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EITM Institutions Week John Aldrich Duke University Arthur Lupia University of Michigan John Aldrich Duke University Arthur Lupia University of Michigan

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Coalition Duration M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. When and how they end has a broad societal impact. When and how they end has a broad societal impact. NH. CDs causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics. NH. CDs causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics. P. Vary by paper. P. Vary by paper. C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration. C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration. M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. When and how they end has a broad societal impact. When and how they end has a broad societal impact. NH. CDs causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics. NH. CDs causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics. P. Vary by paper. P. Vary by paper. C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration. C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration.

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Empirical Evolution

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Browne, et al (1986) M. Why do governments dissolve before their time? M. Why do governments dissolve before their time? NH. Structural attributes largely determine a governments duration. NH. Structural attributes largely determine a governments duration. P. Governance contains stochastic elements. P. Governance contains stochastic elements. C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation. C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation. M. Why do governments dissolve before their time? M. Why do governments dissolve before their time? NH. Structural attributes largely determine a governments duration. NH. Structural attributes largely determine a governments duration. P. Governance contains stochastic elements. P. Governance contains stochastic elements. C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation. C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation.

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Browne Premises The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals ( a Poisson process). The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals ( a Poisson process). Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1). Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1). P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r! P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r! P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt. P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt. The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events. The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events. The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model. The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model. The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals ( a Poisson process). The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals ( a Poisson process). Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1). Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1). P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r! P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r! P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt. P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt. The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events. The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events. The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model. The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model.

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Browne Data 238 cabinets from 12 European countries cabinets from 12 European countries Caretaker governments excluded. Caretaker governments excluded. 238 cabinets from 12 European countries cabinets from 12 European countries Caretaker governments excluded. Caretaker governments excluded.

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Browne implications Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical events. Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical events. Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations. Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations. Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events… Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events… Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical events. Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical events. Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations. Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations. Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events… Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events…

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King, Alt, Laver and Burns (1990) M. Structural attributes versus critical events. M. Structural attributes versus critical events. NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables. P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables. C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior. C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior. M. Structural attributes versus critical events. M. Structural attributes versus critical events. NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables. P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables. C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior. C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior.

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KABL Premises Critical Events: Y i = e - yi Critical Events: Y i = e - yi Y i – a random variable describing cabinet duration length, the rate of event occurrence Y i – a random variable describing cabinet duration length, the rate of event occurrence 1/ expected duration 1/ expected duration Structural Attributes: Y i = x i + i Structural Attributes: Y i = x i + i Could duration be generated by a normal distribution? Could duration be generated by a normal distribution? Critical Events: Y i = e - yi Critical Events: Y i = e - yi Y i – a random variable describing cabinet duration length, the rate of event occurrence Y i – a random variable describing cabinet duration length, the rate of event occurrence 1/ expected duration 1/ expected duration Structural Attributes: Y i = x i + i Structural Attributes: Y i = x i + i Could duration be generated by a normal distribution? Could duration be generated by a normal distribution?

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KABL Premises Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country? Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country? The termination hazard has systematic and stochastic components. The termination hazard has systematic and stochastic components. Durations are independent. Durations are independent. Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow. Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow. Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country? Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country? The termination hazard has systematic and stochastic components. The termination hazard has systematic and stochastic components. Durations are independent. Durations are independent. Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow. Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow.

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King, Alt, et. al. Conclusions Model 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline Model 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit. Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit. Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit. Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit. Majority status increases duration. Majority status increases duration. Number of formation attempts reduce duration. Number of formation attempts reduce duration. Model 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline Model 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit. Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit. Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit. Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit. Majority status increases duration. Majority status increases duration. Number of formation attempts reduce duration. Number of formation attempts reduce duration.

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KABL Premises Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model. Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model. Models Structural attributes added. Improved fit. Models Structural attributes added. Improved fit. Comparing best models, country-specific effects disappear. Comparing best models, country-specific effects disappear. Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability. Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability. Table 3 shows the fit. Table 3 shows the fit. Q: Censoring and strategy? Q: Censoring and strategy? Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model. Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model. Models Structural attributes added. Improved fit. Models Structural attributes added. Improved fit. Comparing best models, country-specific effects disappear. Comparing best models, country-specific effects disappear. Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability. Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability. Table 3 shows the fit. Table 3 shows the fit. Q: Censoring and strategy? Q: Censoring and strategy?

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Warwick (1992) M. Are termination hazard rates constant? M. Are termination hazard rates constant? NH. Yes. NH. Yes. P. Event history model applies. P. Event history model applies. What is the termination rate given survival at time t? What is the termination rate given survival at time t? (t)=exp( x(t)) 0(t) (t)=exp( x(t)) 0(t) (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered. (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered. Censor only involuntary terminations. Censor only involuntary terminations. T1. Without other factors, (t)/ t >0 for most countries. T1. Without other factors, (t)/ t >0 for most countries. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length. M. Are termination hazard rates constant? M. Are termination hazard rates constant? NH. Yes. NH. Yes. P. Event history model applies. P. Event history model applies. What is the termination rate given survival at time t? What is the termination rate given survival at time t? (t)=exp( x(t)) 0(t) (t)=exp( x(t)) 0(t) (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered. (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered. Censor only involuntary terminations. Censor only involuntary terminations. T1. Without other factors, (t)/ t >0 for most countries. T1. Without other factors, (t)/ t >0 for most countries. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length.

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Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections Motivation: What determines the timing and nature of coalition terminations? What determines the timing and nature of coalition terminations? What factors affect government membership and portfolio allocation? What factors affect government membership and portfolio allocation? Null Hypotheses: Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing. Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing.Motivation: What determines the timing and nature of coalition terminations? What determines the timing and nature of coalition terminations? What factors affect government membership and portfolio allocation? What factors affect government membership and portfolio allocation? Null Hypotheses: Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing. Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing.

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Lupia and Strom: Null Hypotheses 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior. 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior. 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive. 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive. 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior. 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior. 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive. 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive.

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ConclusionsConclusions Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination. Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination. In coalition governments, a partys size need not directly effect government composition or action. In coalition governments, a partys size need not directly effect government composition or action. Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk- away values. Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk- away values. Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of critical events. Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of critical events. Implication: An events impact depends heavily on the election cycle. Implication: An events impact depends heavily on the election cycle. Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination. Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination. In coalition governments, a partys size need not directly effect government composition or action. In coalition governments, a partys size need not directly effect government composition or action. Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk- away values. Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk- away values. Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of critical events. Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of critical events. Implication: An events impact depends heavily on the election cycle. Implication: An events impact depends heavily on the election cycle.

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ExampleExample Premises Party A has 49 seats. Party A has 49 seats. Party B has 48 seats. Party B has 48 seats. Party C has 4 seats. Party C has 4 seats. Any coalition including C produces value. Any coalition including C produces value. Any coalition without C produces no value. Any coalition without C produces no value.Premises Party A has 49 seats. Party A has 49 seats. Party B has 48 seats. Party B has 48 seats. Party C has 4 seats. Party C has 4 seats. Any coalition including C produces value. Any coalition including C produces value. Any coalition without C produces no value. Any coalition without C produces no value. Results C has the fewest seats, but the largest walk- away value. The only sustainable outcome involves a contract giving party C almost all of the power.

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Tested in Daniel Diermeier and Randy T. Stevenson Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks AJPS 43: Sanford C. Gordon Stochastic Dependence in Competing Risks AJPS 46: Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal Exit models, hazard rates and government duration. With empirical application to government duration in the Benelux countries ( ). ISCORE paper.

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Diermeier and Stevenson (2000) M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination? M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination? NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non- strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non- strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom. P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom. C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not. C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not. M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination? M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination? NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non- strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non- strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom. P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom. C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not. C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not.

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Diermeier and Stevenson Key Assumptions For all parties s i, c i, and k i are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not too high. For all parties s i, c i, and k i are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not too high. As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline. As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline. Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. time until CIEP. >0. time until CIEP. >0. i,j and 0. i,j and 0. Implication: The termination hazard is ( )=( +o( )) (s,c,gij( )) Implication: The termination hazard is ( )=( +o( )) (s,c,gij( )) The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ. The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ. For all parties s i, c i, and k i are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not too high. For all parties s i, c i, and k i are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not too high. As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline. As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline. Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. time until CIEP. >0. time until CIEP. >0. i,j and 0. i,j and 0. Implication: The termination hazard is ( )=( +o( )) (s,c,gij( )) Implication: The termination hazard is ( )=( +o( )) (s,c,gij( )) The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ. The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ.

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Diermeier and Stevenson Theoretical Conclusions Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. The same is not true for replacement hazards. The same is not true for replacement hazards. Must know more about electoral prospects. Must know more about electoral prospects. These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work. These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work. Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. The same is not true for replacement hazards. The same is not true for replacement hazards. Must know more about electoral prospects. Must know more about electoral prospects. These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work. These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work.

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Diermeier and Stevenson Empirical Conclusions No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL. No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL. Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8]. The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8]. Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models. Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models. Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions. Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions. No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL. No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL. Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches. The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8]. The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8]. Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models. Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models. Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions. Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions.

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D&S Results

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InstitutionsInstitutions If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalitions contract, it must affect a pivotal actors walk away value. If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalitions contract, it must affect a pivotal actors walk away value. Institutions that affect walk away values Institutions that affect walk away values formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel) formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel) size/composition rules size/composition rules internal party rules internal party rules independence of the judiciary and civil service independence of the judiciary and civil service If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalitions contract, it must affect a pivotal actors walk away value. If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalitions contract, it must affect a pivotal actors walk away value. Institutions that affect walk away values Institutions that affect walk away values formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel) formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel) size/composition rules size/composition rules internal party rules internal party rules independence of the judiciary and civil service independence of the judiciary and civil service

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