Presentation on theme: "CEILINGS AND FLOORS: GENDER WAGE GAPS BY EDUCATION IN SPAIN Sara de la Rica *, Juan J. Dolado * * & Vanesa Llorens ** * & Vanesa Llorens ** * ( * ) UPV."— Presentation transcript:
CEILINGS AND FLOORS: GENDER WAGE GAPS BY EDUCATION IN SPAIN Sara de la Rica *, Juan J. Dolado * * & Vanesa Llorens ** * & Vanesa Llorens ** * ( * ) UPV & IZA ( ** ) UCIII & CEPR & IZA ( *** ) LECG
Motivation Gender wage gaps: ln(W m /W f ) (W m - W f )/ W f Traditional: At the mean vs. New: At the quantiles Recent evidence about Glass Ceilings in Sweden (Albrecht et al., 2003) Southern vs. Central & Northern Europe
Composition effect by Education Glass Ceiling (H-Group): High female participation rate (80% vs 85%) Lower job stability (Lazear and Rosen, 1990) leads to lower promotion opportunities and higher wages (PUZZLE) Glass Floor (L-Group): Low female participation rate (48% vs 68%) Statistical discrimination at the bottom of the wage distribution
INTERPRETATIVE MODELS L-Group Ability for men and women:, c.d.f. G( ) Need of training in period 1 (2 periods) Productivity: 1, 0< 1 <1 (period 1), 2, 1 < 1< 2 (period 2) Firms know at the begining of period 2 Workers receive a disutility shock with c.d.f. F( ) after wages in period 1 & 2, W i (i=1,2) are chosen by the firm. Workers do not quit if W i - 0. No wage renegotiation nor outside wage offers (monopsony) F m ( )>F f ( ) G( )= U[0, ]; f m ( ) =U[0, m ]; f f ( ) =U[0, f ]; f > m
H-Group (Lazear and Rosen, 1990) A model of job ladders: A (no training), B (training) A:, ; B: 1, 2 Firms pay competitive wages in period 2: W A 2 =, W B 2 = 2 Cut-off points to allocate to B: * f > * m Less women are promoted but conditional on being promoted they should be earn higher wages Explanations:(i) Different ability distribution (Mincer and Polacheck, 1974), (ii) Different outside offers (Booth et.al., 2003), (iii) Different competing skills (Gneezy et al., 2003, Babcock and Laschever, 2003)
Covariates -Exp (age), marital st., tenure, children age, Sec. Edn (L-W), type of contract, immigrant, public, firm size, supervisory role, region, size local council, occupations.
Different QR by gender and by education [Tables 2 a-d] i.H-group Higher returns to experience ( ), being married ( ), supervisory role ( ), (Men) Higher returns for public sector, size>20, OC4-6 (Women) ii.L-group Higher returns for experience ( ), being married and supervisory role ( ) (Men) Higher returns to tenure ( ) (Women), Higher returns for public sector, permanent contract, secondary attainment, public sector (Women)
GENDER GAP DECOMPOSITION (Oaxaca-Blinder)
MM decomposition Draw θ-th quantile from U[0,1] Estimate β m (θ) Draw x f and construct β m (θ) x f. Repeat N=100 times Construct counterfactual gap ( M=250 times): β m (θ) x f - β f (θ) x f = (β m (θ) - β f (θ)) x f. Returns
PANEL & STAT. DCN. ECHP waves ( ) to follow workers in their jobs over time. Follow approach in Farber & Gibbons (1996) Interact Tenure* Female RESULT: Only Positive & Significant for L-group.
CONCLUSIONS New finding: Glass Floors Due to statistical dcn. in countries with low participation of L-women. Further research: - Other alternatives for H-group (stress leaves) - Endogenize Participation (with S. de la Rica and C. Gª-Peñalosa…in progess) - Academic women-economists (with M. Almunia and F. Felgueroso)