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Detainee Family Demographics: Family Social Structure is Complex Does the detainee make the decisions in the household? Who else lives in your household?

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Presentation on theme: "Detainee Family Demographics: Family Social Structure is Complex Does the detainee make the decisions in the household? Who else lives in your household?"— Presentation transcript:

1 Detainee Family Demographics: Family Social Structure is Complex Does the detainee make the decisions in the household? Who else lives in your household? Most detainees live with extended family Majority dont make the decisions Do you go to your tribal leader to help solve problems? Tribal influence is a factor N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

2 Detainee Family Demographics: Marriage, Children Add to Complexity and Financial Burden Most detainees are married Most detainees live with extended family, even after marriage Majority: 79% have Children N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

3 Detainees are Not Prepared to Compete More than 60% of the Detainees Have not Completed High School 60% N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

4 Most Detainees Say they Are Employed Majority of Detainees Work as Unskilled Labor 14% Entered Labor Market Since 2003 N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

5 Why do they Fight? What Are Their Motivations? Several Motives Explored: –Sectarian animosity –Economic motives –Religious extremism –Revenge as a motive –Attitudes toward coalition

6 Sectarian Attitudes Sunni Support Secular Shia Allawi as Best Leader N=220

7 Sectarian Attitudes Sunni Support Intermarriage Intermarriage common before US intervention but interviews reveal some intermarriage still takes place post 2003 N=220

8 Majority View Both Sunni and Shia As Equally Good Muslims N=1024

9 Economic Motives Economic motives can be divided into two categories –1. Subsistence/survival- those who commit and/or support violent acts due to lack of viable alternative employment –2. Opportunistic/greed- those who commit and/or support violent acts to supplement income that can provide a viable existence The second category seems to be predominant Many detainees are not totally unemployed; rather they are underemployed or employed sporadically (e.g. day laborers) –Implicit they may have ended up in detention by attempting to supplement their income by other means N=220

10 Economic Motives (ii) The post 2003 environment can be termed the best of times, the worst of times Detainees interviewed report exponential increase in access to consumer good –82% reported and increase in income –92% had acquired a satellite dish, 56% a cell phone, and 43% one or more vehicles; other goods acquired included DVD players, refrigerators, computers, air conditioners, etc. –Access to cell phones and vehicles may have enhanced their utility to insurgency, DVD players (propaganda) may have attracted them to insurgency - but cause and effect very hard to establish At the same time, the old patriarchal system of Saddam was gone, creating a chaotic environment Entrepreneurs willing to engage in criminal activity can thus prosper from activities ranging from oil smuggling to arms sales and enjoy the good life There is a danger that the insurgency is becoming a vocation N=220

11 Economic Motives Majority Do Not Report Financial Problems; Many Find It Difficult to Provide for Family Is this enough money to Take care of your family? N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

12 Economic Motives Weekly Income of Detainees Note: 76% of detainees reported that their weekly income was sufficient to meet the needs of their family; this closely matches the 72% that reported income of 50,000 Iraqi dinar/week or more N=220

13 Religiosity Religious motivations seem muted among the majority of Iraqi detainees Even some interviewees alleged to be mid-level AQI have not expressed very strong religious feelings Some alleged JAM members have seemed very unreligious (heavily tattooed, enjoying alcohol) N=220

14 Religiosity Most Detainees in Sample Have Traditional/Conservative Religious Views; Small but Powerful Minority Extreme N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

15 Religiosity Mosque Not Central to Most Iraqi Detainees Lives Note: 70% of detainees did not attend mosque every week N=220

16 Religiosity Attitudes Towards Enforcing Religious Behavior Note: 80% either sometimes did not fast themselves or felt it was a private matter N=220

17 Religiosity Attitudes Towards Women Wearing Hijab are Relaxed N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

18 Religiosity Most detainees do not seem religiously motivated Minority with strong religious motivation have disproportional influence –Extremist fall into two classes: Takfiri (means excommunicate) –Most extreme –Have their own interpretation of Quran –Willing to do anything, including take on Western guise (i.e. eat pork), in order to accomplish goals –Hated by most of detainee population –Dreaded by those unlucky enough to find themselves in a Tafir compound –Will recruit through physical threat and mind control AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) –Motivation is to wage jihad –Influence of foreign fighters in terms of numbers is minimal; AQI is Iraqi –Influence of foreigners in terms of financing and upper echelon direction of strategy more substantial – Viewed as foreign by most detainees and blamed for violence against people of Iraq –Main recruiting leverage appears to be money

19 Revenge as a Motive Revenge seems to be a relatively rare but possibly powerful motive Question probing violence against friends/family (from any source) had significant response Forced relocation had relatively few responses However, some mid to senior AQI leaders note revenge-related themes (loss of business to JAM or killing of a relative by CF) N=220

20 Coercion as a Motive Like revenge, coercion hard to estimate In TIFs, significant evidence suggests it is a powerful motive, e.g. forced adoption of or compliance with takfiri views Outside TIFs, some evidence from a few interviews but still inconclusive N=220

21 Attitudes toward Coalition - Positive Most detainees expressed qualified positive feelings towards the Coalition This was most clear among Sunni detainees asked about CF withdrawal; the vast majority used vivid language to describe a disaster; e.g. the Apocalypse, the streets will run red All felt treatment by coalition was better than treatment by Iraqis N=220

22 Attitudes toward Coalition - Negative However, a significant fraction had friends or family who had been killed by CF, most commonly near CF convoys Many blame coalition for detention Many have or have had family members detained N=220

23 Attitudes toward Coalition Detainees hold coalition responsible Who do you blame for your detention? N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

24 Attitude Toward Coalition Insurgency & Detention Impacts Extended Family – 57% had family member detained Have any of your family members been detained by the Coalition? N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

25 Detainees Report Security in Iraq as Biggest Concern N=220

26 Majority of Detainees Have Been Personally Affected by Fighting N=220

27 Many Detainees Exhibit Signs of Psychological Trauma and Anxiety; Very Few Have Ideas of Martyrdom and Aggression N = 1016 Transition In Assessment


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