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2010 NZ SCHOOLS and DECISION MAKING Gregory MacRae

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1 2010 NZ SCHOOLS and DECISION MAKING Gregory MacRae
SEE6 2011 Schools Workshop Tehran, Iran 2010 NZ SCHOOLS and DECISION MAKING Gregory MacRae

2 OUTLINE NZ School Seismic Risk
2) Use of a Scenario to as a Decision Tool for Earthquake Risk 3) University of Canterbury Recent Decisions with Earthquake Risk 4) Damage to Schools in the Canterbury Earthquakes

3 Acknowledgements to: Brian Mitchell, Ministry of Education
NZ School Seismic Risk It is an honour to be back in Myanmar again I will talk about I am representing WSSI and UC Acknowledgements to: Brian Mitchell, Ministry of Education

4 WHY SCHOOLS? Expensive, smelly they make us worry
Vulnerable, Our future By educating at school, can effect changes in rest of society

5 NZ SCHOOL BUILDINGS New Zealand has a wide variety of school building.
The, majority of school buildings are one- or two-storey braced timber-frame constructions with low vulnerability to earthquake damage. We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

6 NZ LEGAL FRAMEWORK The New Zealand Building Act regulates building design and construction. The Department of Building and housing administers this act and approves standards for loadings and all types of construction. Schools and other buildings must be designed and constructed, and inspected to ensure that they meet these standards. Design for ductility started in 1976 so buildings before this date were susceptible We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

7 NZ BUILDING VULNERABILITY
Mitchell et al. (2004) We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

8 MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK
Ministry of Education developed requirements to minimize building seismic risk involving review of: buildings of heavy construction (i.e. with concrete floors), and all buildings with major assembly areas, and school buildings with a heavy tile roof If buildings did not meet code levels (with 1.2 factor), they needed to be strengthened to those levels. In addition, - conventional timber-framed and floored school buildings with light roofing were reviewed against two-third threshold of the full requirement levels. - all other pre-1976 blocks containing at least two storeys were evaluated using a Rapid Evaluation (RE) We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

9 MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK
Implementation – to prevent life loss ( ) Ministry of Education commissioned a structural survey by registered engineers of all 21,100 individual buildings at 2,361 state schools Potential defects that required a more detailed investigation were identified The key finding of the survey: NZ school buildings and site structures were generally in sound structural condition given the size and diverse nature of the school property portfolio. Only four buildings were found to have an unacceptable level of structural risk. Corrective action was undertaken immediately. We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

10 MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK
Approximately 11% of the buildings were found to have at least one structural defect that required remedial work. Typical defects (Mitchell 2004): We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty

11 SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO - A Decision-Making Tool for Seismic Risk
It is an honour to be back in Myanmar again I will talk about I am representing WSSI and UC Acknowledgements to: The Seattle Fault Scenario Project Team

12 BACKGROUND 4 Loss ($$$) 3 Response 2b 2a Ground Motions 1 Faulting
Damage Death Downtime 3 Response 2b Surface Site R 2a Ground Motions Rock Fault Magnitude M 1 Faulting

13 How are these decisions made?
BACKGROUND 4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) 3 Controlling Response - Engineers How are these decisions made? 2b Surface Site R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists Rock Fault Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists

14 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
BACKGROUND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS To Perform Mitigation for a Future Disaster, the Decision-Maker must: (Based on Petak) 1) Be Aware of the Problem - E.g. Earthquake Based on - empirical evidence - studies (science/engineering) 2) Be Aware of Possible Solutions - E.g. Design/Retrofit Based on - empirical evidence - studies (engineering/science) 3) Be Prepared to Allocate Resources to address This Need, Rather than Competing Needs Greater demands on beams/columns Based on - evidence from technical experts - support from stakeholders - ability to raise necessary funds Lobbyists/Media are involved. It requires Policy

15 BACKGROUND POLICY ENGINEERING SCIENCE 2b 2a Ground Motions 1 Rupture
4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) POLICY ENGINEERING 3 Controlling Response - Engineers 2b Surface Site R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists Rock Fault Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists SCIENCE

16 Need to coordinate/communicate to: (a) Decide what should be done
BACKGROUND The Disconnect: Engineers/Scientists Decision Makers Need to coordinate/communicate to: (a) Decide what should be done + (b) Ensure it is done Engineers/Scientists/Planners are employed by working on a problem Top down approach

17 BACKGROUND Armenia, 1988 (EERI) Northridge, 1994 (EERI)

18 BACKGROUND Kobe, 1995 Turkey, 1999 EQE EERI, EQE

19 BACKGROUND Taiwan, 1999, (DRPI) Bhuj, 2001, (R. Goel)

20 Demonstration Building
BACKGROUND Good building codes Good structures = Base Isolated Demonstration Building Pelabuhan Ratu EERI, Taniwangsa

21 The Hierarchy of Denial
BACKGROUND The Hierarchy of Denial (Cowan 2011) It won’t happen Or If it does happen it won’t affect me Or, If it happens to me it won’t be too bad Or If it’s bad, there is nothing I can do SO ..... Why are you worrying me with this?” Engineers/Scientists/Planners are employed by working on a problem Top down approach

22 BACKGROUND Why is there a problem? - Different Priorities - Different Languages - Different Questions

23 Different Languages BACKGROUND E.g. Neotectonic Magnitude
Liquefaction potential Ductility Business Interruption Reinsurance Loss of market share

24 Different Questions/Culture
BACKGROUND Different Questions/Culture Scientists (e.g. Geologists/Seismologists) ask : - What? and Why? Engineers (e.g. Geotechnical and Structural) ask : - Why? and How? Planners ask : - How can we get a good consensus? Businesses ask : - Do I need to do anything? - Where are the facts in a form that I can understand so that I can make a decision as to what I can do?

25 BACKGROUND POLICY ENGINEERING SCIENCE 2b 2a Ground Motions 1 Rupture
4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery) POLICY ENGINEERING 3 Controlling Response - Engineers 2b Surface Site R 2a Ground Motions - Seismologists Rock Fault Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists SCIENCE

26 Why A Scenario? BACKGROUND A scenario is a story …… Types:
analytic physical manipulations We all grow up with stories Snow White, Cinderella, Rama and Cinta, King Noritar and King Jansetar in the Bagan dynasty Scenario studies are vivid and highlight strengths/weaknesses pertinent to future events help decision makers think through ramifications of events may provide fuel for stakeholders wanting change

27 BACKGROUND EERI wanted a methodology for Scenario development
Previous studies existed … e.g. Hayward Fault Scenario (EERI, 1996) …. but there have been changes since 1996 Increased knowledge about Seattle faults Better tools for estimating losses (e.g. HAZUS) The 2001 Nisqually earthquake affecting Seattle had just occurred Greater demands on beams/columns

28 BACKGROUND Greater demands on beams/columns

29 The result is a publication
THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO The result is a publication Greater demands on beams/columns

30 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
LOSSES: Deaths Deaths – > 1,600 Injuries – > 24,000 Damage Buildings destroyed – About 9,700. Buildings unsafe to occupy - About 29,000. Buildings with restricted use – About 150,000. Fires – ≈ 130, causing $500m loss Property and economic loss – About $33 billion Downtime Business Interruption - Months Full repair - Years Greater demands on beams/columns

31 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO PROJECT TEAM
Project coordination team - 12 volunteers Areas of expertise - Earthquake risk, emergency preparedness, lifelines, geotechnical engineering, management and decision making, planning, seismology, and structural engineering. Employment: - Consulting engineers, consulting planners, or as public servants with the University of Washington, National Science Foundation, Fire Department, City of Seattle Emergency Management, Washington Military Department Emergency Management or the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Greater demands on beams/columns

32 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
REPORT LAYOUT: Greater demands on beams/columns

33 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
REGIONAL FAULTS Greater demands on beams/columns

34 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
Expected Demands Greater demands on beams/columns

35 Scenario Shaking Intensities
THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO Scenario Shaking Intensities Greater demands on beams/columns

36 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS: WSDOT Bridge Group WSDOT Ferries Group A Port Authority Major Companies GENERAL INFORMATION: AUTHORS HAZUS - CENSUS - EXPERT OPINION QUALITY CONTROL: REVIEWERS Greater demands on beams/columns

37 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
Residential Housing Damage (HAZUS)

38 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
CALL TO ACTION Priority Recommendations : • Establish an Independent State Seismic Safety Board or Commission • Implement Risk Reduction Plan for Critical Public Facilities • Retrofit of High Risk Buildings • Protect the Transportation Infrastructure General Recommendations: i) Accelerate Earthquake Hazard Assessments, Geological Mapping and the Use of these Studies, ii) Develop Incentives for Increased Seismic Safety, iii) Expand Public Education Programs with Emphasis on Self-Sufficiency; iv) Enhance the Pacific Northwest Seismographic Network; v) Establish an Earthquake Information Clearinghouse. Greater demands on beams/columns

39 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION
THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO METHODS OF COMMUNICATION Technical Information - No technical jargon Executive Summary Detailed Information Glossy colour photos including damage - Regional damage after past earthquakes - Photos relevant to region or to similar situations General Interest Information in text boxes Non-Technical Information Prologue Introduces a school teacher, a businessman, a tourist, mother, etc. Chapter Introductions Describes what happens to these people as the day progresses It was apparent to Lisa and Marjorie Bona that they were not going to get home to Bainbridge Island; at this point, all they wanted was to escape from the horrors of the Alaskan Way Viaduct, portions of which lay amid twisted cars and bodies …… All transportation had stopped and they did not know what to do. Greater demands on beams/columns

40 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
MEASURES OF SUCCESS The impact of the scenario is quantified by - awareness raised regarding earthquake risk - activities initiated to better consider or manage earthquake risk which can be attributed in some part to the scenario effort. There were several presentations to interested groups (of up to 100 people including city organisations such as planners, engineers, fire, police, emergency responders, insurance underwriters) both during the development of the scenario, as well as after the scenario. At the rollout meeting in February 2004, 450 people from different professions attended. The local mayor spoke and the state governor’s office was represented.

41 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
MEASURES OF SUCCESS More than a dozen television and radio interviews and newspaper stories including a big multi-page feature story starting on the front page of the Sunday Seattle Times Presentations to interested groups Distribution of 4,100 reports. Downloadable copy at: Significant presentations were made to the Washington State Senate Transportation Committee and to the Puget Sound Region Freight Mobility Roundtable in Autumn 2004. Funding for renovation of the University of Washington Seismic Laboratory. The State Seismic Safety Committee was reconstituted. Washington State EMD used the scenario for its March 2006 response exercise. The City of Seattle proposal to analyze the cost effectiveness of retrofit investments Several presentations to interested groups (of up to 100 people including city organisations such as planners, engineers, fire, police, emergency responders, insurance underwriters) both during the development of the scenario, as well as after the scenario. At the rollout meeting in February 2004, 450 people from different professions attended. The local mayor spoke and the state governor’s office was represented.

42 Seattle Times Editorial - Wednesday, March 1, 2006 - 12:00 AM
THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO MEASURES OF SUCCESS Seattle Times Editorial - Wednesday, March 1, :00 AM Puget Sound's Katrina The fundamental lesson of the Gulf states' hurricane miseries is that the worst can happen. Puget Sound will be pummeled by storms and floods, but catastrophic earthquakes are the real natural menace here. These issues get to Puget Sound's economic survival and recovery. The failure of layers of government to talk and function after the hurricanes haunts the Gulf states. The Seattle Fault runs from Hood Canal in the west, through Puget Sound and south Seattle, and east through Bellevue and Issaquah roughly parallel to Interstate 90. Last year, a panel of experts looked at the region's earthquake hazards and picked this one to jolt the Bellevue gathering with an extreme disaster. Scenario losses include: 1,600 deaths; 24,000 injuries; 9,700 buildings destroyed; 29,000 buildings too damaged to occupy; 154,000 moderately damaged buildings with restricted use; and 130 fires. Estimated property damage and economic loss: about $33 billion. For the next two days, the thinking gets ramped up several grim notches to contemplate physical destruction and institutional failures that would have been unimaginable before Hurricane Katrina. Greater demands on beams/columns

43 THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO
MEASURES OF SUCCESS Planners were initially noticeably uninterested in the scenario until Hurricane Katrina. “They (the authorities) knew there was a problem, they knew that it was only a matter of time, and they did nothing!” Planners started to evaluate their own vulnerability and risks to natural hazard. American Planners Association is using this “window of awareness” to provide seminars on planning. The local APA branch is referencing the scenario document. Many communities, including smaller ones without large planning staff, are participating. Several presentations to interested groups (of up to 100 people including city organisations such as planners, engineers, fire, police, emergency responders, insurance underwriters) both during the development of the scenario, as well as after the scenario. At the rollout meeting in February 2004, 450 people from different professions attended. The local mayor spoke and the state governor’s office was represented.

44 SCENARIO CONCLUSIONS ● Communication between all stakeholders is important ● A scenario may be a useful tool leading to the implementation of earthquake disaster mitigation methods

45 UC RECENT DECISIONS WITH SEISMIC RISK
It is an honour to be back in Myanmar again I will talk about I am representing WSSI and UC

46 Canterbury Earthquakes
BACKGROUND Canterbury Earthquakes Saturday 4 September 2010, 4:40am M7.1 40km West of Christchurch to 20km West of Christchurch PGA in CBD: About 0.23g Casualties: 0 2. Tuesday 22 February 2011, 12:50pm M6.3 8km South of Christchurch PGA in CBD: About 0.50g Casualties: 183 + many significant aftershocks Engineers/Scientists/Planners are employed by working on a problem Top down approach

47 BACKGROUND Things not discussed: - Decision making tools
- Extended Direct Analysis - 47

48 BACKGROUND Christchurch Botanical Gardens Records N-S W-E V
Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - Christchurch Botanical Gardens Records (From Brendon Bradley, U. Canterbury, New Zealand) 48

49 Canterbury Earthquakes
BACKGROUND Canterbury Earthquakes Engineers/Scientists/Planners are employed by working on a problem Top down approach 4 September February 2011

50 - As described by Jeff Clendon
FIVE STEP PROCESS - As described by Jeff Clendon Rapid Damage Assessment 2A. Structural System Evaluation for Damage 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation 3. Life Safety Systems Evaluation 4. Remediation (i.e. Hazard Removal) 5. Building WOF Led by Facilities Management + Jeff Clendon (Holmes Consulting) Many engineers participating from BECA, GHD, Holmes, UoC …. Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 50

51 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)
External and internal walk-through inspection for obvious damage that could limit access Tagging Red, Orange, Green For similar level of shaking to that experienced 51

52 FIVE STEP PROCESS For similar level of shaking to that experienced 52

53 FIVE STEP PROCESS For similar level of shaking to that experienced 53

54 FIVE STEP PROCESS For similar level of shaking to that experienced 54

55 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)
For similar level of shaking to that experienced 55

56 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)
For similar level of shaking to that experienced 56

57 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2A. Structural System Evaluation for Damage
(Weeks 2-3) Detailed evaluation of structural damage in all buildings - Locations of potential damage identified from plans - Involved - inspection of ceiling spaces - removal of wall linings - lifting of carpets, etc. Revised tagging Red, Orange, Green Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 57

58 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6) Life safety check of all UC buildings under a bigger earthquake (CTV Building Issue) - All buildings rated in terms of risk: H – High risk M – Medium Risk L – Low Risk This involves inspecting all buildings and going through plans plus some simple analysis. Brittle failure modes of special concern. Some relatively undamaged buildings which failed this check are: - Siemon building (which poses a threat to other buildings) - Jack Mann auditorium (Dovedale campus) - UCSA Building Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 58

59 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6) CTV Building Issue Not damaged in 9/2010 M7.1 earthquake People were permitted to go back to work Collapse occurred in 2/2011 M6.3 earthquake (117 deaths/183) ((117earthquakeinhttp://www.bing.com/images/search?q=ctv+building&view=detail&id=D08AF3EC98D82EA260818F D30F5BA5A2&first=31&FORM=IDFRIR Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - LifeStream/timthumb.php?src=http://project7.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/CIMG1586_ctv.jpg&w=580&zc=1 59

60 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6) Some drawings Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 60

61 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6) Some drawings Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 61

62 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 3. Life Safety System Evaluations Electrical
HVAC Sprinklers Firewalls Water/Toilets Data Systems, etc. Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 62

63 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 4. Remediation (i.e. Hazard Removal)
Major risk issues identified in Steps 1 – 3 including: - Ceiling tiles (All heavy tiles throughout the university are being replaced with much lighter tiles) - Major seismic joint effects on passage e.g. top of stairs, between different buildings - Structural issues Note: Some minor issues such as gypsum board cracking, left for later work Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 63

64 FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 5. Building Warrant-of-Fitness (WOF)
Tasks in Steps 1-4 are reviewed and actions approved This is conducted by an independent consultant (SGS) who: - Reviews Step 2 and 3 reports - Reviews remediation carried out Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 64

65 FIVE STEP PROCESS Additional issues:
Inspections made of alternative teaching premises E.g. Avonhead Baptist Church Mandeville Houses Etc., Etc. Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 65

66 FIVE STEP PROCESS Result of 5 step process:
An overall reduction in risk for staff and students with: - remediation work, and - high risk buildings (Step 2B) not occupied Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 66

67 SOME UC STRUCTURES James Height Building:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg) Some damage where the building is tied together at levels 2 and 4. Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 67

68 SOME UC STRUCTURES Mushroom:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg) Some rotation and movement affecting linkage structures, Step 2B issues Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 68

69 SOME UC STRUCTURES Registry Building:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg) Some beam-column joint damage, basement damage + 2B issues. Repair/retrofit of Law building is possible 69

70 SOME UC STRUCTURES Commerce Building: Atrium Damage
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg) Atrium Damage East Stairwell damage 2B issues Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 70

71 SOME UC STRUCTURES Boiler chimney: Behaved well Some slight cracking
Some existing cracks enlarged Cracks are being grouted Environmental concrete damage is being repaired Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 71

72 SOME UC STRUCTURES Boilerhouse: Red tagged Roof issues
Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 72

73 SOME UC STRUCTURES Law Building: Step 1 – OK Green
Step 2A/2B – OK Green Step 3 – Cracking of floor found under carpet Orange Things not discussed: - Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 73

74 SOME UC STRUCTURES Tent teaching: Things not discussed:
- Decision making tools - Extended Direct Analysis - 74

75 UC Update – 11 May 2011 “More than 200 of 240 campus structures have now been approved for general access. By the end of May relatively few buildings will remain closed to general access. Those still subject to investigation and ‘make safe’ remediation in June are likely to include: Law (early June access); Erskine faculty offices; Engineering College Office, E1 & E4; Student Services Centre; Warehouse; Science Lecture Theatre (7 lecture theatres); Registry; UCSA; parts of the Recreation Centre (Sports Science and Offices); Te Pourewa; Wheki; Commerce; Siemon; EPS Library; Engineering Mushroom; Hydrology Tower; Ilam Homestead. The Business Recovery Group continues to focus on opening teaching, study, and laboratory spaces and social spaces for students. “Work related to remediation is underway in 17 buildings on site. More than 200 Hawkins staff and sub-contractors are on site and there are four full-time project managers assigned to earthquake remediation project management. We have eight engineers on site dedicated to assessment, remediation design and oversight, with others off-site undertaking modelling and support.  “Any discussion of “relocating the University” has to take account of the fact that no buildings fell down and at this stage none have been condemned. In addition,  72 per cent of our students live within 2.5 km of the University and Halls of Residence provide accommodation for more than 1,000 students. The 87 ha campus is fit for purpose and this week more than 2,000 programmes and courses were being delivered by the University of Canterbury. The University is well on the way to being back in business with the James Hight Library due for re-opening by end of this month and all but a few special purpose laboratories are already accessible for general use.” UC Press Release

76 TYPICAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS TYPICAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES F IO LS NC Target Performance(?) FE DBE MCE Prior to presenting the research program it is beneficial to review the performance requirements for new and existing reinforced concrete buildings. Thought of in context of PBSD, the building performance is descirbed by numerous performance objectives. Pairing a performance level, describe by the building damage or required reair, and the seismic hazard level describes the performance objective. However, for our existing structures, these performance objectives are not known. Joe’s Beer! Food! Joe’s Beer! Food! Joe’s Beer! Food! Ref: Ron Hamburger, FEMA273 76

77 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS LOW DAMAGE STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS
Elastically Responding b) Base isolated c) Supplementally damped d) Post-tensioned beam e) Rocking f) Friction g) Other devices I want to tell you a story 77

78 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Concrete post-tensioned beam systems 78
E.g. VUW Campus, Wellington, March Dunning-Thornton (Cattenach), Concrete Structure 78 78

79 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Steel low damage systems
A. LEAD DISSIPATOR: with Mander, Chase, Dhakal and Mander Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early 79

80 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Steel low damage systems
B. SLIDING HINGE JOINT CONCEPT Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early MacRae et al. 2010 80

81 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS DETAILS:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap 81

82 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 1 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 1 82

83 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 2 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 2 83

84 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 3 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 3 84

85 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 4 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 4 85

86 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 5 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 5 86

87 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 6 Deformations:
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early Don’t forget the gap Column Force Displacement 6 87

88 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS 310UC158 DETAILS: 1.5m 2.0m 360UB44.7
Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early 2.0m 360UB44.7 Mackinven and MacRae, 2006 88

89 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Steel Shims 89

90 MINIMAL DAMAGE (to connection and frame) LOW COST (and not patented)
LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS SHJ BEHAVIOUR MINIMAL DAMAGE (to connection and frame) LOW COST (and not patented) RECENTERING CHARACTERISTICS ISSUES CONSTRUCTION TOLERANCES DURABILITY Connection strength may be up to about 67% of the plastic section strength - Yield doesn’t occur early 90

91 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Courtesy: Darrin Bell of Connell-Wagner, 2007
The Sliding Hinge Joint (SHJ) moment connection has: Excellent Performance Minimal Damage to joint and to frame Low Cost Steel, brass or aluminium shims may be used A method for design is available The SHJ is already used in NZ construction Courtesy: Darrin Bell of Connell-Wagner, 2007 91

92 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Courtesy: Geoff Sidwell, Aurecon
The Sliding Hinge Joint (SHJ) moment connection has: Excellent Performance Minimal Damage to joint and to frame Low Cost Steel, brass or aluminium shims may be used A method for design is available The SHJ is already used in NZ construction Courtesy: Geoff Sidwell, Aurecon 92

93 LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS Timber LVL system
The Sliding Hinge Joint (SHJ) moment connection has: Excellent Performance Minimal Damage to joint and to frame Low Cost Steel, brass or aluminium shims may be used A method for design is available The SHJ is already used in NZ construction 93

94 DAMAGE TO SCHOOLS IN THE RECENT CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKES
It is an honour to be back in Myanmar again I will talk about I am representing WSSI and UC

95 Hallswell Primary After September 2010 earthquake:

96 St Margaret’s College After February 2011 earthquake:

97 Christ's College From Dreamstime.com

98 Avonside Girl’s High School
After February 2011 earthquake:

99 Avonside Girl’s High School
After February 2011 earthquake:

100 Avonside Girl’s High School
After February 2011 earthquake:

101 Avonside Girl’s High School
After February 2011 earthquake:

102 Linwood North School

103 Aranui High School

104 Aranui High School

105 Aranui Primary School

106 South New Brighton School

107 Mount Pleasant School

108 Redcliffs School

109 Over 15,000 students were effected by the earthquake …..
Christchurch Schools Over 15,000 students were effected by the earthquake ….. (Daily telegraph)

110 Questions?

111


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