Presentation on theme: "HEMP and ALARP Training"— Presentation transcript:
1 HEMP and ALARP Training RecoverHEMPIdentifyAssessControlHEMP and ALARP TrainingALARP
2 Objectives of HEMP & ALARP Training Increase Awareness of HEMP ConceptsDevelop a common understanding of ALARP PrinciplesThese topics are covered in more detail in:HSE 0026 – Hazards and Effects Management Process(HEMP and ALARP)
5 Individual HEMP Responsibilities All EmployeesResponsible and accountable for conducting their work in such a manner which reduces to ALARP or eliminates risk to their own personal health and safety and that of their fellow employees and that ensures the protection of the environment, company assets, and company reputation.Technical StaffParticipate in HEMP efforts for your Area, including asset integrityAchieve a competent level of understanding concerning your Area’s HSE Case and Activity Specification SheetsComply with strict adherence to the organization’s MOC policy
6 Hazards and Effects Management Process Four Step , Iterative ProcessMost Important - MUST Identify the Hazards. Know what they are, then understand them, in order to control them, to manage HSE risks.Developing an HSE Database for HSE Critical Activities.Developing Performance Standards which state what they will achieve
7 Risk Assessment Matrix & Major Hazards B5Major Hazards are those that have high risk orhigh potential consequences
8 Major Hazards & HSE Cases SEPCo Policies require that operations and facilities with Major Hazards have documented HSE Cases.An HSE Case is a facility or operation-specific demonstration that the HSE risks from Major Hazards are managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and a description of how SEPCO’s HSE Management System is applied to HSE hazards.
9 Bow Tie Terminology the loss of control or release of the hazard. DefinitionTop Eventthe loss of control or release of the hazard.Threats“release mechanisms” of the hazard.Barriersprevent the release of a hazard (i.e. top event) and act directly on the threatare the hardware and procedures in place to prevent the threat from leading to the top event.appear on the left hand side of the bow-tie.Consequencesthe effects of a hazard once it has been released.appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.Recovery Measuresmitigate a hazard’s potential to cause harm, damage, and environmental impacts.are similar to barriers, but act on the consequences
11 Best Practice Bow TiesThere will be a single bow tie for each major hazard in SEPCo that sets the minimum required barriers/recovery measures to manage risks.These are Best Practice Bow Ties.Each Asset or Operation will:review applicable best practice bow ties to consider and document any unique threats/consequences that may exist at their location.benchmark the effectiveness of the barriers at their location against the performance expectation included in the best practice bow ties.Identify gaps and implement remedial actions to improve the barriers / recovery measures and reduce the risk to ALARP.
12 Hazard RegisterThe Hazard Register describes hazards, their associated risks, and how the hazards are managed.Those items with an Environment rating are E-aspects. Those that are Major in the Environment column are “Significant E-aspects”Those items with in the Health column were identified during health risk assessments, and consider chronic and acute health exposuresHazardDescriptionPotential ConsequencesSources of expsoureHealthPeople - SafetyAssetsEnvironmentReputationOverall RiskControlsH-01.01Crude oil under pressureunignited release fire spill / environmental impact personnel injuries/fatalities loss of asset / asset damage production lossfor health effects of flammable hydrocarbons, see the listings under H-21/22 General ChemicalsMmajorHMFor locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.H-19.07ACarbon monoxide (Gas)Acute: chemical asphyxiant causing carboxyhaemoglobin Chronic: Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child, unconsciousness, fatalityPower generation unit; engine exhausts, emergency generators, boilers, fired equipmentLN1. CO monitor in temporary quarters where combustion emission may occur.H-20.01H2S (hydrogen sulphide, sour gas)personnel injury / fatality minor environmental impact Health: Acute: Irritant to eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality Chronic: prolonged contact may lead to dermatitisRaw Material. Sour crude. Examples include rich and fat DEA, sour water, fuel gas streams, sour hydrogen, acid gas, spent caustic stripper overheadFor locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5. For Health, Refer to generic Chemical Minimum Controls in Table 5.1 of SEPCo HSE MS Part MMS Contingency Plan for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 2. Local Emergency Response PlanAnother change in this revision of the HEMP Standard is the integration of E-aspects into the hazards and effects register, instead of having a separate listing and e-aspects database.The new definition of an e-aspect is any hazard that has a rating in the Environment column of the Risk Assessment Matrix.“Significant E-Aspects” are equivalent to major hazards – those E-aspects that are High or Major in the Environment column of the Risk Assessment Matrix are significant E-Aspects.This change has been incorporated in the next revision of the HSE MS, and will be incorporated in the HSE Cases as they are updated per their normal schedule.This is important for ISO
13 HEMP ToolsThe most commonly used HEMP tools are highlighted
14 Risk Management Hierarchy In order of preference:RecoverHEMPIdentifyAssessControlEliminate – remove the risk altogetherSubstitute – use a lower risk alternativeIsolate / Separate – keep the hazard away from where it can cause harmEngineering Controls – Prevention – design such that the risk of an incident is minimalEngineering Controls – Mitigation – design such that if an incident occurs, it is mitigatedProcedural Controls – provide procedures to reduce riskPersonnel Protective Equipment – provide protection to reduce potential for injury
15 HEMP Study Interactions AuditsIncident InvestigationProceduresVariancesHEMPStudyProject HSE PlanRegulationsHSE CaseDesignsIt doesn’t matter where you start on this loop - it is continuousHEMP Studies could be PHA’s, HRA’s, or Dropped ObjectsStudies stored in LiveLink® in HSE folder in Asset AreaIMPACT used to track action items and document close-outHSE Case is the overarching document which describes how all hazards are managed on location and demonstrates through use of bow-ties how major hazards are managed.HSE Case will be periodically updated and will trigger a review of the associated HEMP studies & hazard managementMOC is the key Work Process for managing changesA Project HSE Plan will define what HEMP activities are required for the project and who is responsibleHEMP studies kept for the life of field or operationHEMP studies periodically reviewed to ensure hazards are well understood and for CPI (e.g. changes in codes and standards)Further Guidance Provided:Process Safety Information Guidance HSE0047Establishing Asset Integrity Guidance HSE0049PHA Execution Guidance HSE0063MOCProcess
16 Asset Responsibilities for HEMP Studies The owner of the HEMP study is the accountable party for the asset or operation covered by the study. The owner is accountable for:Maintaining the studyUpdating the study at the requisite frequencyMaking sure actions from the study are documented and closedStudies done for design considerations are kept by engineering.Studies done for operational considerations are kept by Operations.Action items resulting from SEPCo HEMP studies shall be tracked and closed out using IMPACT.
17 Human Factors Engineering The Group Minimum Health Management Standard states:Human factors engineering principles are to be considered and applied during the early design stage of new facilities projects where design can have a critical impact on equipment usability and user safety or health.The following picture illustrates how a human interacts with a technical component and the factors that can influence his/her performance.Organizational Structure(job design, communication, task)Work Environment(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)Individual Constraints(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)HumanDisplaysControlsSensory InformationActionTASKInputOutputMachineInterfaces - DisplaysInterfaces - Controls
19 ALARP TRIANGLEThe tolerability threshold is the point at which the risk moves from being tolerable to being unacceptable. The Tolerability threshold has been defined in this revision of the Standard.
20 Risk Perception - Types of Fatalities, US, 2001 Match the causes to the listed number of deaths/year(data from the National Safety Council).CauseAccidental Drowning (Non Transport)Transport AccidentsContact with venomous animals & PlantsLightningLegal InterventionFallsAssaultAccidental PoisoningExposure to smoke, fire and flamesNumber of deaths /year47,28820,30815,01914,0783,3093,2813966144AnswersTransport AccidentsAssaultFallsAccidental PoisoningExposure to smoke, fire and flamesAccidental Drowning (Non Transport)Legal InterventionContact with Venomous animals & plantsLightningAdd a new slide with the answers – and calculate the IRPA. US population in divide #/population = IRPAIn UK, they say work-related IRPas should be less than .001, Voluntary vs not. What is the denominator.
21 Increasing Individual Risks and Societal Concerns Relative RiskTolerabilityThresholdIncreasing Individual Risks and Societal ConcernsTolerabilityThresholdOil and Gas ExtractionTransport AccidentsAssaultFallsAccidental PoisoningDrowningPer Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are 23.1 fatalities per 100,000 employed in “Oil and Gas Extraction” = 2.3 x 10-4Legal InterventionVenomous animals & plantsLightning
22 Actual Vs Perceived Risks Which “hazard” results in more deaths per year?45 Deaths in 199659 Deaths in 199576 Attacks Worldwide49 Attacks USA1 Death USA 2001
23 Risk Misperception .. Mountaineering Council for Scotland said “These two men were very aware of safety issues and did not have a reputation for taking any sort of risks”
24 Problem Framing An outbreak of disease is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been proposed:Which program would you select?
25 Rephrasing the Problem Depending on the problem phrasing, people made different decisions:
26 ALARP DefinitionTo reduce a risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable involves balancing reduction in risk against time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.This level represents the point, at which time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.•RiskCostScreening CriteriaALARP ?From quantitativerisk analysis
27 ALARP: Road Transport Example When does the cost of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained?:No specificationDoes not meet legal requirementsNo regular vehicle maintenanceProvide recovery measures, e.g. roll-bars, seat beltsProvide mitigation, e.g., speed limiter, 4WDProvide driver trainingProvide safe driving incentivesJourney management systemRoad transport management systemAvoid journeys by planningBuild black-top roadsUse aircraft transport onlyAutomate production facilities - eliminate routine drivingStop productionIntolerableSCREENING CRITERIAALARP regionALARPprobablyin this area
28 ALARP and Risk Tolerability – 4 Levels of Risk The new revision of the Standard defines 4 levels at which risk may be assessed:Cumulative: the sum of all the risks at a location. This is one area that has often received a lack of consideration in the past e.g. how many risers can be added at a location before the cumulative risk threshold is exceeded?Hazard level: This is the level at which bow-ties may be created (for Major hazards).Threat level: This is the level at which adequacy of barriers/escalation factor controls is assessed for bow-tiesFailure mode level: Failure modes are specific causes of a failure that, with others, are collectively treated as a contributor to the threat/consequence or escalation factor. Examples shown in diagram.The new revision of the HEMP Standard describes Risk Tolerability Thresholds, ALARP Evaluation Requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of HSE Risk.The HEMP Standard describes the Tolerability Threshold, Evaluation requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of risk.
29 ALARP and Risk Tolerability Decision-Making ALARP and risk tolerability decisions are required when changes affect hazard management.For example:Variances to SEPCo requirementsIdentification of a new hazard, or a change in risk of an existing hazardOperating without barriers/recovery measures or operating in a way that deteriorates a barrierMaking a change that impacts an existing barrierSelecting a new conceptAdding additional risk such that the cumulative risk threshold may be approached
30 Decision Making Framework Outline Means of CalibrationDecisionLevelTechnologyBasedWell establishedsolutionCodes and StandardsWell understood risksVerificationDriversPeer ReviewBenchmarkingVery novelHigher level of ManagementInternal StakeholderConsultationSignificant trade-offsStrong viewsand perceptionsValues BasedExternal StakeholderConsultation
31 Decision Making Framework LevelHigher level of ManagementIn order to determine the evaluation requirements for a specific HSE decision, the decision type needs to be determined. The SEPCo decision making framework is used for this purpose, and provides guidance on the types of bases needed to make HSE decisions.A Type A decision is well-understood, nothing new or unusual. When drawing a line across the framework it is indicated that Codes and Standards, Good Practice and Engineering/Expert judgement would be used as the decision bases.A Type B decision has some uncertainty. The line across the framework indicates Codes and Standards, Good Practice and Engineering/Expert judgement, Risk Based assessment or Company values would be used as the decision bases, depending on whether or not the decision was strongly type B.A Type C decision is novel or challenging. The line indicates that Company values and societal values would be the most likely decision bases for this type of decision.The left side of the framework shows the means for calibrating (or checking) the decisions.
32 Following the Decision-Making Process Define decisionWhat do you need to decide?Determine decision typeType A? Type B? Type C? Use the right-hand side of the framework.EvaluateEvaluate at the Cumulative, hazard, threat, and failure mode levelsCalibrateHow to follow the Process???There are basically 5 steps:Define the Decision – what do you need to decide?Determine the Decision Type (A, B, C) using the right hand side of the frameworkEvaluate the Decision (at the cumulative, hazard, threat, failure mode levels as defined in the HEMP Standard).Calibrate the Decision using the means shown on the left hand side of the frameworkDemonstrate the Decision as defined in the HEMP Standard.An example is provided – go through the example.Use the left-hand side of the framework.DemonstrateDemonstrate the decision as defined in the HEMP Standard
33 Type A Decision Example Define decisionHow to design a ladder for accessing a work platform.Determine decision typeThe decision context is Type A because this decision is well-understood.The decision bases are Codes and Standards (ASME, SEPCo design schedules), Good Practice, and Engineering/Expert judgment of the designer.You have to design a new ladder to access a work platform.How are ALARP principles applied?cumulative risk level – N/Ahazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.threat/consequence level - verify against the personnel at heights bowtie.failure mode level – N/AEvaluateCalibrateSince this decision is well understood (Type A), the means of calibration is Codes and Standards, so no additional consultation is requiredSince this decision is well understood (Type A) reference is made to the Hazards and Effects Register, and no additional demonstration is required other than the normal project documentation such as as-built drawings and calculations.Demonstrate
34 ALARP ThinkingThe picture shows an example of a ladder and cage. Has it been designed to reduce the risk to ALARP?
35 ALARP Thinking - Risk Reduction Ideas (RRIs) Consider the Evaluate step.Evaluatehazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.Develop Risk Reduction Ideas for the preceding example.Remember the Risk Management Hierarchy!EliminateSubstituteIsolate / SeparateEngineering Controls – Prevention & MitigationProcedural ControlsPersonnel Protective Equipment
36 Ranking Tool for selecting options Cost multiplierBenefit multiplierEffort multiplierScore=XXSample Score assignmentsCost multiplierCost of ImplementationCost1Low<$50k2Medium$50k -$500k3High>$500kRangeProposed Action1-4Do6-9Study12+PassBenefit multiplierBenefitExamples1HighMove one or more boxes on risk assessment matrix.Reduction of likelihood of a magnitude or more (failure goes from 1/10 to 1/100), consequences are reduced significantly (from potential fatality to minor injury), benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries, significant positive reputation impact2 MediumReduction of likelihood less than magnitude (from 1/10 to 1/50), consequences are reduced, benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries3LowLimited reduction in likelihood, limited reduction in consequenceEffort multiplierEffort of ImplementationActivities examples1LowQuick fix, simple to do, applicable to a specific location (no SEPCo wide impact). Little planning required, one person or small team can execute RRI. No shutdown or downtime required.2MediumSimple fix but with Asset or Operation-wide implications. Complex, site specific activity. Some planning required. Involvement of local contractors. Small team to carry RRI out. May extend a shutdown.3HighComplex activity with SEPCo wide implications. Major planning involved. May involve larger contracts. Specific SEPCo team required. Requires a dedicated shutdown to implement.
38 Type B Decision Example A pressure vessel has been noted to have a reduction in wall thickness from corrosion. Should it be kept in service? How would you make this decision?Define decisionIs a pressure vessel fit for service based on changes in wall thickness from corrosion?Determine decision typeThe decision context is Type B since it is a deviation from codes and standards or good practice (API RP 579)Evaluatecumulative risk level – N/Ahazard level – evaluate based on the vessel contents for considerations regarding environmental effects, flammability or health hazards. The risk management hierarchy should be used.threat/consequence level - An analysis should be conducted for overpressure and any other threats that might be impacted by reduced wall thickness (corrosion, vibration, etc.).failure mode level – conduct a detailed analysis for each failure mode.CalibrateThe means of calibration is peer review, so consultation is made with:Technical AuthoritiesRegulatory AffairsWorkforceSenior LeadershipDemonstrateConsult the HEMP Standard for demonstration requirements!Since this is a Type B decision, demonstration shall be made using the report format in Attachment B of the HEMP Standard. Reference the hazard management hierarchy and the Engineering Analyses from Fitness for Service reviews.
39 HEMP Web Site Available via the HSE in SEPCo Web Portal or directly at
40 Summary of HEMP & ALARP Training You should now be aware of HEMP ConceptsWe all should have a common understanding of the ALARP Principle