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© 2007 MSA MSA BIOSENSOR Biological Agent Detector
© 2007 MSA Problem Major Bio-Threats Anthrax Ricin SEB (staph infection) Botulism Plague Cholera Tularemia Smallpox
© 2007 MSA Homeland Defense Personnel responsible: First Responders Fire Departments Police Departments HazMat teams Hospital Triage Military F.B.I.
© 2007 MSA Solution Needs for Homeland Defense: On-site/portable analysis Rapid detection Easy to use Excellent sensitivity Low false positives Test multiple targets at same time
© 2007 MSA Handheld Detector for Biological Agents MSA BIOSENSOR Biological Agent Detector
© 2007 MSA Product Performance B. Anthracis sensitivity: <10,000 spores Ricin sensitivity: 0.5 ng False positives: < 1 in 1,000,000 Time to answer: Results in 5 minutes
© 2007 MSA Product Performance The MSA BIOSENSOR 2200R Biological Agent Detector has an established track record in real-world applications and has been subject to successful third-party testing.
© 2007 MSA MSA BIOSENSOR 2200R Detector Handheld Dimensions 11(L) x 10(W) x 5(H) Weight: 7 pounds Battery life: 50 + tests LCD screen 4 button user interface Integrated RFID Data storage for up to 50 test results Serial port for data download Training time: 1 hour
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Single-use Self-sealing Reagents in cartridge Shelf life:12 months Storage conditions: room temperature RFID for automatic cartridge identification Available Targets Anthrax Ricin SEB (staph infection)
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Detection Chamber
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Mixing Ball
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Magnetic Microsphere with specific Biological antibodies (Mag)
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Fluorescent Tag with specific Biological antibodies (Tag)
© 2007 MSA Ease of Use Operation 1. Insert wash syringe into cartridge 2. Collect sample and draw into sample syringe 3. Insert sample syringe into cartridge, push on plunger 4. Shake cartridge for one minute 5. Insert into instrument 6. Wait 3 minutes, then push down on wash syringe 7. Push READ button, obtain easy-to-interpret results: RED LIGHT – TARGET PRESENT GREEN LIGHT – NO TARGET PRESENT
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Format Dynamic surface generation and detection Combines benefits of free solution and lateral flow type assays Concentration increases sensitivity Wash step improves assay robustness Compatible with continuous monitor system MIX BIND/ MAGNETIZE WASH READ
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Technology 1. MIX Sample is mixed with sensing solution: Magnetic microspheres and fluorescent tag.
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Technology 2. BIND Sensing materials bind spores during mixing and incubation.
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Technology 3. MAGNETIZE All bound and unbound magnetic material separate to surface.
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Technology 4.WASH Unbound TAG remains in solution and is washed away.
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR Assay Technology 5. READ Concentrated sample (pellet) is illuminated and emits a signal if target is present.
© 2007 MSA < 10,000 spores easily detected within five minutes. Anthrax (bacillus anthracis) Limit of Detection
© 2007 MSA Ricin (ricinus communis) Limit of Detection < 1 ng detected within five minutes.
© 2007 MSA Anthrax/Ricin Multiplex Limit of Detection < 10,000 BA spores easily detected within 5 minutes. <.5 Ricin ng detected within 5 minutes.
© 2007 MSA Anthrax (bacillus anthracis) Interference Study No false positives from common interferents
© 2007 MSA Anthrax Spores Interference Study 0.1 mg/mL of the indicated powders were mixed with 5000 Pasteur spores and analyzed on the Anthrax specific cartridges. Added Powder (0.1mg/mL) Response (mV) Result None (neat Pasteur spike)312 - 573True Positive Spackling Powder179True Positive Baking Soda (Arm & Hammer)934True Positive Instant Non-fat Dried Milk (Nestle Carnation)652True Positive Talcum Powder (Equate)453True Positive Flour (Gold Medal)499True Positive Salt (Morton)550True Positive Yeast (Red Star)609True Positive Powdered Sugar (Confectioners)294True Positive Dipel (Abbot Laboratories)238True Positive Chalk (Bison)272True Positive Foot Powder (Total Body)522True Positive Ajax with Bleach (Colgate-Palmolive)213True Positive Non-fat Dairy Creamer (Great Value)520True Positive Kaolin (Fisher-Scientific)528True Positive Bentonite (Aldrich)356True Positive Aerosil R812S (Degussa)485True Positive
© 2007 MSA Ricin (A Chain) Assay Interference Study No false positives from common interferents.
© 2007 MSA Other Bacillus Spores Interference Study No false positives from nearest neighbor spores.
© 2007 MSA MSA BIOSENSOR 2200R Detector Platform On-site/portable analysis Rapid detection Excellent sensitivity Extremely easy to use Excellent protection against false positives Single test capabilities for multiple bio-threats (anthrax/ricin combo)
© 2007 MSA Target Availability Available Targets Anthrax/ricin multi-agent Anthrax Ricin SEB (staph infection) Under Development Botulinum Plague Cholera Tularemia Smallpox West Nile virus Other agents in development
© 2007 MSA BIOSENSOR 2200R Biological Agent Detector Competitive Comparison
© 2007 MSA Ordering Information MSA BIOSENSOR 2200R Detector Kit (10084834) Includes: BIOSENSOR 2200R Detector Cartridge starter kit: -3 Anthrax/ricin combo -3 Positive control -1 Anthrax -1 Ricin -2 Negative control Battery charger Instruction manual Laminated quick instruction guide Carrying bag for all contents
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Replacement Plans Plans based upon expected annual white powder calls Low (6 per year) - 10084753 Medium (2 per month) - 10084754 High (5 per month) - 10084755
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Replacement Plans Low (1 every 2 months) Includes: 6 Anthrax/Ricin Combo 6 Positive Control 2 Anthrax 2 Ricin 2 Negative Control 2 Wet sample kits 2 Calibration kits Includes 2 positive controls All biohazard targets kits include dry sample kit
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Replacement Plans Medium (2 per month) Includes: 24 Anthrax/Ricin Combo 24 Positive Control 6 Anthrax 6 Ricin 6 Negative Control 4 Wet sample kits 2 Calibration kits Includes 2 positive controls All biohazard targets kits include dry sample kit
© 2007 MSA Cartridge Replacement Plans High (5 per month) Includes: 60 Anthrax/Ricin Combo 60 Positive Control 8 Anthrax 8 Ricin 8 Negative Control 6 Wet sample kits 2 Calibration kits Includes 2 positive controls All biohazard targets kits include dry sample kit
© 2007 MSA MSA BIOSENSOR Biological Agent Detector
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