Presentation on theme: "Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals Market Share Seungchul Lee Robert Rosenman Forthcoming, Journal of Industry,"— Presentation transcript:
Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals Market Share Seungchul Lee Robert Rosenman Forthcoming, Journal of Industry, Commerce and Trade
Motivation for the research comes from two observations: Over the past decade hospitals are increasingly concerned with cost control. – More investment in cost-saving technologies. – Less investment (proportionately) in quality enhancing technologies. There has been a significant growth in for-profit hospitals market share. – From 1980 to 2007, the share of for-profit hospitals grew 5.3% while private not-for-profit grew 2.7%. – Government hospitals share fell by 7.8%.
Raises the question: Are these changes coincidental or has there been a fundamental structural change that explains these why hospitals invest differently and for-profit market share has increased? What has changed in the hospital market? Since 1980, there has been a big shift from retrospective payment to prospective payment. – Medicare – Growth of managed care – Even among indemnity payers with preferred providers
What this paper does: Provides a theoretical argument that the move to prospective payment from retrospective payment – partially explains the change in hospital investment behavior to cost savings from quality enhancing technologies; – allowed for profit hospitals to be more competitive in the market for hospital services. Explains the results in a competitive environment for patients. Hospitals can improve their bottom line by – attracting more patients with higher quality (from investment in quality enhancing technology) than its competitor, or; – lowering costs by investing in cost-controlling technology. How a hospital is reimbursed changes the payoffs from these two different investment strategies. Hence, how hospitals are reimburseed can be a policy tool to enhance quality as well as control costs.
Literature Weisbrod (1991) first discussed how payment form affects investment in just the way we argue. – That part of our analysis is not novel. – What is novel is how we link this to the growing share of for-profit hospitals in the market. Three relevant issues: – How the shift in payment changed investment strategies by hospitals. – The link between the payment system and quality. – What all this means for mixed competition between not-for-profit and for profit hospitals.
Literature (continued) Gaynor and Town (2012) comprehensive review of the literature on mixed competition. – Note that under administratively set prices, the currency of competition is quality. – Applies to the British National Health Service, and sectors of the US health care market like Medicare. – With entry allowed, what matters is the elasticity of demand with respect to quality and the total demand. – Equilibrium quality is higher if most hospitals are not-for-profit. – Empirical analysis mixed, but most find increased competition increases quality. Brekke, et al (2011) explain the ambiguity by letting quality and (low) costs vary from complements to substitutes
Literature (continued) – Explanations for mixed competition Friesner and Rosenman (2002) explain mixed competition by differences in consumer preferences for quality or price. Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) explain it by differences in provider preferences, with a shortage of providers with not- for-profit preferences. Our approach embraces both explanations, although is closer to Friesner and Rosenman – We have a duopoly supply facing heterogeneous consumers They differ in preference for quality and the opportunity cost of their time. The opportunity cost of their time plays the same role as low price. – Like Ladawalla and Philipson, the not-for-profit hospital has profit- deviating preferences Not-for-profits dominates the market due to its willingness to accept part of its return in utility rather than money. For-profits compete only if the not-for-profits dont supply enough to meet the market demand.
Literature (continue)– Prospective Payment and Quality Allen and Gertler (1991) found prospective payment mechanisms cannot induce optimal quality. Siciliani (2006) found prospective payment lowers quality. Selder (2006) finds prospective payment lowers quality for severely ill patients. RAND (2006) found little change in direct care quality, although patients were discharged earlier and sicker with prospective payment. Ma (1994), Selder (2005) and Miraldo (2007) find hospitals invest less in quality improving technologies under prospective payment than under retrospective payment. Empirical evidence from Teplensky, et al. (1995), Hillman and Schwartz (1995) and other studies supports this.
A Model of hospital market competition N patients, each demanding 1 unit of hospital care Patients gain utility from quality, lose utility from waiting for care (a congestion externality). Patient preferences are heterogeneous. Demand for each hospital is (1) where f is the for-profit hospital and n is the not-for-profit hospital, indexes each hospitals demand and is the demand for the for-profit hospital, as a share of total demand, given by N.
For-profit share is positively related to its relative quality and its waiting time, T, is negatively related to its quality. The function collapses to that maps to the proportion of patients choosing the for-profit hospital. We assume that licensing requires a minimum level of quality that exceeds zero. We have T endogenous, but if it instead is thought of as travel time to a heterogeneously distributed population, it could be exogenous.
For-profit objective Not-for-profit objective where the utility function has normal properties and costs are increasing in quality investment (t 1n ) and decreasing in cost saving investment (t 2n ).
Proof: We assume with no incentive to make an investment, a hospital will not. Because they are reimbursed for AC, neither hospital has any incentive to control costs, hence t 2n =t 2f =0. By the same logic, t 1f =0 and so q f (t 1f =0)=q min. The NFP faces the equivalent of the unconstrained maximization problem Because retrospective reimbursement ensures that all costs are covered. Hence the FONC is By strict monotonicity of the utility function and the demand function, this holds only when q n / t 1n =0 which occurs when t 1n =t 1opt. Corollary 1: Under retrospective reimbursement Q n >Q f. Proof: Because of the nature of demand, a higher quality hospital gets a larger market share. By proposition 1, t 1n =t 1opt >0=t 1f so the NFP has higher quality.
Leading to Proposition 2 Under full government payment of patients costs, when hospitals are reimbursed prospectively the same amounts; P21: The for-profit hospital invests in both technologies but does not reach the globally maximum quality. P22: The not-for-profit hospital invests in both technologies if the revenue constraint is binding, but does not reach the globally maximizing quality. P23: The not-for-profit hospital invests only in quality technology if the revenue constraint is not binding, and reaches the globally maximum quality. P24: If the revenue constraint is binding the not-for-profit hospital invests more in both technologies than does the for- profit hospital.
Proofs: P21: From FOC of the FP hospital which requires t 2f >0. We also see that which requires that 00 which means that 00.
P23: If =0 the revenue constraint is non-binding and so which is achieved only if t 1n =t 1opt. The investment in cost saving technology is undefined but there is no incentive to do so.
P24: >0. For quality improving technology notice that for the NFP hospital We know the LHS is positive, hence so is the RHS. But for the FP hospital so The graph on the next slide shows that this inequality requires t 1n >t 1f.
Corollary 2: The dominance of the not-for-profit hospital under both retrospective and prospective reimbursement is not due to its ability to raise revenue through donations. They have no effect on market share under retrospective payment. Donations increase the not-for-profit hospital dominance when payment is prospective. Corollary 3 1: The quality of care given by the not-for-profit hospital under a retrospective reimbursement system exceeds the quality it provides under the prospective payment unless the revenue constraint is non- binding, and its market dominance is stronger. 2: The quality of care given by the for-profit hospital under a retrospective reimbursement system is less than the quality it provides under the prospective payment and it better competes for market share.
Conclusions Medicare was intended to lower costs. It had the intended result: Both hospitals invest more in cost-saving technology. But some unintended results: – For-profit hospitals became more competitive (an innocuous outcome) – Not-for-profit hospitals invest less, most likely, in quality enhancing technology (a potentially negative outcome). – For-profit hospitals invest more in quality investment (off-setting the lower not-for-profit investment). – What happens to average quality is ambiguous and an empirical question. – Interestingly Gaynor and Town (2012) find a convergence of quality after prospective payment was implemented between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.