Presentation on theme: "I NFORMATION P OLICY I NSTITUTE By Michael Turner, Ph.D. Presentation prepared for the The Fourth Annual Consumer Credit Reporting World Conference Beijing,"— Presentation transcript:
I NFORMATION P OLICY I NSTITUTE By Michael Turner, Ph.D. Presentation prepared for the The Fourth Annual Consumer Credit Reporting World Conference Beijing, China September 28, 2004 The Economic and Social Benefits of a Full File Credit Reporting System
2 Introduction Measuring the impact of full file credit reporting Implications Agenda
3 Introduction Measuring the impact of full file credit reporting Implications Agenda
4 Why on earth do banks share information on debtors? Solves a host of informational problems associated with making loans: oAdverse Selection oMoral Hazard oCheaper than research on individual with each loan applications oReduces Informational Rents (Jappelli & Pagano) oRicher and standardized information allows lenders to model behavior credit decision pricing The Advantages of Full File Credit Reporting I
5 Why on earth do banks share information on debtors? (cont) Other benefits oReduces overall indebtedness oFacilitates non-collateralized lending oFacilitates securitization oReduces cross-subsidy from the risk-averse to the risk- loving (reduces average interest rates) The Advantages of Full File Credit Reporting II
6 What is Full File?: Black vs. White Data Report of delinquencies and defaults Indebtedness levels Report of timeliness of payments Black Data White Data
7 How Consumers Benefit from Full-file Regime Price reflect individual circumstances and not societal average, declining cross- subsidy from low-risk to high-risk borrowers Better access to credit because lower information barriers increases suppliers Quicker rewards for responsible credit behavior
8 How Lenders Benefit from Full-file Regime Better identification of the riskiness of a loan Can loan to broader risk segments. Very low-risk consumers enter market as prices drop and loans are priced to reflect individual and not average risk.
9 How Government Benefits from Full-file Regime Better information on the state of the finance sector More stable finance sector and reduce need to bail out banks Stabilizes the allocation of capital
10 Introduction Measuring the impact of full file credit reporting Implications Agenda
11 Factors Contributing to Increased Credit Access Four simultaneous and interdependent factors: 1. Laws permitting the collection and distribution of detailed personal credit data to those with a permissible purpose; 2. The development of statistical scoring techniques for predicting borrower risk; 3. The repeal of legislated interest rate ceilings which had limited the ability of creditors to price their loan products according to risk. 4. The ability to tap credit bureau data to pre-screen consumers in order to identify creditworthy individuals and target solicitations for new credit products.
12 Full-file Performance: Access to Credit Cards
13 Full-file Performance: Access to Credit Cards
14 Full-file Performance: Credit Card Interest Rates Share of card account balances by interest rate tier Declining cross-subsidy from the creditworthy to the credit-risky Credit card interest rate tier 19902002
15 Full-file Performance: Access to Home-Secured Debt
18 Full-file Performance: Home Mortgage Loans If spreads today (2.5%) were at their early 1980s levels (3.5%), the interest rate on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage would be about 1% (100 basis points) higher than it is today. With a total mortgage stock of $5.4 trillion in 2001, a 1% savings in the cost of mortgage funds translates into $54 billion in annual savings to consumers.
19 Full-file Performance: Home Mortgage Loans Before pervasive use of AUS, approving a loan application close to 3 weeks. In 2002, over 75% of all loan applications received approval in 2 to 3 minutes. (Mortech) Lenders that integrated AUS at the POS reduced origination costs by 50%, or roughly $1,500 per loan. (Fannie Mae). Applied to the 12.5 million sales of new and existing homes in 2002, this would produce savings of $18.75 billion.
20 Full-file Performance: Prescreened Credit Offers Prescreening accounts for over two- thirds of all new account acquisitions in the U.S.by far the largest method with direct mail non-prescreened a distant second (18%). Account acquisition costs in those countries that do not prescreen are roughly $15 higher per account.
22 Full-file Performance: Is Credit in the U.S. Too Easy?
23 Measuring the Impact of Full-file: Scenarios
24 Measuring the Impact of Full-file: Scenarios Scenario A (13% reduction of trade lines. Purges of credit card information only. Data furnishers vary). Scenario B (21% reduction of trade lines. Purges of revolving and non- revolving data. Large furnishers only). Scenarios C &D restrictions of kind of data in consumer credit report.
25 Analogous Restrictions Scenarios A &B akin to full-file regimes with limited inter-sectoral data exchanges Scenarios C & D akin to full-file regimes with varying obsolescence rates and delinquency reporting intervals
27 Impact: Findings on a Commercial Model 9 in 10 consumer credit scores change Scenario A & B all score ranges affected Scenario C & D commercial model seriously underestimates high risk loans. (13% subprime move up). Predictive power of models erodes between 1% and 15%
28 Impact: Findings on a Commercial Model Between 14 and 41 million U.S. consumers who currently qualify for credit, would be denied credit. Delinquencies increase between 10 and 70%, resulting in higher fees or interest rates on cards to offset $3 to $21 billion charge-offs. That is $40 to $270 per family on average.
36 Backward bent to the unmodified model Assessing the Retooled Model III: Worsening Trade-Offs
37 Introduction Measuring the impact of full file credit reporting Implications Agenda
38 Implications Access to consumer credit relatively more restricted in negative only countries. Impact of credit restrictions greatest upon traditionally underserved communitiesyoung, elderly, poor, women, minorities.
39 Implications Delinquency and default rates higher in negative only countries for any given amount of consumer borrowing activity per capita. As a result, costs increase relatively more in negative only countries as the amount of credit per capita increases.
40 Implications Consumer credit in those countries with credit bureaus that do not maintain derogotories for at least 7 years will be more expensive and less accessible. Consumer credit more expensive and less accessible in countries with credit bureaus that fail to report delinquencies in 30 day intervals.
41 Call for Future Research Comparative analysis necessary Learn from first generation studies Second generation must distinguish different borrowers (consumer and commercial, not just credit) Second generation should examine institutional differences (concentration of financial services sector)
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