Presentation on theme: "Automated Election System: AES Watch STAR Card Updated as of Feb 28, 2010."— Presentation transcript:
Automated Election System: AES Watch STAR Card Updated as of Feb 28, 2010
AES Watch Conveners University of the Philippines Alumni Association (UPAA); Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG); National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA-CBCP), Bishop Broderick Pabillo (CBCP) and Bishop Deogracias Yniguez (CBCP and Ecumenical Bishops Forum / EBF); National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP); Dr. Reena Estuar, chair of AdMU Dept. of Information Communications System; Dr. Jaime Caro, U.P. computer science & President, Computing Society of the Philippines (CSP); Dr. Rachel Roxas, DLSU College of Computer Studies; Computer Professionals Union (CPU); Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP); Association of Schools of Public Administration of the Philippines (ASPAP); Philippine Computer Emergency Response Team (PhCERT); Transparency International (TI-Philippines); National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP); Engr. Rodolfo Jun Lozada; Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD); Senior Catholic Citizens Organization; Transparentelections.org; CCM; Coordinating Council for Peoples Development (CPDG); Solidarity Philippines; Pagbabago (Movement for Social Change); Council for Health & Development (CHD); Movement for Good Governance (MGG); and others.
AES Watch STAR Card AES Watch is a network of concerned groups and individuals monitoring the poll automation preparations. AES Watch uses the System Trustworthiness, Accountability, and Readiness Scorecard (STAR Card) to assess the readiness and trustworthiness of the AES. The STAR Card assesses the AES on 20 items of concern based on available facts. Each item is rated: PASS WARNING DANGER FAIL
Categories of Concern The 20 items of concern in the STAR Card are grouped into 4 categories: A. Setting up the System Will the AES be ready for full implementation by May 10? B. Internal Security and Trustworthiness Will the AES have the necessary safeguards to prevent fraud? C. Personnel Training and Voters Education Will the teachers and the voters know exactly what to do on May 10? D. Contingencies Will all concerned know what to do when things go wrong? We want to ensure the holding of peaceful, clean, and credible elections on May 10, 2010.
A. Setting Up the System 1. Timely delivery of hardware and software components to Comelec 2. Quality of machines 3. Technology certification 4. Availability of transmission facilities 5. Deployment of machines 6. Physical security of machines 7. Precinct-specific ballots 8. Resource inventory at the voting centers 9. Adequate General Instructions Will the AES be ready for full implementation by May 10?
A. Setting up 1. Timely Delivery of AES Components Will all components of the AES (including ballot boxes) be delivered on time so as not to compromise quality assurance? All 82,200 PCOS are in the country (Feb 27) – 68,620 in Cabuyao warehouse, 13,598 with Customs 77,000 ballot boxes supply contracted only on Feb 1 with Smartmatic (made in Taiwan, full delivery in Apr) Rating: WARNING
A. Setting up 2. Quality of Machines Will quality assurance tests be completed in time to meet other requirements dependent on such tests? About 60,000 reported on Feb 25 to have passed operational tests at Cabuyao warehouse. Machines are still to be configured. Actual case as reported in the papers: Out of 600 ballots fed in a test, only 30 were read properly. Field test on Jan 20: only 40% of ballot read in Aguho Mock election on Feb 6: problems with PCOS Ricardo Papa: ballot feed problem due to tape on scanner; Maharlika: ballot feed jammed twice New Era: 5 ballots rejected with no clear reason for some. Comelec admitted lack of manpower for testing. Rating: DANGER
A. Setting up 3. Technology Certification Will the technology certification be completed by Feb 10, the deadline set by AES Law? AES Law provides: the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) shall certify, through an established international certification entity (SysTest Labs of Colorado contracted in Oct 2009), that the AES, including its hardward and software components, is operating properly, securely, and accurately. TEC Resolution dated Feb 10 stated that 3 requirements are yet to be successfully completed: Audit on the accuracy, functionality & security controls on the AES software based on 5 tests Certification: source code reviewed is the same as that used by equipment (can be done only after configuration of PCOS & CCS in Apr) Operationalization of a continuity plan Rating: FAIL (downgraded from Danger)
A. Setting up 4. Availability of Transmission Facilities Are reliable electronic transmission facilities available at all clustered precincts? Has contracts been signed with the telcos? Has provisions been made for transmission in areas not covered by the telcos? Site survey by Smartmatic-TIM 93% done: 64% of country has connectivity and 32% none. Transmission glitches experienced during field tests requiring use of BGAN (satellite) even in Pateros, which is within Metro Manila. 5,000 BGAN devices acquired. Is the number sufficient? Rating: DANGER
A. Setting up 5. Deployment of Machines Has Comelec prepared a plan that ensures problem-free deployment of machines? Has a contract been signed with an established logistics company? PCOS machines are precinct specific. Errors in delivery can upset the voting process on election day. Ballot boxes are quite bulky. Comelec reported that contracts have been signed with certain provincial logistics companies. Comelec must disclose its logistics plan, contracts with logistics companies and the capability and track record of the contractors. Rating: WARNING A. Setting up 5. Deployment of Machines
A. Setting up 6. Physical Security of Machines Are there adequate plans for ensuring all machines, including the CF cards, are protected from theft or tampering in their assigned locations? The General Instructions specifies that political parties are free to send their poll watchers to secure the machines themselves but there is no clear agreement and explicit plan yet as to how this will be done. The CF card will contains the record of votes. It is sealed in the PCOS but may be removed in case of PCOS malfunction to be transferred or moved. How will the CF cards be protected from snatching, switching, and other risks? Rating: WARNING
A. Setting up 7. Precinct-Specific Ballots Will the ballots with pre-printed names of candidates for specific localities be ready in time? What are the logistics arrangements for deployment of ballots? Printing of 50.7 million ballots started only on Feb 7 (delayed from original Jan 7) and to finish on Apr 25 (later than original Apr 18). Should print about 660K per day. Actual printing: 6 mil in 11 days (Feb 7-25) or ave 330K. Ballot packs are precinct specific: 1,631 unique ballot faces 76,340 clustered precinct, each to be given a fixed number of ballots (based on number of registered voters) with ID. Bidding for services to deploy ballots announced on Feb 6 and scheduled for Mar 1. Start of delivery on Mar 10. Rating: WARNING
A. Setting up 8. Resource Inventory at Voting Centers Are all the necessary resources available at each of the voting centers, including: Power supply and periods of operation? IT-capable personnel for the BEIs and BOCs? Transmission facilities? The site survey being conducted covers only transmission facilities; no mention of other critical facilities such as power and DOST-certified IT-capable persons to support BEI/BOC. Transmission failures during field testing indicate inadequate surveys. Rating: DANGER
A. Setting up 9. Adequate General Instructions Are adequate General Instructions (GI) for the conduct of automated elections ready? GI for BEIs on the Voting, Counting, and Transmission of election results issued on Dec 29, GI for the Consolidation, Transmission, and Canvassing of Votes not finalized. When will this be issued? No response from Comelec about refinements of the GI as suggested by stakeholders, e.g., security of private keys, disposition of ballots rejected by PCOS machines, etc. Mock elections: 50 voters took one hour (projected to 550 voters over 11 hours of election day). Clustered precincts will have up to 1,000 voters. Rating: DANGER
B. Internal Security & Trustworthiness 10. Source code 11. Verifiability of voting and results at all levels of canvassing 12. Secured transmission of election results 13. Initialization of machines 14. Manual audit of vote counts Will the AES have the necessary safeguards to prevent fraud?
B. Internal Secutrity 10. Source Code Was the source code made available to interested political parties and groups for review as mandated by the AES Law? No, not promptly as provided for in RA 9369, Sec 12 when an AES technology was selected in July Source code review is being scheduled by Comelec after certification by SysTest, with limited time left before election day and under restrictive rules – mere walkthrough! Reliability and trustworthiness of the system put in doubt. Rating: FAIL Comelec claims there is a mechanism by which interested parties can validate that the source code certified by SysTest is the same as that used by each of the PCOS and CCS machines. Will Comelec enable such mechanism so validation can be done just before the start and right after voting on election day?
B. Internal Security 11. Verifiability of Voting and Results Will a voter be able to verify if machine has registered his chosen candidates as required by the AES Law? No, function is available in machine but disabled. Will watchers be able to easily verify the election results received and canvassed at the BOCs against the election results printed out at the precincts? No arrangements have been made to facilitate verification, such as by projecting on big screens the statements of votes by precincts (as suggested by Cong. Rufus Rodriguez). Rating: DANGER
B. Internal Security 12. Secured Transmission of Results Will the BEI teachers themselves individually generate their PIN codes, hold it for safekeeping, and use it for digitally signing the transmission of election results? No, Comelc/Smartmatic will generate and provide the PIN codes to be used by the teachers. GI (draft or even Comelec Resolution 8739) is silent on procedures and/or mechanics for making transmissions secure. Rating: WARNING
B. Internal Security 13. Initialization of Machines Will procedures be implemented to assure stakeholders that there are no votes or ballot images pre-stored in the machine memory (CF card) prior to voting on election day? COMELEC requires all AES machines to be cleared or zeroed out to show that there are no entries/votes in the PCOS memory. Election results showing zero votes will be printed out just before start of voting on election day. But what are the safeguards to ensure that there are no ballot images pre-stored in the machine memory prior to voting? Zeroing demo done with PCOS, but not CCS. Rating: WARNING
B. Internal Security 14. Manual Audit of Vote Counts Will the random manual audit be done by independent auditors, for a sufficient number of precincts, and before proclamation? Technical Working Group on Random Manual Audit (TWG- RMA) created in Nov 2009 with Amb De Villa of PPCRV as Chair and OIC of Comelec Internal Audit Office and COA resident representative as members. No decision yet on who will do the audit and how. Independent auditors key. Sampling methodology has yet to be established Comelec has confirmed that the manual audit will be done after proclamation. The random manual audit is the last possible check on the trustworthiness of the AES. Rating: WARNING
C. Personnel Training & Voters Education 15. Training of technical personnel and members of the BEI and BOC 16. Stakeholder education and training 17. Precinct assignment of voters Will the teachers and the voters know exactly what to do on election day?
C. Training & Education 15. Training of Technical Personnel Will Comelec be able to train the teachers and other personnel in time on both normal and contingency operations of the AES? AES Law requires BEIs/BOCs to each have an IT-capable person. Training for 230,000 teachers to start Mar 1 (2-1/2 months later than original Dec 15). 76,340 teachers must be DOST certified. Ballot with old format to be used for training: confusing. Reports show growing fear among teachers that this delay will leave them inadequately trained in operating the machine. Will Smartmatic-TIM be able to recruit 45,000 competent technicians needed on election day? From where and how? No report on status / progress of training. Rating: DANGER
C. Training & Education 16. Stakeholder Education & Training Will there be an extensive and sufficient voter education on the AES before the elections? RA 9369, Sec 26 requires Comelec, not later than 6 months before elections, to undertake widespread stakeholder education. Mock election: ballots rejected by PCOS due to ambiguous marks (indication of need for effective voter education). Pulse Asia's Jan 2010 Survey: 71% of Filipinos have little or almost no knowledge at all of the AES (79% among class E). No disclosure of detailed plans for training, progress (number of voters trained, particularly for voters in rural and other remote areas), assessment of effectiveness of training programs Rating: DANGER
C. Training & Education 17. Precinct Assignment of Voters Will voters know ahead of time which clustered precinct to go to so as to avoid confusion and delays on election day ? The AES involves clustering of precincts. Majority of voters will likely have to go to new polling places. No update reported on the preparation of voters list for each of the clustered precincts and on the plan for informing voters of their new precinct assignments. Rating: DANGER
D. Contingencies 18. Continuity plan 19. Electoral protest mechanism 20. Alternative election system in some parts of the country Will Comelec and all concerned know what to do when things go wrong?
D. Contingencies 18. Continuity Plan Is Comelec ready with an adequate continuity plan that covers all foreseeable eventualities? RA9369 requires the development, provisioning, and operationalization of a continuity plan to cover risks to the AES at all points in the process such that a failure of elections, whether at voting, counting or consolidation, may be avoided. Per TEC Resolution of Feb 10, this is not yet done. The draft continuity plan shown by Comelec appears inadequate: replace machine or go manual in case of PCOS/CCS malfunction. Other eventualities not covered: e.g., natural disasters, civil disturbance & other disruptions; voting after 6 pm; manual counting, canvassing & consolidation; jamming of transmission; standby resources; training of BEI/BOC personnel, drill exercises. Continuity plan is key to avoiding failure of election. Rating: DANGER
D. Contingencies 19. Electoral Protest Mechanism Has Comelec identified the grounds for electoral protests under the AES and defined the appropriate process for addressing and resolving such protests? No specific legal provisions available for AES-based protests (e.g., differences between machine and visual appreciation of ballot shading, discrepancies in printed and transmitted results, appeal for recount, etc.) No progress report from Comelec. Rating: WARNING
D. Contingencies 20. Alternative Election System Are preparations being undertaken to implement a manual election system if full automation is no longer realistic? How will this be done: manual counting, transmission, and canvassing? With traditional ballots or pre-printed ballots? How will results of manual and automated systmems be consolidated? No guidelines or procedures have been announced yet for the conduct of manual elections where needed. No clear criteria/ trigger points have been defined nor deadline set yet for determining whether to go manual and in which localities. Rating: DANGER
Summary of Ratings (Feb 28, 2010) 1.Timely Delivery of Machines – Warning 2.Quality of Machines – Danger 3.Technology Certification – Fail 4.Availability of Transmission Facilities – Danger 5.Deployment of Machines – Warning 6.Physical– Danger 7.Security of Machines – Warning 8.Precinct Specific Ballots – Warning 9.Resource Inventory at Voting Centers – Danger 10.Adequate General Instructions – Danger 11.Source Code – Fail 12.Verifiability of Voting and Results – Danger 13.Secured Transmission of Results – Warning 14.Initialization of Machines – Warning 15.Manual Audit of Vote Counts – Warning 16.Training of Technical Personnel – Danger 17.Precinct Assignment of Voters – Danger 18.Continuity Plan – Danger 19.Electoral Protest Mechanism – Warning 20.Alternative Election System – Danger
STAR Card Assessment of the AES Overall the AES is in the DANGER zone. Readiness of the AES is at risk due to the pattern of delays and changes in the calendar. Trustworthiness of the AES is in question as needed system safeguards are not yet in place. As of Jan 26As of Feb 11As of Feb 28 PASSNone WARNING DANGER FAIL 1 1 2