Presentation on theme: "Austin Intellectual Property Law Association February 16 Meeting and Luncheon CLE Austin, Texas February 16, 2010 Michael C. Smith Siebman, Burg, Phillips."— Presentation transcript:
Austin Intellectual Property Law Association February 16 Meeting and Luncheon CLE Austin, Texas February 16, 2010 Michael C. Smith Siebman, Burg, Phillips & Smith, LLP Marshall, Texas The 1901 Harrison County Courthouse (restored 2009) Marshall, Texas J. Riely Gordon, architect
All too often, patent infringement suits begin with a battle over where the war is to be fought. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 551 (1973).
– state court venue limited; tort reform Late 1990s – personal injury cases begin to be filed in large numbers in Eastern District – mandamus petitions on venue rulings begin to be filed in Fifth Circuit – all denied prior to In re Horseshoe and In re Volkswagen I, which order cases transferred – In re VW II; numerous product liability cases transferred; new filings drop as well - cases shift back to Dallas and Houston state courts.
1992 – first patent case filed in Marshall, TI v. Micron. 1990s – Texas Instruments files numerous patent cases in Marshall – 99 trial in TI v. Hyundai 2000 – new Marshall federal judge T. John Ward adopts local patent rules; filings start going up – plaintiffs win 18 straight jury verdicts – ED Texas #1 district in nation for patent filings; win rate drops to 33% in 2007; time to trial in Marshall slows to three years as result of new filings – win rate 50-60%; filings drop to 2d in nation; late in year time to trial begins shorten in Marshall – defs win two of first three cases tried.
Patent infringement cases may be filed in the judicial district: (1) where the defendant resides; or (2) where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) A defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
The Federal Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, (Fed.Cir.1990) that the residence of a corporate defendant in patent infringement actions is to be analyzed under the general venue provisions of § 1391(c). So, personal jurisdiction = resides = venue.
In re TS Tech (12/2008) In re Telular In re Genentech In re Volkswagen (IV) In re Hoffman-La Roche In re Nintendo In re Vtech (1/2010) (red = granted ; white = denied)
Product liability case arising out of a collision in Dallas. In re VW IIc eliminated the plaintiffs choice of forum as a separate factor, holding that it is reflected in the defendants burden of proof. The en banc panel held that when the movant … demonstrates that the transfer of venue is clearly more convenient... the district court should grant the transfer. (Emphasis added).
Factors Relative ease of access to sources of proof Availability of compulsory process Cost of attendance of willing witnesses All other practical problems Administrative difficulties/court congestion Local interest in hearing localized controversies Familiarity of forum with the law Avoidance of conflicts of law / foreign law problems Must transfer if clearly more convenient
In In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) the court granted mandamus ordering Judge Ward to transfer a case to Ohio. The plaintiff resided in Michigan, and the accused infringers, three related corporations, resided in Ohio and nearby Canada. Applying In re Volkswagen the Federal Circuit found that the district court, by committing four legal errors in its analysis of the transfer issue, had clearly abused its discretion. Note: In re VW came out after district courts opinion – no remand for consideration, and FC denied In re VW changed the law re: venue at all.
Key holding was the extension from products cases (in which the sale of the product was not the accused activity) to patent cases (in which it is) of the Fifth Circuits holding that sales in the district did not give the forum court a local interest. Whenever the interest the forum court has is the same interest any district would have, that interest is to be disregarded. Only particularized local interests are to be considered.
Plaintiff, a Dallas resident, filed a patent case against several security companies. Telular, sought transfer to Chicago, where its head offices were located (its monitoring offices were in Atlanta). Judge Ward denied the motion in this case, and several months later In re TS Tech issued. Several weeks after that, defendant Telular filed a petition for writ of mandamus, citing In re TS Tech.
The Federal Circuit observed that "Telular faces an extraordinary burden in this case. First, the equities lie considerably against granting mandamus" because, as the Court noted, Telular waited five months after the court's ruling to seek mandamus - unlike TS Tech had done.
[M]andamus relief in § 1404(a) cases is only permitted when the petitioner is able to demonstrate that the denial of transfer was a "clear" abuse of discretion such that refusing transfer produced a "patently erroneous result." A suggestion that the district court abused its discretion, which might warrant reversal on a direct appeal, is not a sufficient showing to receive mandamus relief.
Unless it is clear that the facts and circumstances are without any basis for a judgment of discretion, we will not proceed further in a mandamus petition to examine the district court's decision. In other words, we will deny a petition "[i]f the facts and circumstances are rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district court has done.
The Eastern District of Texas may have no more of an interest in this case than any other district in which Telular's systems are ultimately installed. This alone, however, does not mean that Telular's alternative choice of venue, in this case the Northern District of Illinois, is clearly more convenient.... (Emphasis added). Contrast to later 2009 FC venue opinions.
In In re Volkswagen, 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009), arising out of the MHL Tek litigation, the Federal Circuit denied a petition seeking to mandamus Judge Ward's denial of a motion to transfer the case to Michigan. The Federal Circuit noted that "[i]n this case, the existence of multiple lawsuits involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice. (Emphasis added).
In In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) arose out of the Sanofi-Aventis litigation in Judge Ron Clark's court in which a German plaintiff sued two California companies. In Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 2009 WL (E.D.Tex. Mar 19, 2009) Judge Clark concluded that on balance, the factors favored retaining the case in the Eastern District of Texas.
Key to the courts decision were the facts that: Defendant... has, in the recent past, found it convenient to avail itself of this forum as a Plaintiff; the question of whether [plaintiff] is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District one of the defendants has no presence … in the Northern District [of California]; litigation in California would be more expensive and quite possibly more time-consuming…
In reversing, the Federal Circuit observed that California was only marginally less convenient than Texas for the foreign plaintiff, and declined to allow the Texas court's central location to trump the fact that the California court was "clearly more convenient" for the parties and witnesses in this case. Decreased travel time from Europe to Texas as opposed to California did not support transfer.
Genentech rejects a simply central location argument divorced from analysis that shows the forum is actually more geographically convenient under the facts of the case. Subsequent district court cases continue to use this phrase, but as a shorthand for concluding that a mileage analysis shows that the forum court is more convenient.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the court's assessment that the petitioners failed to identify any key witnesses within the venue, holding that [r]equiring a defendant to show that the potential witness has more than relevant and material information at this point in the litigation or risk facing denial of transfer on that basis is unnecessary. Major change from prior Texas caselaw
Genentech essentially endorsed the battle of the numbers approach where the parties inflate their witness lists in order to show that a particular forum is more convenient, and eliminated the courts ability to cull these lists to those witnesses who were truly necessary and not merely cumulative. Will parties now list witnesses to influence the venue analysis?
The Federal Circuit also noted that in patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant documents usually comes from the infringer, and the place where they are kept, i.e. the defendants location, therefore weighs in favor of transfer to that location. Important to identify the location of all relevant documents. Important to identify the location of all relevant documents.
Based on opinions posted in Westlaw, the court only granted four transfer motions in 2008, and each of these motions was granted to achieve judicial economy as the transferee court had a pending related action. As of the end of November in 2009, the Eastern District had granted at least fourteen transfer orders.
In Odom v. Microsoft, 6:08cv331 (Jan. 30, 2009) Judge John Love granted the Defendant's motion to transfer venue to Oregon. Plaintiff is an Oregon inventor (Patent Hawk) claiming that Microsoft infringes his patent via its Office software. The case also involves Odom's relationship with Microsoft and the Klarquist Sparkman firm in Oregon prior to suit being filed.
Judge Love observed that "[t]his is not a case where witnesses are spread out all over the country or the world" citing Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc. v. D-Link Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800, mandamus denied, 183 Fed. Appx. 967 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding this factor neutral where witnesses were located in Connecticut, New York, California, Taiwan, and Israel). This case, Judge Love wrote, was in fact quite similar to the facts in TS Tech, not Network-1.
Due to the extensive ties Oregon had to the underlying case via the contracts, etc., Judge Love concluded that there was in fact a local interest in the case in Oregon, and none (beyond the sale of infringing products which all districts likely shared) in Texas. Judge Love also discounted in part the sources of proof factor because unlike VW and TS Tech, the proof was likely to be electronic, not physical. See later cases.
Judge Folsom transferred PartsRiver v. Shopzilla, 2:07cv440 by a California patent owner against six California defendants (with a seventh in Washington) to California, finding that "based on the regional nature of this case, that the Northern District of California is clearly more convenient to the parties. (Emphasis added).
In Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics v. Hoffman-La Roche, 2009 WL (Feb. 3, 2009) Judge Folsom denied a motion to transfer the case from Texas to North Carolina. He found that the parties and the sources of proof in this case were distributed nationwide, so a transfer from Texas to North Carolina would actually increase travel an additional 800 miles on average, and substantially inconvenience the West Coast witnesses.
Judge Folsom concluded that the case was distinguishable from VW and TS Tech, in both of which the physical evidence was confined to a limited region. He did not rely on the plaintiffs claim that its documents were on a server in Marshall. This opinion was reversed in In re Hoffman- LaRoche.
Judge Love granted one motion to transfer and denied another in two cases filed by a plaintiff against the same defendant. In Invitrogen Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 2009 WL (E.D.Tex. Feb 09, 2009) (Invitrogen I) GE sought transfer to Maryland, where half of the patents asserted in the Texas case had been asserted by the plaintiff's predecessor in interest against GE over an 11 year period. Invitrogen Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,
Judge Love found persuasive GE's claim that this case should be transferred to Maryland in order to preserve judicial economy, noting that there was "substantial overlap" between the Texas case and the now-settled Maryland case in both the patents asserted and the enforcement of the Maryland case settlement agreement.
In the second case, however, Invitrogen Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 2009 WL (E.D.Tex. Feb 09, 2009) (Invitrogen II) Judge Love denied the motion to transfer, noting that the case lacked the decade-long prior litigation involving the patents, and had little in common with the other litigation.Invitrogen Corp. v. General Elec. Co. Judge Love found that the defendant had not under these facts shown that the proposed transferee forum was "clearly more convenient."
In MHL TEK, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co et al (2- 07-cv-00289) (Feb. 23, 2009) Judge Ward was asked to reconsider his decision denying the defendants' motion to transfer the case to Michigan.MHL TEK, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co et al Judge Ward concluded that "the defendants have not shown that the Eastern District of Michigan is clearly more convenient than the plaintiffs chosen forum" and therefore denied the motion to reconsider.
Plaintiff is a Texas corporation with offices in Michigan. Defendants are various foreign auto companies and subsidiaries. Four defendants reside in Germany, three in California, two in Japan, two in South Korea, two in New Jersey, one each in Michigan, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Indiana, and Virginia.
Judge Ward found that this district would, in the least, be just as convenient or inconvenient to most of the defendants as the desired transferee district. Based on his travel calculations, Judge Ward found that under the 100-mile rule, the Texas court, rather than the Michigan one, was more centrally located to the scattered distribution of party witnesses.
Judge Ward made clear he was not reading the sources of proof factor out of the analysis, but given that the plaintiff's documents were being produced in Texas, only one defendant was from Michigan (and it had two related companies in the litigation, so it was not clear where its documents actually were), and the vast majority of the other documents were located elsewhere - plus that this case did not involve physical evidence, this factor did not support transfer
The Court specifically contrasted this case from TS Tech and VW II, where all of the documents and physical evidence was either located in the transferee forum, or much more convenient to it. Judge Ward's analysis of the factor of judicial economy disclosed an interesting set of facts.
Following the filing of this case by MHL, Volkswagen filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against MHL, involving the same three patents, in the Eastern District of Michigan. The Michigan judge transferred Volkswagens second-filed lawsuit to Judge Ward. Volkswagen petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the Michigan judge to vacate his transfer order.
In its petition, VW made essentially the same arguments regarding the inconvenience resulting from a trial in Marshall. The Federal Circuit denied Volkswagens petition, finding that Volkswagen arguments were only general assertions regarding convenience. In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 296 Fed. Appx. 11 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (In re VW III). "In the light of this guidance from the Federal Circuit," Judge Ward wrote, "this Court is inclined to deny defendants motion.
Judge Ward also noted that there was a previously filed case by this plaintiff against different defendants but involving the same patent filed in his court. "With two other cases involving the exact same patents before this Court, granting defendants motion for transfer in the present case would cut against principles of judicial economy and increase the risk of inconsistent adjudication.
Volkswagen filed another petition for mandamus following Judge Wards order, and the Federal Circuit denied it on May 22. See In re Volkswagen, 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (In re VW IV).
In December 2009 Judge Ward granted summary judgment of noninfringement in defendants favor.
In RealTime Data, LLC d/b/a Ixo v. Packeteer, Inc. et al (6-08-cv-00144) (E.D. Tex. March 5, 2009) 10 of 13 defendants filed a motion to transfer to N.D. Cal. "While Defendants point to the Northern District of California as the location for a significant source of proof," Judge Love wrote, "they ignore the remaining sources of proof which originate from numerous locations."
At its heart, the motion asked Judge Love to evaluate which of the parties were more important, something he was not willing to do at this stage. In the end, he found that transfer would make things easier for some parties, but more difficult for others, and on balance "a transfer … would merely redistribute the inconvenience.
In Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Int'l. Business Machines Corp., 2009 WL (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2009) Judge Ward granted a motion to transfer venue of a patent infringement action to the N.D. Cal. The parties were scattered across the nation (P in NC; Ds in New York and California) and the accused products had been designed and developed in California.
Judge Ward found that the Eastern District of Texas had no connection with the suit and gave little weight to the fact that one of the accused infringers had a training facility in Plano, Texas where it trained personnel on using the accused product, and granted the motion to transfer.
In Deep Nines, Inc. v. McAfee, Inc., 2009 WL (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2009), the court instructed that It is clear that where there is no connection with Texas or the Eastern District of Texas, venue is improper. Although denying the motion to transfer in Deep Nines, the court arrived at its decision only after painstakingly identifying the numerous contacts the action had with the forum.
The court found that one accused infringer maintained an office in the Eastern Texas forum, and that witnesses within the courts subpoena power resided in Dallas. The court also noted that it had previously handled a related dispute between the parties and the terms of the settlement agreement, governed by Texas law, were at issue in the current case, which gave the court an advantage in applying Texas law over the proposed forum in Minnesota.
In Acceleron, LLC v. Egenera, Inc., 2009 WL (Jun 09, 2009) Judge Davis granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (i.e. venue) as to one defendant because the plaintiffs proof that the product was sold in the district was lacking. Judge Davis denied the motion to transfer venue, but in doing so pointed up an issue dealing with sources of proof.
Despite technological advances that certainly lighten the relative inconvenience of transporting large amounts of documents across the country, this factor is still a part of the transfer analysis. In re Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. Therefore, courts have analyzed this factor in light of the fiction that voluminous documents must be transported from their physical location (supposing that electronically stored documents are, in fact, physical) to the trial venue. (Emphasis added).
In Aloft Media, LLC v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2009 WL (E.D.Tex., June 10, 2009) Judge Love also addressed the issue of whether the nature of the evidence (physical or electronic) matters when determining convenience. He noted that the Federal Circuit in Genentech criticized the distinction (citing In re VW) and eventually concluded that the distinction was now inappropriate under controlling precedent.
Judges may now differ on whether the nature of the evidence (physical or electronic) matters when determining convenience. VW and TS Tech dealt only with physical evidence, not electronic, but Genentech criticized any approach that rendered this factor superfluous. Cases seem to indicate that all evidence must be considered as if physical. Thus the inconvenience may not actually exist, but must be deemed to. De facto and de jure inconvenience.
In Sipco, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al (2-08- cv-00359) (June 4, 2009), Judge Folsom denied a motion to sever & transfer. "Defendants cannot argue that transfer of this case is appropriate for all parties because both the Plaintiff and multiple Defendants have offices in [Texas]. Instead, [defendants] separately ask to be severed from this action and transferred to different districts.
Citing the Federal Circuits statement that In re VW IV that the existence of multiple lawsuits involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice (emphasis his) the Court held Defendants' request would create simultaneous proceedings on the same patents and related products in three district courts.... such would be unnecessarily wasteful of the court system's time, energy, and money."
But, in Balthasar Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, LLC, 2009 WL (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009) the patentee sued several accused infringers who resided in California, and some who resided elsewhere. After the accused infringers moved to transfer, the patentee amended its complaint to add additional accused infringers, including some who resided in the Eastern District of Texas.
In considering the transfer motion, Judge Folsom determined that the Texas defendants were small businesses who were not major players in the accused infringement. Accordingly, the court severed the Texas defendants from the case, and stayed the infringement claims against them. It then granted the accused infringers motion to transfer the case to California.
Clearly more convenient test results in difference between regional and national cases MHL Tek continues the approach endorsed by Federal Circuit opinions such as the Network-1 and In re Telular of keeping national cases. Odom v. Microsoft and PartsRiver continue the approach endorsed by the Federal Circuit in In re TS Tech and In re Genentech of transferring cases where the parties (or at least the defendants) are closely grouped geographically.
Prior litigation still frequently results in transfer Invitrogen I continues the line of cases transferring cases where prior litigation raises issues of judicial economy, endorsed by the Federal Circuit in In re VW III and In re VW IV) Transfer is still common where no infringing activity in the district is shown. Fifth Generation and Acceleron continue the line of cases transferring (or dismissing) where no infringing activity in the district is shown.
The Eastern District judges are uniformly looking to see whether the proposed transferee forum is clearly more convenient. Transfers are now easier to obtain in some cases, primarily cases with fewer defendants which are geographically clustered, but more difficult in cases with a large number of defendants or witnesses which are spread throughout the nation or world. Analysis requires facts re: witnesses and documents and quantitative analysis of convenience. Court no longer permitted to engage in a qualitative analysis,or distinguish betweende facto and de jure inconvenience.
The appellate caselaw is not friendly to plaintiffs, but it has created numerous new opportunities for both parties to better their venue facts by, for example, adding parties or witnesses or documents to make a showing that a proposed transferee forum is clearly more convenient easier or more difficult. The extent to which courts will recognize these opportunities is the next frontier in venue law.
In re Hoffman-La Roche In re Nintendo In re Vtech
In In re Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., ____ F.3d ____, 2009 WL (Fed. Cir., Dec. 2, 2009) the Federal Circuit granted a mandamus reversing Judge Folsoms denial of a venue motion in a case brought by a California plaintiff against the makers of Fuzeon, a HIV inhibitor drug. Scientists at Duke Medical Center identified the drugs composition and later formed a company called Trimeris to develop the compound into a possible HIV infection therapy.
Plaintiff sued Trimeris and its commercial partners, the three Roche entities. While the Federal Circuit noted that there were parties and witnesses across the country and indeed, the world, the Federal Circuit granted the mandamus finding that there is stark contrast in relevance, convenience, and fairness between the two venues noting that the accused drug was developed and tested within the Eastern District of North Carolina.
In addition, the court noted that there appeared to be no connection between the case and the Eastern District of Texas It specifically rejected Novartis decision to convert approximately 75,000 pages of documents demonstrating conception and reduction of practice into electronic format and transfer them from California to its litigation office in Texas. Notably, the Court did not consider the (original) location of the plaintiffs documents in California.
The Federal Circuit observed that the assertion that these documents are Texas documents is a fiction which appears to have been created to manipulate the propriety of venue. The Federal Circuit also held that the district court gave too much weight to its ability to compel a Texas witnesss attendance at trial. Finally, it held that the transferee forums local interest was self-evident.
In In re Nintendo, Misc. No. 914 (Dec. 17, 2009), the Federal Circuit transferred the case to Washington state, where one of the two defendant, the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign entity (the other defendant), was located. Federal Circuit did not consider location of Plaintiffs documents (in Ohio and New York) in the analysis. Decreased travel time from Japan to Washington as opposed to Texas for defendant supported transfer. Contrast with Genentech – decreased travel time from Europe to Texas as opposed to California for plaintiff did not support transfer – only marginally less convenient.
Factors Relative ease of access to sources of proof Availability of compulsory process Cost of attendance of willing witnesses All other practical problems Administrative difficulties/court congestion Local interest in hearing localized controversies Familiarity of forum with the law Avoidance of conflicts of law / foreign law problems
No finding that transferee court clearly more convenient but… no meaningful ties to Texas central location used (instead of analysis) Too much weight to plaintiffs choice of forum/too strict a standard Witnesses closer to Washington. None in ED Texas Only identified relevant documents in Washington and Japan. None in ED Texas Not a single relevant factor favoring the plaintiffs chosen venue. FC says mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for the regular appeal process, but notes that regular appeal process does not provide an adequate remedy.
In In re Vtech Communications, Misc. Docket No. 909 (Jan. 6, 2010) the Federal Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus directed at one of Judge Folsom's orders denying transfer. The opinion affirmed Judge Folsom's reliance in on his familiarity with the case (he had concluded the claims construction process) and faulted Vtech for not "actively and promptly" pursing the motion to transfer before the district court had invested considerable time and attention on discovery and completing the claims construction process.
Unlike Genetech in which there were no Texas witnesses, here there was at least one nonparty witness who in the Eastern District of Texas. There was also a source of documents in San Antonio and some of the witnesses were in fact closer to Texas than to Oregon. The Court concluded that because "the facts are rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district court has done", mandamus should not issue, which would interfere with the approaching trial date.
In Hewlett-Packard v Acceleron, 2209 WL (Fed. Cir., Dec. 4, 2009) the Federal Circuit appears to have substantially lowered the bar for an accused infringer to obtain declaratory jurisdiction if the patentee is a licensing only patent holding company.
The patentee's sending of two letters identifying the patent and the relevant product, and requesting the accused infringer to agree to a confidentiality provision in a short response time, along with a refusal by the patentee to agree to the accused infringer's counter proposal of a stand-still agreement was enough to get declaratory jurisdiction.
This case may essentially eliminate pre-suit assertions of patent rights, since a plaintiff who contacts an accused infringer runs the risk of having a declaratory judgment suit filed in an unfriendly forum, and thus giving the infringer the ability to choose the forum.
Proposed Patent Reform Act addresses concerns about patent quality, the relationship of U.S. patents with the rest of the worlds patent systems, and the costs of patent litigation. Deep divisions in the business community over portions of the bill. Courts are clearly responding to legislative proposals with major changes in caselaw.
Shortly after the 111th Congress convened in January 2009, the Patent Reform Act of 2009 was introduced in the Senate. Initial versions of the legislation generally reflected the version which passed the House in September of 2007, but which never achieved sufficient consensus to reach the Senate floor. The Senate sponsors quickly reached a compromise on major parts of the legislation in the spring of 2009.
The Senate Judiciary committee approved a version of the bill in April, 2009, but it stalled when judicial nominations and health care reform began dominating the legislative landscape. While the legislation has not yet been set for floor debate, backers hope to see the bill on the Senate floor in early 2010.
As part of an overall compromise on many issues, the Senate Judiciary Committee has approved a version of patent legislation which with respect to venue contains only a provision drafted by Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.). The Cornyn amendment essentially codifies the clearly more convenient test from In re Volkswagen IIc. The legislation does not modify the general venue provision, or the patent venue provision.
The actual language as passed by Senate Judiciary would amend 28 U.S.C. §1400 by adding at the end the following: (e) CHANGE OF VENUE.For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court shall transfer any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents upon a showing that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient than the venue in which the civil action is pending.