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Neighborhoods, communities, and collective goods and bads Beate Völker Dept. of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

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Presentation on theme: "Neighborhoods, communities, and collective goods and bads Beate Völker Dept. of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands."— Presentation transcript:

1 Neighborhoods, communities, and collective goods and bads Beate Völker Dept. of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

2 Todays message: 1.Communities in Dutch neighborhoods exist, but they consist of weak relationships, which are nevertheless often connected. 2.The association between community and social/physical order is only indirect: the mechanism is informal control. 3.Context effects of social diversity on trust and participation are weak and not robust. Relational similarity and structural embeddedness are much more important. 2

3 3 Why sociological research in neighborhoods? Shift from ascribed to achieved also within networks? Assumption: trend towards less cohesion and community implies less contacts among neighbors People cannot avoid neighbors – what does come out of these opportunities for contact? Social integration depends largely on having weak ties more than on ties to family or close friends

4 Ongoing research projects/interests of BV Community and solidarity behavior in neighborhoods Economic and social conditions for individual well being in neighborhoods Community failure: social and physical disorder in neighborhoods (1) Community failure: Troublesome neighborhood relations (2) Trust and collective good production neighborhoods 44

5 Community and solidarity behavior in neighborhoods Economic and social conditions for individual well being in neighborhoods Community failure: social and physical disorder in neighborhoods (1) Community failure: Troublesome neighborhood relations (2) Trust and collective good production neighborhoods 5 Ongoing research projects/interests of BV 5

6 6 What is a neighborhood? Geographical area Administrative area – zip code What people consider to be a neighborhood Neighbors who interact with each other more than with other people (who live also close by)

7 7 Neighborhoods in the SSND ( the Survey of the Social Networks of the Dutch) Sample of 160 neighborhoods in 40 municipalities taking urbanization and region into account Neighborhood: 5-position zip code area (i.e. 230 addresses on average) this resembles the route of a postman 6-8 respondents in each neighborhood Neighborhood characteristics partially via respondents, partially via national bureau of statistics (CBS, wijken en buurten) Analyses: multilevel analyses: respondents nested in neighborhoods

8 The Survey of the Social Networks of the Dutch (SSND) – municipalities where we collected data - 8

9 9 Facilities in the neighborhood 1.Supermarket 2.Butcher 3.Bakery 4.Green grocery 5.Fish grocery 6.Cinema 7.Shop for building equipment 8.Shop for clothes 9.Market for fresh vegetables etc. 10.Flowery shop 11.Snack bar 12.Physician/general practitioner 13.Police station 14.Church 15.Garage/gas station 16. Sport field 17. Cafe 18. Restaurant 19. Day care center 20. Neighborhood center 21. School 22. Park 23. Swimming center 24. Sport- or fitness center 25. Post office 26. Bus station 27. Train station 28. Theatre, opera, concert hall 29. Public library 30. Playground

10 10 Who are neighbors? Exchange method: name generating questions – partially standard, partially focused on own research interests; step 1: How did you get your current job? Who do you ask for advice concerning matters at your job? Whom do you give advice concerning these matters? With who do you have a problem? Who is your boss? Who did help you get your current home? Who has the keys to your house? Who do you ask for helping with odd jobs in/around your house? With whom do you discuss personal matters? Who are your direct neighbors? Neighbors enter the network in two ways: via name generating questions and via the direct question

11 11 Characteristics of network members and the relation between network member and respondent (= step 2) Characteristics of Alter: –Sex, age, education, occupation, religion, family situation –role relation with ego Characteristics of relationship Ego-Alter: –Intensity, trust, liking –Duration of relationship –Where met first, where meeting currently –Frequency of contact –Geographical distance

12 12 What are activities among neighbors and what is the quality of neighbor relationships? Neighbors who are directly delineated do only rarely have any additional function Neighbors are in particular important for odd jobs, one does visiting neighbors and they are also sometimes member in ones core discussion network Segregation between working and dwelling, private and public: one rarely discusses work matters with neighbors Neighbor relations belong to the weakest relationships in ones network

13 13 Network- neighbors Direct neighbors All other relationships Job Advice (giving) Advice (asking) Work matters Cooperation Taking care of house Odd jobs Key Visiting Core discussion Activities among neighbors… Source: SSND, 2000, example: of all network neighbor relationships, 2.4 are mentioned being important for getting a job

14 14 Network neighbors Direct neighbors All other relations Strength (1-5)3.9 ( (1.0)4.3 (.94) Trust (1-5)4.1 (.96)3.7 (1.1)4.4 (.94) Strength of neighbor relationships in the Netherlands

15 15 Network neighbors Direct neighbors All other relations Strength (1-5)3.9 ( (1.0)4.3 (.94) Trust (1-5)4.1 (.96)3.7 (1.1)4.4 (.94) Strength of neighbor relationships in the Netherlands

16 16 Network neighbors Direct neighbors All other relations Strength (1-5)3.9 ( (1.0)4.3 (.94) Trust (1-5)4.1 (.96)3.7 (1.1)4.4 (.94) Strength of neighbor relationships in the Netherlands 70% of the direct neighbors – which is asked for directly – do not have any other relational function besides being just direct neighbors!

17 17 Local communities in the Netherlands

18 18 When does a community exist? -If people realize a number of important goals within the same group of other -This does not imply that one needs many relationships for experiencing a community -But is does imply that a community offers something for the individual and not the other way around -Hence: community= joint production of wellbeing -Note: this is very efficient!

19 19 Conditions for the creation of local communities Chance to meet (e.g. much facilities) Mating motivation – social capital Interdependency Few alternatives

20 20 Meeting opportunities – opportunities of joint production No mating without meeting (Lois Verbrugge) Depending on –Time spent in the neighborhood –Degree to which one is bounded to the neighborhood (e.g. because of having young children) –Places and facilities enforce meeting (places, parks with benches, shops etc.) –Synchronic rhythms of life (e.g. when do you and your neighbor leave your house?) –Residential stability – probably on both, micro and macro level

21 21 Mating motivation - Social capital – motivation of joint production (i) Depending on –Shadow of the future (e.g. the intention to stay in the neighborhood) –Shadow of the past (investments in specific others in the neighborhood) –Resources (e.g. education, social status of ego and alter) –Similarity concerning relevant characteristics, e.g. social and marital status, family situation

22 22 Alternatives motivation of joint production (ii) A neighborhood is not the only setting where one can achieve his or her goals, also at work or in a voluntary club important goals can be realized. Not only relational alternatives are of importance here but also material property can constitute an alternative for starting relationships (in the neighborhood) e.g. one can derive status from having a luxury car.

23 23 Interdependencies - ease of joint production Different forms of dependencies: –Structural: network embeddedness –Cognitive: common frame of reference, e.g. belonging to the same culture, religion or: neighborhood –Functional: dependency on others for achieving a goal, e.g. writing a petition, making an arrangement on parking cars etc. –Note: dependency is highest if these different forms coincide in the same relationships

24 24 Measurement of Wellbeing/Community Combination of items in a Cobb Douglas function: Community= stimulation 2 *comfort 2 *status 2 *affection 2 Cobb Douglas function (a production function in economics) allows to model diminishing returns of scale. If all exponents are equal to 1, there are constant returns to scale. If they are smaller than 1, returns are diminishing. It also allows to model substitution effects, i.e.: one does not have status but lots of affection and therefore experiences community.

25 25 Local communities (1): goal achievement GoalItem exampleComplete agreement Partial agreement Disagreement StimulationIn this neighborhood are a lot of things going on ComfortI feel safe here AffectionContacts in this neighborhood are generally good StatusI enjoy respect in this neighborhood

26 26 Local community (2): Combination of goals ComfortAffectionStatusStimulation % 1 goal X 75.9 X 14.8 X 5.6 X goals XX 73.9 XX 12.4 XX 7.2 XX 5.2 XX goals XXX 87.9 XXX 11.1 XXX 1.0

27 27 Local communities (3) Multilevel Analysis Community Meeting opportunities Residential stability Facilities in the neighborhood Children in household Interdependencies Collective action/common activities Contact among direct neighbors R knows who resides in neighborhood Mating motivation (social capital) Education Homogeneity: income Intention to leave Alternatives Network members outside neighborhood Explained variance : neighborhood level Individual level Note: in this analysis it is controlled for sex, age cohort, being married, length of residence, urbanism and number of foreigners in the neighborhood

28 28 Local communities (3) Multilevel Analysis Community Meeting opportunities Residential stability.079 (.031)** Facilities in the neighborhood.011 (.004)** Children in household.126 (.061)* Interdependencies Collective action/common activities.050 (.011)** Contact among direct neighbors.127 (.050)* R knows who resides in neighborhood.194 (.036)** Mating motivation (social capital) Education (.012)** Homogeneity: income.075 (.028)** Intention to leave (.032)** Alternatives Network members outside neighborhood-.003 (.001)** Explained variance : neighborhood level55% Individual level26% Note: in this analysis it is controlled for sex, age cohort, being married, length of residence, urbanism and number of foreigners in the neighborhood

29 29 Conclusion, so far Community in neighborhoods depends on a number of conditions –In particular, interdependencies are very important –Facilities, meeting opportunities do matter also, facilities have not only an economic function but also a social one! Yet, there is a differential effect of meeting places, not all work in the same direction –Residential stability is – as always - of importance, yet in the Netherlands this effect seems ot be smaller than, e.g. in the US –Effect of relational alternatives is only weak

30 30 Furthermore: –Relations with neighbors are weak, they belong to the weakest relationships individuals have –It is not necessary to have many neighborhood relationships for developing a sense of community –E.g., higher educated people have more relations with neighbors yet experience less community in their neighborhood –Effects of urbanization and migrants vanishes, if controlled for (a.o.) education

31 31 Community failure? Social and physical disorder in neighborhoods

32 32 Studies and arguments by Sampson, e.g. Sampson et al. 1997, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999 Popular idea (in criminology): social order is a consequence of physical order: e.g. broken window hypothesis (Wilson & Kling, 1982) Sampson c.s. : the correlation between physical and social order is spurious, it is influenced by another common condition, i.e. social control. Networks and community are a condition for informal control Background

33 33 Social and physical order in the neighborhoods are collective goods. Who sanctions those who do not contribute to the production of collective goods? This is known as a second order collective good problem (Coleman, 1990, 266 en passim).

34 34 Model of assumptions on neighborhoods and social and physical order Meeting places Networks Community Informal Control Physical order Social order

35 35 Analyses Description of all elements of the model Association between the different elements Multivariate multilevel regression model (controlling for age, sex, education, family situation)

36 36 Informal social control: Do you expect that people in your neighborhood do something, if they observe the following in the neighborhood: Yes, sureProbably yesProbably not Definitely not Children hanging around and skipping school Adolescents spraying graffiti on the walls Tough arguing Burglary Vandalizing cars of neighborhood inhabitant

37 37 Physical disorder (asked to the interviewers) What do you thing about the neighborhood of the respondent? Much/quite much disorder9.0% In between37.6% Tidy neighborhood36.9% Absolutely tidy neighborhood 16.4%

38 38 Social disorder: Is there sometimes vandalism in the neighborhood? Yes26.8 No, at least not often13.1 No, not that I noticed at any time60.1

39 39 Note: Low income neighborhoods create more community No strong correlation between social and physical order:.30 Ecometric analyses are partially done, no difference in conclusion Meeting places Networks Community Informal Control Physical order Social order.225 (.102)**.083 (.029)**.399 (.072)**.133 (.011)**.200 (.034)**

40 Neighbors in network CommunityControlSocial order Physical Order Meeting opportunities Yesyesyes, different effects: green vs pubs! yesYes, much green space Residential stability yes N of neighbors in network ---no Community--- yesno Control--- yes Most important conditions/associations (yes= significant association, while controlling for all other conditions) 40

41 41 Conclusion, so far Actual relations are not a necessary condition for community, as long as ties are not negative, weak ties are sufficient Conditions in neighborhoods and facilities/meeting opportunities are interesting conditions for relations, community, control as well as social/physical order

42 42 The effect of pubs, snack bars etc. on social and physical disorder is much greater than the effect of migrants! Community has no direct effect on disorder, the effect is indirect via social control and interventions of residents Why? Possibly, because members of a community do not necessarily conform to general norms, community norms can be different from general social norms Furthermore: 42

43 43 Policy measures should not focus on: Creation of cohesion and strong ties in neighborhoods Rather, they should aim at: Stimulating social control and intervening on behalf of common goods in public places Therefore: 43

44 Collective good production, trust and diversity in neighborhoods - the turtle effect

45 Three important contributions by Putnam Putnam on Making democracy work (1993). Putnam on The strange disappearance of social capital in America (1995) andBowling alone (2000). Putnam (2007) on Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. 45

46 E pluribus unum Three contributions of E pluribus unum –Shifting the problem from bowling alone to bowling apart. It matters who is bowling with whom! –New data allow for testing hypotheses on bridging and bonding, which could not yet be tested in bowling alone –Not only data on macro-phenomena but also micro level data in individual characteristics and behavior. 46

47 Bridging and bonding Different forms of social capital: Bridging and bonding ties to different others ties to similar others Both might have different consequences for individual action. Bridging and bonding show a positive correlation, according to Putnam 47

48 Claims of E Pluribus Unum (1) 1) Ethnic diversity will increase substantially in virtually all modern societies over the next several decades. Increased immigration and diversity are not only inevitable, but over the long run they are also desirable. Ethnic diversity is an important social asset. 48

49 Claim 2 and 3 2) In the short to medium run, however, immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital. 49 3) In the medium to long run, successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative.

50 Evidence presented is merely on claim 2: the undesirable consequences of diversity

51 Evidence (1) 51 Source: Putnam (2007)

52 Evidence (2) 52 Source: Putnam (2007)

53 Evidence (3) 53 Source: Putnam (2007)

54 Other evidence for claim 2 Diversity leads to –Lower confidence in local government –Lower political efficacy –Lower frequency of registering to vote –Less expectations regarding collective action –Less likelihood of giving ot charity and volunteering –Less close friends and confidants –Less happiness and lower perceived quality of life –More tv watching 54

55 Putnams explanatory idea: constrict theory Diversity triggers anomie and isolation - not ingroup/outgroup division There is no positive correlation between ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection, but a positive one between bridging and bonding Diversity leads to hunkering down, this is the turtle effect 55

56 Analysis provides us with a number of alternative explanations (eg. age, education, sex, Rs race, ownership, incoem, satisfaction with income) all of them not mentioned by Putnam, yet empirically considerably more important than ethnic diversity in a given area! 56

57 Analysis 57 Source: Putnam (2007)

58 Problems with Putnams arguments and analyses Turtle effect not analyzed! No analysis presenting trust against similar others! Macro/micro conclusions and micro/macro data – on which level are the hypotheses Herfindahl index knows problems 58

59 Microhypotheses in e pluribus unum are not tested If Putnam would have tested the implicit hypotheses about bridging capital, he would have done the following: a) trust of Whites to: Whites, Blacks, Asians and Latin people, b) trust of Blacks in: Whites, Blacks, Asians and Latin people, c) trust of Asians in: Whites, Blacks, Asians and Latin people, d) trust of Latin people in: Whites, Blacks, Asians and people. Instead: he has chosen a general dependent variable, which is not testing any of these hypotheses. 59

60 Micro/macro implications of arguments 1. more ethnic homogeneity – more trust This is not: 2. people of a certain ethnicity prefer to trust others who are ethnically similar to themselves (aggregation of 2 leads to 1 but 1 does not lead to 2) 60

61 Analyzing diversity Herfindahl index: 1-p i 2 IQV= index for qualitative variation : 1-p i 2 /(1-1/k) Where, k=n of categories and p=proportion of observations in category i Source: Agresti& Agresti 1977; Voas et al

62 Herfindahl Index Imagine four groups with the following distribution of social categories (in percent ) 62 Category:RedGreenYellowBlue Group Group Group Group

63 Herfindahl Index… … is the same for every distribution, yet socially this matters a lot! 63 Category:RedGreenYellowBlueHerfindahl index Group Group Group Group ((.25*.25)+(.50*.50)+(.10*.10)+(.15*.15))

64 Absolute group size in the population - resp. whether the number is on majority and or minority groups - is important and not taken into account in the index AND: it is important to which group an actor belongs, in order to determine whether a tie provides bridging or bonding social capital

65 How to proceed ? (1) Technically: –Do not use the index, but separate proportions –Include characteristics of ego as well as alter (who trusts who) –Calculate cross level interaction effects: individuals with a certain ethnicity in an area with a certain percentage of another ethnicity etc. –Take more characteristics than ethnicity into account 65

66 How to proceed? (2) Theoretically: –Bridging and bonding are relative to group size and individual characteristics –who puts trust in whom and how does this depend on context characteristics? E.g. do minority group members trust minority group members in areas where many majority group members live? –Take into account that identities are multiple, cleavages need be salient and this depends on, e.g. goals, tasks, interdependency 66

67 Multiple identities, faultlines and earthquakes… Lau and Murninghan (1998) argue that group conflict becomes much more likely if a group shows more faultlines, that is, the coincidence of certain categories. E.g: 67 Member 1Member 3 Member 4 Group 1 White, male, salesperson, Age 50 White, Male, Sales person Age 55 Black Female, Staff member Age 30 Black Female Staff member Age 34 Group 2 White Male Manager, age 60 Black Female Manager, age 20 Black male Secretary, age 40 Asian Female Sales, age 30 Group 1 knows more faultlines, but less diversity than group 2

68 Problem with own analyses Majority of respondents is Dutch (93%) Even more has mentioned only Dutch neighbors Therefore: similarity with regard to religion is used. However: religion not yet available as neighborhood characteristic Therefore: at the neighborhood level ethnicity in combination with income is used 68

69 Fixed partEmpty modelM1M2M3 Constant3.751 (.037)**3.774 (.036)**3.790 (.033)** NEIGHBORHOOD Urbanization.124 (.035)**.076 (.036)*.067 (.035)+ Stability.144 (.074)+.130 (.072)~ Lowest income quintile-.066 (.101) Second lowest income quintile.054 (.101) % Moroccans in neighbourhood-.106 (.033)** % Moroccans in lowest income quintile.089 (.082) % Moroccans in second lowest income quintile (.084)** 69 Multilevel analysis: trust in neighbors (SSND 2000 and macrolevel information) Note: it is controlled for respondents ethnicity

70 NEIGHBORHOOD Urbanization.026 (.034).024 (.034).037 (.034).035 (.034) Stability.038 (.073) )-.009 (.073) % Moroccans in lowest income quintile.050 (.080).044 (.080)-.045 (L.085)-.036 (.086) % Moroccans in second lowest income quintile )**-.162 (.081)*-.082 (.086)-.091 (.087) EGO Sex (female) (.032)**-.062 (.032) (.033) Age.150 (.032)**.147 (.032)**.118 (.032)**.116 (.032)** Education (.031)**-.066 (.032)*-.060 (.030)* Religion (no) (.032)**-.112 (.032)**-.091 (.033)**-.086 (.032)** Married.052 (.032)+.043 (.032).033 (.032).022 (.032) ALTER Married (alter).047 (.024)*.065 (.024)** Same sex.002 (.022)-.006 (.022)-.007 (.022) Same education.087 (.023)**.067 (.024)**.065 (.023)** Same age (+/-3 years).023 (.021).020(.022).017 (.022) same religion.137 (.054)**.154 (.055)**.155 (.055)** CONTACTS AMONG DIRECT NEIGHBORS.171 (031)**.200 (.036)** SAME RELIGION*CONTACTS (.058)* Multilevel analysis: conted

71 71 Interaction between similarity in religion and contact

72 Additional analyses: does contact among neighbors depend on similarity? NO! Odds for contacts among direct neighbors, depending on (a.o.) –Educational similarity: 1.22 –Religious similarity :1.048 –Same age: –Same sex: 1.25 –Note: odds are highest for Catholics (1.5)! 72

73 Conclusion Context effects on trust are weak Most important are contacts among direct neighbors. These contacts do not depend on similarity/diversity. Trust is predicted through individual characteristics - age and education, and through relational characteristics If context effects matter, however, segregation lines are more important than separate conditions 73

74 Thanks for your attention! ????...questions…????

75 75 How to build social capital? Ask neighbors for help and reciprocate Register to vote and vote Volunteer your special skills to an organization Mentor someone of a different ethnic or religious group Donate blood Join a gardening club Get to know your children's teachers Get to know the clerks and salespeople at your local stores Play cards with friends or neighbors Join or start a babysitting cooperative Participate in political campaigns Have family dinners and read to your children Stop and make sure the person on the side of the highway is OK Hold a neighborhood barbecue Say hello to strangers Be real. Be humble. Acknowledge others' self-worth Fix it even if you didnt break it Sing in a choir Call an old friend Avoid gossip Audition for community theater Bake cookies for new neighbors or work colleagues Hold a neighborhood barbecue Hire young people for odd jobs


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