Presentation on theme: "Economics of European integration Lecture 5: EU trade policy"— Presentation transcript:
1 Economics of European integration Lecture 5: EU trade policy Thomas Blondiau (Center for Economic Studies, KU Leuven)Louvain Institute for Ireland in Europe, January 2012
2 EU Trade Policy: outline International frameworkBenefits of free tradeEU as a trading partnerEU external trade policyPreferential trade liberalization (revisited)
3 EU Trade PolicyCommon Commercial Policy - Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome:Community tariff regimeCommon trade agreement with third countries (trade in goods, service and intellectual property)
4 International framework GATT (1948)WTO (1995) functions:Regulations for conduct of international tradeSettlements of disputesNegotiations to liberalize world tradeLatest negotiations rounds:: Uruguay round2001-?: Doha round
5 International framework: WTO principles Non-discriminationReciprocityBinding and enforceable commitmentsTransparencySafety valves (for specific circumstances)
6 WTO organizational structure Council for trade in goods (GATT)Council for trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS)Council for trade in services (GATS)Trade negotiations committee (TNC): Uruguay round, Doha round, etc.Decision-making: practice of consensusDispute settlement bodyIncluding Appellate Body, arbitrators, etc.
7 International framework: Road to WTO Progress in international trade talks was made during a successive set of ‘trade rounds’Initially, trade rounds were aimed at reducing trade barriers through lower tariffsUruguay round ( ) was more ambitious:Significantly reduce agricultural subsidies (led by ‘Cairns group’: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, New-Zealand)Liberalize framework for foreign investment (TRIM)Liberalize trade in services (GATS)Obtain wider protection and recognition of patents/copyrights (TRIPS)Obtain further reduction in tariffs (GATT)
8 International framework: Road to WTO Doha round ( …): Goal is to improve market accessTalks have stalled since 2008Issues:Continued protectionism and export subsidies for agriculture in developed world (US, EU, Japan)Singapore issues difficult to digest (US, G20 developing countries)Trade facilitation (more efficiency in customs clearing)Public procurement (current GPA scheme is voluntary under WTO)Trade & investmentTrade & competition (more uniformity in ‘market rules’)Additional issues:Related to TRIPS and access to patented medicines in developing countries (innovation incentives vs. public health)Special and differential treatmentImplementation issues (related to Singapore issues)
9 International framework: Doha Round Copenhagen consensus evaluated the Doha round as the second best investment for global welfare, after provision of vitamin supplements to malnourished childrenEvaluation based on economic cost-benefit analysis
10 Benefits of free trade: theory Technological differences; comparative advantage (Ricardo)Difference in endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin)Economies of scaleEconomies of scale and product varieties (Krugman, New Trade Theory; intra-industry trade)
11 Comparative advantage: example In two hours, France could produce 6 kg of bread and 4 liters of wineAssume trade becomes possible at 6 kg of bread for 6 liters of wineFrance produces 12 kg of bread, and trades 6 kg of bread for 6 liters of wine. They end up with 6 kg of bread and 6 liters of wineSimilar reasoning for Italy; both countries better off with tradeLower wages in ItalyRelative world price is between relative autarky pricesTechnologyFranceItalyBread (kg produced in a man-hour)61Wine (liters produced in a man-hour)42
12 Heckscher-OhlinA country will export the commodity whose production is intensive of the factor in which the country is relatively abundantAssume same technology in both countries
13 Heckscher-OhlinAssume the production of bread is capital intensive and the production of wine is labor intensiveAssume France has a relative abundance of capital and Italy has a relative abundance of laborThis shows up in the production possibility frontiers
15 Heckscher-Ohlin graphically Indifference curves shows combinations of wine and bread consumption that give the same level of satisfactionAssume same preferences in both countries (so same indifference curves)Higher indifference curve means higher level of satisfaction (higher utility level)
19 Heckscher-Ohlin graphically For trade to occur, relative world price must be between relative autarky prices:Rel. p(France) > Rel. world price > Rel. p(Italy)World price is slope of green line in next figure
21 Heckscher-Ohlin graphically Because of trade, both countries end up on a higher indifference curve and are therefore better offBoth countries specializePoints outside of production possibility frontier become possible
22 Benefits of protection Protect specific groups in societyDiversify production (uncertainty)Strategic independence (e.g. food, energy)Protect employmentProtect infant industryStrategic argument (terms-of-trade)Avoid (social) dumping
28 Institutions Trade policy is an exclusive competency of EU. Customs Union requires COORDINATION.Trade in goods:Commission has responsibility for negotiating, Council of Ministers sets “Directives for Negotiation.”Karel De Gucht (Trade Commissioner).Council accepts/rejects final deal by Qualified Majority Vote.Commission in charge of surveillance and enforcement of 3rd nation commitments to EU.Trade disputes with US, China, etc.European Parliament has no explicit powers. It’s only informed.
29 QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTE Each member state has a fixed number of votes roughly determined by its population, but progressively weighted in favour of smaller countries.To pass a vote by QMV, all three of the following conditions must apply:the proposal must be supported by 255 votes from a total of about 74% of the votes;the proposal must be backed by a majority of member states;the countries supporting the proposal must represent at least 62% of the total EU population.
30 Treaty of Rome only gave Commission power over trade in goods. Treaty of Nice (& Amsterdam) extended Commission’s authority to some aspects of services trade and intellectual property rights.It made QMV the rule in Council on such matters.
31 Contingent Protection (anti-dumping&anti-subsidy) WTO allows members to raise tariffs to (does not violate WTO):1. Counter ‘unfair’ trade practices, e.g.Antidumping (often)Anti-subsidy2. Provide temporary protection “safeguards.”(Iron, steel, consumer electronics, chemicals)The various WTO articles on these require a procedure; in EU the Commission is in charge of these procedures, but the final decision is subject to QMV approval of the Council.Tariffs and preferably price undertaking (avoid complaints on EU’s protection).Trade-off between consumer welfare and producer welfare.
33 EU External Trade Policy ComplexHas preferential trade agreements with all but nine of the WTO’s 148 members.Each free trade agreement can contain hundreds of pages of exceptions and technical rules.Has general agreement on trade, but also has separate sectoral agreementSee for updating details.
34 EU External Trade Policy EU has special deals with 139 nations; often more than one per partner.
35 EU External Trade Policy European-Mediterranean area:1. West, Central and Eastern Europe = Single market in industrial goods; EU + EFTA (but not agricultural food)2. Euro-Med10 Association Agreements:Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Jordon, Syria and Turkey.Bilateral duty-free trade in industrial goodsAsymmetric:Asymmetric dependence (e.g. 70% of Morocco’s exports to EU, but <1% of EU to Morocco)EU cuts its tariffs faster, Med 10 promise to eliminate their tariffs on EU industrial goods by 2010
36 EU External Trade Policy European-Mediterranean area:Turkey uses EU’s common external tariff for industrial importsEFTA nations sign similar agreements with Med-10
37 EU External Trade Policy Former Soviet republics & Western Balkans1. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).Generalised System of Preference - GSP plus.Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Uzbekistan.2. Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs).Former Yugoslavian states.Croatia has started membership; others likely to follow.These are all GSP (Generalized System of Preference), a WTO rule allows rich nations to charge lower tariffs on imports from poor nations. (Asymmetric)
38 Preferential arrangements with former colonies Colonial preferences conflicted with Common External Tariff.EU made exception for these nations to avoid imposing new tariffs; signed “unilateral PTAs”Yaoundé Convention and Arusha AgreementWhen UK joined 1974 extended to many Commonwealth nations.“ACP nations” (Africa, Caribbean & Pacific); the new agreement = Lomé Convention.Duty-free but subject to quota for sensitive items (sugar, banana, etc.).These didn’t help the ACP nations to industrialize.When Lomé Convention renewed in 2000, the EU and the ACP nations agreed to modernise the deal.Cotonou Agreement; eventually reciprocal free trade.
39 Regional groups, ACP nations West AfricaCentral AfricaEast South AfricaSouthern AfricaCaribbeanPacificBeninBurkina FasoCaper Verde Cote d’IvoireGambia Ghana GuineaGuinea Biss.LiberiaMaliMauritaniaNigerNigeriaSenegalSierra LeonaTogoCameroonChadCongoEquat. GuineaGabonSao Tome e PrincipeBurundiComoros Congo (Rep Dem)DjiboutiEritreaEthiopiaKenyaMalawiMauritiusMadagascarRwandaSeychellesSudanUgandaZambiaZimbabweAngolaBotswanaLesothoMozambiqueNamibiaSwazilandTanzaniaAntiguaBahamasBarbadosBelizeDominicaDomin RepGrenadaGuyanaHaitiJamaicaSta LuciaSt VincentSt Ch and NevisSurinamTrinidad and TobagoCook IsFed MicronFijiKiribatiMarshall IslNauruNiuePalauPapua NGSamoaSolomon IsTongaTuvaluVanuatu
40 Preferences for poor nations: GSP 1971 GATT provision.EU grants GSP-generalised system of tariff preferences- to almost all poor nations.1. General GSP (to all developing countries).2. “Super-GSP” more generous on market access :‘Everything but Arms’ for least developed nations.On paper, EBA grants zero-tariff access to all goods, except arms and munitions.Goods in which these nations are most competitive are in fact excluded from the deal.Tariffs on bananas, rice and sugar – products where these poor nations could easily expand their EU sales – are to come down only in the future.Moreover, even though all tariffs on these items should be gone by 2009, the exports quantities are limited by bilateral quotas.
41 Non-regional free trade agreements Mexico, Chile, and South Africa.Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay & Uruguay)Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates)India and ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma & Laos).
42 Non-preferential trade Only affects 9 nationsBut represents 1/3 of EU imports (US, Japan, etc.)Thus CET still mattersAlso important to evaluate how much of an edge a country obtains by awarding duty-free GSP or FTA treatmentAverage Common Ext. Tariff 6.5%Average industrial goods 4.1%Average on agricultural imports 16.5%with huge variation
43 EU Common external tariff Agricultural products have much higher tariff than others!
44 EU common external tariff May explain why EU is ready to provide duty-free treatment for many industrial goods to certain countriesVery little impact on EU marketIn areas where zero tariffs may matter, EU is much more reluctant for signing FTAIndustrial goods coming from USA, JapanAgricultural goods
45 Current facts…“Traditionally, there has been a divide between northern liberal countries, such as Britain and Sweden, and protectionist founder members, such as France and Italy”. The Economist Dec 2006USA and EU blaming each other for failure in trade negotiations.“What they're saying is that for every dollar that they strip out of their trade-distorting farm subsidies they want to be given a dollar's worth of market access in developing country markets," Commissioner Mandelson said. "That is not acceptable to developing countries and it's a principle that I on Europe's behalf certainly couldn't sign up to either." US trade representative Susan Schwab insisted the US remained "fully committed to multilateral trading system”.
46 Some remarks on poverty World Trade policies are fundamental to diminish poverty and inequality.Poverty is the main cause of violenceDisparities in trade policies increase the gap among countries.Globalization and technology progress make more difficult the migration control. Restrictive policies are not the solution… eliminating miserable conditions from certain areas in the world is.But how to really help poor countries to develop?
47 Aid policy Instruments: Trade preferences Development aid Humanitarian aid
49 EU-US trade and investment Disputes over issues as varied as bananas, beef, trade legislation and subsidies to aircrafts.EU and US are the most important world traders. EU share in goods trade is 22.8% and 27.3% in services. US shares are 19.1% and 20.2% respectively.Each other’s largest trading partner: US accounts for 17.7% (24.2%) of EU15 total imports (exports) of goods. While EU accounts for 24.2% of total US trade of goods.
50 A lot of press attention Trade disputes EU - USAA lot of press attentionBut most disputes only touched a minimal % of tradeAgriculture: USA objected to EU variable levies, domestic support and export subsidies
51 Preferential trade liberalization Early literature (Viner, 1953) focused on static effects of integration on welfare:Trade creationTrade diversion
52 Trade creationBenefit of liberalization: domestic production is replaced by cheaper imports from a partner country
53 Trade diversionNegative effect of preferential liberalization: more expensive imports from a partner country replace low-cost imports from suppliers in third country
54 Implications for the Global Trading System Questions:Can PTA expansion lead to global free trade?Do PTAs make multilateral liberalization less likely?Do PTAs lead to a rise in trade barriers against non-members?What kind of trade regimes are we likely to have with criss-crossing PTAs (Spaghetti-Bowl Phenomenon)?WTO-illegal policies in PTAs?
55 Can PTA Expansion Lead to Global Free Trade? Baldwin’s “Domino Theory of Regionalism”Economic incentives for outside countries to seek entry into an existing PTAUnless there are sufficiently strong non-economic factors that counter these incentives, as the PTA expands, eventually all countries want to enter the PTALimitations of Baldwin’s analysisTrade barriers are seen as transport costs, thus the tariff revenue aspect is not taken into accountAssumption that “insiders” have no incentive to block the entry
56 Do PTAs Make Multilateral Liberalization Less Likely? Building or stumbling blocks? (Bhagwati)Building blocks?Multilateral negotiations will move more rapidly if the number of negotiators is reduced to a handful of blocsHowever, if blocs take the form of FTAs, there is no effect on the number of participantsOne voice in EU or too occupied with internal problems?PTAs may serve as a bargaining threat
57 Do PTAs Make Multilateral Liberalization Less Likely? - ctd. Stumbling blocks?PTAs are mostly between developed and developing countriesSuch PTAs are associated in public mind (in developed countries) with large inflows of L-intensive goods and reduced wages for the unskilledThis can energize and unify protectionist lobbies, generating obstacles against multilateral liberalizationMultilateral negotiations, by contrast, involve both developed and developing countries and draw less attention of protectionist lobbies
58 Do PTAs Lead to a Rise in Trade Barriers against Non-Members? 1. Tariff-revenue objective:If a country is dependent on tariffs for revenue purposes (e.g. Africa), it may be forced to raise the external tariff to maintain the fiscal balanceThe more the country imports from the FTA partner, the larger the loss of revenue, the greater possibility of an increase in the external tariff and greater the trade diversion
59 Do PTAs Lead to a Rise in Trade Barriers against Non-Members? - ctd. 2. Political economy:when producers play the central role in determining trade policies, liberalization through FTA is likely to be replaced by increased protection against outside countriesConsiderable empirical evidence of increases in outside tariffs following the implementation of PTAs
60 The Spaghetti-Bowl Phenomenon To avoid trade deflection, FTA agreements usually include rules of originCriss-crossing FTAs leads to a “Spaghetti Bowl” whereby tariffs vary according to origin of the productSee Fig. 3:Each FTA has its own rules of origin which vary across products and transition phaseFor a given product, there are several different tariff rates depending on what origin is assigned to it
62 WTO-illegal policies in PTAs PTAs can undermine the global trading system by introducing arrangements measures which are WTO inconsistentExample:Anti-Dumping provisions in the EU Czech association agreementtrade-balancing requirement within Mercosur (an Argentine company operating in Brazil must export as much Brazilian goods to Argentina as it imports)These practices are not widespread