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John P. McCaskey · Stanford University. Richard Whately.

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Presentation on theme: "John P. McCaskey · Stanford University. Richard Whately."— Presentation transcript:

1 John P. McCaskey · Stanford University

2 Richard Whately

3 Prosecuting a wrongdoer, even if its your own father. What is piety? Thats an example. What is piety itself? Doing what pleases the gods. But gods disagree. And there are many kinds of disagreement: Disagreement over which number is greater. Disagreement over which thing is larger. Disagreement over which thing is heavier. Disagreement over just and unjust. Disagreement over beautiful and ugly. Disagreement over good and bad. Piety is what pleases all gods. But is it pious because it pleases the gods or does it please the gods because it is pious? What is loved vs. what loves. What is the difference? What is led vs. what leads. What is seen vs. what sees. So... what is admired vs. what admires. I dont know which. Lets start over. Isnt everything pious also just but not vice versa? Yes. Then piety is a kind of justice. What kind? Two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition.

4 Ensure property applies in individual cases. Test kinds broader and narrower. Identify linked contraries. Ensure the predicate can be applied broadly. Use terms that are unambiguous. Identify temporal qualifications. Identify dependencies. Use language that makes clear in what way exceptions are allowed. Check relationship of whole to parts. Be clear whether relationship is absolute or relative.... Use observations and comparisons to... Two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition.

5 This procedure, which arrives at its aim from several instances, may be named inductio, which in Greek is called epagoge; Socrates made extensive use of it in his discussions. Topica Two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition. [used] [used] chiefly by Socrates and his disciples, De Inventione De Inventione Photo posted on Flickr by John Sellars (aka photobiblon)

6 BoethiusPeter Albert Aquinas Scotus Ockham Zabarella al-Farabi Avicenna AverroesClementAlexander Sextus Empiricus Themistius Ammonius Hermiae Simplicius Philoponus Father, Son and Holy Spirit are eternal. [God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.] Therefore, God is eternal. An induction has no necessity unless turned into a syllogism. Everything that is this man, or that man, et cetera, is an animal. [Every man is this man, or that man, et cetera.] Therefore, every man is an animal. An induction is a syllogism in Barbara with the minor premise suppressed.

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8 Thomas Wilson

9 Sunlight Sunlight through magnifier Flame Heated or boiling liquids Wet, compressed plants Fibrous fabrics Quicklime with water Animals Horse dung Lightning Meteors Volcanoes Solids on fire Natural hot baths Distilled spirits? Presence Related Absence Moonlight Starlight …magnifier turned around? Moonlt through magnifier? Liquids in natural state further inquiry is needed let an experiment be made Quicklime with oil? Insects Sheet lightning Comets, aurora borealis Rotting wood? not enough investigations X X Degrees Fish Different parts of animals Dung as fertilizer Kinds of animals Corpse right after death Seasons Altitude Lightning hotter than fire Many kinds Smaller solids heat up faster Three Tables 1 Light? No: Dark things can be hot. Something celestial? No: Heat can emerge from underground. Something terrestrial? No: Heat can come from the heavens. Expansion? No: Water does, but iron doesnt expand when heated. Rarity? No: Fire and hot air are rare, but dense things can be hot. Motion? Not motion generally; some things move without getting hot, but everything hot involves motion. Light? No: Dark things can be hot. Something celestial? No: Heat can emerge from underground. Something terrestrial? No: Heat can come from the heavens. Expansion? No: Water does, but iron doesnt expand when heated. Rarity? No: Fire and hot air are rare, but dense things can be hot. Motion? Not motion generally; some things move without getting hot, but everything hot involves motion. Candidates & Exclusions 2 Heat is a kind of motion. 3 Genus Expansive motionmost apparent in flame, but also apparent in boiling liquids, combustible materials, metals melting, rocks softening when heated. Also consistent with opposite behavior in cold. For example, glass expands when heated then contracts and cracks when cooled. Motion is of the parts (maybe too small to see) not of the whole as a unit... Expansive motionmost apparent in flame, but also apparent in boiling liquids, combustible materials, metals melting, rocks softening when heated. Also consistent with opposite behavior in cold. For example, glass expands when heated then contracts and cracks when cooled. Motion is of the parts (maybe too small to see) not of the whole as a unit... 4 Differentia Definition 5 Heat is an expansive motion which is checked and restrained, and acting through particles, expanding in all directions, a true induction

10 Exploding French gunpowder is hot. Exploding German gunpowder is hot. Exploding English gunpowder is hot. All exploding gunpowder is hot. Heat is such-and-such motion. All gunpowder has heat. By induction By the nature of definition Hot things exhibit such-and-such motion. Such-and-such motion is heat. All gunpowder has such-and-such motion.

11 2 Identify Genus : the (Fundamental) Idea 1 Identify Facts Induction is a term applied to describe the process of a true Colligation of Facts by means of an exact and appropriate Conception. The Inductive Step is the Invention of the Conception. In every inference by Induction, there is some Conception superinduced upon the Facts. 3 Form Conception 4 Form Definition William Whewell

12 Inductive Principle Things will continue as they have. The very foundation of induction. But the principle is not true. ? Thomas Reid (But induction is valid.)

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14 This, that and the other magnet attract iron. [All magnets are this, that and the other.] Therefore, all magnets attract iron. An induction is a syllogism in Barbara with the minor premise suppressed *Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it *Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it. [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed. Henry Aldrich Richard Whately Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it. The instance he gives will sufficiently prove this:... All magnets are this, that and the other... is manifestly false.

15 Therefore all magnets attract iron. Observed tyrannies are short-lived. Therefore Socrates is mortal. Therefore all tyrannies are short-lived. Therefore attracting iron is a property of all magnets. Therefore being short-lived is a property of all tyrannies. Being short-lived is a property of observed tyrannies. [A property of observed tyrannies is a property of all tyrannies.] [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed. MinorMajor Minor Conc. Major

16 Observed tyrannies are short-lived. Therefore all tyrannies are short-lived. Therefore being short-lived is a property of all tyrannies. Being short-lived is a property of observed tyrannies. [A property of observed tyrannies is a property of all tyrannies.] Minor Conc. Major [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed. original extremely important [This] one remark would have sufficed to correct the erroneous notion the ancients had of induction, and to which Lord Bacon... [was responding]. They in fact mistook altogether the inductive syllogism, completing it by the addition of a minor, instead of a major palpably suicidal

17 As Archbishop Whately remarks, every induction is a syllogism with the major premise suppressed; or (as I prefer expressing it) every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism by supplying a major premise. If this be actually done, the principle we are now considering, that of the uniformity of the course of nature, will appear as the ultimate major premise of all inductions. [Induction is] a Syllogism in Barbara with the major* Premiss suppressed.

18 PropositionalInferencePropositionalInference Concept- Formation Prior An Commentrs CommentrsTopicsCiceroTopicsCicero ? ? Bacon Purge this Find formal cause Better sense: Syllogism with suppd major Original and strict sense Original Whately 23 Mill 43 Syllogism w. uniformity principle Syllogism Mere description Ancients What is piety? Scholastics Syllogism by complete enumeration Whewell Each induction ends with a new conception De Morgan 47 Original and logical sense The sense nowadays CorrectCorrectIncorrectIncorrect Bain 70 Find probability that the major is true Find probability that the major is true Jevons 70 Induction is about universal propositions, not universal concepts. Its a risky kind of inference to be understood with reference to the better kind, deduction. Uniformity principle is a presumed major premise. Logicians and mathe- maticians have displaced philosophers of mind. Its about propositional inference not abstraction. In an Induction, there are three essentials:(1) the result must be a proposition as opposed to a notion.... Sometimes we are liable to confound the two. Definitions, or general notions, are limited to one indivisible fact or attribute; they are contrasted with inductions, which always join at least two facts or attributes.... The generalized notions of... resistance, whiteness, heat could not be confounded with inductions. Logic, Book III, Induction In an Induction, there are three essentials:(1) the result must be a proposition as opposed to a notion.... Sometimes we are liable to confound the two. Definitions, or general notions, are limited to one indivisible fact or attribute; they are contrasted with inductions, which always join at least two facts or attributes.... The generalized notions of... resistance, whiteness, heat could not be confounded with inductions. Logic, Book III, Induction

19 PropositionalInferencePropositionalInference Concept- Formation Better sense: Syllogism with suppd major Original and strict sense Original Whately 23 Mill 43 Syllogism w. uniformity principle Syllogism Mere description De Morgan 47 Original and logical sense The sense nowadays CorrectCorrectIncorrectIncorrect Bain 70 Find probability that the major is true Find probability that the major is true Jevons 70 Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others myriads of concurring instances,... go such a very little way towards establishing an universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question... has solved the problem of Induction. Note 2.Since the time of Hume, the nature of our conception of Cause has formed one of the principal topics of philosophical controversy.... (a controversy, however, which possesses a historical rather than a practical or scientific interest). Fowler 70 Presumptions in any inference: · Sense perception · Memory · Uniformity of nature Various defenses: · Mills · Reids · Humes · Venns own Presumptions in any inference: · Sense perception · Memory · Uniformity of nature Various defenses: · Mills · Reids · Humes · Venns own Venn 89 The very concept of an experimental inference involves a great petitio principii. Induction owes all its force to the premise that the future will be like the past, which is just what the induction itself seeks to infer. as Hume relentlessly insisted Cassirer 05 Keynes 21 Humes sceptical criticisms are usually associated with causality; but argument by induction... was the real object of his attack.... Humes statement of the case against induction has never been improved upon. Humes sceptical criticisms are usually associated with causality; but argument by induction... was the real object of his attack.... Humes statement of the case against induction has never been improved upon.

20 [Logic] is the grammar of reasoning by means of words. [Logic] is the art of employing language properly. In introducing the mention of language... to the definition of Logic, I have departed from established practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that Logic is entirely conversant about language.

21 John P. McCaskey · Stanford University


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