1. IGTF Risk Assessment Team

2. Cable Severance
Severance of three (out of four) undersea cables in the Mediterranean basin on December 19th, 2008.
Affected retrieval of CRLs.

3. MD5 MD5 hash collisions in X.509 certificates
Risk for new certificates issued using MD5
IGTF should not have any of these…
Also concern about MD5 weakness in general:
CA certificates (and subordinates)
CNRS subordinate using MD5 will change to SHA1 shortly
CRLs
Proxy certificates (Globus, VOMS, MyProxy)
Globus discussed proxy certificate issue

4. (EC)DSA EE Keys OpenSSL client vulnerability
Unlikely that IGTF CAs have certified (EC)DSA keys
RAT will request CAs to audit

5. Querying CAs Email Online repositories of issued certificates
Privacy issues? Certificates are public?
Ex. Public phone number versus publish in phone book
Restrict access to RAT members?
Decided: Will not require this for now
Goal: Gather information to assess the risk
Must always tell CAs to modify practice in the future based on new risk/threat

6. Sanity Checking Requests
RSA Exponent < 65537
Hardware tokens (pkcs11-tool) tend to generate exponents 3 & 5 by default
Known-weak (Debian OpenSSL) keys
MD5
(EC)DSA
Transient issue? OpenSSL will be patched.
Relying parties should patch in any case!

7. IGTF RAT Risk assessment is difficult Additional members welcome!
Contact: