Presentation on theme: "1 ALARP Recover HEMP Identify Assess Control HEMP and ALARP Training."— Presentation transcript:
1 ALARP Recover HEMP Identify Assess Control HEMP and ALARP Training
2 Objectives of HEMP & ALARP Training Increase Awareness of HEMP Concepts Develop a common understanding of ALARP Principles These topics are covered in more detail in: HSE 0026 – Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP and ALARP)
3 Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)
4 HSE Management System
5 Individual HEMP Responsibilities All Employees Responsible and accountable for conducting their work in such a manner which reduces to ALARP or eliminates risk to their own personal health and safety and that of their fellow employees and that ensures the protection of the environment, company assets, and company reputation. Technical Staff Participate in HEMP efforts for your Area, including asset integrity Achieve a competent level of understanding concerning your Areas HSE Case and Activity Specification Sheets Comply with strict adherence to the organizations MOC policy
6 Hazards and Effects Management Process
7 Risk Assessment Matrix & Major HazardsA5B5 Major Hazards are those that have high risk or high potential consequences
8 Major Hazards & HSE Cases SEPCo Policies require that operations and facilities with Major Hazards have documented HSE Cases. An HSE Case is a facility or operation-specific demonstration that the HSE risks from Major Hazards are managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and a description of how SEPCOs HSE Management System is applied to HSE hazards.
9 Bow Tie Terminology TermDefinition Top Event the loss of control or release of the hazard. Threats release mechanisms of the hazard. Barriers prevent the release of a hazard (i.e. top event) and act directly on the threat are the hardware and procedures in place to prevent the threat from leading to the top event. appear on the left hand side of the bow-tie. Consequences the effects of a hazard once it has been released. appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie. Recovery Measures mitigate a hazards potential to cause harm, damage, and environmental impacts. are similar to barriers, but act on the consequences appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.
10 Bow-Tie Example
11 Best Practice Bow Ties There will be a single bow tie for each major hazard in SEPCo that sets the minimum required barriers/recovery measures to manage risks. These are Best Practice Bow Ties. Each Asset or Operation will: review applicable best practice bow ties to consider and document any unique threats/consequences that may exist at their location. benchmark the effectiveness of the barriers at their location against the performance expectation included in the best practice bow ties. Identify gaps and implement remedial actions to improve the barriers / recovery measures and reduce the risk to ALARP.
12 HazardDescriptionPotential Consequences Sources of expsoure HealthPeople - Safety AssetsEnviron ment Reputati on Overall Risk Controls H-01.01Crude oil under pressure unignited release fire spill / environmental impact personnel injuries/fatalities loss of asset / asset damage production loss for health effects of flammable hydrocarbons, see the listings under H-21/22 General Chemicals MmajorH MH For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5. H-19.07ACarbon monoxide (Gas) Acute: chemical asphyxiant causing carboxyhaemoglobin Chronic: Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child, unconsciousness, fatality Power generation unit; engine exhausts, emergency generators, boilers, fired equipment MLNNNM 1. CO monitor in temporary quarters where combustion emission may occur. H-20.01H2S (hydrogen sulphide, sour gas) personnel injury / fatality minor environmental impact Health: Acute: Irritant to eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality Chronic: prolonged contact may lead to dermatitis Raw Material. Sour crude. Examples include rich and fat DEA, sour water, fuel gas streams, sour hydrogen, acid gas, spent caustic stripper overhead MmajorMLNM For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5. For Health, Refer to generic Chemical Minimum Controls in Table 5.1 of SEPCo HSE MS Part 5. 1. MMS Contingency Plan for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 2. Local Emergency Response Plan Hazard Register Those items with an Environment rating are E-aspects. Those that are Major in the Environment column are Significant E-aspects The Hazard Register describes hazards, their associated risks, and how the hazards are managed. Those items with in the Health column were identified during health risk assessments, and consider chronic and acute health exposures
13 HEMP Tools The most commonly used HEMP tools are highlighted
14 Risk Management Hierarchy 1) 1)Eliminate – remove the risk altogether 2) 2)Substitute – use a lower risk alternative 3) 3)Isolate / Separate – keep the hazard away from where it can cause harm 4) 4)Engineering Controls – Prevention – design such that the risk of an incident is minimal 5) 5)Engineering Controls – Mitigation – design such that if an incident occurs, it is mitigated 6) 6)Procedural Controls – provide procedures to reduce risk 7) 7)Personnel Protective Equipment – provide protection to reduce potential for injury In order of preference: Recover HEMP Identify Assess Control
15 HEMP Study Interactions HEMP Study MOC Process HSE Case AuditsVariances Incident Investigation Project HSE Plan Regulations Designs Procedures
16 Asset Responsibilities for HEMP Studies The owner of the HEMP study is the accountable party for the asset or operation covered by the study. The owner is accountable for: –Maintaining the study –Updating the study at the requisite frequency –Making sure actions from the study are documented and closed Studies done for design considerations are kept by engineering. Studies done for operational considerations are kept by Operations. Action items resulting from SEPCo HEMP studies shall be tracked and closed out using IMPACT.
17 Human Factors Engineering The Group Minimum Health Management Standard states: Human factors engineering principles are to be considered and applied during the early design stage of new facilities projects where design can have a critical impact on equipment usability and user safety or health. The following picture illustrates how a human interacts with a technical component and the factors that can influence his/her performance.
18 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
19 ALARP TRIANGLE
20 Risk Perception - Types of Fatalities, US, 2001 Number of deaths /year 47,288 20,308 15,019 14,078 3,309 3,281 396 61 44 Match the causes to the listed number of deaths/year (data from the National Safety Council). Cause Accidental Drowning (Non Transport) Transport Accidents Contact with venomous animals & Plants Lightning Legal Intervention Falls Assault Accidental Poisoning Exposure to smoke, fire and flames Answers Transport Accidents Assault Falls Accidental Poisoning Exposure to smoke, fire and flames Accidental Drowning (Non Transport) Legal Intervention Contact with Venomous animals & plants Lightning
21 Relative Risk Tolerability Threshold Increasing Individual Risks and Societal Concerns Tolerability Threshold Tolerability Threshold Lightning Venomous animals & plants Legal Intervention Drowning Accidental Poisoning Falls Oil and Gas Extraction Transport Accidents Assault
22 Actual Vs Perceived Risks 45 Deaths in 1996 59 Deaths in 1995 76 Attacks Worldwide 49 Attacks USA 1 Death USA 2001 Which hazard results in more deaths per year?
23 Risk Misperception.. Mountaineering Council for Scotland said These two men were very aware of safety issues and did not have a reputation for taking any sort of risks
24 Problem Framing An outbreak of disease is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been proposed: Which program would you select?
25 Rephrasing the Problem Depending on the problem phrasing, people made different decisions:
26 ALARP Definition To reduce a risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable involves balancing reduction in risk against time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it. This level represents the point, at which time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained. Risk Cost Screening Criteria ALARP ? From quantitative risk analysis
27 ALARP: Road Transport Example When does the cost of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained?: No specification Does not meet legal requirements No regular vehicle maintenance Provide recovery measures, e.g. roll-bars, seat belts Provide mitigation, e.g., speed limiter, 4WD Provide driver training Provide safe driving incentives Journey management system Road transport management system Avoid journeys by planning Build black-top roads Use aircraft transport only Automate production facilities - eliminate routine driving Stop production Intolerable SCREENING CRITERIA ALARP region ALARP probably in this area
28 ALARP and Risk Tolerability – 4 Levels of Risk The HEMP Standard describes the Tolerability Threshold, Evaluation requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of risk.
29 ALARP and Risk Tolerability Decision-Making For example: Variances to SEPCo requirements Identification of a new hazard, or a change in risk of an existing hazard Operating without barriers/recovery measures or operating in a way that deteriorates a barrier Making a change that impacts an existing barrier Selecting a new concept Adding additional risk such that the cumulative risk threshold may be approached ALARP and risk tolerability decisions are required when changes affect hazard management.
30 Decision Making Framework Outline Technology Based Values Based Drivers Means of Calibration Codes and Standards Peer Review Verification Benchmarking Internal Stakeholder Consultation External Stakeholder Consultation Well established solution Well understood risks Very novel Significant trade-offs Strong views and perceptions Higher level of Management Decision Level
31 Decision Making Framework Higher level of Management Decision Level
32 Following the Decision-Making Process Define decision Evaluate at the Cumulative, hazard, threat, and failure mode levels Demonstrate the decision as defined in the HEMP Standard Type A? Type B? Type C? Use the right-hand side of the framework. Use the left- hand side of the framework. Determine decision type EvaluateCalibrateDemonstrate What do you need to decide?
33 Type A Decision Example The decision context is Type A because this decision is well-understood. The decision bases are Codes and Standards (ASME, SEPCo design schedules), Good Practice, and Engineering/Expert judgment of the designer. cumulative risk level – N/A hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy. threat/consequence level - verify against the personnel at heights bowtie. failure mode level – N/A Since this decision is well understood (Type A), the means of calibration is Codes and Standards, so no additional consultation is required Since this decision is well understood (Type A) reference is made to the Hazards and Effects Register, and no additional demonstration is required other than the normal project documentation such as as-built drawings and calculations. You have to design a new ladder to access a work platform. How are ALARP principles applied? How to design a ladder for accessing a work platform. Define decision Determine decision type EvaluateCalibrateDemonstrate
34 ALARP Thinking The picture shows an example of a ladder and cage. Has it been designed to reduce the risk to ALARP?
35 ALARP Thinking - Risk Reduction Ideas (RRIs) Develop Risk Reduction Ideas for the preceding example. Remember the Risk Management Hierarchy! Evaluatehazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy. Consider the Evaluate step. Eliminate Substitute Isolate / Separate Engineering Controls – Prevention & Mitigation Procedural Controls Personnel Protective Equipment
36 Ranking Tool for selecting options XX Cost multiplier Cost of Implementation Cost 1Low<$50k 2Medium$50k -$500k 3High>$500k Benefit multiplier BenefitExamples 1HighMove one or more boxes on risk assessment matrix. Reduction of likelihood of a magnitude or more (failure goes from 1/10 to 1/100), consequences are reduced significantly (from potential fatality to minor injury), benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries, significant positive reputation impact 2 MediumReduction of likelihood less than magnitude (from 1/10 to 1/50), consequences are reduced, benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries 3LowLimited reduction in likelihood, limited reduction in consequence Effort multiplier Effort of Implementation Activities examples 1LowQuick fix, simple to do, applicable to a specific location (no SEPCo wide impact). Little planning required, one person or small team can execute RRI. No shutdown or downtime required. 2MediumSimple fix but with Asset or Operation-wide implications. Complex, site specific activity. Some planning required. Involvement of local contractors. Small team to carry RRI out. May extend a shutdown. 3HighComplex activity with SEPCo wide implications. Major planning involved. May involve larger contracts. Specific SEPCo team required. Requires a dedicated shutdown to implement. RangeProposed Action 1-4Do 6-9Study 12+Pass Sample Score assignments Cost multiplierBenefit multiplierEffort multiplier Score =
37 Selected Option
38 Type B Decision Example Define decisionIs a pressure vessel fit for service based on changes in wall thickness from corrosion? Determine decision type The decision context is Type B since it is a deviation from codes and standards or good practice (API RP 579) Evaluatecumulative risk level – N/A hazard level – evaluate based on the vessel contents for considerations regarding environmental effects, flammability or health hazards. The risk management hierarchy should be used. threat/consequence level - An analysis should be conducted for overpressure and any other threats that might be impacted by reduced wall thickness (corrosion, vibration, etc.). failure mode level – conduct a detailed analysis for each failure mode. CalibrateThe means of calibration is peer review, so consultation is made with: Technical Authorities Regulatory Affairs Workforce Senior Leadership DemonstrateConsult the HEMP Standard for demonstration requirements! Since this is a Type B decision, demonstration shall be made using the report format in Attachment B of the HEMP Standard. Reference the hazard management hierarchy and the Engineering Analyses from Fitness for Service reviews. A pressure vessel has been noted to have a reduction in wall thickness from corrosion. Should it be kept in service? How would you make this decision?
39 HEMP Web Site Available via the HSE in SEPCo Web Portal or directly at http://sepco3.shell.com/sites/hse/hemp/
40 Summary of HEMP & ALARP Training You should now be aware of HEMP Concepts We all should have a common understanding of the ALARP Principle