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Public-Key Encryption from Different Assumptions Benny Applebaum Boaz Barak Avi Wigderson

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Plan Background Our results -assumptions & constructions Proof idea Conclusions and Open Problems

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Private Key Cryptography (2000BC-1970s) Public Key Cryptography (1976-…) k Secret key

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Public Key Crypto Talk Securely with no shared key Private Key Crypto Share key and then talk securely Beautiful Math Few Candidates Discrete Logarithm [DiffieHellman76,Miller85,Koblitz87] Integer Factorization [RivestShamirAdleman77,Rabin79] Error Correcting Codes [McEliece78,Alekhnovich03,Regev05] Lattices [AjtaiDwork96, Regev04] Many Candidates DES [Feistel+76] RC4 [Rivest87] Blowfish [Schneie93] AES [RijmenDaemen98] Serpent [AndersonBihamKnudsen98] MARS [Coppersmith+98] Unstructured Beautiful structure may lead to unforeseen attacks!

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The ugly side of beauty Factorization of n bit integers Trial Division ~exp(n/2) 300BC1974 Pollards Alg ~exp(n/4) 1975 Continued Fraction ~exp(n 1/2 ) 19851977 RSA invented Quadratic Sieve ~exp(n 1/2 ) 1990 Number Field Sieve ~exp(n 1/3 ) 1994 Shors Alg ~poly*(n)

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The ugly side of beauty Factorization of n bit integers Trial Division ~exp(n/2) 300BC1974 Pollards Alg ~exp(n/4) 1975 Continued Fraction ~exp(n 1/2 ) 19851977 RSA invented Quadratic Sieve ~exp(n 1/2 ) 1990 Number Field Sieve ~exp(n 1/3 ) 1994 Shors Alg ~poly*(n) Cryptanalysis of DES 1976 Trivial 2 56 attack 1993 Linear Attack [Matsui] 2 43 time+examples DES invented Differntial Attack [Biham Shamir] 2 47 time+examples 1990 Are there ugly public key cryptosystems?

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Complexity Perspective Our goals as complexity theorists are to prove that: NP P NP is hard on average private key cryptography public key cryptography (clique hard) (clique hard on avg) (planted clique hard) (factoring hard)

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Complexity Perspective Our goals as complexity theorists are to prove that: NP P NP is hard on average one-way functions public key cryptography (clique hard) (clique hard on avg) (planted clique hard) (factoring hard)

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Complexity Perspective Our goals as complexity theorists are to prove that: NP P one-way functions public key cryptography (clique hard) (planted clique hard) (factoring hard)

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Goal: PKC based on more combinatorial problems –increase our confidence in PKC –natural step on the road to Ultimate-Goal –understand avg-hardness/algorithmic aspects of natural problems This work: Several constructions based on combinatorial problems Disclaimer: previous schemes are much better in many (most?) aspects – Efficiency – Factoring: old and well-studied – Lattice problems based on worst-case hardness (e.g., n 1.5 -GapSVP) What should be done? Ultimate Goal: public-key cryptosystem from private-key crypto

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Goal: PKC based on more combinatorial problems –increase our confidence in PKC –natural step on the road to Ultimate-Goal –understand avg-hardness/algorithmic aspects of natural problems This work: Several constructions based on combinatorial problems Disclaimer: previous schemes are much better in many (most?) aspects – Efficiency – Factoring: old and well-studied – Lattice problems based on worst-case hardness (e.g., n 1.5 -GapSVP) What should be done? Ultimate Goal: public-key cryptosystem from one-way function

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Plan Background Our results -assumptions & constructions Proof idea Conclusions and Open Problems

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Assumption DUE Decisional-Unbalanced-Expansion: Hard to distinguish G from H Cant approximate vertex expansion in random unbalanced bipartite graphs Well studied problem though not exactly in this setting (densest-subgraph) G random (m,n,d) graph H random (m,n,d) graph + planted shrinking set S of size q n d m n d m T of size
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"name": "Assumption DUE Decisional-Unbalanced-Expansion: Hard to distinguish G from H Cant approximate vertex expansion in random unbalanced bipartite graphs Well studied problem though not exactly in this setting (densest-subgraph) G random (m,n,d) graph H random (m,n,d) graph + planted shrinking set S of size q n d m n d m T of size

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Assumption DUE Decisional-Unbalanced-Expansion: Hard to distinguish G from H G random (m,n,d) graph H random (m,n,d) graph + planted shrinking set S of size q n d m n d m We prove: Thm. Cant distinguish via cycle-counting / spectral techniques Thm. Implied by variants of planted-clique in random graphs T of size q/3

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Assumption 2 Decisional-Unbalanced-Expansion: Hard to distinguish G from H G random (m,n,d) graph H random (m,n,d) graph + planted shrinking set S of size n 0.01 n d m n d m We prove: Thm 2. 3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) PKC T of size<|S| d-LIN(m=n log n, = n -0.1 )+DUE(d,m=O(n), q= n 0.1 ) PKC

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Decisional-Sparse-Function: Let G be a random (m,n,d) graph. Hard to solve random sparse (non-linear) equations Conjectured to be one-way function when m=n [Goldreich00] Thm: Hard for: myopic-algorithms, linear tests, low-depth circuits (AC 0 ) (as long as P is good e.g., 3-majority of XORs) Assumption DSF m n d x1xnx1xn y1yiymy1yiym =P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) Then, y is pseudorandom. random input random string P is (non-linear) predicate

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Decisional-Sparse-Function: Let G be a random (m,n,d) graph. Hard to solve random sparse (non-linear) equations Conjectured to be one-way function when m=n [Goldreich00] Thm: Hard for: myopic-algorithms, linear tests, AC 0 circuits (as long as P is good e.g., 3-majority of XORs) Assumption DSF m n d x1xnx1xn y1yiymy1yiym =P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) Then, y is pseudorandom. random input random string P is (non-linear) predicate

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SearchLIN : Let G be a random (m,n,d) graph. Hard to solve sparse noisy random linear equations Well studied hard problem, sparseness doesnt seem to help. Thm: SLIN is Hard for: low-degree polynomials (via [Viola08]) low-depth circuits (via [MST03+Brav n -order Lasserre SDPs [Schoen08] Assumption SLIN m n x1xnx1xn y1yiymy1yiym =x2+x3+x6=x2+x3+x6 Given G and y, cant recover x. random input Goal: find x. - noisy bit +err

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SearchLIN : Let G be a random (m,n,d) graph. Hard to solve sparse noisy random linear equations Well studied hard problem, sparseness doesnt seem to help. Thm: SLIN is Hard for: low-degree polynomials (via [Viola08]) AC 0 circuits (via [MST03+Brav09] ) n -order Lasserre SDPs [Schoen08] Assumption SLIN m n x1xnx1xn y1yiymy1yiym =x2+x3+x6=x2+x3+x6 Given G and y, cant recover x. random input Goal: find x. - noisy bit +err

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Search3LIN : Let G be a random (m,n,3) graph. Thm 1: 3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) PKC Assumption 3LIN m n x1xnx1xn y1yiymy1yiym =x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err Given G and y, cant recover x. random input - noisy bit

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Main Results PKC from: Thm 1: DUE(m, q= log n, d)+DSF(m, d). -e.g., m=n 1.1 and d= O(1) -pro: combinatorial/private-key nature -con: only n log n security q q/3 n m DUE: graph looks random P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) d x1xnx1xn DSF: output looks random input output d x1xnx1xn dLIN: cant find x input output x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err

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Main Results PKC from: Thm 1: DUE(m, q= log n, d)+DSF(m, d) -e.g., m=n 1.1 and d= O(1) -pro: combinatorial/private-key nature -con: only n log n security q q/3 n m DUE: graph looks random P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) d x1xnx1xn DSF: output looks random input output d x1xnx1xn dLIN: cant find x input output x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err

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Main Results PKC from: Thm 1: DUE(m, q= log n, d)+DSF(m, d) Thm 2: SLIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2,d=3) q q/3 n m DUE: graph looks random P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) d x1xnx1xn DSF: output looks random input output d x1xnx1xn dLIN: cant find x input output x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err

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Main Results PKC from: Thm 1: DUE(m, q= log n, d)+DSF(m, d) Thm 2: SLIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2,d=3) Thm 3: SLIN(m=n log n,,d) q q/3 n m DUE: graph looks random P(x 2,x 3,x 6 ) d x1xnx1xn DSF: output looks random input output d x1xnx1xn dLIN: cant find x input output x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err + DUE(m=10000n, q=1/, d)

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3LIN vs. Related Schemes d x1xnx1xn dLIN: cant find x input output x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err Our scheme[Alekhnovich03][Regev05] #equationsO(n 1.4 )O(n) noise rate1/n 0.2 1/ n degree (locality)3n/2 fieldbinary large evidenceresists SDPs, related to refute- 3SAT implied by n 1.5 -SVP [Regev05,Peikert09] Our intuition: 1/ n noise was a real barrier for PKC construction 3LIN is more combinatorial (CSP) low-locality-noisy-parity is universal for low-locality

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Plan Background Our results -assumptions & constructions Proof idea Conclusions and Open Problems

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Evidence for S3LIN Our Assumption: Search-3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) is hard Distinguish version D-3LIN(n 1.4,n 0.2 ) hard for exp(n ) size AC 0 circuits [MST03+Brav09] n rounds of Lasserre (strongest SDP hierarchy) [Schoenebeck08] D-3LIN(m=1000n, =0.01) assumed to be hard [MST03,Alekh03, AIK06] E.g., Yes = -satisfiable; No = random (unsatisfiable) Algorithmic tasks for CSPs (avg case): No Yes Space of all instances Refute: certify No Distinguish: tell a part Search: certify Yes > >

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Evidence for S3LIN Our Assumption: Search-3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) is hard Refutation version Follows from hardness of R-3SAT(n 1.4 ) [Feige02] E.g., Yes = -satisfiable; No = random (unsatisfiable) Algorithmic tasks for CSPs (avg case): No Yes Space of all instances Refute: certify No Distinguish: tell a part Search: certify Yes n 1.5 satisfiability threshold conjectured to be hard [Feige 02] non-deterministic algorithm [Feige-Kim-Ofek 02] poly-time algorithm [Goerdt-Krivelevich01 Friedman-G- Krivelevich, G-Lanka, Feige-Ofek 03] n 1.4 100n 4.2n > >

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Evidence for S3LIN Our Assumption: Search-3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) is hard Alternative construction based on Search-3LIN(m=n log n, =n -0.2 ) + Planted dense subgraph problem E.g., Yes = -satisfiable; No = random (unsatisfiable) Algorithmic tasks for CSPs (avg case): No Yes Space of all instances Refute: certify No Distinguish: tell a part Search: certify Yes < <

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Comparison to Other Schemes Our: S3LIN(n 1.4,n -0.2 ) Evidence: refutation follows R3SAT(n 1.4 ), resists Lessere(n ) [Alekhnovich03]: LPN(O(n), 1/ n) [Regev05]: LWE p (O(n), 1/ n) y M x += e err vector of rate m n random 3-sparse matrix random n-bit vector Over F p

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Comparison to Other Schemes Our: S3LIN(n 1.4,n -0.2 ) Evidence: refutation follows R3SAT(n 1.41 ), resists Lessere(n ) [Alekhnovich03]: LPN(O(n), 1/ n) [Regev05]: LWE p (O(n), 1/ n) Evidence: implied by n 1.5 -SVP [Regev05,Peikert09] Implication: SZK is hard Our intuition: 1/ n noise was a real barrier for PKC construction –R3LIN(m,1/ n) does not seem to follow from R3SAT 3LIN is more combinatorial (Constraint-Satisfaction-Problem) low-locality-noisy-parity is universal for low-locality functions (learning junta, Feiges xor priniciple, crypto in NC 0 ?)

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Plan Background Main Thm: Construction of Cryptosystem Search Approximate Search Prediction Prediction over planted distribution PKC Variants Conclusions and Open Problems

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S3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) PKE Proof outline: Search Approximate Search Prediction Prediction over planted distribution PKC Goal: find x y M x += e err vector of rate m n random 3-sparse matrix 1 1 1 n x1xnx1xn =x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err random input - noisy bit y1yiymy1yiym

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S3LIN(m=n 1.4, =n -0.2 ) PKE Goal: find x y M x += e err vector of rate m n random 3-sparse matrix 1 1 1 n x1xnx1xn =x 2 +x 3 +x 6 +err random input - noisy bit y1yiymy1yiym

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z Our Encryption Scheme Public-key: Matrix M Private-key: S s.t M m = i S M i Decryption: w/p (1- ) |S| >0.9 no noise in e S i S y i =0 i S z i =b Encrypt(b): choose x,e and output z=(y 1, y 2,…, y m +b) y x += e M Given ciphertext z output i S z i y b + Params: m=10000n 1.4 =n -0.2 |S|=0.1n 0.2 S z =

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z Our Encryption Scheme Public-key: Matrix M Private-key: S s.t M m = i S M i Thm. (security): If M is at most 0.99-far from uniform S3LIN(m, ) hard Cant distinguish E(0) from E(1) Proof outline: Search Approximate Search Prediction Prediction over planted distribution security Encrypt(b): choose x,e and output z=(y 1, y 2,…, y m +b) y x += e M y b + Params: m=10000n 1.4 =n -0.2 |S|=0.1n 0.2 S z =

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z Our Encryption Scheme Public-key: Matrix M Private-key: S s.t M m = i S M i Thm. (security): If M is at most 0.99-far from uniform S3LIN(m, ) hard E(0) 0.1 E(1) Amplify via standard techniques [Holenstein-Renner 05] Encrypt(b): choose x,e and output z=(y 1, y 2,…, y m +b) y x += e M Given ciphertext z output i S z i y b + Params: m=10000n 1.4 =n -0.2 |S|=0.1n 0.2 S z =

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Search Approximate Search S3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find x whp AS3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find w 0.9 x whp Lemma: Solver A for AS3LIN(m, ) allows to solve S3LIN(m+10n lg n, ) y M x += e err vector of rate m n random 3-sparse matrix random n-bit vector 1 1 1 search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC

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Search Approximate Search S3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find x whp AS3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find w 0.9 x whp Lemma: Solver A for AS3LIN(m, ) allows to solve S3LIN(m+10n lg n, ) Use A and first m equations to obtain w. Use w and remaining equations to recover x as follows. Recovering x 1 : – for each equation x 1 +x i +x k =y compute a vote x 1 =x i +x k +y – Take majority Analysis: Assume w S = x S for set S of size 0.9n Vote is good w/p>>1/2 as Pr[i S], Pr[k S], Pr[y row is not noisy]>1/2 If x 1 appears in 2log n distinct equations. Then, majority is correct w/p 1-1/n 2 Take union bound over all variables =wi+wk+y=wi+wk+y

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Search Approximate Search S3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find x whp AS3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find w 0.9 x whp Lemma: Solver A for AS3LIN(m, ) allows to solve S3LIN(m+10n lg n, ) Giveninvoke A on (T,z) to obtain w. Recover x from w and (M,y) as follows. Recovering x 1 : – for each row (1,i,k) compute a vote x 1 =w i +w k +y row – Take majority Analysis: Assume w S = x S for set S of size 0.9n Vote is good w/p>>1/2 as Pr[i S], Pr[k S], Pr[y row is not noisy]>1/2 Assume x 1 has 2log n distinct neighbors. Then, majority is correct w/p 1-1/n 2 Take union bound over all variables T, z M,y

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Approximate Search Prediction AS3LIN(m, ): Given M,y find w 0.9 x w/p 0.8 P3LIN(m, ): Given M,y, (i,j,k) find x i +x j +x k w/p 0.9 Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN(m, ) allows to solve AS3LIN(m+1000 n, ) y M x += e m n 1 1 1 ? search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC

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Approximate Search Prediction Proof: y M 1000n z T m

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11 Approximate Search Prediction Proof: Do 100n times Analysis: By Markov, whp T, z are good i.e., Pr t,j,k [A(T,z,(t,j,k))=x t +x j +x k ]>0.8 Conditioned on this, each red prediction is good w/p>>1/2 whp will see 0.99 of vars many times – each prediction is independent y M 1000n z T m 1 1 1 111111 1 Invoke Predictor A + 2 noisy 0.2 noisy x i i

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Prediction over Related Distribution P3LIN(m, ): Given M,y, r=(i,j,k) find x i +x j +x k w/p 0.9 D = distribution over (M,r) which at most 0.99-far from uniform Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN D (m, ) allows to solve P3LIN U (O(m), ) Problem: A might be bad predictor over uniform distribution Sol: Verify that (M i,r) is good for A with respect to random x and random noise y M x + = e 1 1 1 ? r search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC

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Prediction over Related Distribution P3LIN(m, ): Given M,y, r=(i,j,k) find x i +x j +x k w/p 0.9 D = distribution over (M,r) which at most 0.99-far from uniform Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN D (m, ) allows to solve P3LIN U (O(m), ) Problem: A might be bad predictor over uniform distribution Sol: Test that (M,r) is good for A with respect to random x and random noise Good prediction w/p 0.01 Otherwise, I dont know y M x + = e 1 1 1 ? r search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC Uniform D

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Prediction over Related Distribution Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN D (m, ) allows to solve P3LIN U (O(m), ) Sketch: Partition M,y to many pieces M i,y i then invoke A(M i,y i,r) and take majority Problem: All invocations use the same r and x Sol: Re-randmization ! M x + = 1 1 1 ? r e y

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Prediction over Related Distribution P3LIN(m, ): Given M,y, r=(i,j,k) find x i +x j +x k w/p 0.9 D = distribution over (M,r) which at most 0.99-far from uniform Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN D (m, ) allows to solve P3LIN U (O(m), ) Sketch: Partition M,y to many pieces M i,y i then invoke A(M i,y i,r) and take majority Problem: success prob is small even in a single invocation Sol: Verify that (M i,r) is good for A with respect to random x and random noise Re-randomize x: redefine y i to be y i +M i x Problem: All invocations use the same r Sol: Re-randmization: randomly permute cols of r and M i y M x + = e 1 1 1 ? r search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC

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Prediction over Related Distribution P3LIN(m, ): Given M,y, r=(i,j,k) find x i +x j +x k w/p 0.9 D = distribution over (M,r) which is 0.01-close to uniform Lemma: Solver A for P3LIN D (m, ) allows to solve P3LIN U (O(m), ) Sketch: Partition M,y to many pieces M i,y i then invoke A(M i,y i,r) and take majority Problem: success prob is small even in a single invocation Sol: Verify that (M i,r) is good for A with respect to random x and random noise Re-randomize x: redefine y i to be y i +M i x Problem: All invocations use the same r Sol: Re-randmization: randomly permute cols of r and M i y M x + = e 1 1 1 ? r search app-search prediction prediction over planted PKC

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Distribution with Short Linear Dependency H q,n = Uniform over matrices with q-rows each with 3 ones and n cols each with either 0 ones or 2 ones P m,n q = (m,n,3)-uniform conditioned on existence of sub-matrix H H q that touches the last row Lemma : Let m=n 1.4 and q=n 0.2 Then, (m,n,3)-uniform and P m,n q are -close for const Proof: follows from [FKO06]. 1 1 1

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Distribution with Short Linear Dependency H q,n = Uniform over matrices with q-rows each with 3 ones and n cols each with either 0 ones or 2 ones P m,n q = (m,n,3)-uniform conditioned on existence of sub-matrix H H q that touches the last row Lemma : Let m=n 1.4 and q=n 0.2 Then, (m,n,3)-uniform and P m,n q are at most 0.999-statistially far Proof: follows from [FKO06]. 1 1 1 stat

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Plan Background Our results -assumptions & constructions Proof idea Conclusions and Open Problems

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Other Results Assumptions Oblivious-Transfer General secure computation New construction of PRG with large stretch + low locality Assumptions Learning k-juntas requires time n (k)

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Conclusions New Cryptosystems with arguably less structured assumptions Future Directions: Improve assumptions - use random 3SAT ? Better theoretical understanding of public-key encryption -public-key cryptography can be broken in NP co-NP ?

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Thank You !

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