Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological and Genetic Modification Safety Course October 2013 Medical School: Post Graduate Students Prof Ron Croy,

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological and Genetic Modification Safety Course October 2013 Medical School: Post Graduate Students Prof Ron Croy,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological and Genetic Modification Safety Course October 2013 Medical School: Post Graduate Students Prof Ron Croy, Biosafety Consulting – University Biological Safety Consultant

2 Occupational Health & Safety Service Genetic Modification Safety Additional safety considerations for research with GM organisms

3 Occupational Health & Safety Service Biosafety Course Covered - Biosafety Laws and regulations Biosafety Laws and regulations Risk assessments - BioCOSHH Risk assessments - BioCOSHH Laboratory risks Laboratory risks Schedule 5 – bioterrorism agents Schedule 5 – bioterrorism agents Working with microorganisms, animals, plants Working with microorganisms, animals, plants Hazard groups of biological agents Hazard groups of biological agents Containment and control Containment and control Microbiological Safety Cabinets – class 1-3 Microbiological Safety Cabinets – class 1-3 Emergency spillage Emergency spillage Sharps Sharps Storage Storage Transport Transport Containment levels 1-3 Containment levels 1-3 PPE PPE Disinfection Disinfection 3

4 Occupational Health & Safety Service 4 What is different in GM? The GM process produces a NEW organism with different, potentially unknown properties. The GM process produces a NEW organism with different, potentially unknown properties. Thus the route of exposure and virulence may have changed requiring altered containment. Thus the route of exposure and virulence may have changed requiring altered containment. Therefore it is a legal requirement for all GM work to be i) notified to HSE and ii) can only be carried out in registered GM centres Therefore it is a legal requirement for all GM work to be i) notified to HSE and ii) can only be carried out in registered GM centres Newcastle University's GM Centre Reference number is GM540 Newcastle University's GM Centre Reference number is GM540 Note: HSE tend not to accept that the new (GM) organism may be less viable or less infective even if it is a deletion transgenic organism. Note: HSE tend not to accept that the new (GM) organism may be less viable or less infective even if it is a deletion transgenic organism.

5 Occupational Health & Safety Service GM Safety Law The project manager/PI has ultimate legal responsibility for adequately risk assessing the GM project and is liable for all their projects. The project manager/PI has ultimate legal responsibility for adequately risk assessing the GM project and is liable for all their projects. All of the regulations from Biological Agents cover GM work also (including COSHH) All of the regulations from Biological Agents cover GM work also (including COSHH) plus: plus: Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Act and Regulations Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Act and Regulations

6 Occupational Health & Safety Service DEFINITIONS: Genetically Modified Organisms? 6 3 components are required to generate a GMM / GMO: Gene / cDNA Host Vector Geneticmaterial GM cells GM organisms (GMOs) GM microorganisms (GMMs)

7 Occupational Health & Safety Service DEFINITIONS: GM Exemptions – but still subject to BioCOSHH Mutagenesis (eg x-rays, chemicals) Mutagenesis (eg x-rays, chemicals) Synthetic nucleotides Synthetic nucleotides Self cloning – genes into same organism Self cloning – genes into same organism Natural transformations Natural transformations Hybridomas (mabs) Hybridomas (mabs) Humans and human embryos - IVF Humans and human embryos - IVF

8 Occupational Health & Safety Service Genetically Modified Organisms

9 Occupational Health & Safety Service RISKS: GM Cell lines Plasmid/siRNA tranfection: transient or stable transfection – antibiotic resistance! Plasmid/siRNA tranfection: transient or stable transfection – antibiotic resistance! Cancer cell lines – GM may effect Cancer cell lines – GM may effect Cell phenotype or functions, Increased tumourigenicity Cell phenotype or functions, Increased tumourigenicity Immune evasion ? Immune evasion ? Some cell lines already contain viral components: HPV-E6, SV40, adenoviruses Some cell lines already contain viral components: HPV-E6, SV40, adenoviruses Know your cell line before transfecting in recombinant components! Know your cell line before transfecting in recombinant components! Effects of GM modification could be unknown Effects of GM modification could be unknown

10 Occupational Health & Safety Service Risks With Viral Vectors Vectors encoding for cDNA or shRNA of choice can be inserted Vectors encoding for cDNA or shRNA of choice can be inserted The major risks to be considered The major risks to be considered Potential for generation of replication-competent lentivirus (RCL) Potential for generation of replication-competent lentivirus (RCL) User infection - potential for oncogenesis, (oncogenes, TSGs) User infection - potential for oncogenesis, (oncogenes, TSGs) Some liver tumours have been observed in neo-natal animals following Lentiviral administration Some liver tumours have been observed in neo-natal animals following Lentiviral administration (source SACGM) (source SACGM) 10

11 Occupational Health & Safety Service Naked DNA Safety Naked DNA used safely in gene therapy Naked DNA used safely in gene therapy Sub cutaneous injection show plasmid DNA presence in organs, lymph, skin ~1month later Sub cutaneous injection show plasmid DNA presence in organs, lymph, skin ~1month later Caution when handling mutant TSGs*/oncogenes, with upstream c.a. promoters *TSG=Tumor suppressor gene Caution when handling mutant TSGs*/oncogenes, with upstream c.a. promoters *TSG=Tumor suppressor gene Working with Viral DNA - replication? Working with Viral DNA - replication? Clean lab area, pipettes, minimise aerosol, avoid sharps, wear PPE at all times Clean lab area, pipettes, minimise aerosol, avoid sharps, wear PPE at all times DNA can be destroyed by: DNA can be destroyed by: UV - transluminator crosslinks DNAUV - transluminator crosslinks DNA specific chemicals (hypochlorite, Exitus-Plus)specific chemicals (hypochlorite, Exitus-Plus) 11

12 Occupational Health & Safety Service Plasmid + Expression Vectors Supercoiled DNA plasmid containing cDNA/shRNA Supercoiled DNA plasmid containing cDNA/shRNA UV light – viewing/cutting out DNA - sunburn UV light – viewing/cutting out DNA - sunburn DNA Gels – acrylamide, ethidium bromide, Gel Red DNA Gels – acrylamide, ethidium bromide, Gel Red potential carcinogen/mutagen actionpotential carcinogen/mutagen action What protein is expressed and how much? What protein is expressed and how much? Wear PPE – UV opaque face mask Wear PPE – UV opaque face mask Clean benches and pipettes regularly Clean benches and pipettes regularly DNA can be destroyed by UV light (UV crosslinker) and specific chemicals DNA can be destroyed by UV light (UV crosslinker) and specific chemicals Pipettes, plates, racks, glovesPipettes, plates, racks, gloves 12

13 Occupational Health & Safety Service Severe Unknown Risks e.g. GM Mousepox-IL4 Virus Scenarios where the results of well- intentioned scientific research can be used for both good and harmful purposes give rise to what is now widely known as the dual-use dilemma Scenarios where the results of well- intentioned scientific research can be used for both good and harmful purposes give rise to what is now widely known as the dual-use dilemma Hypervirulent strain of highly pathogenic GM virus – with no vaccine Hypervirulent strain of highly pathogenic GM virus – with no vaccine Mousepox does not normally infect humans Mousepox does not normally infect humans GM mousepox infection of workers or escape from lab? GM mousepox infection of workers or escape from lab? Could achieve same for smallpox in humans? Could achieve same for smallpox in humans? Smallpox was responsible for million deaths in the 20 th Century alone! Smallpox was responsible for million deaths in the 20 th Century alone! 13

14 Occupational Health & Safety Service 14 1) One of the most cited examples of dual-use research is that of Australian researchers who inadvertently developed a lethal mouse virus. In this now-famous study, the researchers used standard genetic engineering techniques to insert the gene for interleukin-4 (IL-4) into the mousepox virus. They hoped that the altered virus would induce infertility in micewhich are a major pest in Australiaand would thus serve as an infectious contraceptive for pest control. To their surprise, they discovered that the altered virus could kill both mice that were naturally resistant to, and mice that had been vaccinated against ordinary mousepox. When they published their findings, along with a description of the materials and methods, in the Journal of Virology in 2001 ( Jackson et al, 2001), critics complained that they had thereby alerted would-be terrorists to new ways of making biological weapons and had provided them with explicit instructions.Jackson et al, 2001 vaccine-resistant strain of smallpox Of particular concern was the possibility that the same techniques used to engineer the mousepox virus could be applied to create more virulent forms of poxviruses that afflict humans, including a vaccine-resistant strain of smallpox; one of the most devastating diseases in human history. Although it was eradicated in the 1980s, fears remain that former Soviet stockpilesor genetically reconstituted forms of the viruscould be put to use by nefarious agents. Boy this is scarythis is the kind of thing that science fiction is made of. This research was the first example of a virus overcoming vaccination, and this was very worrying. And I suppose there was a little bit of excitement about it as wellit wasn't all doom and gloom. This is exciting stuff, no matter how evil or bad it may turn out to be. We went away wondering what to do about it. In those times there was no pathway in the structure of scientific institutions for resolving a case like this. EMBO reports (2010) 11, Published online: 11 December (2009) An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw This was the first example of a virus overcoming vaccination, and this was very worrying Severe Unknown Risks Interleukin-4 (IL-4) mousepox virus

15 Occupational Health & Safety Service 15 2) Catastrophic failure of recombinant antibody In its first human clinical trials, recombinant CD28- SuperMAB an immunomodulatory drug being developed for treatment of leukemia and rheumatoid arthritis, caused catastrophic systemic organ failure in the subjects, despite being administered at a sub-clinical dose 500 times lower than the dose found safe in animals. Six volunteers were hospitalized, at least four of these suffering from multiple organ dysfunction. trial subjects was an unpredicted biological action of the drug in humans The molecule was genetically engineered by transfer of the complementarity determining regions (CDRs) from heavy and light chain variable region sequences of a monoclonal mouse anti-human C28 antibody into human heavy and light chain variable frameworks. Humanised variable regions were subsequently recombined with a human gene coding for the IgG4 gamma chain and with a human gene coding for a human kappa chain, respectively. The recombinant genes were transfected into Chinese hamster ovary cells and the recombinant antibody harvested from culture supernatant. Severe Unknown Risks recombinant CD28-SuperMAB

16 Occupational Health & Safety Service 16 Tumpey TM, Basler CF, Aguilar PV, Zeng H, Solorzano A, Swayne DE, et al., et al. Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic virus. Science 2005; 310: ) Spanish Flu Virus: A more recent study, published in Science in 2005, employed techniques of synthetic genomics (similar to those used in the polio study) to reconstruct the Spanish Flu virus, which killed between 20 and 100 million people in Tumpey TM, Basler CF, Aguilar PV, Zeng H, Solorzano A, Swayne DE, et al., et al. Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic virus. Science 2005; 310: Rosengard AM, Liu Y, Nie YZ, Jimenez R. Variola virus immune evasion design: expression of a highly efficient inhibitor of human complement. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2002; 99: ) Smallpox Immune Evasion: In a third study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2002, researchers used published DNA sequences to engineer a protein – known as SPICE – produced by the smallpox virus. 8 The study revealed the ways in which, and the extent to which, this protein defeats the human immune system. Though the findings may facilitate development of protective medicines, they may also reveal ways to increase the virulence of the closely-related vaccinia virus (which is used in the smallpox vaccine). Rosengard AM, Liu Y, Nie YZ, Jimenez R. Variola virus immune evasion design: expression of a highly efficient inhibitor of human complement. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2002; 99: Cello J, Paul AV, Wimmer E. Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 2002; 297: ) Synthetic Virulent Polio Virus: In a second study, researchers at the State University of New York at Stony Brook artificially synthesized a live polio virus from scratch. 6 Following the map of the polio virus RNA genome, which is published on the Internet, they stitched together corresponding strands of DNA, which they purchased via mail-order. The addition of protein resulted in the creation of a virus that paralysed and killed mice. Upon publication of results in Science in 2002, the researchers said they made the virus to send a warning that terrorists might be able to make biological weapons without obtaining a natural virus. 7 Similar techniques might enable production of smallpox or Ebola. Cello J, Paul AV, Wimmer E. Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 2002; 297: and Pollack A. Scientists create a live polio virus. New York Times, 2 July 2002 and Pollack A. Scientists create a live polio virus. New York Times, 2 July 2002 Synthetic virulent viruses and immune evasion Examples of dual-use dilemma

17 Occupational Health & Safety Service 17 Unknown Risks What this means is that You need to try to predict what properties will be conferred on each of your GMOs and assess how this might affect the Risk Where there is little evidence of the effects of a genetic modification may need to consider a worst case scenario and implement appropriate controls GM often induces unexpected changes in transgenic cells and organismsGM often induces unexpected changes in transgenic cells and organisms it is important that as far as possible the changes are envisioned and controlled or in the worst possible scenario the GMO/GMM is controlledit is important that as far as possible the changes are envisioned and controlled or in the worst possible scenario the GMO/GMM is controlled

18 Occupational Health & Safety Service Things to Consider when reading or preparing a GM Risk Assessment Infectious Vectors – viruses? Infectious Vectors – viruses? Potential to transfer genetic material to other organisms – mobilisable vectors! Potential to transfer genetic material to other organisms – mobilisable vectors! Products of GM modification Products of GM modification Toxins Toxins Affects to cell signalling Affects to cell signalling Mutated genes Mutated genes Oncogenes and tumour supressor genes Oncogenes and tumour supressor genes Phenotype and stability of GMM/GMO Phenotype and stability of GMM/GMO How will you contain and control these risks? How will you contain and control these risks? 18

19 Occupational Health & Safety Service GM Activity Class ? As well as Hazard group rating of host we now also need to consider GM Class As well as Hazard group rating of host we now also need to consider GM Class CL1 – HG1 – GM Class 1CL1 – HG1 – GM Class 1 CL2 – HG2 – GM Class 2CL2 – HG2 – GM Class 2 CL3 – HG3 – GM Class 3CL3 – HG3 – GM Class 3 BUT an HG1 organism could become a GM class 2 depending on how its modified - what its expressing BUT an HG1 organism could become a GM class 2 depending on how its modified - what its expressing Hazard group rating sets the base level then depending on the modification the organism may be elevated to a higher risk group based on the modification Hazard group rating sets the base level then depending on the modification the organism may be elevated to a higher risk group based on the modification Oncogenes / Tumour Supressor genesOncogenes / Tumour Supressor genes Pathogenic genesPathogenic genes Toxin genesToxin genes Increased survival, spread, resistance etcIncreased survival, spread, resistance etc 19

20 Occupational Health & Safety Service GM Activity Class ? ClassDescriptionExamples 1 Unlikely to cause human disease or environmental damage HG1 Biological agents (Minimum for host) - E. coli K12 with harmless genes - Replication defective virus vectors with harmless genes 2 May cause human disease but unlikely to cause significant environmental damage HG2 Biological agents (Minimum for host) - E. coli K12 with harmful genes - Replication defective vectors or competent HG2 viruses with harmless or harmful genes 3 May cause severe human disease or significant environmental damage HG3 Biological agents (Minimum for host) - Competent HG3 viruses with harmless or harmful genes 20

21 Occupational Health & Safety Service Additional Considerations for Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO)

22 Occupational Health & Safety Service 22 GM Regulations Health and Safety Executive is the competent authority regulating all aspects of GMHealth and Safety Executive is the competent authority regulating all aspects of GM Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations (2000) modified 2002, 2005, 2010Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations (2000) modified 2002, 2005, 2010 HSE plans to consolidate GMO(CU) legislation by October 2014HSE plans to consolidate GMO(CU) legislation by October 2014 Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations Defra governs the release of any GMOs - mainly crop plants.Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations Defra governs the release of any GMOs - mainly crop plants. Defra also involved with import of GM animal pathogens and numerous other animal products; CITESDefra also involved with import of GM animal pathogens and numerous other animal products; CITES

23 Occupational Health & Safety Service Containing GMO Animals/Plants Possible increased risk to environment….Possible increased risk to environment…. Escape of animals – ease of recaptureEscape of animals – ease of recapture Sheep > Mice > Insects > Pollen!Sheep > Mice > Insects > Pollen! Ability to breed with native populationAbility to breed with native population Rate of breeding?Rate of breeding? Transfer of stable GM genes?Transfer of stable GM genes? However unlikely, Risk AssessmentHowever unlikely, Risk Assessment needs to consider animal escape and needs to consider animal escape and consequences! consequences! Crop plants a major considerationCrop plants a major consideration

24 Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological containment eg Escherichia coli K12 E. coli K-12 was originally isolated from a convalescent diphtheria patient in 1922 – lacks pathogenicity E. coli K-12 was originally isolated from a convalescent diphtheria patient in 1922 – lacks pathogenicity E. coli K-12 is defective in at least three cell wall characteristics E. coli K-12 is defective in at least three cell wall characteristics Lipopolysaccharide coreLipopolysaccharide core GlycocalyxGlycocalyx Capsular (K) antigensCapsular (K) antigens K12 strains (and others!) are therefore debilitated and do not colonise the human intestine and survive poorly in the environment K12 strains (and others!) are therefore debilitated and do not colonise the human intestine and survive poorly in the environment K12 is used routinely for plasmid transformation for bulking up of DNA and for expressing encoded proteins K12 is used routinely for plasmid transformation for bulking up of DNA and for expressing encoded proteins

25 Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological containment 3 rd Generation Lentiviral Vectors The packaging vector – minimal set of lentiviral genes required to generate the structural proteins and packaging The packaging vector – minimal set of lentiviral genes required to generate the structural proteins and packaging The pCMV-VSV-G envelope vector – provides the heterologous envelope The pCMV-VSV-G envelope vector – provides the heterologous envelope The shRNA transfer vector – contains the sequence of interest and cis acting sequences (RNA production) The shRNA transfer vector – contains the sequence of interest and cis acting sequences (RNA production) Particles are replication-incompetent Particles are replication-incompetent Deletion in the U3 portion of the 3 LTR eliminates the promoter-enhancer region Deletion in the U3 portion of the 3 LTR eliminates the promoter-enhancer region Similar systems for other viral vectors Similar systems for other viral vectors Lentivirus used for studying mammalian gene expression in cultured target cells Lentivirus used for studying mammalian gene expression in cultured target cells 25

26 Occupational Health & Safety Service Inactivation of GMMs/GMOs 100% kill of GMM / GMO is required before disposing of waste100% kill of GMM / GMO is required before disposing of waste Autoclaving is the most effective method for inactivating GM waste – essential requirementAutoclaving is the most effective method for inactivating GM waste – essential requirement Standard 121°C or 134 °C for minutesStandard 121°C or 134 °C for minutes Validation of effectiveness using annual thermocouple testing is required; cycle verification for GM at CL2 and CL3Validation of effectiveness using annual thermocouple testing is required; cycle verification for GM at CL2 and CL3 Do not autoclave GMM / GMO containing radioactive or hazardous chemical substancesDo not autoclave GMM / GMO containing radioactive or hazardous chemical substances

27 Occupational Health & Safety Service Summary All GM work must be in registered facilities and all GM projects properly risk assessed and CL2, CL3, CL4 projects notified to HSEAll GM work must be in registered facilities and all GM projects properly risk assessed and CL2, CL3, CL4 projects notified to HSE All GM work must be risk assessed taking into account the effects of the GM on the agents and organisms used; products expressedAll GM work must be risk assessed taking into account the effects of the GM on the agents and organisms used; products expressed GMMs / GMOs must be containedGMMs / GMOs must be contained GMM / GMO waste must be 100% inactivatedGMM / GMO waste must be 100% inactivated Ensure HG of host and final activity class are considered and respectedEnsure HG of host and final activity class are considered and respected Take additional care with mammalian viral vectors with harmful insertsTake additional care with mammalian viral vectors with harmful inserts Transport of GMO / GMM must be done according to transport and associated regulations (secure packaging, certified carriers, authorisation of receiving lab/BSO)Transport of GMO / GMM must be done according to transport and associated regulations (secure packaging, certified carriers, authorisation of receiving lab/BSO) 27

28 Occupational Health & Safety Service GM Risk Assessment 28

29 Occupational Health & Safety Service 29 GM Risk Assessments Comprehensive Guidelines also available GM Project Application procedures (http://safety.ncl.ac.uk/activityclass.aspx )

30 Occupational Health & Safety Service 30 GM Risk assessment forms

31 Occupational Health & Safety Service 31 GM Risk Assessments example RA available You are here: Safety Office » Safety Topics » Biological Safety » Example Risk Assessments Example GM application for Transduction of mammalian cells using lentiviral vectors

32 Occupational Health & Safety Service 32 Genetically modified organisms CU1 forms and CU2 forms must be provided before work begins. Please also send your risk assessment and appropriate fee with forms CU1 and CU2. No fee or risk assessment is required with an accident notification, CU3. Downloadable forms CU1 - Notification of intention to use premises for genetic modification CU1 - Notification of intention to use premises for genetic modification CU2 - Notification of intention to conduct individual contained use activities involving genetic modification CU2 - Notification of intention to conduct individual contained use activities involving genetic modification CU3 - Notification of accidents involving Genetically Modified Organisms (Regulation 21) CU3 - Notification of accidents involving Genetically Modified Organisms (Regulation 21) CU4 - Transfer of notified activity form (eg GM research transferred from another institute) CU4 - Transfer of notified activity form (eg GM research transferred from another institute) Biological Agents CBA1 - Notification of use and consignment of biological agents CBA1 - Notification of use and consignment of biological agents HSE Forms Notifications and Fees

33 Occupational Health & Safety Service WHAT IF?

34 Occupational Health & Safety Service 34 Emergency Situations In Section 5 of your RA you need to consider what emergencies could happen during the handling of the GM biological agent that might affect its containment and then detail the procedures to be used to deal with this situation

35 Occupational Health & Safety Service Fire (real or a false alarm) Fire (real or a false alarm) Spillage Spillage Injury with a SHARP (HG2 / 3!) Injury with a SHARP (HG2 / 3!) Flood Flood Power / instrument failure (MSC, centrifuge) Power / instrument failure (MSC, centrifuge) Bio-terrorism ? (mousepox lesson) Bio-terrorism ? (mousepox lesson) What are realistic emergencies? 35 Emergency Situations

36 Occupational Health & Safety Service adopt working procedures which minimise the risk of an accident happening adopt working procedures which minimise the risk of an accident happening the most likely emergency is spillage of a liquid culture or loose samples; leakage from a container the most likely emergency is spillage of a liquid culture or loose samples; leakage from a container know what to do in the event of a spillage of your materials know what to do in the event of a spillage of your materials the problem is greater with larger scale experiments - so be prepared accordingly! the problem is greater with larger scale experiments - so be prepared accordingly! special situation in centrifuges due to bottle leakage special situation in centrifuges due to bottle leakage BEFORE an emergency occurs…….consider what might happen BEFORE an emergency occurs…….consider what might happen 36 Emergency Situations

37 Occupational Health & Safety Service dont panic - but act quickly dont panic - but act quickly leave the lab to allow aerosols to settle (~hours) leave the lab to allow aerosols to settle (~hours) put on protective clothing put on protective clothing minimise aerosol risk ASAP - cover spillage with layers of paper towels (absorbent granules) minimise aerosol risk ASAP - cover spillage with layers of paper towels (absorbent granules) extreme care if broken glass present but dont remove pieces extreme care if broken glass present but dont remove pieces cover whole area with disinfectant (conc ?) cover whole area with disinfectant (conc ?) leave to disinfect - notify other lab users leave to disinfect - notify other lab users seek advice - supervisor / BSO seek advice - supervisor / BSO cleanup (24h) – autoclave waste cleanup (24h) – autoclave waste emergency? what emergency? 37 Emergency Situations An example spillage SoP dont panic!

38 Occupational Health & Safety Service 38 Emergency Situations Video: Emergency Procedures Dealing with Spillages Dealing with Spillages

39 Occupational Health & Safety Service remember when it comes to the enforcing authorities, such as HSE, Defra/Fera remember when it comes to the enforcing authorities, such as HSE, Defra/Fera ………. If its not documented – its not done! If its not documented – its not done! Risk Assessments So if you have no evidence (usually a printed document) that your work has been properly and adequately risk assessed it is assumed (by HSE) that this has NOT been done So if you have no evidence (usually a printed document) that your work has been properly and adequately risk assessed it is assumed (by HSE) that this has NOT been done this applies to risk assessments, standard operating procedures, testing of facilities/equipment and training records/schedules for staff and students this applies to risk assessments, standard operating procedures, testing of facilities/equipment and training records/schedules for staff and students 39

40 Occupational Health & Safety Service Important advice! Keep a well documented portfolio of all your safety training (date, title, course content, signatures) Keep a well documented portfolio of all your safety training (date, title, course content, signatures) As well as verifying your competency to perform specific tasks it forms part of your CV for your future career / appointments As well as verifying your competency to perform specific tasks it forms part of your CV for your future career / appointments Training Records 40

41 Occupational Health & Safety Service Emergency procedures - expect the unexpected !

42 Occupational Health & Safety Service Any questions about GM or emergencies? Please make sure that you sign the attendance sheets for this course and the GM course (this afternoon) to make sure that you are registered as having attended these courses and that you receive your GM certificate


Download ppt "Occupational Health & Safety Service Biological and Genetic Modification Safety Course October 2013 Medical School: Post Graduate Students Prof Ron Croy,"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google