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DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137 CS IN STEEL FACTORIES J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos 6th.

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Presentation on theme: "DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137 CS IN STEEL FACTORIES J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos 6th."— Presentation transcript:

1 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137 CS IN STEEL FACTORIES J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos 6th Dresden Symposium HAZARDS – DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT September 20 – 24, 2010 Dresden Germany

2 Where we are … GRUPO RADÓN Facultad de Medicina Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n 39011 Santander Cantabria (SPAIN) e-mail: laruc@unican.es Phone: +34 942 20 22 07

3 .- FOUNDED IN 1976 AROUND NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS.- 1976-1982: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES.- 1982-1985: ALTAMIRA CAVE.-1985-1989: INHALATION TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, USA.-1989-TODAY: RADON STUDIES IN SPAIN RADIATION PROTECTION IN STEEL FACTORIES WHO WE ARE ………... Laboratory validated by Health Protection Agency (HPA, UK) for indoor radon measurements Laboratory Quality System certified by AENOR (ISO 9001)

4 RADON GROUP TODAY 11 PEOPLE: 2 Professors 1 Postdoctoral researcher 3 Ph.D. student 5 Laboratory technicians Relevant instrumentation Gamma spectrometry: HPGe, NaI BERTHOLD Alpha beta counter Radosys (radon indoors) Equipments for the measurement of radon in situ (soil, air and water): SARAD, Alphaguard Equipment for X-Ray fluorescence Radiation monitors

5 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION IN STEEL FACTORIES

6 Radiological Dispersal Device RDD Courtesy of Sarad GmbH

7 Classical Threat Scenarios Acquisition of a nuclear weapon Acquisition of nuclear material to construct a nuclear weapon Acquisition of radioactive material to cause a radiological hazard (dirty bomb)

8 New Threat Aspects after 9/11: Terror attacks can be internationally coordinated operations Time frame for planning an attack can be years Terrorists are willing to commit collective suicide Terrorists are capable of using sophisticated logistics Non-terrorist threat: orphan sources in steel factories

9 LOSS OF CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN USA For material licensed under the Atomic Energy Act (1954): Up to 2 million devices with radioactive sources have been distributed to 190,000 US licences 300 reports/year of lost/stolen material (mostly short-lived or small sources) US has lost control over about 30,000 radioactive sources (orphans)* *US EPA (1998)

10 ACERINOX, Cadiz (1998, Spain), Cs-137 incident (120 Ci) Day: 30th of May 1998 Time: 00 Z Day: 30th of May 1998 Time: 06 Z

11 "SPANISH PROTOCOL FOR COLLABORATION ON THE RADIATION MONITORING OF METALLIC MATERIALS" 1998

12 DETECTION OF SOURCES IN STEEL SPANISH FACTORIES (1998-2010)

13 MAIN STEEL FACTORIES IN SPAIN (nGyh -1 ) 240 200 160 120 80 40

14 ORIGIN OF ORPHAN SOURCES

15 REASONS FOR THE DETECTION

16 TYPES OF SOURCES

17 OPEN SOURCES

18 SOURCES WITH SHIELD EQUIPMENT

19 DETECTION OF NORM

20 ARCELOR FACTORY IN SESTAO HARBOUR ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)

21 ARCELOR FACTORY ENTRANCE OF SCRAP IN SESTAO ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)

22 RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN SPANISH STEEL FACTORIES CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192 RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN SPANISH STEEL FACTORIES.-ACERINOX, 30th of May 1998 -----120 Ci.-SIDERURGICA SEVILLANA, 7th of December 2001 ----- 2.7 Ci.-DANIEL GONZALEZ RIESTRA, 11th of Auguts 2003, 210 mCi.-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 15th of September 2003, 47 mCi.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2004, 81 mCi.-ARCELOR ZUMARRAGA, 31st of May 2004, 20 mCi.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2007, 40 mCi.-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 10th of April 2007, 2 mCi CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192

23 Scenario Proposed: Radioactive materials in the scrap Cs-137 Am-241 Ra-226 Sr-90 Co-60 Ir-192 METAL PHASE SLAG PHASE DUST

24 SMELTING C0-60 1000 Ci STEEL(3 cm) + CONCRETE(22 cm) COBALT-60 1 m 2.000 μSv/h 2 m 700 μSv/h 5 m 100 μSv/h 10 m 25 μSv/h 130 Tn

25 FIRST DEVICE: REDIFASE-SODERCAN- U.CANTABRIA "IN SITU CS-137 MEASUREMENTS IN STEEL DUST"

26 CLASSICAL DEVICE

27 SILO FOR steel DUST 200 TONNES 30-40 tonnes per day Cleaning: 5 days Accumulated activity: 1 curie of Cs-137

28 "IN SITU detection OF CESIUM 137 IN STEEL DUST "

29 GSW (GLOBAL STEEL WIRE) "IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 "IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 in steel dust" Lower Limit of Detection: 0.5 Bq/g for a five minutes counting

30 NEW DEVICE: In situ detection NaI

31 Advantages of new system: In situ detection of smelting Detection Limit ~ 0.1 Bq/g In case of accident: Economical Losses are drastically reduced System is under development We are open for funding from steel factories (potential patent)

32 INTERNATIONAL INTERCOMPARISON EXERCISE ON NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS Organized by the Radon Group (University of Cantabria, SPAIN) SUMMER 2011 Saelices el Chico (Salamanca, Spain)

33 www.elradon.com

34 Thank you very much for your attention Danke Schön GRUPO RADÓN Facultad de Medicina Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n 39011 Santander Cantabria (SPAIN) Phone: +34 942 20 22 07 e-mail: laruc@unican.es


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