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The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden Johanna Jussila Hammes VTI, TEK-Stockholm.

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Presentation on theme: "The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden Johanna Jussila Hammes VTI, TEK-Stockholm."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Political Economy of Infrastructure Planning in Sweden Johanna Jussila Hammes VTI, TEK-Stockholm

2 Background An explorative study Analyse data from two Swedish National Transport Infrastructure Plans, for and for What factors explain which projects get included in a Plan? Examine political economy explanations.

3 Hypotheses 1.There is a geographic-political aspect to the choice of infrastructure projects. 2.The preferred transport mode varies depending on government colour. 3.There is a rural-urban split in project choice depending on the colour of the government. 4.Lobbying affects the choice of which projects are included in a National Transport Infrastructure Plan.

4 Data VariableObsMeanStd.Dev.MinMax Nat. Plan Nat. Plan ,450,49801 Government ,217,8244,372,9 Government ,595,8845,665,8 Government ,018,3628,2960,46 Reg.-nat. congruence ,490,501 Reg.-nat. congruence ,490,501 Reg.-nat. congruence ,510,501 Investment cost597896,152893, ,7 NBIR4070,892,01-2,19717 NBIR Assessed Positive6090,3960,4901 Rail6090,410,4901 Gothenburg area6090,0720,2601 Malmo area6090,0640,2501 Stockholm county6090,110,3101 Co-financing/IC, ,0490,1701 NPV Freight/IC2870,2030,51-0,436,43

5 t-tests Mean (Std. Dev.) t Plan Plan Pr (|T|>|t|) Government (7.18)(7.74)(0.99) Government (5.57)(5.76)(0.85) Government (7.55)(8.48)(0.67) Reg.-nat. congruence (0.50) (0.67) Reg.-nat. congruence (0.50) (0.81) Reg.-nat. congruence (0.50) (0.67) Rail (0.49)(0.50)(0.032) Gothenburg (0.24)(0.28)(0.44) Malmö (0.25) (0.94) Stockholm (0.29)(0.38)(0.038)

6 Regression results: basic regression National Plan, (1)(2)(3)(4) Government **0.0286** (2.63)(3.14) Reg.-nat. congruence **0.504** (2.72)(3.23) Rail0.939***1.384***0.940***1.395*** (4.64)(7.85)(4.63)(7.88) NBIR *0.153* (2.50)(2.56) NBIR Assessed Positive 0.796*** 0.821*** (5.06) (5.19) Investment Cost (0.42)(0.28)(0.58)(0.49) Constant-1.710***-2.382***-0.742***-1.308*** (-3.78)(-5.25)(-5.76)(-8.25) Observations z statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

7 Regression results: big cities National Plan, (1)(2)(3)(4) Government *0.0341** (2.13)(2.70) Reg.-nat. congruence ** (1.91)(2.67) Rail0.932***1.401***0.924***1.397*** (4.54)(7.89)(4.49)(7.85) NBIR *0.150* (2.27)(2.34) NBIR Assessed Positive 0.810*** 0.826*** (5.06) (5.13) Investment Cost (0.48)(0.33)(0.63)(0.51) Gothenburg area (0.74)(0.21)(0.51)(-0.10) Malmö area (1.13)(-0.05)(1.10)(-0.09) Stockholm county (-0.66)(-0.77)(-0.23)(-0.17) Constant-1.829**-2.625***-0.738***-1.312*** (-3.15)(-4.46)(-5.69)(-8.18) Observations z statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

8 Regression results: lobbying National Plan, (1)(2)(3)(4) Government *0.0348** (2.48)(2.80) Reg.-nat. congruence *0.592** (2.38)(2.79) NBIR (1.14)(1.27) NBIR Assessed Positive 1.029*** 1.080*** (4.53) (4.64) Investment Cost (-0.05)(-0.15)(0.06)(-0.08) Co-financing/IC, *1.725*1.604*1.823* (1.99)(2.22)(2.05)(2.34) NPV Freight/IC (1.91)(1.70)(1.82)(1.67) Constant-2.213***-3.017***-0.986***-1.715*** (-3.82)(-4.88)(-6.60)(-8.08) Observations z statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

9 Conclusions The political variables get positive and statistically significant coefficients in the regression analysis. t-tests show no difference in the means of the variables between the two Plans. We consider the regression analysis to provide at least partial support for the first hypothesis. Rail investments get a positive and significant coefficient in the regression analysis. The mean value for Rail is greater for the Plan than for the Plan. Both governments favour rail investments over road but the left-wing government favours rail more.

10 Conclusions The regression coefficients for the big cities are insignificant. The mean value for Stockholm County is lower for the Plan than for the Plan. The left-wing government seems to have discriminated against the Stockholm County. The regression coefficients for Co-financing/IC are positive and significant. The coefficients for NPV Freight/IC are borderline significant and positive. Lobbying matters, especially lobbying by the municipalities through co-financing.


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