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Detection of Algebraic Manipulation with Applications to Robust Secret Sharing and Fuzzy Extractors Ronald Cramer, Yevgeniy Dodis, Serge Fehr, Carles Padro, Daniel Wichs

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Properties of § ( G ): 1. § ( G ) provides privacy. 2. § ( G ) allows algebraic manipulation. 2 G + Storage § ( G ) Whats g ? ¢ 2 G Abstract Storage Device § ( G ) g

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Q: Why study devices with these properties? A: They appear implicitly in crypto applications: – –Secret Sharing – –Fuzzy Extractors Problem: Because of algebraic manipulation, the above primitives are vulnerable to certain active adversarial attacks. Task: A general method that helps us addrobustness to secret sharing and fuzzy extractors.

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s = Cut the blue wire! Application: Secret Sharing g 2 G S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 S4S4 S5S5 S6S6 Qualified sets: can recover g. Unqualified sets: learn nothing about g.

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Application: Secret Sharing S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 S4S4 S5S5 S6S6 S 4 S 3 S 2 Whats g ? Unqualified Set

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g= Rec( S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5, S 6 ) s = Cut the red wire! Application: Secret Sharing Robust Secret Sharing: An adversary who corrupts an unqualified set of players cannot cause the recovery of s s.

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g =Rec( ) = Rec( S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5, S 6 ) + Rec(0, ¢ 2, ¢ 3, ¢ 4, 0, 0) = g + ¢ Linear Secret Sharing S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5, S 6 So is limited to algebraic manipulation!. Assume Secret Sharing is Linear (i.e. [Sha79,KW93,…] )

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Linear Secret Sharing S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 S4S4 S5S5 S6S6 §(G)§(G) Privacy of SS ) Privacy of § (G). Linearity of SS ) Algebraic Manipulation. Need: A way to store data on § ( G ) so that algebraic manipulation can be detected.

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Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes An AMD Code consists of – –A probabilistic encoding function E : S ! G – –A decoding function D : G ! S [ { ? } For any s, D ( E ( s )) = s For any s 2 S, ¢ 2 G Pr[ D ( E ( s ) + ¢ ) { s, ? }] · ² Robust Secret Sharing: Share E ( s ).

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g =Rec( S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5, S 6 ) = g + ¢ = E ( s )+ ¢ D ( g) = D ( E ( s ) + ¢ ) 2 { s, ? } Robust Linear Secret Sharing Recall:

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Construction of AMD Code Systematic AMD code: E ( s ) = ( s, k, h ( s, k )) where k is random. G = S £ G 1 £ G 2 Construction: h ( s, k ) = k d +2 + § s i k i Construction: h ( s, k ) = k d +2 + § s i k i Intuition: ¢ 3 = h ( s + ¢ 1, k + ¢ 2 ) – h ( s, k ) Intuition: ¢ 3 = h ( s + ¢ 1, k + ¢ 2 ) – h ( s, k ) is a non-zero polynomial in k. is a non-zero polynomial in k. –hence hard to guess for a random k. i =0 d

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Parameters and Optimality To get robustness security ² = 2 - ·, encoding of s adds overhead 2 · + O(log(| s |)) bits. Almost matches lower bound of 2 · bits. Previous constructions of Robust SS implicitly defined AMD codes with overhead linear in | s |. [CPS02, OK96, PSV99] To share a 1MB message with robustness ² = 2 -128 – Previous construction had an overhead of 2 MB. – We get an overhead of less than 300 bits.

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Application #2 Fuzzy Extractors

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Fuzzy Extractors Fuzzy Extractors Secret w : secret_Password Secret w : Secret~password w ¼ w w Gen P R Robust P Rep w R Fuzzy Extractor: R looks uniformly random even after I see P. P * R * Robust fuzzy extractor: I will detect P * P. ?

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Robust Fuzzy Extractors Robust Fuzzy Extractors Secret w w Gen P R Rep w P * R / ? (Bob in the future) Does not allow interaction!

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The Price of Robustness Non-robust fuzzy extractors with good parameters were constructed for several natural metrics. [DORS04] Until now, to get robustness, you had to choose: – –Interaction + computational assumptions + CRS [BDKOS05] – –Random Oracle model [BDKOS05] – –Entropy rate of w more than ½ + extract short keys [DKRS06] Would like to get a non-interactive protocol that works for all entropy rates and does not require random oracles. I.T. robustness requires that the entropy rate of w is more than ½, even in the non-fuzzy case w = w. – –The price of robustness, w.o. RO/CRS/assumptions, is HIGH! [DS02] This talk: Robustness is essentially FREE in the CRS model!

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Randomness Extractors Ext Secret: w Public Seed: i R Can extract almost all entropy in w. The extracted string is random, even given The public seed ( i, R ) ¼ ( i, U )

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Non-fuzzy Key Exchange R =Ext( w, i ) i Choose i Not robust!

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Non-fuzzy Key Exchange CRS: Extractor seed i R =Ext( w, i ) Trivial! No communication necessary! But does not generalize to fuzzy case… Robust!

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Correcting Errors using a Secure Sketch SS w S Rec w w S SS( w ) is very short and does not leak out much info about w.

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Fuzzy Extractor w P = ( i, S ) R Ext SS i S Gen() : Rep( w, P ) : w w w w Rec S w w R Ext i Cannot put in CRS since S is user- specific. Lets try to only put i in the CRS and authenticate S.

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P = ( S, ¾ ) R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S w w Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver S ¾ RkRk yes, no k R R Split extracted randomness Into 2 parts. Use k as a key to a MAC to authenticate S Might not be secure! But lets see - how insecure is it? Assume that the secure sketch and extractor are linear...

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P = ( S, ¾ ) R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S w w Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver S ¾ RkRk yes, no k R R Split extracted randomness Into 2 parts. Use k as a key to a MAC to authenticate S

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P * = ( S *, ¾ *) R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S * w w Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver ¾*¾* RkRk yes, no k S *

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P * = ( S *, ¾ *) R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S * w*w* Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver ¾*¾* RkRk yes, no k S * w*w*

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P * = ( S *, ¾ *) R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S * w*w* Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver ¾*¾* Rk*Rk* yes, no k*k* S * w*w* Might not be secure! But lets see - how insecure is it? Assume that the secure sketch and extractor are linear...

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Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver yes, no S+¢SS+¢S w*w* w*w* Rk*Rk* k*k* ¾*¾* S * P * = ( S *, ¾ *)

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w+¢ww+¢w w+¢ww+¢w Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec S+¢SS+¢S Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver yes, no Rk*Rk* k*k* ¾*¾* S * P * = ( S *, ¾ *)

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k+¢kk+¢k R k + ¢ k w+¢ww+¢w Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w R,kR,k Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver yes, no w+¢ww+¢w S+¢SS+¢S P * = ( S *, ¾ *) ¾*¾* S *

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k R Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w P = ( S, ¾ ) R Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver yes, no §(G)§(G) Can think of MAC key k as stored on a device § ( G ). Cant encode k using an AMD code. Need a new MAC primitive. S * w*w* ¾*¾* w*w*

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MAC with Key Manipulation Security (KMS-MAC) A (one-time) MAC that is secure even if the key used for verification is stored on § ( G ). Given ¾ = MAC k ( s ) cant come up with ¢ and ¾ = MAC k + ¢ ( s). Systematic AMD code ) KMS-MAC: Systematic AMD code ) KMS-MAC: – E ( s ) = ( s, k, h ( s, k )) –MAC ( k 1, k 2 ) ( s ) = h ( s, k 1 )+ k 2

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k R Robust Fuzzy Extractor? w R Ext SS i S Gen(): Rep( w, P ): w w w w Rec Ext i CRS: Extractor seed i MAC k ¾ S Ver yes, no §(G)§(G) S * w*w* ¾*¾* w*w* Use a KMS-MAC! P * = ( S *, ¾ *)

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Parameters Because our KMS-MAC has short keys, we loose very little randomness to achieve robustness! Because our KMS-MAC has short keys, we loose very little randomness to achieve robustness! In the CRS model, robustness comes essentially for FREE. In the CRS model, robustness comes essentially for FREE. – At least for linear fuzzy extractors

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Review Devices § ( G ) appear naturally in crypto applications. Devices § ( G ) appear naturally in crypto applications. –Linear Secret Sharing. –Fuzzy Extractors in CRS model. Use AMD codes or KMS-MACs to get robustness. Use AMD codes or KMS-MACs to get robustness.

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THANK YOU! Questions?

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