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U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead

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1 U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead
Today I would like to present to you an overview of the United States submarine force including current programs and future plans. U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead 1

2 Submarine Force Situational Awareness
Reduced DoD budget Little or no growth in shipbuilding account Diverging trends Increasing requirements and responsibilities Diminishing resources Seamless leadership focus required Embark on a unifying effort Before discussing programs I think it is important to set the stage for today's environment and where it is headed in the future. While tight Defense budget environments are the norm, even a cursory review of today's headlines support the fact that the nations large deficits and debt situation are unprecedented and it is hard to realistically contemplate any scenario that does not include reduced defense budgets for the foreseeable future. Even though the Navy is still roughly 10% below its stated floor of 313 total ships little or no growth in shipbuilding accounts is projected. Unfortunately, the demands for naval forces, including submarines continues to increase and that trend is projected to continue (based on feedback from Combatant Commanders). This results in a disconnect or diverging trend between requirements and resources. To address these challenges it is clear the submarine leadership will need to be focused and unified in their planning and execution. As part of this effort they have recently rolled out a new Integrated Undersea Strategy - elements of which I will discuss today.

3 Integrated Undersea Warfare
Submarines are asymmetric weapons Stealth is a force multiplier ASW is hard and getting harder Submarines are the optimum ASW platform Anti-Access/Area Denial must be defeated Submarine's unique access increasingly valuable to the Joint Force Adapt/leverage new payloads and sensors This new Integrated Undersea Strategy recognizes the inherent value of submarines in conducting undersea warfare. Submarines are often characterized as asymmetric weapons because they capitalize on a threat's weaknesses - more specifically their ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare. Due largely to the challenges acoustic challenges associated with the undersea environment, it is very hard and expensive to develop and maintain a proficient ASW force. Submarines are also considered asymmetric weapons because they provide disproportionate effects and impose a psychological impact on adversaries that impact their freedom of action. A modern example of this effect was the reaction by the Argentine Navy after the British submarine HMC Conqueror sank the light cruiser General Belgrano during the 1982 Falkland Islands war. After this one attack the entire Argentine Navy returned to port and never ventured out for the remainder of the conflict. The inherent Stealth of submarines is an obvious force multiplier. That stealth makes ASW a significant challenge. But because our nuclear powered submarines operate in the same environment and have the stealth to avoid threat submarines, they are often the optimum ASW platform. The stealth of our submarines also ensures they have the unique access to denied areas, an attribute that is expected to make submarines play even a greater role in the Joint Force against proliferating Anti Access Area Denial threats. Finally, while the our submarines have historically proven to be flexible and adaptable, they will need to adapt and leverage new payloads and sensors if we are going to get the realize their full potential.

4 Why Submarines in WWII Submarines (1.6% of the Navy) Sunk 54.6%
Requisites: A National imperative - World War II Inadequacy of other platforms - Battle Force – Much of the Pacific Fleet is “Out of Action” Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics - Stealth, speed, endurance, and the right weapon Ability to step up to critical new roles - From “Fleet Scouts” to Anti-Surface Ship Warfare “Hunter-Killers” R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities - Continuous welds, Sonar, Radar, Mark 14 Torpedo Issues A strategy built around the submarine – “Strangulation of Japan” → Capital Ships, Merchants, Tankers I will take a minute to briefly examine the history of U.S. submarines in two major conflicts - not to justify continued procurement of submarines based on historical success alone, but to offer a construct of requisites that if applied to the past and future help to demonstrate the flexibility and value of submarines. This construct notes there are six requisites that should exist to make submarines a key element of force structure. The first is there must be a national imperative. While this imperative was obvious in WWII, it may not be as clear today or in the future. Next, there should be a shortfall in other platforms - either in numbers or capabilities. In WWII this occurred in an instant when most of the Pacific fleet battle force was disabled at Pearl Harbor. Next, for submarines to be effective they must add value through distinctive characteristics. In WWII these included stealth, speed, endurance and torpedoes. One requisite that highlights the value of a submarine's flexibility is the ability to step up to critical new roles. On 6 December 1941 the U.S. submarine force's primary mission was to act as "Fleet Scouts". Late the next day all Pacific Fleet submarines were directed to commence unrestricted surface ship warfare on the imperial Navy - a role they quickly mastered as can be seen in the bullet at the bottom of the slide. Another requisite needed to get the most out of our submarines is that there must be R&D contributions to enhance or enable needed capabilities. The submarine force, industry and DoD research labs have a strong reputation for making such advances. Finally, if we are going to procure and operate submarines, they must be made a key element of the nation's strategy. In WWII submarines were a key factor in defeating the Japanese. There effects far outweighed their cost. Submarines (1.6% of the Navy) Sunk 54.6% of all Japanese Ships Sunk During the War

5 Why Submarines in the Cold War
Requisites: A National imperative - Cold War – Contain Communism Inadequacy of other platforms - ISR, Deterrence Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics - Stealth, speed, endurance Ability to step up to critical new roles - From “Hunter-Killers” to “ISR, Strategic ASW and Strategic Deterrence” R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities - Nuclear Power, Acoustic Quieting, Sonar, Ballistic Missiles, MK-48 torpedo A strategy built around the submarine – “Control the Seas – Resupply Europe” Following the same construct one can assess the value and role submarines played during the Cold War. Several capability gaps were identified early in the Cold war, both in intelligence gathering and strategic deterrence. In both cases, submarines were able to fill these critical gaps. A key enabler of these capabilities was the exponential increase in endurance that nuclear power brought. R&D contributions dramatically increased the value of submarines with the timelines for these technological advancements being quite impressive, even by today's standards. While submarines refined their ability to hold any surface ship at risk, they again demonstrated their flexibility by filling critical roles in ISR, strategic ASW and strategic deterrence. The survivability of submarine ballistic missiles changed the calculus of nuclear deterrence, virtually eliminating the advantage of a surprise attack and stabilizing superpower relationships. 1947 1940 1950 1960 1970 1942 1955 1965 First Controlled Nuclear Chain Reaction “Underway on Nuclear Power" First Fleet Ballistic Missile 41 For Freedom Construction Complete

6 Why Submarines Now and in the Future
Requisites: A National imperative Rise of Global challenges to U.S. Supremacy Counter A2/AD Peer, IW, Regional Conflict, Sea Control, Piracy… Inadequacy of other platforms - Only submarines have assured access in A2AD environments Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics - Stealth, speed, endurance, modular payloads, COTs electronics Ability to step up to critical new roles Strike, SOF Support, SEAD, Information Operations Prompt Strike R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities Photonics Mast, Unmanned Systems Integration, Ship Automation Unmanned systems integration (UAVs, UUVs, DNS) A strategy built around the submarine Sea Control / Sea Denial / Assured Access Air/Sea Battle Using the same requisites, why do we need submarines today and in the foreseeable future? And, what additional R&D should be pursued and what new roles should submarines take on? Today's national imperative is a bit more complicated than in WWII or the Cold War. There are many global challenges and an increasing number of anti-access and area denial threats and challenges to sea control. With respect to the A2/AD challenges, only submarines have assured access. Submarines are more modular and flexible than ever and maintain state of the art systems via routine upgrades to commercial off-the-shelf electronics. While they already have demonstrated the ability to take on new roles and missions in Information Operations and in support of special forces, they are well suited for and could be quickly outfitted to take on other missions including conventional prompt strike. While submarines meet all the requisites needed to address the nation's needs today and in the future, those items in red are areas that warrant further development. Emerging Concepts Requiring Additional Development

7 Platforms The U.S. Submarine Force consists of:
42 Los Angeles class attack submarines (SSN) 3 Seawolf class attack submarines 9 Virginia class attack submarines 4 Ohio class Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) 14 Ohio class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) Now will shift to describing today's force and the related programs in construction or under development. Today's submarine force consists of 52 nuclear powered fast attack submarines or SSNs. There are three classes of SSNs. The vast majority consist of 688's or Los Angeles class submarines. These include baseline 688's as well as improved versions that included retractable bow planes vice fairwater or sail planes and 12 vertical tomahawk missile cells. Three larger Seawolf submarines exist with the last of these, the Jimmy Carter, having a nearly 100 foot multi-mission platform or module inserted. The Seawolf submarines were designed to take on the Soviet Union Navy with a torpedo capacity and stealth capability that far exceeded all previous U.S. fast attack submarines. The end of the Cold War led to the early end of the Seawolf program and the birth of the Virginia-class of submarines, a program that is currently in production. The submarine force also includes four SSGNs. These submarines were the four oldest Ohio-class of ballistic missile submarines and were converted to carry tomahawk missiles and Special Forces. Finally, the remaining 14 Ohio-class of SSBNs make up our sea-based strategic nuclear force. I will go into more detail on these programs in the next few slides.

8 SSN Force Current Requirements (2005 Assessment) Current Allocation
10 SSNs providing Forward Presence (FP) Able to surge 35 SSNs: includes war plan support Need 48 SSNs to surge 35 and keep 10 for FP Fewer ships - greater risk Current Allocation SSNs assigned missions only they can perform Mission categories: critical, high priority, priority, routine CJCS allocation of 10 just meets critical missions Future Outlook A2/AD Prompt Strike The Navy has had a requirement for 48 SSNs since the last publically released force assessment in The need for 48 SSNs is based on several factors including the need to maintain 10 SSNs forward deployed providing forward presence. While deployed these submarines perform a variety of missions, many of which are national level taskings. Based on the maintenance requirements and a 24 month deployment schedule during which a SSN typically deploys for 6 months, it takes 48 SSNs to keep 10 SSNs continuously on deployment. Additionally, to support Combatant Commander needs and war plans there is a need to be able to surge a total of 35 SSNs including the 10 forward deployed. In recent years Combatant Commanders have requested SSNs to support their mission needs. In response, the Joint Staff has typically allocated 10 SSNs, which has just been able to meet the critical missions - those considered vital to national security. Unfortunately, as the number of SSNs declines over the next decade, Combatant Commanders have projected their demands for SSNs are going to increase.

9 SSGN Force 4 Ships each capable of carrying:
154 TLAM (105 typical loadout) 2 Dry Deck Shelters 66 SOF for > 60 Days 2-3 ships always in theater Bangor WA Moving on to the SSGN force, the U.S. has four SSGNs, with two operating out of Kings Bay, GA and two out of Bangor, Washington. Like the SSBNs from which they were converted, the SSGNs operate with two crews each, a blue and a gold crew. They operate forward on a 15 month deployment pattern that provides nearly 70% forward presence. The 24 SSGN tubes are reconfigured to carry up to 154 tomahawk land attack missiles and up to 66 special operations forces. However, typically the SSGNs deploy with just 105 Tomahawk missiles. Recently USS Florida demonstrated the fire power available from a SSGN when she launch over 90 tomahawk missiles at Libyan targets as part of the Operation Odyssey Dawn. While the SSGNs provide significant strike and SOF capability to COCOMs, there still is no official Navy requirement for their replacement and currently there are no plans to replace them with a comparable platform. Kings Bay GA Guam Homeport Maintenance Transit SOF Cert 15 Months Turnover/ Maintenance 10 ½ Months Theater Presence 70% Operational Availability Diego Garcia SSGN Mission: High Volume Precision Strike & High Volume SOF Support Able to Perform Many Other SSN Missions

10 135 Consecutive Successes 1000 Ohio class SSBN Patrols
SSBN Force 14 OHIO class SSBNs 100% of survivable warheads 54% of operational warheads 70% under NEW START 19% of strategic budget 3900 SSBN patrols since 1960 TRIDENT(D-5) on OHIO Survivable Leg of TRIAD Significant hedge capability 135 Consecutive Successes 1000 Ohio class SSBN Patrols Today's sea-based strategic deterrent force includes 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Each carries 24 Trident (D-5) strategic missiles. While the missiles are expected to be in operation through 2042, the current SSBN hulls reach the end of their lives beginning in 2027. U.S. SSBNs have conducted over 3900 patrols since 1960, including over 1000 Ohio-class patrols. The statistics associated with are SSBNs are impressive and demonstrate the surety of the entire weapons system and command control network. No alert OHIO-class SSBN sub has ever missed an exercise launch order or actual retargeting message. And the Trident D-5 missile has an unmatched track record of 135 consecutive successful launches. The SSBN is considered the most survivable leg of the TRIAD. They carry over half of the operational warheads today and that is expected to grow to 70% under the New Start treaty. Finally, the SSBN force is a cost effective force: While more than half the Nation’s strategic arsenal is carried by OHIO-class SSBNs, they use less than 1.5% of the Navy’s personnel at a cost less than 19% of the strategic budget. 10

11 Virginia Class SSN Program
Current Plan: 30 Ship Class Block I: ships All delivered Block II: ships 4 delivered, 2 under construction Block III: ships 2 ships per year in 2011 Acquisition Program $93B (TY) Procurement Program APB assumes 30 hulls As mentioned earlier, the Virginia-class of submarines is the latest class of SSNs and is currently in production. Eight ships of this class have been delivered to the Navy to date and 6 others are in construction. Of note, the beginning of construction of the latest submarine in September 2011 (SSN 787) marked the first time in over two decades that the U.S. has procured more than one submarine in a year. The current Virginia program assumes a build of 30 hulls, though as I will discuss later that number is expected to increase.

12 Virginia Class Improvement Focus
"… the cost of them has got to come down ... it's got to be about $2 billion a ship.” ADM Michael G. Mullen Sept 2005 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000 12,500 15,000 >40% Labor >40% Labor Reduction Reduction Cost Reduction Strategy Perform on the Backlog Design For Affordability Acquisition Strategy The Virginia-class submarine is the most advanced submarine in the world and is the first U.S. ship designed for a post Cold-War mission. It excels in both the littoral and open ocean environments. It is 377 feet long, has a 34 foot beam and displaces 7,835 tons. It is a little bigger than the LA -class (362 ft, 33ft, 6927 tons) and displaces quite a bit less than the 40ft wide Seawolfs (9138 tons, 353ft). The Virginia class submarines are built using a unique teaming arrangement. While Electric Boat is the design agent and prime contractor, Newport News Shipbuilding is a teaming partner. The work on Virginia class submarines is split nearly equally between the two shipyards. Boats are alternatively delivered from Electric Boat and then Newport News with even hulls delivered at EB. The Virginia-class program is widely viewed as a model shipbuilding program. Hulls are consistently being delivered ahead of schedule and under target cost, with one of the most recent ships, the USS MISSOURI (SSN 780) being delivered in 2010, 9 months early and over $100M below target cost. In response to then CNO Admiral Mullen's call to reduce the cost of each Virginia hull by 20 percent, the shipbuilders, suppliers and Navy embarked on a Cost Reduction Strategy that included three main elements. First was improving performance on contracted ships. The shipbuilders have reduced the man-hours needed to build the Virginia-class submarines from nearly 15 million on the first hull to just under 10 million on the most recent or 7th hull. Another element of the Cost Reduction Strategy were changes to the acquisition strategy whereby savings were obtained by leveraging a multi-year block buy that procured 8 submarines over 5 years. Together with Advanced Procurement funding for key components and economic order quantify funding, the Block III contract signed in December of 2008 was able to achieve nearly 200 million in savings per hull. # of Recurring Manhours xK Unit Cost Unit Cost Reduced by Reduced by 4.9M Hours 4.9M Hours To Date To Date SSN803 Unit 1 Unit 7 Unit 30

13 First Bow Payload Tubes
Block III Bow Redesign SSGN MAC Benefits Parts Reduction – 50K reduced to 29K Pumps and Valves Further Reduced Hull Penetrations – 136 reduced to 64 Life of Ship Components added to the design Concept to Reality in 18 Months $800M Total Program Acquisition Savings First Bow Payload Tubes The third major area of savings targeted was the Design for Affordability effort, commonly referred to as DFA. In DFA the entire Virginia-class shipbuilding team worked together to identify design changes that could be made to the Virginia-class submarine that would reduce acquisition cost without reducing capabilities different projects were selected to redesign. One of the largest projects that resulted in significant DFA cost savings was the Block III bow redesign. The two big elements of this redesign was replacing the spherical array sonar with a Large Aperture Bow array and replacement of 12 vertical launch cells with 2 large payload tubes. As you can see in the bullets on the slide the bow redesign significantly reduced parts and simplified production. No other major shipbuilding program has ever taken on such a redesign effort while in production and in such a way as to not disrupt or delay production. While the ships capability was not reduced, the large payload tubes will offer enhanced flexibility in the future. And many of the changes will also lead to lower sustainment costs. The DFA effort validated the concept that it takes money up front to save money. The effort to validate, development and make the design changes required the Navy to invest money up front. However, only projects which could realistically pay back the up front investment costs within several hulls were selected. In the end the government expects to achieve acquisition savings multiple times its original investment through the remainder of the class. Additional sustainment savings are also expected.

14 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
Retained the TRIAD and implies future retention SSBN most survivable leg of TRIAD No viable near- or mid-term threat to U.S. SSBNs Requires continuous at-sea presence in both oceans Keeps 14 SSBNs in the near-term Expect to maintain 20 operational tubes per SSBN by 2015 Shifting to our Nuclear Ballistic Missile fleet of SSBNs, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review supported the need to maintain a sea-based strategic deterrent, including continuous at-sea presence in both oceans. Though the replacement class of 12 SSBNs will be able to maintain 12 Operational units because they will not require mid-life refueling overhauls, he NPR called for keeping the current force of 14 SSBNs but indicated this figure would be reviewed towards the end of this decade as we see how the Ohio-class of SSBNs age and strategic deterrent requirements evolve. 14

15 OHIO class Replacement Program
Milestone A Achieved on 10 Jan 2011 Initiated Technology Development Phase Target Average ship cost (2-12) = 4.9B (FY10$) Target Average ship annual O&S = 110M (FY10$) The Ohio Replacement Program reached Milestone A in January, establishing target costs and initiating the Technical Development Phase. The target average ship cost for hulls 2 through 12 is $4.9 billion. This is an aggressive cost target and will require an adequate design maturity by the time construction of the first hull starts in While this date may seem like a long way off, the timeline to develop and design the ship has no margin and the replacement class must be fully operational as the current class begins to retire. While most of the ship specifications still have to be determined, currently the ship is expected to have 16 missile tubes and Electric Drive propulsion. The Common Missile Compartment is being designed and built in collaboration with the United Kingdom, who are also developing a replacement for their Vanguard-class of SSBNs. Common Missile Compartment Electric Drive Propulsion 16 Missile Tubes Maximize commonality with VCS

16 Submarine Industrial Base
Situation Two private construction yards Electric Boat Newport News Shipbuilding Issues Shrinking supplier base 75% (by $) sole-source suppliers 75% of suppliers are small businesses Need 2500 designers to sustain a submarine design capability While the Virginia Class and OHIO Replacement submarines have helped to stabilized the submarine industrial base, the health of the industrial base still needs to be carefully managed. Industry has recognized the sustained trend in declining Navy force structure HII plans to shutter Avondale. Northrop Grumman recently exited the shipbuilding business – spinning off the Ingalls and Newport News shipyards as Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. With non-traditional shipyards building LCS, Avondale’s closure still leaves excess shipbuilding capacity – something the industry will have to rationalize in the coming years Several issues continue to confront the remaining shipbuilders, especially a shrinking supplier base. Among high-tech, major components, 75% of acquisition money is spent on sole source suppliers. Also, studies indicate the industry needs about 2500 designers and engineers as a core group to mentor new personnel for a whole submarine design. With times between new classes of submarines exceeding a decade, the designer base must be carefully managed. The UK lost their critical mass in the years before ASTUTE, and had to hire Electric Boat to help produce the design. Obviously, the US would have no one to turn to if it lost that capability.

17 Undersea Payload Capacity
50 100 150 200 250 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 2054 2059 Payload Volume (ft^3) Thousands 688 SSGN VIRGINIA* * Assumes 30 Ship Virginia 2/year Starting 2011 66% Reduction in Payload Capacity From Payload Capacity Will Decline, As The Value of Undersea Delivery Increases New Ship Options Are Unaffordable Flat Fish Study 1999 As I indicated previously there are not plans to replace the SSGNs with a comparable platform when they retire - resulting in a significant reduction in submarine payload capacity. It is worth noting that this decline happens when many defense analysts consider that our non-stealthy power projection forces will be highly vulnerable to anti-access threats, especially missiles Since this payload capacity will be necessary to deliver the innovative payloads envisioned to mitigate Anti Access Area Denial threats and conduct other missions, EB and others have taken a hard look at ways to affordably increase undersea payload capacity as well as improve the functionality of the capacity we will have. Increasing the Virginia build-rate to 2 ships per year in 2011 doesn’t alleviate the problem - submarine force structure will continue to decline, exacerbating the payload issue The submarine force does have a plan for replacing much of this undersea payload capacity and I will speak to it later during my discussion of their Integrated Undersea Strategy. DARPA Future Sub Study 2003 Towed Payload Module Study 1998 Multi-Mission Module Study 2002 New SSGN 20XX Towed Payload Module Virginia Hull Plugs

18 Plan of Record 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 Fiscal Constraints 48 48 Shortfall of
OHIO Replacement SSBN (12) III New SSN (27) (34) Fiscal Constraints II 1 1 IV (18) (27) V (37) (10) 48 48 Shortfall of SSNs 2 2 46 39 SSNs While this is a busy chart it is useful in providing an overview of the U.S. submarine force structure, the current plan of record for each type of submarine and the associated challenges. The top section of the chart shows the current procurement schedule. The Virginia-class program is seen transitioning to a follow-on class in 2025, though that would prove problematic because it would require development and design at the same time as the Ohio Replacement. The large center section shows SSN force structure over the next 40 years. The different colors represent the different classes of SSNs and the different blocks of Virginia-class submarines. The most significant issue associated with this chart is the large gap in SSN force structure that is projected to occur when the SSN force drops below the required level of 48 SSNs in 2023 and remains below this level for over 20 years, reaching a minimum level of 39 SSNs in 2030. The light and dark green section of the slide represents the SSBN force and shows how the current build plan just maintains the minimum number of SSBNs required. There is no schedule margin. Finally, the bottom section shows the SSGNs which are scheduled to retire without replacement. As mentioned earlier this will result in a significant reduction in undersea payload capacity. Recognizing each of these challenges the Submarine Force has developed an Integrated Undersea Strategy and associated campaign. Uninterrupted Strategic Deterrence 3 3 SSBNs Sufficient Payload Volume SSGNs 4 4

19 Submarine Force Campaign Design
Force wholeness and integrity Maintenance/modernization/training Ao Operations and warfighting today Safe/secure/effective operations Operations and warfighting tomorrow Force structure/payload volume/payloads Their campaign focuses efforts in three main areas. Force wholeness needs to be addressed with the ultimate goal of improving Operational Availability - or more time supporting the Combatant Commanders. Their campaign also recognizes that they need to keep focused on the performance of today's forces. Otherwise, focusing exclusively on future warfighting needs could jeopardize current readiness and performance. The Integrated Undersea Strategy also includes a coherent and comprehensive plan to address the needs of tomorrow's forces.

20 Integrated Undersea Strategy
Issues Actions OHIO Replacement Performance and Schedule Keep OHIO Replacement top priority SSN Force Structure Shortfall Add two lowest cost SSNs with best impact Undersea Payload Volume after SSGN Retirement As part of their future plans for the force, the Integrated Undersea Strategy identifies four main issues. These are listed in priority order. First and most importantly the Ohio Replacement program must execute on schedule and produce the required strategic deterrence without disruption. Next, to address the projected SSN gap the submarine force wants to procure a second Virginia-class SSN in 2018 and These are the most cost efficient SSNs as they would be the last of a block of submarines. To address the reduction in undersea payload capacity when the SSGNs retire the submarine force plans to add a Payload Module to 20 Virginia-class submarines during construction. Finally, the submarine force plans to focus on developing evolutionary payload enhancements. Add VIRGINIA payload module to 20 SSNs Undersea Payload Capability Gaps Evolutionary payload enhancements with high return

21 SSN Force Procurement Changes
Add 2 Cost-Efficient Hulls Delay New SSN Start This slide speaks to the second priority of the Integrated Undersea Strategy - addressing the SSN force structure issues. The charts shown are a blow up of a section of the full chart I showed two slides ago. The top chart shows the current procurement plan and what happens to the SSN gap if you buy a second SSN in 2018 and You can see that buying these two SSNs fills over 40 percent of the SSN gap. The bottom chart shows a change to the procurement plan the submarine force wants to make for Virginia-class and the follow-on class of SSNs. They plan to extend the Virginia-class through two more blocks (adding blocks 6 and 7) and delay building the follow-on SSN until This will reduce the pressure on designers, holding off on the design on the next SSN until the Ohio Replacement design begins to ramp down. It also aligns the procurement of Virginia-class block 6 and 7 to be better aligned with ORP block buys. Since the Ohio Replacement is being designed with maximum commonality with the Virginia-class submarines, aligning the block buys of Virginia-class and Ohio Replacement submarines should result in economic order quantity procurement savings.

22 Virginia Payload Module
40 Tomahawk / TACMS 8-12 Prompt strike weapons Battle management center Inboard SOF storage Targeting Block V ships To replace the undersea payload capacity resident on the SSGNs, the submarine force plans to pursue development of a VIRGINIA payload module and insert it into 20 future Virginia-class submarines. The Virginia-class is specifically designed to be modular built and can accommodate the addition of a four large payload tube section. The module would be able to hold 28 Tomahawk missiles for a total of 40 per boat, or 8 to 12 larger prompt strike missiles. The submarine force is planning to insert the VPM beginning with Block V of the Virginia-class submarines. If all block 5,6 and 7 submarines include a VPM that would result in the addition of 20 VPMs to the fleet.

23 VPM Restores Payload Capacity
1400 1272 Launchers 1200 Block VII 1000 SSGNs Block VI Total # of Launchers Stretch SSN Capacity 800 (4 VPM) Block V 600 400 SSNs (2 Large Bow Tubes) SSNs (12 Vertical Launch Tubes) 200 Here you can see the effect of adding the 20 Virginia Payload Modules to all block V, VI and VII hulls. While there is still a projected gap in undersea payload capacity over the next two decades, the 20 VPMs will eventually restore most of the payload capacity that exists today, and this payload capacity will be more distributed. SSN Torpedo Tubes Fiscal Year VPM added to Blocks V, VI and VII restores most of the payload capacity and distributes it across more hulls

24 Modular, Flexible Payload Plan
2 Large Bow Payload Tubes 12 Missile Stows Advance Dry-Deck Shelter Swimmer Delivery Vehicles Combat Rubber Raiding Rafts Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles This picture demonstrates all the potential evolutionary payload enhancements or locations that could be accommodated on a future Virginia-class submarine with a VIRGINIA Payload module. The Integrated Undersea Strategy has identified development of a Large Diameter UUV as one of their specific payload objectives, though other payloads are also been considered and studied, including multi-function torpedoes, other UUVs, Distributed Netted Systems, prompt strike missile, and decoys. Reconfigurable Torpedo Room 24 Torpedoes or; 21” Unmanned Systems or; Distributed Networked Systems or; Decoys Special Operations Force Berthing Virginia Payload Module (per tube) 3 Prompt Strike Weapons or; 7 Cruise Missiles or; 7 Torpedoes or; 14 Miniature Air Launched Decoys or: 1 Large UUV

25 Summary Challenges are clear - plan is in place
Submarine Force leadership is focused and unified VCS program is DoD role model ORP execution is key To be certain, our nation, Navy and submarine force face many challenges. To address these challenges, the submarine leadership has developed a holistic Integrated Undersea Strategy. The Submarine Force leadership is unified, more than I have seen in a long time. Of course, this unity of effort and focus will be essential to address the challenges that exist today and are expected in the foreseeable future. The focus by our submarine force, shipbuilders and suppliers has been vital to making the Virginia class program a DoD role model - and the timing couldn't be better. Moving forward though the entire submarine enterprise team understands they won't be able to rest on the success of the Virginia program. They will need to translate those successes and the associated lessons to the Ohio Replacement program. Subject to your questions that concludes my presentation.

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