Presentation on theme: "1 Risk profile of Islamic banks Claudio Porzio & M. Grazia Starita University of Naples Parthenope."— Presentation transcript:
1 Risk profile of Islamic banks Claudio Porzio & M. Grazia Starita University of Naples Parthenope
2 Agenda A taxonomy of Islamic contracts Islamic bank contracts: their typical risk profile Liabilities Assets Murabaha Salam Ijara Istisna Mudaraba Musharaka Risk profile of Islamic banks Conclusions
3 A taxonomy of Islamic contracts Liability side: short-term (liquidity management) and long-term (investment) funding; banking book mobilisation (ijara, especially). Asset side: contracts with or without Profit and Loss Sharing (P&LS) P&LS contracts can be subdivided according to the different needs (financial, insurance and asset management) satisfied. No P&LS contracts allow short and long term financing. Asset finance requires the lender to purchase the asset and to sell it on to the borrower at a higher price with instalment payments. Partnership finance requires the lender to participate in the equity of the transaction. Lease finance involves the lender acquiring the asset, leasing it to the borrower in exchange for rental payments.
4 A taxonomy of Islamic contracts Liability side Funding Liquidity managementInvestment Demand deposits Islamic funds (mudaraba) Securitisation Investment accounts Sukuk Outside the conventional banks boundary
5 A taxonomy of Islamic contracts Asset side P&LS contracts Financial needs Insurance Musharaka Mudaraba Takaful Asset management Islamic fund Partnership finance
6 A taxonomy of Islamic contracts Asset side No P&LS contracts Short-term financing Long-term financing Murabaha Salam Ijara Istisna Lease finance Asset finance
7 A taxonomy of Islamic contracts The parallel with conventional finance Salam Householders lending Murabaha Mortgage with banks ownership (in the first step of contract) Ijara Renting / Leasing Istisna Sale of real estate under contruction Musharaka Joint venture / investment deposits Mudaraba Limited partnership / Investment accounts Mudaraba Mutual funds / banks performance bonds Qardh hasan Demand deposits 11(current accounts) Takaful Insurance contract Sukuk Asset Backed Securities Asset side Liability side Other
8 Islamic bank contracts - Liabilities Losses absorption + P S Investment accounts (unrestricted) Equity - P S Investment accounts (restricted) Demand deposits (non interest bearing) - + S tability Having both debt and equity features, are PSIAs to be accounted for as off- balance-sheet ?
9 There is a commercial pressures on Islamic banks to offer market-based returns and repay in full on due date to ensure PSIAs continue to be funded (displaced commercial risk). What is the boundary between shareholders claims and investment account holders claims? What happens in a liquidation scenario? What relationship between control rights and cash flow rights? Shareholders claims Dividend (after PERs depreciation and IRRs depreciation) Control rights Shareholders claims Dividend (after PERs depreciation and IRRs depreciation) Control rights PSIAs holders cash flow rights Return in line with market interest rates (after PERs depreciation against the displaced commercial risk) No control rights PSIAs holders cash flow rights Return in line with market interest rates (after PERs depreciation against the displaced commercial risk) No control rights Islamic bank contracts - Liabilities
10 Islamic bank contracts - Liabilities Profit smoothing Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) Unexpected loss against displaced commercial risk Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) Capital adequacy? Is a different approach to its calculation and accounting standards necessary? Capital ratio in case of profit smoothing where: RWA = Risk Weighted Assets OR = Operational Risk RWA PSIAr = RWA funded by Restricted PSIAs RWA PSIAunr = RiWA funded by Unrestricted PSIAs RWA PERIRRPSIAunr = Risk Weighted Assets funded by Profit Equalisation Reserve and Investment Risk Reserve of Unrestricted Profit Sharing Investment Accounts α = percentage of assets financed with PSIAunr
11 Murabaha (purchase and resale) involves three parties: the purchaser/importer, the seller/exporter, the bank. The last provides finance by purchasing the desired commodity and reselling it to the purchaser at a prefixed higher price (mark-up) payable in installments. The key risk is that the bank must have title to the goods at some point in the transaction. The main risk drivers are linked to: the contract structure: with or without customers promise to pay; with or without customers appointment ; the enforcement of customers promise; The mitigation techniques (collateral or deposit). Short-term financing Compare with the IFSBs requirement Islamic bank contracts - Murabaha
12 Islamic bank contracts - Murabaha Counterparty monitoring + with customers appointment and instalment payment (revolving murabaha) without customers promise - with customers appointment with customers promise - + Knowledge of the underlying market Credit risk Market risk risk due to the existing implicit option to buy
13 Islamic bank contracts - Salam Salam (purchase and resale) involves two parties: the bank as purchaser and his borrower as seller. It is an agreement to purchase, at a prefixed price, a specific kind of commodity not available with the seller. The commodity will be delivered on a specified future date. The risk profile of Salam depends on: banks role; the presence of parallel contract (parallel salam); the standardization of the underlying asset. Short-term financing counterpart performance risk
14 Islamic bank contracts - Jiara Ijara (leasing): due to the asset-backed nature of the operation, the bank retains ownership of the asset until maturity, helping to reduce the credit risk of the counterparty. The bank shares in the risk through its responsibility for maintenance and insurance. The main risk drivers are: the customers appointment, the sale of underlying asset at the end of the contract (the customers promise to buy the underlying asset); the mitigation instruments (collateral or takaful contract). Long-term financing Compare with the IFSBs requirement
15 Islamic bank contracts - Jiara Counterparty monitoring + with customers appointment and promise to buy the underlying asset without customers promise to buy the underlying asset - with customers appointment without customers appointment - + Knowledge of the underlying asset Credit risk The full collateral can mislead in creditworthiness assessment Market risk
16 Islamic bank contracts - Istisna Istisna: the bank finances work in progress or construction of a building or an installation and then sells it to the customer; it is payable in instalments. The main risk drivers are linked to: the type of contract: customers (full version)/underlying assets cash flows (limited version); the presence of parallel contract (parallel istisna): the underlying business risk. Long-term financing counterpart performance risk
17 Islamic bank contracts - Mudaraba Mudaraba (PL&LS agreement): a contract between a bank (acting as a silent partner) and one or more entrepreneurs (the bank and the depositor in case of PSAs): The bank provides the entrepreneur with the funding for a specific commercial activity. The entrepreneur does not contribute any funding himself, but contributes management expertise. The entrepreneur earns an agreed portion of the profits (management fee). The profit balance is payable to the bank. The default event is indefinite and collaterals (or guarantees) are not allowed Partnership financing
18 Islamic bank contracts - Mudaraba Firms cash flow Banks pay-off In the example, if the firms cash flow is positive the banks participation is 50% Bank pay off in tipycal mudaraba
19 Islamic bank contracts - Mudaraba Firms cash flow Strike Prefixed level Banks pay-off According to several Islamic schools it is possible to determine a prefixed level of banks partecipation on firms cash flow against the moral hazard of the counterpart. Its similar to pay-offs put option (short position) on firms cash flow Bank pay off in mudaraba with maximum profit
20 Islamic bank contracts - Musharaka Musharaka: partnership between a bank and an entrepreneur: both contributing capital to a project and sharing in its risks and its rewards. A formal contract is normally in place, outlining the obligations and rights of both parties: profits can be allocated in any pre-agreed ratio, and losses are borne in proportion to the capital of each partner. The risk profile of musharaka depends on: the underlying asset; the goal of contract such as the link with other contracts (diminishing musharaka for householders, for example). It is the purest Islamic contract thanks to the sharing of risk Partnership financing
21 Islamic bank contracts – Risk unbundling Contract / Risk CreditMarketLiquidityOperational Salam Murabaha Ijara Istisna Musharaka Mudaraba Market and credit risks are more ntensely interdependent and connected Relevant market risks are strictly connected to liquidity risks hign medium low
22 Islamic bank contracts - Asset and liability No P&LS contracts with high operational risk P&LS contracts inside the commercial banks boundary Murabaha Salam Ijara Istisna Mudaraba Musharaka Demand deposits (qardh hasan) Investment accounts (mudaraba) Islamic funds (mudaraba) Losses absorption of investment deposits Mudaraba on both asset and liability sides Typical Islamic banks balance-sheet
23 Risk profile of Islamic banks Even though Islamic scholars consider mudaraba and musharaka as preferable Sharia-compliant financing vehicles, Islamic banks concentrate on selling the lucrative murabaha markup financing. The most common activities (trade and commodity finance, leasing, fund/asset management, etc) of dedicated Islamic banks are essentially no different to similar activities practised by many conventional banks. However Certain risks are of greater significance compared to conventional banks. Creditworthiness, solvency and profitability are influenced by their unique characteristics. Higher profitability, cheaper and more stable deposits, and higher customer loyalty than for conventional peers tend to be offset by weaker liquidity; greater concentration; and more heterogeneous and less rigorous regulatory, accounting and disclosure frameworks.
24 Risk profile of Islamic banks Credit risk peculiarities Transformation of credit in risk into market risk and viceversa A different bundling of credit and market risks between the bank and its financed customer. As collateral levels are typically higher than in conventional banks, a significant part of assets must be converted to real assets over a certain period of time. The legal environment is crucial for allowing an efficient loan recovery. Many products tend to carry higher asset and operational risk. Musharaka and mudaraba expose to heightened asset risk and potentially limits the banks ability to foreclose on loans and recover bad debts. They carry a fair amount of potential risks, as recognition of impaired transactions can be assessed only at the end of a contract. Overall, may be difficult to judge an Islamic bank's asset portfolio risk.
25 Risk profile of Islamic banks Credit risk management The credit risk management functioning of an Islamic bank is essentially no different from that of a conventional bank even if some aspects are key: loan sanctioning process, loan book concentrations, loan impairment, collateral valuations and risk appetite. A higher transparency and a clear distinction between the risk management and the Shariah board are required. This board provides guidance and supervision in the development of Shariah-compliant products to ensure that they meet the requirements of Islamic law. A Shariah board should not involve itself with the actual granting of credit, as it is doubtful whether scholars are sufficiently skilled in credit analysis.
26 Risk profile of Islamic banks Performance risk Returns achieved in Islamic banking seem to be high and have attracted the attention of conventional banks. This is due to: the benign operating environment that Islamic banks, mainly those based in oil- producing countries, have benefited from; the asset quality remained healthy; the margins on some products tend to be high partly reflecting the lack of pricing transparency but also limited competition (at least until now); as much of an Islamic banks funding comes from interest-free customer deposits, its cost of funding is typically lower than that of a commercial bank. This, in turn, boosts its net profit margin and net profit from financing activities line although it leaves income vulnerable to falling asset yields.
27 Risk profile of Islamic banks Governance and compliance Governance structures are quite peculiar because the institution must obey a different set of rules - those of the Holy Qur'an - and meet the expectations of Muslim community by providing Islamically- acceptable financing modes. Many different interpretations of Sharia law can exist at bank and country level. Although this has hampered product standardisation, the resulting lack of product comparability and pricing transparency has helped to benefit margins. smoother throughout the cycle, as IFIs do not pay fixed interest on debt and because they engage in profit- and-loss
Conclusions - The concerns for supervisors Market risk: the specific dynamics of underlying market of asset-based contracts (no P&LS contracts) can create several concerns to the banks in case of unexpected price shocks or liquidity crisis Credit risk: the moral value of borrowers promise and the enforcements mechanisms of this promise imply different standards of credit screening and monitoring Operational risk: the endogenous factors of operative risk are under control thanks to the Sharia deterrent
Conclusions - The concerns for supervisors The regulation of Islamic banks in Europe implies several issues (as above mentioned) but what is the degree of growth in Europe? What is the real concern of European supervisors? Is the framework of the existing regulation, adequate for Islamic banks? Islamic banks operating in Europe (Islamic Bank of Britain, for example) have a simple business, mainly retail. In particular, on the asset side they dont use the P&LS contracts while on the liability side the degree of freedom in managing PSIAs is limited.
Conclusions - The concerns for supervisors Any regulatory framework has to: recognise the special features of Islamic finance and, in case, find appropriate responses to them rather than simply applying solutions already devised for traditional banks offer those who use Islamic finance the same degree of protection offered to those who use non Islamic finance. Principles applied (adequate resources, corporate governance, reliable control systems, transparency) are general and cannot be modified. Specific issues relating to Islamic finance (the special position of the Sharia Board, banks and customers rights under a contract of mudaraba), accounting, …) may require specific solutions. In this case, it is necessary to adjust the domestic fiscal and legal framework to render it friendlier to the development of Islamic banking (and finance).
Conclusions - The concerns for Italy Are there specific problems of compatibility with the existing Italian regulation? In addition to products offered, typical risks, investors and depositors protection, the assessment of corporate governance is crucial. In fact, in any case: the authorities cannot give any guarantee as to the Sharia compliance of products offered; the role and responsibilities of the Sharia Board vis a vis top management and shareholders are completely delegated to the bank and its management. However, some reflections are necessary about the composition of the Board and its relationships with other stakeholders bank. Although formally independent and separate, the effective influence on management depends on the nature of their relationship with the bank which may take different forms.9