounge-Please remember this was an International flight and Customs and Border Protection will need to conduct an intake screening on the passengers and crew.-The non-injured were taken to the sterile area inside Customs.-Customs responded to the hospitals and conducted their entry into the United States screening of the passengers and crew.
12Emergency Operations Center Activated -The EOC was activated within 3 minutes of crash and we established a Unified Command-The EOC has four sections including one that accommodates Public Safety.-The center of the table rises and there are individual telephones, laptop computers, and a Microphone that can be used during briefings.-On the main wall there is a large 9 panel screen that connects to the television and the airport security camera system.
13First Passenger Tweet – .53 seconds 11:28:07 Aircraft comes to rest11:29 (0.53) First photo sent on Twitter-A passenger that evacuated the aircraft sent the first Twitter photo in 53 seconds which let the media know this was a confirmed crash and they began arriving quite quickly.
14Plan for Initial SFPD Response Original Plan: SFPD – Pre-designated duties according to the Emergency Response Plan involves security and access control-Although SFO has a comprehensive plan for an aircraft crash, the best laid plans don’t always go according to plan.-The duties of the SFPD during a aircraft crash are to secure the area, facilitate access for the emergency responders, and crime scene duties.-In reality, when you have 307 people to rescue, the on-site fire department can’t do it alone.
15Initial ResponseSFPD (18), SFFD (23), and Airfield Safety (5) personnel responded to the scene, initiated a command post and began a rescue operation for 307 people Four SFPD officers remained in the terminals and established security at the family reunification, museum (press location), and patrolled the terminals-My Lieutenant was the platoon commander; he was one of the 18 that responded to the crash scene and began the rescue operations. He assigned four officers to remain in the terminals.-The initial rescue was started by SFPD and the Airfield Safety personnel.-The fire department immediately began fire suppression with their ARFF rigs and their remaining personnel joined the rescue effort.
16NTSB Federal Family Assistance Plan for Aviation Disasters Appendix H, Page 58, December 2008 What if the TSA or an airport police officer wants the manifest?Since the events of 9/11/2001, the NTSB and air carriers have agreed that air carriers may give a copy of the manifest to the FBI’s Airport Liaison Agent (ALA) at any airport in the United States. The agent will then distribute the manifest, as necessary, to other agencies. If you do not know your ALA, please contact your local FBI office or your airport police department.SFPD officers were able to obtain a copy of the flight manifest very early in the event. This was extremely helpful in accounting for all the passengers and crew members.-Getting access to the manifest for the flight and is a great asset because it gave us an accurate count of the passengers and crew on the aircraft. This was key in determining there were no missing passengers or crew.
17What Went Well Challenges we Faced Lessons Learned At this point, I will address;-What went well-Challenges we faced-Lessons learned from the incident
18San Francisco Police Department Airport Bureau On-Duty Staffing on July 6, 2013, 1128 hours. PATROL TRAFFIC 1 – Lieutenant 1 – Lieutenant 1 – Sergeant 0 – Sergeants 12 – Officers (3 in each of four terminals) 2 – Officers 2 – Patrol cars on Landside 26 – Police Service Aides 1 – Patrol car on the Airfield 2 – Mobile Canine Units Total: 48This was the on-duty staffing at the time of the crash.Although it appears we had a substantial amount of sworn and civilian personnel working, that wasn’t the case.We had;19 sworn in patrolsworn in traffic26 civilians (6 on checkpoints and reliefs) (20 spread across the 4 Terminals).Of the 22 Sworn, 18 responded to the crash scene and four remained in the Terminals.Most of the civilians were quickly absorbed dealing with arriving family members and friends.Additionally, they had to deal with the arrival of the media.
19Airport Staffing / Night Watch 1230 hrs. Started calling in the 1500 shift officers14 scheduled to work13 responded to work early1500 hrs. Started calling in the 2100 shift officers10 scheduled to work9 responded to work early* You must begin thinking about the Second and Third Operational Periods immediately so you don’t use all of your Human Resources in the First Operational Period.Although we knew Mutual Aid was responding from San Mateo and San Francisco County, we knew none of these people had SIDA badges allowing access to the restricted areas of SFO.I directed my senior staff to begin calling personnel that was scheduled to work that day and have them report to work early.During this time, I was evaluating whether to activate our Emergency Mobilization Plan. This plan directs that all sworn personnel are Ordered to report for duty and begin working a 12 hour per day schedule.Group A: HoursGroup B: HoursGroup C: HoursAs soon as you begin your initial reaction to an incident, keep the 2nd and 3rd Operational period in mind otherwise you will exhaust all of your resources in the beginning and have no “fresh” personnel for the subsequent operational periods.My senior lieutenant called me from his home shortly after the crash to see what I needed him to do. I put him on stand-by and after I was able to have a good assessment of the incident and the staffing needs, he filled the critical role of commander for the 2nd Operational Period.
20Airfield Safety Officer Response 1 - Supervisor 4 - Airfield Safety Officers Airfield Safety Officers (ASO’s) responded to the scene and evacuated the victims in pickup trucks to the ambulance staging area because the scene was too volatileWith only 5 Airfield Safety officers on duty, they were an asset that was quickly exhausted.
21Mutual Aid from San Mateo County San Mateo Sheriff’s Office and Neighboring San Mateo County Police Agencies 1 - Lieutenant 4 - Sergeants 32 - Officers/Deputies Total: 37During the next hour, the Sheriff of San Mateo County sent these resources to SFO and assisted with many urgent tasks including a grid search of the entire crash site to ensure there were no victims under the debris.
22On-Duty SFPD City units sent to SFO to assist Outside StaffingOn-Duty SFPD City units sent to SFO to assist1 - Captain2 - Lieutenants4 - Sergeants51 - OfficersTraffic (12), Tactical (7), Marine (4), Stations (35)Total: 58The Chief of Police for San Francisco also sent resources to SFO.The Traffic, Tactical, and Station Units assisted at the scene with the rescue, and several responded to the Terminals for crowd management of the families, friends, and Media.The Marine unit responded to the Water side of the Crime Scene and was stationed there for the next 5 days.
23U.S. Customs & Border Protection Sworn members dispatched15 – Initially20 – AdditionalTotal: 35Customs initially sent 15 sworn members and offered additional assistance. I requested an additional 20 sworn members to assist on the AOA.
24StaffingBy 1400 hours, there were 165 police officers, sheriff deputies and customs officers on scene. This put a significant strain on law enforcement staffing in both San Francisco and San Mateo Counties.SWORN CIVILIANSan Francisco Police (Airport units) – 22 Police Service Aides – 26San Francisco Police (City units) – 58San Francisco Police (Off duty) – 13San Mateo County Agencies – 37U.S. Customs & Border Protection – 35Total: 165However, as the event transitioned from a rescue operation to an investigation, the amount of officers needed on the Airfield Operations Area (AOA) dropped significantly. By 1500 hours, we were able to begin releasing a significant amount of the outside resources.What Worked:As you can see, by 1400 hours (2-1/2 hours into the incident), we had 165 sworn and 26 civilians at SFO attending to a variety of assignments.By 1500 hours, we were able to determine how much we could reduce the law enforcement resources on scene. AT this point, the rescue concluded and it became a crime and crash scene that required site management and perimeter management issues. We began releasing resources and were able to manage the AOA and terminals with the SFPD Airport officers. We used SFPD city units to assist with the checkpoints and maintaining an elevated presence in the non-sterile areas of the Terminals. We were able to do this with less than 20 officers from the city.
25Radio IssuesSFPD Airport units could communicate with San Mateo units on the county channelCity units from San Francisco could not communicate with Airport Bureau units because the airport recently switched to a new 700 MHz encrypted system and the City units are still on the former 800 MHz.Airport Communications was able to use the old mutual aid channel to facilitate communication for all SFPD unitsWe could communicate with the Mutual Aid resources from San Mateo County because of our pre-existing access to the County Channel(s).Initially, we had difficulty communicating with our SFPD units from the City because the SFPD airport radios were recently upgraded and this caused a disconnect with the City units because of the new encryption. We were able to overcome the problem by using the former Mutual Aid channel for San Francisco.
26The Reflection Room (Family Reunification Area) Located in a Public Area in the International Terminal(No Privacy)Room was too small (Capacity 145 )No restrooms inside, families used adjacent public restroomsThe Reflection Room is located in the International Terminal, “G” side. The room only holds 145 people and the restrooms are located approximately 30 feet away from the room and you must walk through the Terminal to access them.Obviously this room is too small to accommodate a situation where over 300 people are involved and it presents several problems with security for the families, friends, etc.
27California Penal Code 409.5(a) Whenever a menace to the public health or safety is created by a calamity including a flood, storm, fire, earthquake, explosion, accident, or other disaster, officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, marshal's office or sheriff's office, any officer or employee of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated a peace officer by subdivision (g) of Section 830.2, any officer or employee of the Department of Parks and Recreation designated a peace officer by subdivision (f) of Section 830.2, any officer or employee of the Department of Fish and Game designated a peace officer under subdivision (e) of Section 830.2, and any publicly employed full-time lifeguard or publicly employed full-time marine safety officer while acting in a supervisory position in the performance of his or her official duties, may close the area where the menace exists for the duration thereof by means of ropes, markers, or guards to any and all persons not authorized by the lifeguard or officer to enter or remain within the enclosed area. If the calamity creates an immediate menace to the public health, the local health officer may close the area where the menace exists pursuant to the conditions set forth in this section.(b) Officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, marshal's office or sheriff's office, officers of the Department of Fish and Game designated as peace officers by subdivision (e) of Section 830.2, or officers of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated as peace officers by subdivision (g) of Section may close the immediate area surrounding any emergency field command post or any other command post activated for the purpose of bating any calamity enumerated in this section or any riot or other civil disturbance to any and all unauthorized persons pursuant to the conditions set forth in this section whether or not the field command post or other command post is located near to the actual calamity or riot or other civil disturbance.(c) Any unauthorized person who willfully and knowingly enters an area closed pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) and who willfully remains within the area after receiving notice to evacuate or leave shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor.(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent a duly authorized representative of any news service, newspaper, or Radio or television station or network from entering the areas closed pursuant to this section.California Penal Code gives the Media access to disaster scenes and we can only restrict their access to Crime Scenes and Command Posts at those incidents.The Reflection Room was nowhere near the crash so the elements of PC were not applicable.However, the Airport is private property that is open to the public with lawful business at SFO. The SFO airport Duty Manager request the police close off the area surrounding the Reflection Room and only allow family and friends into the area.The Restroom was the next emerging issue. When family and friends tried to use the rest room, the media would follow them into the restroom and try to interview them.The Duty Manager requested that we secure the restrooms for the use of persons legitimately in the Reflection Room. We established a perimeter around the Reflection Room and restrooms.Any person in the Reflection Room that wanted to speak to the media was allowed to exit the room and contact the media outside of the perimeter.
29A family member was “wired up” by media to solicit statements from family/friends in the reunification areaA media representative tried to present themselves as a family member to gain access to the reunification areaProblems in dealing with the Media developed rather quickly as you can see we had these issues.
30Designated Media AreaOur Museum in the International Terminal had the necessary space but the location created problems once media ascertained they could get access to the family reunification area that is located at the opposite end of the terminal. Beginning at 1300 hours on 7/6/14, the airport PIO (Doug Yakel) facilitated the first of four briefings.Note: Identify a location that has sufficient space for media personnel and their equipment.As you can imagine the response by the Media was enormous.We often use the Museum because it is a large room that can sustain such a massive gathering. Although it is at the opposite end of the International Terminal (approximately ¼ of a mile away). The Media migrated back and forth and this created ongoing issues at the Reflection Room.
31First Press Announcement Doug Yakel – PIO for SFO held the first of four press briefings.
32Joint Media BriefingThe Museum was used for the Press briefings
33EOC Hourly Briefings The first briefing was at 1300 hours. A representative of the Airport announced to the EOC group and Airlines that runways 1L & 1R will be open in four (4) hours with no consultation with LEO’sRecommendation:Agency Heads need to meet at 45 minutes to the hour and determined what activities will occur in the next hour and then make the announcement at the top of the hourAs you can imagine, things are most confusing at the beginning and the first briefing in the EOC was at 1300 hours approximately 90 minutes after the crash.During the briefing, two representatives, (one after the other) announced that two runways would be open within four hours. Although we have a great working relationship with airport management, this should not have occurred with out speaking to us. After the second person finished talking, I could see the 50+ people in the room begin making calls and texting this information.I went to the podium and announced that the airfield was currently a Crime Scene under the control of the FBI and when they completed their assessment of the event, it would become an Accident scene under the control of the NTSB, and no runways would be opened until both entities cleared that request.I strongly recommend that you have agency heads meet at 45 minutes to the hour and resolve all issues so accurate updates can occur during the top of the hour.
34Site Management (Length of two football fields) Crime Scene – FBI Assessed the scene to determine if a criminal act was involved in the crash. After they finished their assessment, the crash scene transitioned to the focus of the NTSB. Runways 1L/1R opened on 7/6/14 at 1528 hours. Runway 28R opened on 7/7/14 at 1253 hours. Crash Scene – NTSB The NTSB investigated the scene during daylight hours until 7/10/13 at 2000 hours. Area returned to SFO for Recovery Operation SFO immediately began repairs and re-opened runway 28L on 7/12/13 at 1705 hours.As I mentioned in the previous slide, keep the crime and crash scene authority in mind.Here you can see a timeline for the transition from Crime Scene to Crash Scene to Recovery project and Re-opening.Opening of Runways 1L and 1R was 1528 hoursOpening of Runway 28R was on 7/7/14 at 1253 Hours
35Site Preservation 24 / 7 Landside / AOA: Command Post Vehicle 3 units posted in a triangle around crash siteWaterside/Lagoon/Point of Impact:SFPD Marine Unit (Primary)(Mutual Aid from the region was needed to support SFPD)The listed agencies staffed some of the shifts for 5 days:1) San Mateo Sheriff2) Alameda Sheriff3) Oakland PolicePreserving the site created several challenges. We started with a Command Post and three units plus a Marine Asset in the lagoon. The scene was marked with Crime Scene tape and patrol units were posted on the three side in a Triangle. The Marine Asset was needed for the lagoon for approximately 5 days until it was confirmed that no evidence was in the lagoon.
36Secured Area Access Issues Crime Scene Management (Land and Sea)Staffing for Regular Patrol AssignmentsLEO Support for Police Service Aides at AOA CheckpointsA morning meeting at the United Conference Room for access clearance and transportation to the crash siteIdentify a single point of entry for investigative personnel that arrive during the dayIdentify access road with cones from the gate to crash site staging area to avoid accidents-Staffing the Crime/Crash Scene required SFPD-SFO personnel because we needed people that understood the airport operation and had the proper credentials to be on the AOA without an escort. This would take 3 people away from our Patrol Assets.-I sent sworn police officers to the AOA checkpoints that are staffed by our civilian Police Service Aides. My concern was that people would be attempting to gain access that were not entitled (Media, Curious Citizens) or Federal Authorities that were legitimate but it would be difficult to validate their credentials. Because the checkpoints are on the perimeter of the AOA, I was able to use Police Officers from the City to staff these posts and no AOA credentials were required.-The airport management, United Airlines, and the NTSB establish daily assemblies at the United Maintenance center. Investigative personnel would meet there for a briefing, get validated for access to the crash scene, and then they would be bused to the scene which helped minimize the amount of vehicles on the AOA.-Of course there will always be investigators that need ingress and egress during the day so I established the checkpoint closest to the crash site as the “Single Point of Entry” for them. Additionally, we obtained a listed of the Investigation Teams (FBI, NTSB, etc.) and when an investigator arrived, we would call their on-site agency representative to validate their need to access the AOA and then the Airfield Safety Officer would escort them to the command post.-As things stabilized, the Airfield Safety moved the access point to a construction gate even closer to the crash site and then created a “Traffic Cone” lane leading from the access point to the command post to ensure that no one strayed away from the escort and caused a collision.
37Hotel Issues Asiana moved the passengers and families to: Crown Plaza Hotel1177 Airport Blvd, Burlingame, CA(located 5 minutes south of SFO)Issues:Security for the FamiliesMedia ManagementLaw Enforcement Jurisdictional IssuesAsiana and United arranged accommodations for the families at a local hotel that is five minutes south of SFO.The solution was facilitated by the San Mateo Sheriffs Office. They assigned a reserve deputy to the hotel and this solved the problem without any agency incurring overtime or staffing issues.As a side note, picking this hotel was a good decision as it was on the west side of the roadway. If they selected a hotel on the east side of the roadway, the rooms would have faced the crash site.
38Family Assistance What Worked: What worked: -It was close and made getting them to a place of comfort easy.What problems occurred:-The hotel was concerned because the media arrived and would try and contact the families.-We asked Burlingame PD to send someone and they accommodated. Unfortunately, they’re a small agency and only have a few units on duty at any one time so staffing the Hotel became a task they didn’t have the staffing to support.-The problem was resolved by the San Mateo Sheriff sending a reserve deputy to assist.
39Passengers in the Terminal Most of us are accustomed to having passengers stranded in the Terminals, so this wasn’t a significant problem but something to think about. Since SFO was the flight’s destination, most of the passengers had a place to go. If this was a departing flight, the amount of people in the Terminals could have been substantially greater.
40Critical Incident Response Team DebriefingCritical Incident Response Team(C.I.R.T.)A C.I.R.T. debriefing for SFPD Officers, Police Service Aides, Airfield Safety Officers and Airport Dispatchers was held twice during the week and was facilitated by the SFPD Behavioral Science UnitCustoms and Border Protection had established a support network for their own personnel-The SFPD has a robust Critical Incident Response Team and it is managed by our Behavioral Science Unit.-Within a couple of days, they facilitate two debriefings with our officers.-Knowing not every agency has a program, I asked the BSU/CIRT to invite the Airport dispatchers, SFPD-Police Service Aides, and the Airfield Safety Officers to the debriefing.
41Captain Albert Pardini Contact InformationCaptain Albert PardiniCommanding OfficerAirport Bureau, Patrol Division(650)