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Everybody loves html5, h4ck3rs too

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Presentation on theme: "Everybody loves html5, h4ck3rs too"— Presentation transcript:

1 Everybody loves html5, h4ck3rs too

2 Security Enthusiastic
~#Whoami Nahidul Kibria Co-Leader, OWASP Bangladesh, Senior Software Engineer, KAZ Software Ltd. Security Enthusiastic

3 Everybody loves html5…Well h4ck3rs too… What!!!
Which part you care Everybody loves html5…Well h4ck3rs too… What!!! Because we are here the security guy we care second part

4

5 What is HTML5 Next major version of HTML.
The Hypertext Markup Language version 5 (HTML5) is the successor of HTML 4.01, XHTML 1.0 and XHTML 1.1 Adds new tags, event handlers to HTML. Many more…. HTML5 is not finished

6 supported by latest versions of FireFox, Chrome, Safari and Opera.
HTML5 is already  here. HTML5 TEST - Many  features   supported by latest versions of FireFox, Chrome, Safari and   Opera.

7 Standard web model B4 go to the HTML5

8 Html5 OVERVIEW COR Web sockets Iframe Sandboxing Web Messaging

9 WEB BROWSER SECURITY MODELS
The same origin policy The cookies security mode The Flash security model/SandBox

10 Same Origin Policy The same origin policy prevents document or script loaded from one origin, from getting or setting properties from a of a document from a different origin. An origin is defined as the combination of host name, protocol, and port number;

11 The Browser “Same Origin” Policy
bank.com XHR TAG See Also: TAG XHR JS blog.net document, cookies

12 What Happens if the Same Origin Policy Is Broken?

13 Some major HTML5 feature
CORS-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing WebSockets WebWorkers Javascript APIs

14 My intention is not make you panic
Disclaimer Today I want to show you how far an attacker go with simple JavaScript and html5 So you can convince your boss to give effort on security measure My intention is not make you panic My intention is not make you panic

15 Cross Origin Request (COR)
Originally  Ajax   calls  were subject   to   Same Origin  Policy Site  A  cannot   make XMLHttpRequests to  Site  B HTML5   makes  it  possible  to   make these  cross  do main  Calls site  A  can   now   make XMLHttpRequests to  Site  B  as  long  as  Site  B  allows  it. Response   from  Site  B  should   include   a  header: Access ‐Control ‐Allow‐Origin:  Site  A

16 Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
<allow-access-from domain="*">

17 CORS-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
Why programmer happy? Lets see from attacker view

18 XSS-Cross Site Scripting

19 Demo

20 xss attack vector

21 Impact of xss History Stealing Intranet Hacking XSS Defacements
DNS pinning IMAP3 MHTML Hacking JSON Cookie stealing Clipboard stealing

22 Cookie stealing Pr3venting

23 XSS Defacements

24 If you still cannot manage your boss More Evil use
I do not care Show me how my org is effected

25 Attacking intranet

26 Obtaining NAT’ed IP Addresses
Java applet

27 If the victim’s Web browser is a Mozilla/Firefox, it’s possible to skip the applet
<script> function natIP() { var w = window.location; var host = w.host; var port = w.port || 80; var Socket = (new java.net.Socket(host, port)).getLocalAddress().getHostAddress(); return Socket; } </script> if the victim’s Web browser is a Mozilla/Firefox, it’s possible to skip the applet requirement and invoke a Java socket directly from JavaScript space. The net-net effect between these two techniques is more or less the same. if the victim’s Web browser is a Mozilla/Firefox, it’s possible to skip the applet requirement and invoke a Java socket directly from JavaScript space. The net-net effect between these two techniques is more or less the same.", "width": "800" }

28 Not only NAT’ed IP ,You can lots more system info
Demo

29 Port Scanning O’ Really

30 Port Scanning window.onerror = err; <script src=http://ip/></script> if (! msg.match(/Error loading script/)) //ip does not exit’s Else Find internal ip if (! msg.match(/Error loading script/)) //ip does not exit’s Else Find internal ip", "width": "800" }

31 Blind Web Server Fingerprinting
Apache Web Server /icons/apache_pb.gif HP Printer /hp/device/hp_invent_logo.gif <img src="http://intranet_ip/unique_image_url" onerror="fingerprint()" />

32 HTML5 Made it easy Demo

33 What just happed

34 Port Scanning: Beating protections
Blocking example for known ports (Firefox, WebSockets and CORS) ➔ Workaround! ➔ ftp://example.com:22 It works on Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari Based on timeouts, it can be configured WTFun

35 Port Scanning: result

36 Self‐triggering XSS exploits with HTML5
A common XSS occurrence is injection inside some attribute of INPUT tags. Current techniques require user interaction to trigger this XSS <input type="text" value="‐>Injecting here" onmouseover="alert('Injected val')"> • HTML5 turns this in to self ‐triggering XSS <input type="text” value="‐‐>Injecting here" onfocus="alert('Injected value')" autofocus>

37 Black‐list XSS filters
Html5 introduce many new tag

38 How your browser become a proxy of an attacker?

39 CSRF(Cross-Site Request Forgery)
The Sleeping Giant

40 Victim logon to bank.com

41 Converting POST to GET

42 https://bank.com/fn?param=1
Credentials Included https://bank.com/fn?param=1 JSESSIONID=AC934234… blog.net

43 Cross-Site Request Forgery
bank.com Go to Transfer Assets https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Select FROM Fund https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Select TO Fund https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Select Dollar Amount https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Submit Transaction https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Confirm Transaction https://bank.com/fn?param=1 attacker’s post at blog.net

44 XSS & CSRF- Killer Combo Programmers Prepare, Users Beware
Demo XSS & CSRF- Killer Combo Programmers Prepare, Users Beware If xss is there all csrf protection can be bypass <form method="POST" name="form0" action="http://my.victim.mutillidae:81/mutillidae/index.php?page=add-to-your-blog.php"> <input type="hidden" name="csrf-token" value="SecurityIsDisabled"/> <input type="hidden" name="blog_entry" value="This is come from CSRF"/> <input type="hidden" name="add-to-your-blog-php-submit-button" value="Save Blog Entry"/> </form>

45 How Does CSRF Work? Tags <img src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”>
<iframe src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”> <script src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”> Autoposting Forms <body onload="document.forms[0].submit()"> <form method="POST" action=“https://bank.com/fn”> <input type="hidden" name="sp" value="8109"/> </form> XmlHttpRequest Subject to same origin policy

46 What Can Attackers Do with CSRF?
Anything an authenticated user can do Click links Fill out and submit forms Follow all the steps of a wizard interface

47 Using CSRF to Attack Internal Pages
attacker.com internal browser CSRF TAG Internal Site Allowed! internal.mybank.com

48 Web Workers http://www.andlabs.org/tools/ravan.html
Web Workers provide the possibility for JavaScript to run in the background. Web Workers alone are not a security issue. But they can be used indirectly for launching work intensive attacks without the user noticing it.

49 Web Storage

50 Web Storage Vuln. & Threats
Session Hijacking If session identifier is stored in local storage, it can be stolen with JavaScript. No HTTPOnly flag. Disclosure of Confidential Data If sensitive data is stored in the local storage, it can be stolen with JavaScript. User Tracking Additional possibility to identify a user. Persistent attack vectors Attacker can be store persistently on the user browser

51 Offline Web Application
Cache Poisoning Caching of the root directory possible. HTTP and HTTPs caching possible.

52 Ok Enough, Just tell me can attacker Get a remote (Control)shell of my PC??

53 Infection method known as Drive by download

54 In summary = + = + + = Cracking Hashes in JS Cloud
Web Worker = Cracking Hashes in JS Cloud Cross-origin resource sharing Web Worker + = Powerful DDoS attacks Cross-origin resource sharing Web socket Web Worker + + = Web-based Botnet.

55 Is HTML5 hopelessly (in)secure?
Ahem no…but security has been a major consideration in the design of the specification But it is incredibly hard to add features in any technology without increasing the possibility of abused.

56 Reference Compass Security AG
security-v1.html https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Sec urity_Cheat_Sheet

57 Be secure & safe Twitter:@nahidupa
HTML5 make everybody happy including h4ck3rs and make security professional busy.


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