Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker,

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker,"— Presentation transcript:

1 ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker, Jim Clarke and David Kosson

2 Introduction September 11, 2001 Nuclear Industry targeted Successful attack would potentially cause devastating release of radioactive material (Source:

3 Headlines …could cause contamination problems significantly worse than those from Chernobyl …could release up to 20 times the 137 Cs released from Chernobyl …disaster of catastrophic proportions

4 Background Circles represent sites with one reactor, squares represent plants with two, and stars represent three. Open symbols represent sites with at least one shutdown reactor (Source: Alvarez, et al., Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power- Reactor Fuel in the United States, 2003).

5 Light Water Reactors (Source: National Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, 2006)

6 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Pool within Pool Building: Industrial-type design Steel superstructure above pool Pool depth: 12-15m Pool volume: ~4000m 3 No drains or low-level pathways (Source: NRC, Spent Fuel Pool, 2003)

7 REALISTIC THREAT Severe consequences and unpredictability of terrorists National Academies: National Academies: difficult but possible additional analysis needed UNREALISTIC THREAT Robust construction and stringent security requirements Critics overestimate consequences and underestimate ability to cool fuel in damaged pool Probability of Successful Attack

8 Scenario Loss of Coolant Event – Zirconium Fire Realistic worst-case analysis SFP located in rural and urban areas

9

10 Dispersion Modeling Defense Threat Reduction Agency CBRNE modeling tool Gaussian Puff model SCIPUFF Joined with RASCAL and climatology database for Nuclear Reactor modeling

11 HPAC Incident Models Chemical/Biological Facility Damage Chemical/Biological Weapon Industrial Facility Industrial Transportation Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Radiological Weapon Incident Missile Intercept

12 HPAC High-resolution weather, terrain, and land cover data Surface and Upper air climatology Historical, real-time or forecast weather options

13 HPAC Parameters Spent Fuel Release Zirconium Fire Zirconium Fire Fuel Cladding Failure Fuel Cladding Failure Worst-case settings Historical Weather

14 Parameters (cont.) Release Height – effective release height Buoyancy Vertical Exhaust Velocity Vertical Exhaust Velocity Temperature above Ambient (20 o C) Temperature above Ambient (20 o C) Exhaust Area Exhaust Area

15 RESRAD Argonne National Lab Calculates site-specific residual radiation levels, lifetime dose and excess lifetime cancer risks to chronically exposed on- site residents Pathway Analysis

16 RESRAD: Pathway Analysis

17 RESRAD Scenarios PathwayResident Farmer Suburban Resident Industrial Worker Recreationist External gamma exposure Yes Inhalation of dustYes Radon inhalationYes Ingestion of plant foodsYes No Ingestion of meatYesNo Yes Ingestion of milkYesNo Ingestion of fishYesNo Yes Ingestion of soilYes Ingestion of waterYesNo

18 RESRAD Parameters Default parameters Radionuclides determined by HPAC Soil density =1.5 g cm -3 Contamination depth = 0.1 m

19 RESULTS

20 HPAC RURAL SCENARIO April, May & December yielded areas of contamination ~ 560 km 2 (0.037 GBq m -2 contour) April yielded area of contamination ~ 55 km 2 (0.37 GBq m -2 contour) Majority of plumes released in generally Northern direction April represents worst-case dispersion URBAN SCENARIO January yielded area of contamination ~ 202 km 2 (0.037 GBq m -2 contour) January yielded area of contamination ~ 14 km 2 (0.37 GBq m -2 contour) Majority of plumes released in generally Northern- Eastern direction January represents worst- case dispersion

21 N N Rural Scenario Annual Dose Rate: 70 Sv y -1 7 Sv y mSv y mSv y -1 Urban Scenario Ground Deposition 37 GBq m GBq m GBq m GBq m -2

22 HPAC Total Activity Released = 4.8E+08 GBq (13 MCi) Radionuclides contributing to ground deposition: 137 Cs = 33.08% 137 Cs = 33.08% 134 Cs = 17.69% 134 Cs = 17.69% 90 Sr = 1.54% 90 Sr = 1.54% 106 Ru = 0.26% 106 Ru = 0.26% 125 Sb = 0.22% 125 Sb = 0.22% 144 Ce = 0.08% 144 Ce = 0.08% 147 Pm = 0.02% 147 Pm = 0.02% (Noble Gases = 12.31%, external dose contribution only) NOTE: (Noble Gases = 12.31%, external dose contribution only)

23 Activity Release (GBq): HPAC vs. Chernobyl HPAC Scenarios (Mean) HPAC Scenarios (Mean) 137 Cs = 1.48E Cs = 7.96E Sr = 7.03E+06 Chernobyl Chernobyl 137 Cs = 8.50E Cs = 5.40E Sr = 1.00E+07

24 RESRAD: Dose Rural Scenario: 0.37 GBq m -2 (10 mCi m -2 ) contour

25 RESRAD: Dose Urban Scenario: 0.37 GBq m -2 (10 mCi m -2 ) contour

26 Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) PhaseProtective ActionPAG Early - Limit Emergency Worker Exposure0.05 Sv (5 rem) - Sheltering of Public Sv (1-5 rem) projected dose - Evacuation of Public Sv (1-5 rem) projected dose Intermediate- Limit Worker Exposure0.05 Sv (5 rem) y -1 - Relocation of General Public 0.02 Sv (2 rem) projected dose first year Late- Final Cleanup Actionsbased on Optimization Source: Federal Registrar, Vol 71, No. 1, 3 Jan 06

27 RESRAD: Dose Rural Scenario: GBq m -2 (1 mCi m -2 ) contour

28 RESRAD: Dose Urban Scenario: GBq m -2 (1 mCi m -2 ) contour

29 RESRAD: 137 Cs contributions to Dose Rural Scenario: GBq m -2 (1 mCi m -2 ) contour

30 RESRAD: 90 Sr contributions to Dose Rural Scenario: GBq m -2 (1 mCi m -2 ) contour

31 Headlines in Review …could cause contamination problems significantly worse than those from Chernobyl …could release up to 20 times the 137 Cs released from Chernobyl …disaster of catastrophic proportions

32 Conclusions HPAC analysis of worst-case incident results in contamination levels in general agreement with Chernobyl. RESRAD analysis shows potential for acute effects are unlikely. Dose levels in the worst case analysis are high in some zones, showing that restrictions on worker access and temporary relocation of some populations will be necessary. Although significant, an incident that results in a zirconium fire at a SFP may not be as catastrophic as suggested.

33 For More Information: HPAC acec/hpac.cfm acec/hpac.cfmRESRAD


Download ppt "ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker,"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google