1. What You Need to Know About
U.S. Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Laws
Nov. 14, 2006

2. Why is This Important?
Supports the U.S. Government’s objectives of protecting U.S. national security and furthering foreign policy interests
Establishes the university as a “good corporate citizen”
Avoids reputational harm and adverse publicity
Don’t want to see headlines “UofA and its Researcher Caught Releasing Sensitive Technology”

3. Why is This Important?
Avoids severe criminal and civil penalties for the institution and the individuals involved
Civil penalties up to $500,000
Criminal penalties including fines of up to $1 million and jail time
Suspension/Denial of Export Privileges
Could have an adverse impact on government contracts

4. Are Universities Targeted?
State/Commerce/Defense Depts. are focused on universities
GAO conducted visits
IG report highlighted export control issues
Treasury Dept. has fined universities for sanctions violations involving Cuba, Iran and Sudan
E.g., UCLA, Pace Univ., Frederick Taylor Univ.

5. What are Export Controls?
US laws that regulate the transfer of items, technology, software, and services
Other countries have similar laws
Apply to all activities with foreign persons and foreign countries – not just sponsored research projects

6. How Does This Affect UofA?
Many activities qualify for an exception
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189:
“Fundamental research means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.”

7. How Does This Affect UofA?
Thus, not all research activities are exempt
Export controls may restrict:
Ability of foreign students or researchers to participate in research
Ability to provide services (including training in the use of equipment) to foreign persons
Ability to send equipment, spare/replacement parts, technology or software to foreign countries
Ability to collaborate with researchers in foreign countries

8. What is an Export?
Physical transfers of tangible items outside the U.S.
Electronic or digital transfers of software or technical data outside the U.S.
Release or disclosure of software or technical data to any foreign person by , Internet, phone/fax, in-person (oral) communication, or visual inspection
Application of technical data abroad

9. What Else is an Export?
“Deemed Export” -- disclosure of technical data or software source code to a non-U.S. person in the United States (including foreign embassy staff)
This transfer is “deemed” to be an export to his/her home country
Reexport -- an export of a U.S.-origin item, software or technology from one foreign country to another
U.S. laws “follow” the item

10. Who is a U.S. Person? U.S. person Everyone else is a “foreign person”
Everyone who is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. legal permanent resident (“green card” holder) or an asylee/refugee
Not F-1, J-1, H-1B, O-1 visa holders
A U.S. corporation, partnership, trust, society or other entity incorporated or organized to do business in the United States
Everyone else is a “foreign person”
Special rules apply to “dual nationals”
E.g., a citizen of China who also is a Canadian citizen

11. Structure of U.S. Export Controls
Treasury Department: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Defense Department
(DOD)
Economic Sanctions: Countries, Entities, and Individuals
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
Commerce Department: Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
State Department: Directorate of Trade Controls (DTC)
Additional U.S. Government agencies with possible jurisdiction over export activities include the Department of Energy (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Food and Drug Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
“dual use”/ commercial
military use

12. What is Subject to the ITAR?
Broad restrictions on exports, reexports, imports, proposals to sell and brokering
Defense Articles
Technical Data
Defense Services
Items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)

13. What is a Defense Article?
Any item listed on the USML
Includes raw materials, components, parts, software, and related technical data (i.e., not just end products)
Any item specifically designed, developed or modified for a military application

14. What are Some Examples? USML examples include:
Launch vehicles, missiles, rockets
Military aircraft and vehicles
Military training and simulation
Military electronics
Toxicological agents, including chemical and biological agents, and associated equipment
Spacecraft systems and satellites

15. Broad scope What is Technical Data?
Information required for design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of Defense Articles

16. What is a Defense Service?
Furnishing of assistance or training to a Foreign Person in the design, development, engineering, production, assembly, testing, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, or modification of Defense Articles

17. How Strict are ITAR Controls?
VERY!
Almost all ITAR activities require a license from the US Govt. prior to engaging in the controlled activity
Even proposals are regulated—for example, proposals to a country subject to a U.S. arms embargo are prohibited

18. Which are ITAR Proscribed Countries?
Afghanistan
Haiti
Rwanda
Belarus
Indonesia
Somalia
Burma
Iran
Sudan
China
Iraq
Syria
D.R. of Congo (former Zaire)
Ivory Coast
Venezuela
Vietnam
Liberia
Yemen
Cuba
Libya
Zimbabwe

19. What is Subject to the EAR?
Items not on the USML
Items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) including commercial as well as “dual-use” goods, software and technology

20. What is on the CCL? Ten categories:
0-Nuclear Materials, Facilities & Equipment (and Miscellaneous Items)
1-Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and Toxins
2-Materials Processing
3-Electronics Design, Development and Production
4-Computers
5-Telecommunications and Information Security
6-Sensors and Lasers
7-Navigation and Avionics
8-Marine
9-Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles and Related Equipment

21. What is Export Classification?
If an item appears on the CCL, it will be assigned a five digit alpha-numeric Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”)
Each ECCN dictates where an item can be exported

22. What are Some Examples? ECCN Examples:
3C003 covers the following “organo-inorganic compounds”
Organo-metallic compounds of aluminium, gallium or indium having a purity (metal basis) better than %
Organo-arsenic, organo-antimony and organo-phosphorus compounds having a purity (inorganic element basis) better than %
6A002 covers a number of “optical sensors” including
“Space-qualified” solid-state optical detectors
Pyroelectric detectors using enumerated materials
Non-”space-qualified” focal plane arrays with specified characteristics
Monospectral imaging sensors and multispectral imaging sensors having any of the enumerated characteristics
ECCN 3C003 is controlled for NS and AT reasons
ECCN 6A002 is controlled for NS, MT, CC, RS, AT, UN reasons

23. What is Known as “EAR99”?
If an item does not have a specific entry on the CCL, it falls into the basket category, known as “EAR99”
EAR99 items are subject to minimal export controls
Exception: the terrorist supporting countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria) and U.S. Government restricted persons and end-uses

24. Who are Restricted Persons?
BIS designates persons and entities with whom certain transactions are restricted (i.e., a license generally is required) or are prohibited altogether:
Entity List
Denied Persons List
Unverified List
Entity List
Non-U.S. end users involved in proliferation activities
Currently includes entities in China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and Syria
Denied Persons List
Persons who have been denied export privileges due to unauthorized or illegal export conduct
Currently includes entities and persons in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, U.A.E., Pakistan and Russia, among other countries
Unverified List
Foreign persons who in the past were parties to a transaction with respect to which Commerce Department could not conduct a pre-license check or a post-shipment verification for reasons outside of the U.S. Government’s control

25. Who are Restricted Persons?
What do these four entities have in common?
Beijing Huahang Radio Measurements Research Institute in China
Bharat Dynamics Limited in India
Al Kayali Corporation in Richardson, Texas
Arrow Electronics Industries in the UAE
All four entities appear on one of the BIS restricted parties lists

26. Is a License Always Required?
Most items controlled under the EAR do not require an export license
A license to export or reexport items may be required based on:
Export classification of the item or technology
Destination country
Identity of the intended recipient (“end user”)

27. When Do Universities Need an Export License?
When making shipments of controlled items or software outside the U.S.
Transferring controlled technical information and software source code to a foreign person in the U.S. or abroad, unless an exclusion applies

28. What are the Exclusions?
A license is not required if one of four exclusions applies:
Education Exclusion
“Public Domain” Exclusion
“Fundamental Research” Exclusion
Employment Exclusion (ITAR only)

29. 1. Education Exclusion
Information concerning general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly taught in colleges or universities
Applies to information released during catalog-listed courses at UofA (through lectures, course materials, or instruction in laboratories)

30. 2. “Public Domain” Exclusion
Information generally accessible to the public in any form, including information:
readily available at libraries open to the public or at university libraries
in patents and published patent applications available at any patent office
released at an open conference, meeting, seminar, trade show, or other open gathering
published in periodicals, books, print, electronic, or other media available for general distribution (including websites that provide free uncontrolled access) or for distribution to a community of persons interested in the subject matter, such as those in a scientific or engineering discipline, either free or at a price that does not exceed the cost of reproduction and distribution

31. 3. “Fundamental Research” Exclusion
Information arising during or resulting from:
Basic and applied research in science and engineering
At an accredited US institution of higher learning
Where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community

32. “Fundamental Research” (cont’d)
Distinguished from proprietary research or industrial design or development, where research results are restricted for proprietary or specific national security reasons
Federal government and commercial sponsors of university research increasingly are inserting export-control related clauses in agreements
Prepublication approval, citizenship requests, non-disclosure restrictions
EAR contains these limited exceptions for prepublication review. ITAR is less clear (its language prohibits any restriction on publication of information resulting from the research; if prepublication review is limited to input data for proprietary/IP reasons, then arguably it is not a restriction on the information resulting from the research)

33. The Fundamental Research Exclusion Does Not Apply if
UofA accepts any contract clause, for example, that:
Forbids / restricts the participation of foreign persons
Gives the sponsor a right to approve publications resulting from the research
Restricts access to and disclosure of research results

34. U.S. Govt. Funded Research
Special rules apply to research funded by the U.S. Government when there are specific access and dissemination controls protecting information resulting from the research
ITAR-controlled: Not “fundamental research” if such controls are accepted
EAR-controlled: May still qualify for the “fundamental research” exclusion under certain circumstances

35. Prepublication Review
UofA could accept prepublication review provisions and still claim the exclusion for the research results if the review is solely to ensure that publication:
Would not divulge proprietary information that the sponsor provided to UofA researchers
Would not compromise patent rights and it only causes a temporary delay in publication

36. “Fundamental Research” & Input Data
If, however, UofA
accepts such prepublication review, or
agrees that the sponsor may withhold from publication some or all of the information it provided to UofA
Then the information provided by the sponsor to UofA (“input data”) could be export controlled
UofA would have to assess the export classification of the input data and prevent its “deemed” export to a foreign person on the project
E.g., maybe only PI needs access to the input data

37. You Should Watch Out For
“Side deals” between a PI and Sponsor that may destroy the fundamental research exclusion
Presence of or access to “classified information” during research—special rules apply and only U.S. citizens can receive it
Items, software or materials that arise from research do not qualify for this exclusion and a license may be required for export outside the US

38. Case Study # 1
Q. UofA enters into a cooperative research arrangement with a US company and the research would be conducted at UofA’s lab. UofA has agreed to a prepublication review so that the company could decide whether to hold the research results as trade secrets (or otherwise proprietary) or whether to allow UofA to publish the results. Can my student from China work in the lab?

39. Case Study # 1 (cont’d)
A. First, the research would not qualify as “fundamental” because the sponsor has the right prevent publication (there is no intent to publish at the time of entry into the agreement). Second, if UofA received any proprietary or confidential information from the company (input data), you would need to determine the export classification of such data in order to determine whether a license is required, or a license exception is available, for China. Third, perform the same analysis for the research results (even if there was no input data).

40. Case Study # 1 (cont’d)
Q. What if the prepublication review was intended solely to prevent inadvertent disclosure of proprietary information or to avoid compromising patent rights?
A. That changes the outcome. Such prepublication review does not destroy the fundamental research exclusion. You could involve the Chinese student on the project, provided that UofA has not agreed to any other restrictions (e.g., access by foreign persons etc.) and that the input data is not controlled for export to China, if the student even needs access to such data. If the input data is controlled for China, you would need to determine if a license exception is available and, if not, UofA would need to restrict the student’s access to the input data.

41. Case Study # 2
Q. What if a non-US company is funding the research at UofA and there are no prepublication restrictions but there is a requirement that UofA researchers do some work at the foreign company’s facility abroad?

42. Case Study # 2 (cont’d)
A. You should be very careful. Application abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in the US constitutes an “export” of that knowledge / experience and such export may be controlled under the EAR. If the project is ITAR-controlled, you could be providing a Defense Service, which generally requires a license. You would need to determine the proper export classification and assess whether a license is required, or a license exception is available, for that particular foreign country.

43. Case Study # 3
Q. On a DOD-funded project, UofA accepts certain national security controls (90-day prepublication review and DOD approval before any foreign national is assigned to the project). Does the information resulting from the research qualify for the “fundamental research” exclusion?
A. If the project is subject to the ITAR, the exclusion is not available. If, however, the project is subject to the EAR and you abide by the specific controls you have agreed to, the export of information consistent with the controls will still qualify for the “fundamental research” exclusion.
Example: you asked for DOD’s permission before assigning an Indian student to work on the project and the DOD approved his/her participation. You then gave DOD 90 days to review the results before publication. You have complied with the controls and the fundamental research would apply with respect to any “deemed” export to the Indian student.

44. Case Study # 3 (cont’d)
Q. What if the agreed controls did not ask for DOD approval prior to assignment of foreign persons but rather had an explicit prohibition on participation of anyone who was not a U.S. citizen?
A. Foreign persons could not participate and must not have access to the data. Fundamental research exclusion does not apply.

45. 4. Employment Exclusion
No license is required to share ITAR-controlled technical information with a foreign person who
Is a full-time, bona fide regular UofA employee (generally not applicable to graduate or undergraduate students)
Has a permanent place of abode in the U.S. while employed
Is not a national of an ITAR proscribed country, and
Is advised in writing not to share ITAR-controlled information with other foreign persons

46. What About Equipment Use?
Use of Equipment vs. “Use” Data
For limited types of equipment, the US Govt. restricts the transfer of information related to its “use”
Commerce Dept.: interprets “use” to mean “operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul and refurbishing” so only data related to all 6 activities would need an EAR license
State Dept.: all “use” data is restricted

47. Case Study # 4
Q. I work on a research project involving semiconductors and want to involve my students from India and S. Korea. Students will work with me to come up with a solution to a problem that has been identified in literature and we intend to publish all of our results. Do I need an export license to brainstorm with students and have them help me resolve the technical problem?
A. No.

48. Case Study # 4 (cont’d)
Q. I would also like my students to maintain the equipment (a frequency changer operating in the Hz range with total harmonic distortion below 10% and frequency control better than 1%). Can I instruct them on how to operate and maintain the equipment?
A. Yes, provided that you do not also provide the Indian student information on installation, repair, overhaul and refurbishing of the equipment (which would, in total, constitute “use” data). The S. Korean student could even receive use data because it is not controlled for export to S. Korea.
Equipment is listed under 3A225 (subject to NP controls); 3E201 controls technology (“use” data) for such equipment
NP controls do not restrict exports to S. Korea but do restrict to India

49. What If I Do Need to Transfer Abroad?
A license is required to ship or otherwise transfer items, technical data and software, or provide services, controlled by ITAR to any foreign country (few exclusions or exceptions)
A license may be required to transfer items, technology or software controlled under the EAR out of the US depending on the export classification, where it is being sent, who is the end-user, and whether an exception applies
Replacement or spare parts may require a separate license, even if the initial equipment was exported pursuant to a valid license

50. Transfers Abroad cont’d
The process to classify equipment, technology and software under the EAR is tedious, detailed and time consuming
It can take months to obtain a license from State or Commerce

51. What are the “Red Flags”?
UofA must take into account “red flags” -- any abnormal circumstances that indicate inappropriate end-use, end-user, or destination
When red flags are raised, there is a duty to investigate before proceeding

52. What are Some Examples?
Other party reluctant to offer information about end-use or end-user
When questioned, the recipient is evasive and/or unclear about whether the product is for domestic use, for export, or for reexport
Product’s capabilities do not fit the recipient’s line of business
The shipping route is abnormal for the product and destination
The item ordered is incompatible with the technical level of the country to which it is being shipped

53. Proposal Stage: Compliance Issue-Spotting
Does the Project involve
Shipping equipment to a foreign country?
Collaborating with foreign colleagues in foreign countries?
Training foreign researchers in using equipment outside the classroom?
Working with a country subject to US sanctions?
Is the RFP marked “Export Controlled” or does it reference “Classified Information”?
Is the sponsor demanding pre-approval rights over publications or the participation of foreign national students?

54. If you answer yes…
A determination must be made by UofA as to possible license requirements
Note 1: If license is needed it takes much time and effort of faculty and administrators and can be months in process
Note 2: These laws apply to all activities – not just sponsored projects

55. License Example University archeologists desire to take GPS
systems to France to use in training foreign
colleagues
GPS equipment is covered by EAR Category 7, Navigation and Avionics, under ECCN nos. 7A005, 7A105, and 7A994. Two of those entries redirect the exporter to ITAR
The exporter must evaluate the EAR entries and ITAR Category XV, Spacecraft Systems and Associate Equipment, to identify the appropriate licensing authority and classification

56. Accepting Export Controlled Information
In deciding whether to accept an award that requires the institution to receive export controlled information, consider whether the information is
Central to the project (probably rendering the entire project export controlled) or
Tangential in that the PI needs the information but not others working on the project

57. Accepting Export Controlled Information (cont’d)
If you decide the information is tangential
Work with RSSP/General Counsel to put in place a nondisclosure agreement prior to receiving the information
Require that the information be clearly marked “export controlled”
Work with the PI to safeguard the information and have the PI sign a statement accepting responsibility for protecting the information
A U.S. person may receive the information but the right to publish must remain unrestricted

58. Accepting Export Controlled Information (cont’d)
Contact RSSP if:
you agreed to receive controlled information to determine compliance issues
you are aware that UofA has accepted controlled information or signed DoD form DD2345 (Militarily Critical Technical Data Agreement)
Acceptance creates compliance issues for individuals and the university

59. What are Economic Sanctions?
US laws that prevent target countries, entities and persons from benefiting from U.S. capital, goods, technology or services
US sanctions prohibit a wide range of transactions with designated countries, entities and persons

60. What is Prohibited?
U.S. persons (incl. UofA and its faculty and staff) generally may not, without a license or other authorization:
Export/import goods, services, or technology to/from, or enter into a contract involving, or otherwise provide services to, a sanctioned country, entity, or individual
Engage in any transaction with persons/entities designated by the U.S. Government as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)
Approve or facilitate any of the above
Evade provisions of the sanctions regulations

61. How Can This Affect Research?
UofA researchers can encounter sanctions issues by:
Conducting surveys and interviews in sanctioned countries
Hiring persons in sanctioned countries to perform services for UofA such as research or field work
Collaborating on research projects with persons or entities from sanctioned countries
Providing marketing or business services to persons or entities in sanctioned countries
Creating materials at the request of a person or entity from a sanctioned country

62. Which Countries are Sanctioned?
Currently U.S. sanctions apply to:
Comprehensive: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria
Limited: Burma (Myanmar), Iraq, Liberia, North Korea
Non-territorial: Belarus, Côte D’Ivoire, D.R. of Congo, Zimbabwe
Restrictions are country-specific and vary considerably

63. What About Travel?
In general, only travel to Cuba is restricted (trips have to be authorized by OFAC)
Trips to other sanctioned countries should be reviewed due to the restrictions on activities and expenditures
Also, the ability to take along certain items (e.g., laptops, testing equipment) is restricted

64. OFAC Case Study
Q. I am working on a research project and need empirical data regarding the growth rate of a rare plant in Sudan. I know a research institute in Sudan and want to hire their researcher to observe the plant and record the results. Can I do this?
A. Not without a specific license. OFAC regulations prohibit the importation of services from Sudan. By hiring a person in Sudan to perform the work, you would be importing his/her services, which is prohibited under U.S. law (even if he/she is not an SDN of Sudan)
Q. Can I go myself and watch the plant grow?
A. Yes. Travel to Sudan is not prohibited. However, if you need to take your laptop or technical information related to your research, you need to analyze sanctions and export control law provisions to determine whether such export is permitted (e.g., whether the laptop contains encryption software etc.)

65. Who are SDNs?
List of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) – more than 6,000 entries for individuals and entities with whom transactions are prohibited, including:
Terrorists and sponsors of terrorist activities
Narcotics traffickers and kingpins
Agents of sanctioned country governments and
Weapons proliferators
The SDN list changes frequently due to new designations by the US Government

66. Who are SDNs?
The vast majority of the SDNs are located outside the United States. However:
Some of the SDNs are located in the United States (e.g., Richard A. Chichakli in TX, AERO Continente Inc. in FL, Al-Haramain (US branch) in OR, Ash Trading Inc. in FL, IAC International Inc. in FL, Sepulveda-Iragorri Inc. in FL)
Some of the SDNs have U.S. Soc. Sec. numbers (e.g., Julio C. Flores Monroy, Raed M. Hijazi, Abu Ahmad) or were born in the United States (e.g., Abdul Rahman Taha)
All citizens of Cuba (except those in the United States) and all entities owned or controlled by the Cuban Government or citizens of Cuba are considered SDNs, even though not specifically named on the SDN list

67. What About Peer Review?
OFAC general licenses authorize U.S. persons to engage in certain activities related to the publishing of articles authored by persons in Cuba, Iran and Sudan.
Collaborating on the creation and enhancement of written publications
Augmenting and substantive editing of written publications
However, cannot engage in transactions involving:
Retention of a publishing house or a translator in one of those countries, with limited exceptions
Goods or services not necessary and ordinarily incident to publishing (e.g., accounting, legal, design or consulting services)
The development, production, design or marketing of software
The sanctioned country government or its agencies (excluding academic or research institutions and their personnel)
ITAR-controlled technology or export information controlled under the ITAR or the EAR
Exception to the prohibition on retention of a publishing house or translator in a sanctioned country: if the activity is primarily for the dissemination of written publication within the sanctioned country.

68. What are Anti-Boycott Regulations?
UofA cannot participate in boycotts not sanctioned by the U.S. Government
Primarily the Arab League boycott of Israel
The following countries are currently listed as maintaining a boycott against Israel
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, U.A.E.

69. What are Some Examples?
Examples of requests to participate in boycotts
A purchase order asking for confirmation that the goods are not manufactured in Israel
A bill of lading stating that goods being shipped to the U.A.E. will not be boarded onto a vessel owned by an Israeli entity
A Letter of Credit requiring a certification that UofA is not “blacklisted”
A lease agreement for premises in Saudi Arabia requiring UofA to certify that none of its employees are Israeli
There are complicated, fact-specific exceptions in the regulations

70. What Should You Do?
If you believe you have received a boycott related request, contact RSSP immediately
Don’t respond in any way until authorized
Even responding to a request with a “no” can be a violation
UofA must report requests (even if the university does not respond) to the Commerce Dept. and include information on tax filings to the IRS

71. Liability for Violations
Liability is personal and institutional and may take the form of:
Administrative penalties
Monetary fines
Jail time
Voluntary disclosure of violations may serve as a “mitigating factor” in deciding penalties

72. Administrative Penalties
Termination of export privileges
Suspension and/or debarment from government contracting

73. Penalties for EAR Violations
Criminal (willful) violations:
Up to $1 million for institutions
Up to $250K per violation for individuals and/or up to 20 years in prison
Civil violations:
Up to $50K per violation for individuals or institutions

74. Penalties for ITAR Violations
Criminal (willful) violations:
Up to $1 million for institutions
Up to $1 million per violation for individuals and/or up to 10 years in prison
Civil violations:
Up to $500K per violation for individuals or institutions

75. Penalties for OFAC Violations
Criminal (willful) violations:
Maximum fine of $250K for individuals (including corporate officers) and/or 20 years imprisonment ($5 million and 30 years for Narcotics Kingpin Act)
Maximum fine of $1 million for institutions ($10 million for a Narcotics Kingpin Act violation)
Civil penalties:
Maximum fine of $50K per violation in most cases ($65K for Cuba; $55K for foreign terrorist org.)
Maximum fine of $1.075 million for a Narcotics Kingpin Act violation

76. Compliance Steps
Faculty and/or research administrators should ask these questions:
Does the project involve, in any way, a U.S. sanctioned country or an SDN?
Do the terms of the RFP or award involve:
Restrictions on publication (e.g., sponsor approval rights or prepublication review beyond a brief review for patent protection and/or release of proprietary information)?
Restrictions on the participation of foreign persons (e.g., sponsor approval required for participation of foreign persons, explicit prohibition on participation)?
Requirement to keep information confidential?
Permission for the sponsor to claim research results as proprietary or trade secret?

77. Compliance Steps
Is the RFP or SOW marked “Export Controlled” or “Classified Information” or does it contain similar references to U.S. export control regulations?
Will the project involve an export of items, software or technical data from the United States?
Are there any Red Flags?
Are any parties on any U.S. Government restricted party lists?

78. Compliance Steps
Do you know or have any reason to believe that the item, technical data or software to be exported will be used to support WMD efforts?
Are there any boycott-related requests?
If the answer to any of these questions is “YES,” please contact RSSP to assist in a determination whether an export license or other authorization is required; the General Counsel’s office will also assist, as necessary

79. For More Information
UofA policies pertaining to export control and other research compliance issues are available at:
If you have questions regarding any activity, please contact RSSP
The Office of the General Counsel is also available as a resource