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1. THE COLD WAR DEFINITION: A STATE OF PERMANENT HOSTILITY BETWEEN TWO POWERS WHICH NEVER ERUPTS INTO AN ARMED CONFRONTATION OR A “HOT WAR” MEANS USED.

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Presentation on theme: "1. THE COLD WAR DEFINITION: A STATE OF PERMANENT HOSTILITY BETWEEN TWO POWERS WHICH NEVER ERUPTS INTO AN ARMED CONFRONTATION OR A “HOT WAR” MEANS USED."— Presentation transcript:

1 1. THE COLD WAR DEFINITION: A STATE OF PERMANENT HOSTILITY BETWEEN TWO POWERS WHICH NEVER ERUPTS INTO AN ARMED CONFRONTATION OR A “HOT WAR” MEANS USED IN THE COLD WAR 1. U.S. DOLLARS 2. MILITARY FORCE 3. NUCLEAR ARSENAL 4. ALLIANCE SYSTEMS 5. ECONOMIC WARFARE 6. PROPAGANDA 7. ESPIONAGE 8. SECRET OPERATION. In current historiography the term “Cold War” describes the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1945 until It was popularized by the American journalist Walter Lippman in 1947 and widely used thereafter to describe US-Soviet relations. In the aftermath of the Second World War the Soviet Union and the United States were the most powerful states and they formed the two poles of the international state system (the bipolar system). Both nations were competing for position of dominance within the system and they wanted to stop each other filling the power vacuum created by the Second World War. The American policy in the Cold War was called “containment” but it was a policy of confining communism in those areas where it already existed. The methods the Americans used to wage the Cold War were as following: US dollars were the primary instrument of war. The United States channeled huge amounts of economic aid to its allies to bolster non-communist governments. For example, between 1948 and 1952 the US granted 12.5 billion dollars in economic aid to the states of western Europe, the so called Marshall aid. The Americans also used military force to counter communism, but not directly against the Soviet Union. Twice during the Cold War the United States fought land wars in Asia, in Korea and Vietnam, in order to defeat international communism. After 1950 America was in continuous state of military preparedness and maintained a large peacetime army. US armed forces were serviced by a massive nuclear arsenal. The Americans successfully developed an atom bomb in 1945 and by 1952 possessed a hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Union caught up quickly, testing an atom bomb in 1949 and a hydrogen bomb in As the Cold War progressed both the nuclear weapons and the delivery systems became more sophisticated. In case of war the United States eagerly recruited friendly nations into alliance systems. In 1949 most of the nations of western Europe were organized into a military alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the communist states of eastern Europe belonged to the Warsaw Pact after By the mid-1950s the Americans had built a global network of anti-communist military coalitions encompassing Latin America, western Europe, the Middle East, Australasia and southeast Asia. Another traditional form of warfare employed by the Americans was economic warfare. After the 1948 there was only a trickle of US exports to the Soviet Union and curbs were imposed on the sales of military equipment. Propaganda was also an important weapon in the Cold War. Two US-financed radio stations, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, were set up in Germany to transmit Western news and values to countries in Soviet-controlled eastern Europe, the so-called eastern block. Espionage assumed a new importance during the Cold War. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was set up in 1947 partly to co-ordinate information-gathering on the Soviet Union and its allies. After 1956 the American U-2 spy-plane, provided invaluable intelligence about the Soviet Union, particularly the state of Soviet missile sites. From 1960 satellites revolutionized intelligence-gathering. The CIA also conducted secret operations in order to combat communism. As an example in 1950s the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of left-wing governments in Iran and Guatemala and developed plans to murder the heads of communist foreign states.

2 2. ALLIES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
A) USA AND THE USSR BECOME ALLIES 1. JUNE 1941; THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION 2. NOVEMBER 1941; THE LEND LEASE AGREEMENT 3. PEARL-HARBOR AND US WAR WITH JAPAN 4. GERMANY DECLARES WAR ON THE USA 5. THE “GRAND ALLIANCE” OR “ANTI-HITLER COALITION”. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 America had not yet entered the war but was committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany. It must therefore help the Soviet union as the enemy of Germany. In November 1941 America began to send supplies to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Agreement. Under Lend-Lease America loaned the enemies of Germany military equipment for the duration of the war. The following month the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor brought America into the war as a belligerent. Japans ally, Germany, also declared war on the United States. America was now an official ally of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany. It was an alliance of convenience brought about by German and Japanese aggression. In the West the new partnership between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union earned the grandiose title the “Grand Alliance” but in the Soviet Union it was named the “anti-Hitler coalition”. This wartime partnership between America and Russia was an effective one and achieved its ultimate objective of reducing Germany to unconditional surrender.

3 3. BREAKDOWN OF ALLIANCE: AN OVERWIEV
: CAUSES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE A) LONG TERM CAUSES B) CONFLICT DURING THE WAR TIME C) DIFFERENT PEACE AIMS 1945: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE THE LONG TELEGRAM 1946: THE COLD WAR STARTS CHURCHILL´S SPEECH After the Second World War the wartime alliance disintegrated. By 1946 the United States had abandoned a policy of long-term cooperation with the Russians an committed itself to the containment of Soviet power across the globe. The Soviet Union was seen as an enemy intent on territorial aggrandizement and ultimately world domination. It was in 1946 that the Cold War truly began. But why did not the wartime partnership between the two superpowers continue after the Second World War? US-Soviet friendship during the war should perhaps be seen as above all an alliance of convenience whose strongest bond was a common interest in defeating Nazi Germany.

4 4. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR A) LONG TERM CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR
: U.S. HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM 2. THE “SHOW TRIALS” IN THE SOVIET UNION (1936, 1937, 1938) : THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN IN 1939. B) CONFLICT DURING THE WAR TIME 1. CRACKS IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ALLIANCE A) ARGUMENT ABOUT THE OPENING OF SECOND FRONT AGAINST GERMANY B) STALIN´S SUSPICION C) THE MANHATTAN PROJECT A) Long term causes of the Cold War: When Lenin and his Bolshevik party seized power in Russia in 1917 the United States and its allies made half-hearted and unsuccessful attempts to strangle the new Bolshevik regime in its infancy two years after the October Revolution and American troops intervened briefly on the side of anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian civil war. In January ,000 suspected communists in the United States were arrested and imprisoned. Soviet-American relations were further strained by Stalin’s methods of governing the Soviet Union. The “show trials” of 1936, 1937 and 1938 had particularly adverse impact on American public opinion. The use of fabricated evidence and confessions extracted under torture to sentence Stalin’s political opponents to death was seen as typical of the way communist governments abused their power. Stalin’s reputation suffered further damage when he concluded the Non-Aggressive Pact with Hitler in August 1939 in order to save an unprepared Soviet Union from German invasion. Many Americans saw this as the work of two dictators with similar ideas and methods. B) Conflict during the war time. Already during the war there were cracks in the Soviet-American alliance. The two sides argued about the opening of a second front against Germany. Stalin wanted the United States and Britain to invade western Europe in order to relieve pressure on the Red Army in the east. As early as 1942 Roosevelt promised a second front but the repeated postponement of plans for an Anglo-American invasion of German occupied France angered Stalin. It was not until D-Day in June 1944 that Britain and America invaded France. Stalin also feared that America and Britain would conclude a separate peace with Nazi Germany and that the three of them would then turn their force against communist Russia. In 1941 American scientists had begun work on the development of an atomic bomb in a program called the Manhattan Project. Roosevelt decided to share some information about the project with Britain and Canada but not to tell the Soviet Union about it. This decision hardly showed a high level of trust in one of Americas allies.

5 4. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR C) DIFFERENT PEACE AIMS
ROOSEVELT´S KEY POST-WAR AIMS INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND CO-OPERATION (UN) NO FORMAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY (FREE SPEECH, FREE ELECTIONS) FREE TRADE (OPEN DOOR) RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD ECONOMY (IM, WORLD BANK) STALIN´S KEY POST-WAR AIMS CO-OPERATION WITH AMERICA RUSSIAN SECURITY SPHERE OF INFLUENCE ON SOVIET PERIMETER RESTORATION OF RUSSIA´S 1914 BORDERS LIMITING GERMAN POWER ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET UNION C) Different peace aims. Roosevelt and Stalin shared some post-war objectives. Both agreed on the importance of German disarmament and demilitarization and to divide and occupy Germany among the victors. Yet in many respects Russian and American plans for the post-war world was radically different. Roosevelt’s key post-war aims: Creation of a world peace-keeping organization, the United Nations. He also wanted no empires or spheres of influence in the post-war world. A sphere of influence is a group of states under indirect control of an outside power. Roosevelt also hoped that democratic institutions would flourish and that people would enjoy the human rights of free speech and free elections. Many Americans believed they had a mission to export democratic values to the rest of the world. For the American’s free trade, the unrestricted exchange of good between nations, was especially important. Individual countries should operate an “Open Door” policy, opening their markets to imported goods. American’s genuinely believed that the free exchange of goods between nations maximized the volume of world trade and world wide prosperity and created a vast marketplace for American goods. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 America had laid plans for the creation of two institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which would shape an open world economy after the war. Stalin’s key post-war aims: Stalin wanted to be on good terms with the United States after the Second World War. He believed that the continuation of the US-Soviet alliance would bring real benefits to the Soviet Union. Stalin’s overriding concern after the war was the security of the Soviet Union because Russia had paid a high price for victory over Germany. To guarantee the future safety of the Soviet Union he wanted to form a Soviet sphere of influence by creating a belt of friendly states on Russia’s western perimeter. He also wanted to move Russia’s boundaries westward and restore its 1914 borders. Stalin was also eager to limit German power because twice in his lifetime Germany had invaded Russia from the west. One very important objective of Stalin’s post-war policy was economic reconstruction of Soviet Union. He hoped that he would be able to approach the United States directly for loans to finance Russian economic recovery.

6 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES
A) POLAND THE YALTA CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 1945 AND THE POLISH-QUESTION. (WHERE THE WEST: 1) OBJECTED THE REVISION OF POLAND´S EASTERN BORDERS; 2) ASKEÐ FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE LONDON POLES IN THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE; 3) WANTED FREE POLISH ELECTION) IN THE LIGHT OF THE THERAN CONFERENCE (IN THERAN CHURCHILL HAD SUGGESTED A PERMANENT CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE´S FRONTIERS. RUSSIA COULD REGAIN HER 1914 BOUNDARIES BY ABSORBING EASERN POLAND, WHILE POLAND WOULD BE CONPENSATED BY RECEIVING PARTS OF EASTERN GERMANY AND THE BILATERAL MEETING IN MOSCOW IN OCTOBER (IN THE BILATERAL MEETING IN MOSCOW THE INFORMAL PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED WHERE CHURCHILL ACCEPTED THAT USSR SHOULD HAVE ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE). THE POLISH QUESTION AND STALIN´S RESPONSE RUSSIANS DID NOT CONCLUDE FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND STALIN ABSORBED EASTERN POLAND HE KEPT HIS PROMISE TO BRODEN THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE FOR A TIME BEING. The Polish question was one of the main causes why the Cold War started. Both the United States and Britain recognized the so-called London Poles but it was the absentee Polish government which had fled to London after the partition of the country between Germany and Russia in When the Red Army occupied Poland in 1944 Stalin set up a pro-Soviet government called the Lublin Committee an fixed Russia’s boundaries with Poland where they had been in 1914. At the Yalta Conference in the Crimea in February 1945, both Churchill and Roosevelt objected to the revision of Poland’s eastern borders and asked for the inclusion of the London Poles in the Lublin Committee to be closely followed by free Polish election. Stalin was furious with Anglo-American interference because he believed that the issue had been settled at previous wartime meetings. At the Big Three Conference in Theran in 1943 Churchill had suggested a permanent change in eastern Europe’s frontiers. Russia could regain her 1944 boundaries by absorbing eastern Poland, while Poland would be compensated by receiving parts of eastern Germany. In October 1944 Stalin and Churchill held a bilateral meeting in Moscow at which an informal percentages agreement was concluded where Churchill accepted that the USSR should have its sphere of influence. The Theran and Moscow agreements formed the guidelines for Soviet policy in eastern Europe but American demands at Yalta were an attempt to retrieve what had been given away at previous meetings with Stalin. After Yalta Roosevelt insisted that the Americans had got their way over Poland. In spite of that Stalin did’n keep all his promises on Poland. Even though he kept his promise of broadening the Lublin Committee through the inclusion of some London Poles he did not conclude free elections in Poland as he had promised at Yalta and the Soviet Union’s new western border with Poland remained in place. This gulf between American expectations of Soviet policy in eastern Europe and actual Soviet policy created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion between the two sides. Soviet-American difference over Poland were an important cause of the Cold War. American policy-makers saw the Polish question as an acid test of Soviet intentions. The failure to hold elections was a breach of good faith and caused fear in Washington. Policy-makers worried that the Soviet Union was intent on projecting its power into new areas.

7 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES
B) ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION JANUARY RUSSIA ASKS FOR $ 6 BILLION LOAN AND AMERICAN CONDITIONS THE TERMINATION OF THE LEND-LEASE IN MAY 1945 FURTHER REQUEST FOR AMERICAN LOAN IN AUGUST 1945 REJECTED RUSSIA DID NOT BE A MEMBER OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK In January 1945 the Russians asked for a $6 billion loan. The Americans immediately imposed conditions on such a loan, in particular the opening of eastern European markets for US manufactured products. The United States was using its financial muscle to extract political concessions, a strategy known as dollar diplomacy. The Russians did not yield to such pressure tactics. The abrupt termination of Lend-Lease without notice in May 1945 was also a source of tension. The Soviet Union made a further request for a loan in August 1945 which was mysteriously lost by the State Department. A combination of all this resulted in the Soviet Union boycotting both the IMF and World Bank.

8 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES
C) ATOMIC WEAPONS 16 JULY THE FIRST AMERICAN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED. AMERICAN ATOMIC MONOPOLY A) WORRIED STALIN B) INFLUENCED AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION C) THE ATOMIC DIPLOMACY On 16 July an atomic bomb was successfully exploded by the Americans and the atomic age began. When Stalin was informed about the event he was deeply worried by American’s sole possession of the bomb – the atomic monopoly. The availability of the bomb immediately influenced American attitudes towards Soviet participation in the Pacific war against Japan. At Yalta Roosevelt secured a promise from Stalin that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months of the surrender of Germany. By July, however Truman hoped that the bomb would enable the United States to defeat Japan without Russia. Americans saw the bomb as a useful means of ending the war with Japan before Russians intervened. The United States attempted to turn the atomic bomb not only to military but to diplomatic advantage, using it as a bargaining counter in negotiations. Truman believed that American’s atomic monopoly would enable him to achieve much of what he wanted at the negotiating table. Americans now offered information about the bomb in return for reorganization of Soviet-controlled governments in Romania and Bulgaria. The tactic of trading the secret of the bomb for political concessions has been called atomic monopoly.

9 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES
D) GERMANY THE YALTA CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS. (SHARED POST-WAR OBJECTIVES OF USA AND USSR ON GERMANY) A) LIMITING THE POWER OF GERMANY B) GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARISATION C) GERMANY DIVIDED AMONG THE VICTORS INTO FOUR ZONES OF OCCUPATION D) THE WINNERS ENTITLED TO TAKE REPARATIONS FROM ITS OWN ZONE E) RUSSIA GRANTED ADDITIONAL REPARATION FROM THE THREE WESTERN ZONES IN EXCHANGE FOR FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS FROM THE SOVIET ZONE F) THE FOUR ZONES A SINGLE ECONOMIC AREA DISAGREEMENT OR DIFFERENCES OWER THE YALTA AND POTSDAM AGREEMENTS ABOUT GERMANY A) GERMAN COAL OUTPUT 1. USSR: GERMAN COAL AS A REPARATION 2. USA: GERMAN COAL TO ASSIST IN THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE B) THE SOVIETS WERE TREATING THEIR ZONE AS A SELFCONTAINED ECONOMIC ENTITY. DID NOT SUPPLY FOOD TO THE WESTERN ZONE C) DIAGREEMENT OVER THE RUSSIAN DEMAND OF ACCESS TO THE COAL AND STEEL OUTPUT OF THE RUHR VALLEY D) THE USSR AND THE USA READ DIFFERENT MEANING INTO THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT Agreements about Germany. Shared post-war objectives of USA and USSR on Germany. Limiting the power of Germany. German disarmament and demilitarization. Germany divided among the victors into four zones of occupations. Each occupying power would be entitled to take reparations from its own zone. These reparations were intended as compensation for human, material and financial losses incurred in the war against Germany and were to take the form of industrial output and equipment. The Russians were granted additional reparations from the three western zones in exchange for food and raw material s from the Soviet zone because the extent of Soviet war losses was recognized in the Potsdam agreement. The occupying powers agreed to treat the four zones of occupation as a single economic area. In other words goods were supposed to move freely between the four zones. Disagreements or differences over the Yalta and Potsdam agreements about Germany. German coal output was an important area of disagreement. The Russians wanted coal from the western zones as reparations, but the Americans wanted to use German coal to assist in the economic reconstruction of western Europe. The Russians were treating their zone as a self-contained economic entity which existed exclusively for their economic benefit. Some reparations from the British and American zones had been delivered to the Russians, but the Soviet Union was not supplying food and basic commodities in return. The Americans insisted that they would not send more reparations until the Russians exported essential items from their zone. In turn, the Russians argued that they would not release goods from their zone until they received a satisfactory level of reparations. Access to the coal and steel output of the Ruhr valley, west Germany’s industrial heartland, was a further cause of conflict. The Russians demanded four-power international control over the Ruhr, which lay inside the British zone of occupation. Both the British and the Americans refused Soviet demands for international trusteeship of the Ruhr. The United States and the Soviet Union read different meanings into the Potsdam agreements on Germany. The difficulty in implementing and interpreting agreements was a significant cause of the Cold War.

10 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES
E) AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST PRESUPPOSED SOVIET EXPANSION A) SOVIET INVASION IN MANCHURIA AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE B) SOVIET INVASION IN KOREA AND AMERICAN RESPONSE C) THE AMERICAN AND BRITHISH PROTEST AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN IRAN D) THE AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE MOVEMENT OF YOGOSLAVIAN FORCES INTO TRIESTE E) AMERICAN $ 25 MILLION LOAN TO GREEK. The on-going failure to settle the major issues of the postwar world deepened American suspicion about Soviet motives. The United States now took a number of measures to enhance its national security in the face of perceived potential Soviet threat. One of the first attempts to block Soviet expansion occurred in Manchuria. In China there was a civil war between the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang (KMT) under Jiang Jieshi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong. Only few days before the Japanese surrender the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan and moved troops into neighboring Manchuria and allowed the Chinese communists to establish a foothold there. Soviet actions in Manchuria brought a swift response from the United States. In September ,000 US Marines were sent to northern China to establish a strong presence of the KMT in northern China. In August 1945 Soviet troops had moved across the Russian border into northern Korea in the war against Japan. The Americans quickly dispatched troops to southern Korea to prevent Soviet control over the entire Korean peninsula. The two sides agreed to divide Korea into two occupation zones along the 38th parallel. Under wartime agreements Russian troops had been garrisoned in Iran in order to stop a seizure of the Persian oilfields by the Axis power. After the war Soviet troops remained in Iran and the Americans and the British protested at the continued presence of Russian troops there and reminded Russians that the agreed date for withdrawal was 1 March 1946. In May 1945 forces of the Yugoslavian communist leader Josip Broz Tito reached Trieste, a port city whose ownership had historically been disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Americans protested to both Stalin and Tito about the movement of Yugoslavian forces into Trieste an Tito withdrew his troops. In Greeks the withdraw of German armies had been followed by a civil war between the right and left and the Americans feared a takeover by the Greek Communists (KKE). The United States made a $25 million loan to Greece in an attempt to stabilize the economy and prevent a political revolution which they believed the KKE might exploit.

11 6. THE COLD WAR STARTS A) 1946: NEW PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION
1. GEORGE KENNAN´S LONG TELEGRAM IN FEBRUARY OFFERED A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY RUSSIAN RULERS HAD ALWAYS BEEN WEAK NEEDED TO INVENT EXTERNAL ENEMY THAT ENEMY WAS THE WEST THEREFORE USSR WAS INEVITABLY EXPANSIONIST AND HOSTILE TO THE WEST MARXISM-LENINISM WAS THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION BECAUSE HE TAUGHT THAT COMMUNIST STATES COULD NOT CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH CAPITALIST STATES 2. WINSTON´S CHURCHILL´S SPEECH IN MARCH 1946 ABOUT THE “IRON CURTAIN”. “IRON CURTAIN” HAD DESCENDED ACROSS EUROPE FROM STETTIN TO TRIESTE BEHIND IT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING AN EMPIRE IN EASTERN EUROPE BEYOND IT THEY WERE ATTEMTING TO PROJECT THEIR POWER BY DIRECTING COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE TO WORK AGAINST ELECTED GOVERNMENTS 3. SHIFT IN THE PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE US AGAINST THE SOVIET UINION. (IN OTHER WORDS: CHURCHILL´S SPEECH HARDENED THE PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE USA AGAINST THE USSR). During 1946 American perception of the Soviet Union changed for the worse. From the opening months of that year the Soviet Union was seen no longer as an ally but as potential adversary. George Kennan, an official in the US Embassy in Moscow, was instrumental in changing attitudes towards the Russians. On 22 February he sent the State Department a telegram which offered a historical analysis of Soviet foreign policy. Britain’s wartime leader, Winston Churchill, was partly responsible for hardened public opinion within the United States against the Soviet Union by his “iron curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March Churchill warned that the only way to deal with the Soviets was to be firm with them in negotiations. These two men contributed to changing attitudes towards the Soviet Union within the political elite in Washington which were also matched by a shift in the mood of the American public.

12 6. THE COLD WAR STARTS B) NEW POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION (“PATIENCE WITH FIRMNESS” OR “GET TOUGH POLICY”) 1. US ACTION IN IRAN 2. MORE STRINGENT CONDITIONS TO LOANS AND CREDITS REQUESTED BY THE SOVIETS 3. US TOUGHER POLICY TOWARDS SOVIETS IN GERMANY A) HALTED REPARATIONS B) BIZONE C) RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 4. BARUCH PLAN (JUNE 1946) A) THE USA AND THE USSR ATTEMTED TO WORK OUT PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS VIA THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN 1945 B) IN JUNE 1946 THE AMERICANS PRESENTED A PLAN WHICH PROVIDED FOR FREQUENT INSPECTION OF ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS IN UN MEMBER STATES. THE BARUCH PLAN C) THE AMERICANS REFUSED TO DESTROY THEIR EXISTING ATOMIC STOCPILE UNTIL INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS WERE FIRMLY IN PLACE D) THE RUSSIANS REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO INSPECTION OF THEIR SITES UNTIL THE AMERICANS HAD DESTROYD THEIR ATOMIC WEAPONS 5. THE CLIFFORD-ELSEY REPORT (JULY 1946) THE REPORT HIGHLIGHTED EXAMPLES OF AGGRESSIVE SOVIET ACTIONS AND STATED THAT THE ULTIMATE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS WORLD DOMINATION. New perception of the Soviet Union quickly resulted in a redirection of American policy. The Americans were now practicing “patience with firmness” or a “get tough” policy towards the Soviets, which was the forebear of the later policy of containment. This new policy appeared in some cases: In March 1946 Russian forces were only 40 miles from the Iranian capital Theran and had not observed the 1 March deadline for withdraw. The Americans took the issue to the United Nations and in May Soviet troops began to retreat. The Americans also applied a much tougher version of dollar diplomacy in loan negotiations with the Russians. They attached more stringent conditions to the loans and credits requested by the Soviets. Significant changes also occurred in US occupation policy in Germany. In an attempt to secure food and commodities from the Russian zone, the Americans halted reparation deliveries to the Soviets from the western zones in May In July the United States and Britain agreed to merge their two zones of occupation into an area called the Bizone, which would form a single political and economic unit. In September the Americans announced the relaxation of restrictions on German industrial production. The United States also brought an uncompromising attitude to information-sharing about atomic weapons. In June 1946 Americans presented the Baruch Plan which demanded for a strict inspection of atomic energy installation in UN member states which was unacceptable to the Russians. In July 1946 Truman commissioned two of his advisers to review US-Soviet relations. Their findings, the Clifford-Elsey Report, highlighted examples of aggressive Soviet actions and stated that the ultimate Soviet objective was world domination.

13 7. WHO TO BLAME FOR THE COLD WAR
STALIN´S RESPONSIBILITY DID NOT IMPLEMENT THE YALTA ACCORD ON POLAND BLOCKED ECONOMIC UNITY IN GERMANY INSTALLED COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN POLAND, ROMANIA AND BULGARIA MOVED SOVIET TROOPS INTO KOREA AND MANCHURIA RETAINED MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN AFTER THE WAR. AMERICA´S RESPONSIBILITY A) MISINTERPRETED RUSSIAN POLICY ALL THE RUSSIAN ACTIONS WERE DEFENSIVE. THEY OCCURRED ON THE PERIMETER OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN ATTEMT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS FRONTIERS SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS DRIVEN BY NATIONAL SECURITY BUT NOT EXPANSIONIST COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY SOVIET UNION DID NOT OPPOSE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN MANCHURUIA AND KOREA, WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS FROM NORTH-KOREA, MANCHURIA AND IRAN AND DID NOT SUPPLY WEAPONS TO THE GREEK COMMUNISTS. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS CONTINUED IN HUNGARY AND FREE ELECTIONS TOOK PLACE IN CHECHOSLOVAKIA IN MAY 1946 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE WAS AN EFFECT AND NOT CAUSE OF THE COLD WAR B) THE SCALE OF AMERICAN POWER AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS DETERMINATION TO CREATE THE POST-WAR WORLD ACCORDING TO ITS IMAGE. The Soviet Union was partly responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War because it did’n fully keep its agreements from Yalta and Potsdam. America’s misunderstanding of Soviet motives was an important cause of the Cold War. From 1946 US policy was based on the false assumption that expansionist communist ideology and not the national security drove Soviet foreign policy. The scale of American power was also an important cause of the Cold War. The Second World War had destroyed existing balances of power within the international state system and had left the United States as the most powerful nation in the world. The American program was designed to remake the world according to US interest and the American image and did not take account of Soviet interest. US power provoked fear among the Russians.

14 7. THE SECURITY DILEMMA In the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union frequently misinterpreted each other’s policy. United States believed for example that the Soviet Union was systematically penetrating areas vital to US security and was engaged in a grand design to become the word’s dominant post-war power. To this extent US policy was based on fear. Policy makers saw the Soviet Union as the aggressor. They therefore took measures to underpin US security, but those defensive measures were construed by the Russians as aggressive, prompting the Russians to take further defensive measures which the Americans then saw as offensive. Thus a dangerous cycle of action and reaction came into being. Strategists call this situation the “security dilemma”. The net outcome was less security for both parties. The security dilemma In the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union frequently misinterpreted each other’s policy. United States believed for example that the Soviet Union was systematically penetrating areas vital to US security and was engaged in a grand design to become the word’s dominant post-war power. To this extent US policy was based on fear. Policy makers saw the Soviet Union as the aggressor. They therefore took measures to underpin US security, but those defensive measures were construed by the Russians as aggressive, prompting the Russians to take further defensive measures which the Americans then saw as offensive. Thus a dangerous cycle of action and reaction came into being. Strategists call this situation the “security dilemma”. The net outcome was less security for both parties.

15 7. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS
THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL THE REVISIONIST SCHOOL THE POST-REVISIONIST SCHOOL. The Orthodox School sees the Cold War as the product of the aggressive and expansionist foreign policy of Stalin and the USSR which had the aim of spreading world revolution. Some events after 1945 can be seen as examples of Stalin’s expansionist objectives. At the Yalta Conference he demanded parts of eastern Poland to be given to the USSR and he was also trying to establish a communist governments in Poland and other eastern European countries. The Berlin Blockade of can also be seen as yet another example of Stalin’s expansionist foreign policy. The Revisionist School sees the Cold War as the result of the provocative actions of the USA rather than the USSR. This approach stresses the defensive aspect of Stalin’s foreign policy faced with an aggressive USA attempting to gain economic dominance over Europe. It highlights a hard-line approach towards the USSR on behalf of the USA. The school also sees Truman’s policy as a product of US economic interests. It highlights the power of big business and the military-industrial sector in pushing the US government towards Cold War confrontation as a way of protecting the economic interests of capitalism. Truman’s actions were unnecessarily provocative and ignored the USSR’s security needs. The Post-Revisionist School has sought to avoid blaming either side for the breakdown in relations and to approach the topic from a more objective standpoint. Instead of trying to decide which side should be blamed for the development of the Cold War, the post-revisionists have attempted to examine in detail the issues involved and bring out the full complexity of decision-making which led to the deterioration in relations.

16 7. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR. STALIN´S FOREIGN POLICY. THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL
The orthodox School: Stalin’s expansionist policy. Part of eastern Poland to the USSR, communist governments in Poland and other Eastern European countries and the Berlin blockade.

17 7. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR: USA´S RESONSIBILITY. THE REVISIONIST VIEW
USA’s hard-line approach towards the USSR after the war. The role of the power of big business and the military-industrial sector in pushing the US government towards Cold War confrontation as way of protecting then economic interests of capitalism USA ignored the USSR’s security needs USA’s provocative actions.

18 7. THE POST-REVISIONIST SCHOOL
Has sought to avoid blaming either side for breakdown in relations and to approach the topic from a more objective standpoint.

19 7. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR. ROLE OF PERSONALITY
The big three: Churchill replaced by Attlee 1945 Roosevelt replaced by Truman 1945 Stalin.

20 CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT 1941-1945
Difference of ideology. Communism, capitalism Economic differences Political differences A) Liberal democracies B) The communist state.

21 CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM: IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
Capitalism (USA) Communism (USSR) Limited government Strong central state Multi party politics One party government Individual rights Free enterprise economy A command economy Open society Closed society

22 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
1. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE IN 1947 CIVIL WAR WAS GOING ON IN GREECE BETWEEN ROYALISTS AND COMMUNISTS RUSSIA HAD PUT PRESSURE ON TURKEY. WANTED TO REGAIN RUSSIAN LAND WHICH TURKEY HAD CONQUERED IN 1918 AND THAT THE MONTREAUX AGREEMENT ABOUT FREE SAILINGS THROUGH THE DARDANELLE-STRAIT SHULD BE REVITALIZED IN THE BEGINNING OF 1947 BRITAIN INFORMED THE USA THAT IT COULD NO LONGER AFFORD TO GIVE FINANCIAL AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY TO CONVINCE THE RELUCTANT CONGRESS TO SEND AMERICAN MONEY AND MILITARY ADVICERS TO GREECE AND TURKEY TRUMAN ANNOUNCED THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE ITS CORE IS AS FOLLOWS: “I BELIEVE THAT IT MUST BE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT FREE PEOPLE WHO ARE RESISTING ATTEMTED SUBJUGATION BY ARMED MINORITIES OR BY OUTSIDE PRESSURE” CONGRESS GRANTED THE PRESIDENT 400 MILLION DOLLARS TO GREECE AND TURKEY. In 1947 the United States adopted a policy of containment. The assumption underlying containment was that the Soviet Union would constantly attempt to extend its power by applying pressure on weak points beyond its own sphere of influence. The broad objective of containment was to prevent the spread of communism beyond those areas where it already existed. Containment was first put into practice Greece and Turkey when president Truman announced the Truman Doctrine: Its core is as follows: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure”.

23 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
2. NATIONAL SECURITY A) THE UNITED STATES INCREASED ITS STOCPILE OF ATOMIC BOMBS FROM IN ONE YEAR FROM JUNE 1947 B) THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT WAS ESTABLISHED (1947) 1) ENLARGED DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CREATED (AT THE PENTAGON) 2) CENTRA INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) ESTABLISHED 3) THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CREATED The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was accompanied by increase in military preparedness as a precautionary measure. The role of the National Security Act was as following: The enlarged Defense Department was designed to improve America’s war-making capability. The function of CIA was to gather intelligence on potential enemies of the United States and engage in secret operations abroad. The National Security Council became very influential in forming policy towards the Soviet Union, and its head, the National Security Adviser, would be a key figure in any presidential administration.

24 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
3. THE MARSHALL PLAN Announced by Secretary of State George Marshall on 5 June 1947 Massive program of economic assistance for countries of Western Europe. Amounted 13 billion dollars between 1948 and 1952 Motives: a) Economic. Create markets for American goods b) Containment of communism. (people who were hungry and unemployed were more likely to turn to extreme parties of the left for solution of their problems). The best antitoxin to communism was prosperity Stalin was offered the Marshall aid but turned it down and forced other Eastern European countries to do the same. Saw the Marshall Aid as an attempt to create an American economic empire in eastern Europe Prompted more aggressive Soviet policy in eastern Europe Russian answer was the Molotov Plan and reformation of Cominterm, now renamed Cominform. More aggressive policy in eastern Europe, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. Marshall Plan was a key episode in the Cold war and marked the moment when compromise between the two sides was no longer possible. The real function of the Marshall Plan was the containment of communism. Washington’s reading of the situation in western Europe was pessimistic. Americans saw a continent in the grip of economic recession. A scenario of continuing economic crisis, growing support for European communist parties and closer alignment with Moscow alarmed the United States. The Soviet Union would then control western Europe. The domination of continental Europe by a hostile totalitarian state organized around a communist ideology would threaten the national security of the United States. To prevent that a large-scale transfusion of dollars to western Europe was necessary. The Russians produced its own version of the Marshall Plan (the Molotov Plan), which was an attempt to bind the countries of eastern Europe into a single economic area. The division of Europe into two separate economic blocs was imminent. In September 1947 Stalin reformed the Cominterm, now renamed the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau). Its functions was to circulate propaganda and liaise with the communist parties of western Europe.

25 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
4. Creation of a West German state US initiation to combine the three western occupation zones into a West German state 1947: Restrictions on industrial production of (West) Germany relaxed 1948: the three occupying powers of the West met to draw up a constitution for a new West German state June 1948: Introduction of a new currency in the three Western zones Stalin’s response; a land blockade of Berlin In June 1948 Russia blocked the road and rail routes to Berlin The purpose was to force the western powers to cancel their plans for West German state The response of the western powers was to supply west Berlin from the air. The Berlin Airlift In may 1949 Stalin ended the Blockade In September 1949: The birth of the Federal Republic of Germany (West-Germany) October 1949: The Soviet occupation zone becomes the German Democratic Republic (East-Germany) The partition of Germany reflected the division of Europe as a whole. American’s gradually began to look at Germany as a vital battleground in the Cold War. They wanted Germany to become an American ally and a solid buffer against communism in central Europe. To win the support of the west German people, a number of steps were taken to revive Germany more quickly than had been planned at the Potsdam Conference. Stalin’s response was to initiate a land blockade of Berlin. At the Potsdam Conference the city had been divided between the four occupying powers. The problem for the three western powers was that the former German capital lay deep within the Soviet occupation zone, which had been sealed off from the rest of Germany since West Berliners therefore depended on the western zones for vital supplies which were delivered along road, rail and land corridors.

26 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
5. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Established 4th April 1949 Military Alliance Article 5: Adopted a principle of collective security whereby an attack on one or more member states would be considered an attack on them all and could be met with armed force Purpose: To keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in. NATO secured a permanent US military presence on the European continent as a guarantee against Soviet attack.

27 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
6. CONTAINMENT IN ASIA: A) JAPAN The main objective of US occupation policy towards Japan between 1945 and 1947 Demilitarization and democratization The Japanese armed forces were demobilized, stockpiles of weapons were destroyed and a “no war” clause was written into a new Japanese constitution Some of Japan’s vast industrial combines were broken up in order to neutralize Japan’s war making capacity The right to strike was recognized and trade unions were legalized War criminals were brought to trial and Japan was forced to pay reparations to its former enemies. The policy-makers in the United States also feared the projection of Soviet influence into Asia. America therefore employed the strategy of containment there. The principal means of containment were: conversion of Japan into a satellite of the United States; substantial financial assistance to anti-communist forces in China and Vietnam; support for an independent non-communist South-Korea; and war plans to defend a crescent of offshore Pacific islands against an aggressor (most probably the Soviet Union) – the so-called defensive perimeter strategy.

28 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
6. CONTAINMENT IN ASIA: A) JAPAN US POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN AFTER 1947 In 1947 US changed its policy towards Japan to win support of the nation Emphasis on economic reconstruction of Japan In 1949 American’s authorized $ 500 million in aid to Japan The program of industrial de concentration was diluted and restrictions on industrial production were relaxed so as not to hinder economic recovery In 1948 government workers were forbidden to strike and US occupation authorities started arresting communist sympathizers The prosecution of war criminals was quietly scaled down Responsibility for day-to-day government was increasingly handed over to the Japanese. The onset of the Cold War altered the direction of American policy from Now the goal of American policy was to secure Japan as an ally firmly anchored to the United States.

29 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
6. CONTAINMENT IN ASIA: B) CHINA US tried to prevent communist victory in the civil war in China by supporting Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalists (Kuomintang) For the American’s the Cold War was as much a conflict over the control of key resources as a battle of ideas. They believed that the recovery of Japan depended on access to the resources and markets of the Chinese interior and that the communists would prevent that. In 1947 American policy in China revolved around rescuing the country from communism.

30 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
6. CONTAINMENT IN ASIA: C) KOREA, VIETNAM AND THE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER Worsening Soviet-American relations meant that neither side could agree on terms for unification of Korea. Policy-makers in America were convinced that USA must hold on to South-Korea at least. US support and economic aid to Syngman Rhee in South-Korea USA was supporting France in its colonial war in Vietnam in spite of the fact that one of Roosevelt’s aims for the post-war era had been decolonization. Americans were afraid that withdraw of the French from Vietnam would swell the rising tide of communism in Asia For America the first line of military defense against communism in Asia would not be the land mass but a belt of offshore islands including Japan, the Riukyu Islands, Guam and the Philippines. US air bases and garrisons existed on all these islands and formed a so-called defense perimeter against an Asian aggressor. For the Americans communism had to be contained on the Asian periphery. Two separate Korean states emerged in The communist Kim Il Sung headed the administration in the north, while in the south an anti-Soviet nationalist Syngman Rhee established himself in power with American backing. The Americans had envisaged the partition of Korea into two occupation zones as a temporary arrangement. Their long-term aim was to unify Korea under a government chosen by free and fair elections. Vietnam had been part of the French empire in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). In 1945 the United States had applied pressure on France to grant independence to its former colonies in Indochina. However, the outbreak of hostilities between the French and the communist Vietminh under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh in 1946 led Americans to side firmly with France.

31 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
7. How successful was the policy of containment? 1. The policy of containment had met with reasonable success in Europe in September 1949 A) Territorially communism made no gains B) The influence of communist parties within Western Europe was in decline 2. In Asia the strategy of containment was less effective A) Success in Japan and partly in South-Korea B) Little success in China and Vietnam. American policy had helped to produce in western Europe a collection of states friendly to the United States. The influx of American dollars was partially responsible for improving living standard there. It seemed that the conditions which bred political extremism were receding. In Asia the strategy of containment had been less effective. One obvious success had been Japan. By 1949 post-war Japan was emerging as a US satellite and bulwark against communist expansion in the Far East. In Korea the Americans had managed to exclude communism from at least the southern part of the peninsula. On the other hand US policy in China had been an outright failure. The Nationalists lost the civil war against the communists in American policy towards Vietnam had also met with little success. French troops were making little headway against the guerrilla forces of the Vietminh.

32 8. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
8. Why was the policy of containment less successful in Asia than in Europe? American policy was resolutely Europe first The communist threat was more complex in Asia than in Europe. Americans assumed that communist forces everywhere were part of a monolithic movement answerable to Moscow and were slow to appreciate the diversity of Asian communism The relative failure to contain communism in many regions of Asia was the consequence more of the inherent popularity of communism based on circumstances the US could not control than of lack of American resources and willpower In Vietnam for example US was siding with an unpopular colonial power against a champion of national independence. There are mainly two reasons why containment was less successful in Asia than in Europe: American policy-makers never committed the same resources or attached the same importance to restricting communism in Asia. The communist threat was more complex in Asia than in Europe.

33 9. ESCALATION: GLOBAL COLD WAR, HOT WAR IN KOREA 1950-53
1. New communist threats: 1. Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in October 1949 2. The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in late August The end of American atomic monopoly 3. American reaction: NSC 68. A document produced by the National Security Council in April Proposed a substantial increase in Americas military strength, i.e. expansion of US conventional forces and its arsenal of atomic weapons and accelerated development of the hydrogen bomb. In the autumn of 1949 the objectives of US policy were the same as they had been since Yet two events rapidly transformed the situation and ushered in a new and dangerous phase in the Cold War. These events were the communist victory in China and the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb. The “fall of China” was a disaster for the United States and Russia’s detonation of the bomb ended the American atomic monopoly. The events of 1949 forced the Truman administration to review both the goals and the tactics of American policy towards the Soviet Union. The outcome of the reappraisal of policy was NS C68, a document produced by the National Security Council in April The document proposed a substantial increase in America’s military strength. Truman broadly agreed with the document’s analysis of Soviet policy and its conclusion but his immediate reaction was to do nothing. But the Korean war forced his hand and within two years every recommendation made in NSC 68 had been implemented.

34 9. THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53 2. Hot war starts in Korea:
1. North Korean soldiers cross the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950 A) Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, was encouraged (to invade South Korea) by Acherson’s (US Secretary of State) defense perimeter speech in January 1950, in which he had omitted South Korea from a list of countries which the United States would automatically defend in the event of aggression 2. America’s response: A) Was not in accordance with Acherson’s speech B) 27. June: The United States sponsored a resolution in the National Security Council calling for military action against North-Korea. The resolution was passed C) 30 June: Truman ordered American troops stationed in Japan into Korea 3. Why did America change its policy? A) They could not accept that Kim was acting independently. The invasion was interpreted as a clear instance of Soviet expansionism. If US did nothing in Korea the neighboring states would fall to Soviet communism (the domino theory) B) On another level, the invasion of South Korea provided a test of America’s credibility and ability to resist communism across the world. As recently as January 1950 US Secretary of State, Acheson, had implied that under the defense perimeter strategy American forces would not be used in Korea. When North Korea invaded the south US response did not match that policy. America´s initial response to North Korea’s invasion was to sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling for military action against North Korea. The resolution was passed only because the Soviet Union was boycotting meetings of the Security Council in response to the American refusal to accept newly communist China as a permanent member of the Council. Why in June 1950 did the United States commit itself to a land war in Asia in spite of Acherson’s speech?

35 9. THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53 3. The development of the war:
1. August 1950: The North-Koreans capture Seoul 2. September 1950: The UN forces occupied only a toehold around Pusan 3. Mac Arthur lands UN forces behind enemy line at the port of Inchon and UN troops brake out of the Pusan perimeter 4. Truman decides to unify the two Korean states. The policy of rollback 5. China sends troops across the Yalu River 6. January 1951: The fall of Pyongyang and Seoul 7. Truman considers to use atomic weapons against China but eventually: 8. Abandons the objective of unifying Korea, reverts to the policy of restoring the 38th parallel and decides to fight a limited war in Korea 9. Disagreements between Truman and MacArthur. Truman relieves Mac Arthur of his command in April 1951 10. February 1951: UN counterattack 11. March 1951: UN troops re-cross the 38th parallel. The battle line stabilized 12. July 1951: Peace talks begin 13. July 1953: Armistice. The war opened badly for the Americans but in September general Mac Arthur turned its tide. Then president Truman decided to pursue a policy of rollback, the recovery of territory under communist control, and unify the two Korean states within the US orbit. When the UN troops approached the Yalu River the communist China intervened in the war, launched a major counter-offensive, and reoccupied Pyongyang and Seoul. Then Truman took the crucial decision to abandon the objective of unifying Korea by military means and revert to the original American war aim of restoring the 38 parallel as the border between North and South Korea and fight a limited war. This caused a disagreement between Truman and Mac Arthur and the president decided to relieve him of his command. In February and March 1951 the UN forces began to enjoy success on the ground and managed to re-crossed the 38th parallel. For the rest of the war the battle front stabilized along a line just north of the parallel. Stalemate on the ground encouraged both sides to seek a negotiated end to hostilities. Peace talks began in July 1951 but dragged on for two years. One of the main obstacles was the issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The North Koreans and the Chinese rejected the principle that prisoners of war should not be returned to their native countries against their will. Compromise on the matter of repatriation eventually resulted in an armistice in July It was agreed that a line corresponding roughly to the 38th parallel should be confirmed as the boundary between North and South Korea. Three years of fighting had changed nothing.

36 9. THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53 4. Consequences:
1. Truman now supported the increase in military spending proposed in NSC 68. Korea marked the militarization of the Cold War 2. NATO was strengthened and enlarged 3. US started to prepare for a rearmament of West Germany 4. US made arrangements to secure Japan as a post-war ally 5. US support to Taiwan 6. The ANZUS pact 7. United States threw its weight behind the French in their war with the Vietminh 8. The globalization of the Cold War. Engagement in Korea necessitated a substantial rise in US defense production. NATO was strengthened and in 1951 the membership of NATO was enlarged to include Greece and Turkey. West German rearmament was also central to the reinforcement of NATO and eventually Germany joined the alliance in 1955. The Korean war hastened Japan’s economic as well as political recovery. The political reconstruction of Japan was confirmed in the San Francisco peace treaty (1951), which ended the state of war between the United States and Japan, restored sovereignty to Japan and terminated the occupation with effect from 1952. US policy towards Taiwan had changed as soon as the Korean war started. In June 1950 Truman immediately ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to defend the island against possible communist invasion. In order to align Australia and New Zealand behind the policy of promoting Japan the United States signed the ANZUS Pact. Under the term of this security agreement all parties agreed to help each other in the event of aggression against Australasia. The Korean war also impacted on US policy towards south-east Asia. In an attempt to eliminate communism in Vietnam the United States threw its weight behind the French in the war with Vietminh. The Korean war was a pivotal event in the Cold War. It marked an acceleration but not a reorientation of American policy. War in Korea also accelerated the globalization of the Cold War and brought about a militarization of American policy. After Korea the United States had new military commitments across the world.

37 WHY AMERICA COMMITTED ITSELF TO LAND WAR IN KOREA?
Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea was encouraged (to invade South Korea) by Acherson’s (US Secretary of State) defense perimeter speech in January 1950, in which he had omitted South Korea from a list of countries which the United States would automatically defend in the event of aggression Why did America change its policy? 1. They could not accept that Kim was acting independently. The invasion was interpreted as a clear instance of Soviet expansionism. If US did nothing in Korea the neighboring states would fall to Soviet communism (the domino theory) 2. On another level, the invasion of South Korea provided a test of America’s credibility and ability to resist communism across the world. In January 1950 US Secretary of State, Acherson, held a speech (defense perimeter speech) in which he omitted South Korea from a list of countries which the United States would automatically defend in the event of aggression. This speech was an encouragement for Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, to invade South Korea. Why did the United States change its policy in June 1950 and commit itself to a land war in Asia? First of all they could not accept that Kim was acting independently. The invasion was interpreted as a clear instance of Soviet expansionism. If US did nothing in Korea the neighboring states would fall to Soviet communism (the domino theory). On another level, the invasion of South Korea provided a test of America’s credibility and ability to resist communism across the world.

38 10. EISENHOWERS COLD WAR : New strategy of containment: The “new look”. Differed from Truman’s policy. Increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Now regarded as a weapon of first and not last resort. The doctrine of massive retaliation. Smaller role for conventional forces. More willingness to use covert operations; CIA More willingness to use personal diplomacy as a legitimate part of the policy of containment. Eisenhower’s arrival in office prompted a re-examination of how the United States should respond to international communism. By the end of 1953 a new strategy of containment had emerged, entitled the “New Look”. The doctrine of massive retaliation: A policy where America could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in order to extract concessions from communist adversaries. Yet the fact that the Soviet Union now possessed nuclear weapons of its own made nuclear blackmail a dangerous tactic. Dulles articulated the diplomacy of brinkmanship as: “The ability to go to the verge without getting into war is necessary art ... If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost”. Ike chose the expansion of America’s nuclear arsenal over the continued increase in conventional forces as the cheaper and more effective method of combating communism. Truman had used covert operation selectively, but Ike was far more willing to sanction such actions. Both the scale and the frequency of CIA operations grew under Ike and he regarded undercover action as a routine instrument of foreign policy. Eisenhower also regarded negotiation both with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China as a legitimate part of the policy of containment. There was a full US-Soviet summit under Ike in 1955, a further meeting between Ike and Khrushchev in 1959 and one abortive summit in 1960.

39 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Europe:
The Soviet suppression of workers uprising in East-Germany in The United States did not do anything in spite of the fact that US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had promised “rollback” and the liberation of eastern European countries under Soviet domination during the 1952 presidential election The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in The United States did not do anything The Rapacki Plan (1958). The Soviet proposition of a phased reduction of conventional forces and nuclear-free zone in central Europe. US rejected the plan 1958: Khrushchev’s demand that the western powers quit Berlin within six months. Rejected by the West US difficulty with France. France refused to accept the rearmament of West Germany. But eventually (1955) Germany joined NATO. During Eisenhower’s administration the status quo continued in Europe and the frontier between the American sphere of influence and the Eastern block remained unchanged. When the insurrection of workers in East Germany in June 1953 and the revolution in Hungary in 1956 were put down by Soviet troops the Americans did not do anything in spite of the promise made by Dulles during his Senate confirmation hearings to bring about “the liberation of these captive peoples”. For their part the Russians made two attempts to change the situation in Europe in their favor. The first was the Rapacki Plan (1958) and the second was Khrushchev’s demand at the end of 1958 that the Western powers quit Berlin within six months. Ike warned that a Soviet takeover of West Berlin ran the risk of massive retaliation. In 1954 the United States also encountered difficulties in Europe with its own partners in the Western alliance, principally France. France did not want West Germany to join NATO but then the Americans threatened to withdraw its troops from western Europe and leave the region vulnerable to Soviet land armies. Eventually a solution was brokered. West Germany would be admitted to NATO subject to certain severe restrictions designed to mollify the French. When West Germany joined NATO in May 1955 the act was accepted both by France and the Soviet Union.

40 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Korea
Eisenhower was personally committed to a speedy end to the Korean war Negotiations for armistice foundered on the repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners Ike applied pressure to the Chinese by hinting that the US might use atomic weapons against the Chinese mainland In July 1953 the two sides agreed an end to hostilities. The first outstanding issue confronting Ike’s administration was the resolution of the Korean conflict. Negotiations for armistice foundered on the issue of repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners who did not want to return to their native countries. Having agreed to send such prisoners to neutral countries which would decide their fate, the United States and China could not agree on which neutral countries. Ike applied pressure to the Chinese by hinting that the US might use atomic weapons against the Chinese mainland. In July 1953 the two sides agreed an end to hostilities. Ike warned the Chinese that any breach of the terms of the armistice might also bring a nuclear reprisal from the United States.

41 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands
Major crisis in Sino-American relations in 1954,1955 and 1958 1954: The communist China’s bombardment of two tiny islands, Quemoy and Matsu, occupied by Taiwan’s Nationalist forces 1955: The Chinese communists attack the Tachen islands. US response: Fully supported Jiang Jieshi, renewed its commitment to defend Taiwan against communist invasion and threatened to use atomic bombs against China for the second time. The Formosa resolution 1958: Renewed bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. US forces in the Far East put onto a war footing and a veiled threat of nuclear strike against China again issued Explanation of US response: Any instance of communist aggression regarded as a test case of America’s determination to defend the “free world”. American’s were aware that a firm stance on the issue of the offshore islands might create cracks in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Small island groups, the Quemoy, Matsu and Tachen islands, lying between Taiwan and mainland China and garrisoned by Nationalist forces were the cause of two major crisis in Sino-American relations under Eisenhower. The Chinese communist attached these islands in 1954, 1955 and The response of the United States was to renew its commitment to defend Taiwan. In 1955 Congress passed the Formosa Resolution allowing Eisenhower to take whatever military action he thought necessary to defend Taiwan. The president also announced that any move by the Chinese communists against Taiwan would be met by the use of nuclear weapons against China. A veiled threat of a nuclear strike against China was again issued in 1958 when the Chinese government renewed its bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. Why was America prepared to risk war with China and the Soviet Union in order to defend the Quemoy and Matsu islands? There are two explanations for that. Firstly under Eisenhower, as under Truman, any instance of communist aggression was regarded as a test of America’s determination to defend the “free world”. If the United States did nothing, it would send the wrong signals to anti-communist forces everywhere. Secondly the Secretary of State, Dulles, was aware that a firm American stance on the issue of the offshore islands might create cracks in the Sino-Soviet alliance and put a serious strain on relations between these two countries.

42 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia)
American intervention in the region was justified by the domino theory (if Indochina fell to the communists other Asian countries might follow) 1954: The French defeated at the Dien Bien Phu by Vietminh (the communist forces of Ho Chi Minh) Negotiations opened and the Geneva Accords concluded (in 1954) Vietnam temporarily divided along 17th parallel and provisions made for national elections to unify the country within two years The United States did not sign the Geneva Accords US policy was to bolster South-Vietnam as a stable non-communist state South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) established. Its purpose was to prevent communist interference in Indochina The Americans opened military mission in South-Vietnam 1956: Eisenhower decided that South-Vietnam would not participate in the nationwide elections agreed at Geneva In the late 1950s: “Vietcong” and the National Liberation front established. Began to conduct guerrilla warfare against the government of South-Vietnam In Laos the pro-Western government of Laos was encountering opposition from communist group (the Pathet Lao). American policy-makers continued to invest Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) with great strategic importance. The view that Ho Chi Minh was a Moscow trained communist had led the Americans to support France in its war against the Vietminh in Vietnam. The war reached a critical phase by 1954 when the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The French and the Vietminh now opened negotiations in the presence of America and China and concluded the Geneva Accords in These agreements temporarily divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel and made provisions for national elections to unify the country within two years. The United States did not sign the Geneva Accords and its response was to bolster South Vietnam as a stable non-communist state capable of resisting communist incursion from the north. Thus began America’s long military commitment to the defense of South Vietnam. Two years later Eisenhower decided that South Vietnam would not participate in the nationwide elections agreed at in Geneva on the grounds that Ho would have won such elections. As a reaction to the growing communist threat in the area the Americans established the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Its members were the US, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. It was modeled on NATO and its purpose was to prevent communist interference in South Vietnam, Laos an Cambodia. The situation in Laos was also a source of concern in Washington. The pro-Western government of Laos was encountering opposition from the Pathet Lao, an indigenous communist group.

43 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR The Middle East; Iran
1951: Mohammad Mossadeq appointed as prime minister of Iran Nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company half owned by Britain Britain and the US then led a boycott of Iranian oil on the world market Americans decided to overthrow Mossadeq by undercover operation The Shah’s attempt to remove Mossadeq by the order of the Americans failed CIA orchestrated fake communist demonstration on the streets of Theran to arouse fear of communist takeover Then they mounted massive counter-demonstrations in the favor of the Shah. American money was paid to street mobs Mossadeq quit office and Iran was now clearly aligned with the United States. The first attempt to contain communism in the Middle East occurred in Iran in Two years earlier Mohammad Mossadeq had been appointed as prime minister of the country. One of his first actions was to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was half-owned by Britain. Britain and the United States then led a boycott of Iranian oil on the world market. In 1953 the Americans decided to overthrow Mossadeq by undercover operation because they were worried about his links with the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh. The Shah attempted to remove Mossadeq by the order of the Americans but his plan failed. CIA agents now exploited the situation by orchestrating fake communist demonstration on the street of Theran, aimed at arousing fears of communist takeover. They then mounted massive counter-demonstrations in favor of the Shah. American money was paid to street mobs who marched into the centre of Theran and seized key government buildings. Mossadeq quit office and Iran was now clearly aligned with the United States.

44 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR 1955: The Baghdad Pact formed (Britain and Iraq and later Iran and Pakistan) Purpose: Designed to exclude Soviet influence from the Middle East After 1959 it was known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) when Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was a further measure designed to exclude Soviet influence from the Middle East. It was formed in 1955 and its original members were Britain and Iraq, joined later by Iran and Pakistan. After 1959 it was known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). For the British the Pact was a means of maintaining their influence in the Middle East and their military bases in Iraq. The United States supported but did not join the Pact.

45 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Egypt
President Nasser played off the two superpowers against each other in an attempt to secure aid for Egyptian economic development The United States offered to part-finance the construction of the Aswan Dam in order to avert an alignment between Egypt and the Soviet Union When Nasser recognized the Peoples Republic of China in 1956, the US cancelled economic aid to Egypt As a response Nasser nationalized the British-owned Suez Canal Company On 5 November Britain and France along with Israel started military operation against Egypt to regain the Suez Canal zone Soviet Union threatened to intervene militarily in defense of Egypt. Wanted cooperation with US which Eisenhower rejected Eisenhower condemned the whole operation and put pressure on the British, French and Israel to withdraw their forces which they did Soviet-Egyptian alliance emerged in the aftermath of Suez Aroused fear in the West and the response was the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957 which granted the president powers to send economic and military aid to friendly states in the Middle East The Eisenhower Doctrine invoked in Jordan in 1957 and in July 1958 when Americans invaded Lebanon to halt Nasser’s influence in the region. Egypt was the scene of the greatest Cold War crisis in the Middle East under Eisenhower. The Egyptian leader at this time, President Nasser, played off the two superpowers against each other in an attempt to secure aid for Egyptian economic development. The construction of the Aswan Dam on the River of Nile was part of his program of economic modernization. The United States offered to part-finance the construction of the Aswan Dam in order to avert an alignment between Egypt and the Soviet Union. When Nasser recognized the Peoples Republic of China in 1956, the United States cancelled economic aid to Egypt. Nasser aimed to make up for the shortfall in revenue by nationalizing the British-owned Suez Canal Company. This action brought Anglo-Egyptian relations to the verge of breakdown and on 5 November Britain and France along with Israel started military operation against Egypt to regain the Suez Canal zone. The Soviet Union immediately threatened to intervene militarily in defense of Egypt and asked for US-Soviet cooperation. Eisenhower rejected this proposal but, nevertheless, condemned the whole operation. He put pressure on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces which they did. The Sues crisis had several important and long-lasting effect on American policy. A Soviet-Egyptian alliance emerged in the aftermath of Suez. Nasser’s ties to Moscow aroused new fears about the penetration of Soviet power into the Middle East. The response was the Eisenhower Doctrine announced in January Congress passed a resolution granting the President power to send economic or military aid to any Middle Eastern state seeking assistance against “overt aggression from any nation controlled by international communism”. The Doctrine was first invoked in 1957 by economic aid to Jordan and July 1958 when Americans invaded Lebanon to halt Nasser’s growing influence in the region.

46 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Central America and the Caribbean
The United States viewed Latin America and the Caribbean as its backyard. Its aim was to exclude communism from the Western hemisphere 1951: Jacobo Arbenz elected president in Guatemala Started land reform by seizing unused land owned by the US United Fruit Company Eisenhower saw it as the prelude to a communist reform program and authorized a CIA plan to overthrow Arbenz The CIA supplied the anti-communist Castillo Armas with funds, mercenaries and the base in Honduras In June 1954 Armas invaded Guatemala supplied with two planes flown by US pilots and Arbenz fled to Mexico. Central America and the Caribbean. The United States always viewed Latin-America and the Caribbean as its backyard. It was an unwritten rule of US policy to exclude communism from the Western hemisphere. Guatemala. In 1953 a potential communist threat was identified in Guatemala. The countriy’s president Jacobo Arbenz Guzman had been elected in One of his priorities was land reform and in 1953 he seized unused land owned by the US United Fruit Company. The already suspicious Eisenhower administration saw the seizure as the prelude to a communist reform program and authorized a CIA plan to overthrow him. The man chosen to lead the coup was Castillo Armas, a staunch anti-communist. The CIA supplied him with funds, mercenaries and a base in neighboring Honduras. Armas invaded Guatemala in June 1954 supplied with two planes flown by US pilots. Arbenz fled to Mexico and after a short interval Armas became president.

47 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Cuba
On New Year’s Day 1959 Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba Quickly initiated a program of land distribution Castro’s confiscation of US assets on the island and his recognition of communist China aroused American fears that he might become Moscow’s ally When Cuba signed trade agreement with the Soviet Union Eisenhower responded with an embargo on Cuban sugar imports and instructed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for invasion of the island Later US blocked all trade with Cuba and in January 1961 the two countries broke off diplomatic relations. Cuba. The spectre of communism loomed even closer to home when in 1959 Fidel Castro assumed the leadership of the island of Cuba. Like Arbenz in Guatemala, he quickly initiated a program of land redistribution. Castro’s confiscation of US assets on the island and his recognition of communist China aroused American fears the he might become Moscow’s ally. When Cuba signed trade agreement with the Soviet Union Eisenhower responded with an embargo on Cuban sugar imports and instructed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for an invasion of the island. Castro continued to seize US assets in Cuba and the United States now blocked all trade with Cuba except for a few essential items. In January 1961 the two countries broke off diplomatic relations.

48 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR US-Soviet relations under Eisenhower
1953: Eisenhower’s proposal “Atoms for Peace” Plan. Khrushchev policy of “peaceful co-existence”. May 1955: Agreement on the future of Austria. 1955: Geneva summit Ike’s proposal of “Open Skies”. Rejected by the Russians. The Hungarian rising and the Suez crisis soon dissipated the “Spirit of Geneva The Russians launching the worlds first orbiting satellite, Sputnik. Ike accused of allowing “missile gap” to grow between USA and USSR. Ike hoped for a ban on the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. America ceased testing in October 1958 and the Russians immediately followed suit in absence of formal agreement Khrushchev issues an ultimatum giving the Americans six month to leave Berlin. Ike ignored the ultimatum Khrushchev visits the United States in September 1959 (the “Spirit of Camp David”) On 1 May 1960 a U-2 spy plane shot down over the Soviet union The U-2 incident and its consequences. Eisenhower’s arrival in the White House and Stalin’s death 1953 produced new Cold War leaders. Yet new leadership in Washington and Moscow did not bring about a sea-change in US-Soviet relations. At the United Nations in 1953 Eisenhower put forward his “Atom for Peace” Plan. Ike proposed that the major powers should deposit a portion of their nuclear stockpiles in a bank of nuclear materials supervised by the UN. The material would be then be used for the peaceful generation of nuclear energy. This initiate came to nothing because the Russians rejected the plan. Nevertheless there were signs of a more conciliatory approach to Cold War problems on the part of the Post-Stalinist Russia. The new leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, suggested that relations between capitalist and communist states should proceed in a context of “peaceful co-existence”. Agreement on the future of Austria was a further example of improving Soviet-American relations. Like Germany, Austria had been divided into four zones of occupation in All four powers now agreed to withdraw their occupying forces and unify Austria in return for Austrian neutrality. The agreement was initialed in May 1955. The Austrian State Treaty cleared the way for the Geneva summit later in the same year. The summit created a climate of goodwill between the two superpowers (the ”spirit of Geneva”) but little substance was achieved. Eisenhower’s proposal of “Open Skies” was rejected by the Russians. According to it the Russians and Americans would exchange a blueprint of their military installations and allow mutual aerial inspection of weapons sites. The Hungarian rising and the Suez crisis soon dissipated the “spirit of Geneva”. Also the Russians launching the world’s first orbiting satellite, Sputnik, caused panic in the United States. Eisenhower was accused of allowing a dangerous “missile gap” to grow between the United States and the Soviet Union and a special commission appointed by Ike recommended a substantial increase in defense spending (the Gaither Report). Eisenhower rejected the Gaither Report’s proposal and dismissed talk of a “missile gap”. Confident in US nuclear superiority, he showed a renewed commitment to negotiating with the Soviet Union in the closing period of his presidency. He hoped for a ban on the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. America ceased testing in October 1958 and the Russians immediately followed suit in absence of formal agreement. Soviet-American relations worsened temporarily when Khrushchev issued an ultimatum giving the Americans six months to leave Berlin. Eisenhower ignored the ultimatum and kept lines of communications to Moscow open. The Russian leader visited the United States briefly in September 1959 and the friendly atmosphere between the two leaders led people to talk of the “spirit of Camp David”. Plans were laid for a summit in Paris in May 1960 to be followed by a visit to the Soviet Union by Eisenhower. On 1 May 1960 a U-2 spy-plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. The U-2 incident had the consequences that the Paris summit which was held later that month between Khrushchev and Eisenhower collapsed. It prevented further progress on the key issues of Berlin and a test ban and the invitation to the American president to visit the Soviet Union was cancelled.

49 EISENHOWERS COLD WAR Eisenhower: An assessment
Western Europe offered a secure frontier against communism Were successful in confining China (the doctrine of massive relations) Friendly Iran ensured Avoided major split with Arab states because of his policy in the Suez crisis Controlled the cost of the cold war The policy in Indochina was failure The overthrow of Mossadeq and Arbenz examples of American imperialism CIA too powerful Authorization of U-2 flight was a major error. During Eisenhower’s presidency communism was successfully contained in many areas of the world. Western Europe offered a secure frontier against communism. In East Asia the doctrine of massive retaliation had helped to deter a Chinese takeover of the Quemoy and Matsu islands and a possible invasion of Taiwan. The CIA-inspired coup in 1953 had also ensured a friendly Iran and its action in Guatemala eliminated a perceived communist threat. Eisenhower’s opposition to the use of force in the Suez crisis avoided a major split with the Arab states. Finally Ike deserves some credit for controlling the costs of the Cold War. On the debit side, the Eisenhower administration’s policy in Indochina was a failure. The overthrow of Mossadeq and Arbenz rested on the false assumption that nationalist and reforming leaders in the world’s emerging nations were likely to be communist fellow-travellers. The coups in both countries have been seen as among the worst examples of American imperialism in the Cold War era. Arguably Eisenhower’s reliance on covert CIA operations made the agency too powerful. Finally Ike’s authorization of a U-2 flight in the eve of the Paris summit was a major error of judgment and destroyed his cherished ambition of achieving a permanent thaw between Moscow and Washington.

50 KENNEDY Policy of flexible response Cold warrior Main elements:
A) Increase in conventional forces and enlargement of nuclear arsenal, B) Economic aid, C) Covert action, D) Negotiation 1. Increase in military spending and buildup of military forces 2. Economic aid as an instrument of containment. Alliance for Progress 3. Covert action, invasion of Cuba, Operation of Mongoose 4. Negotiations with Russia. Before John F. Kennedy became a president of the United States he had been a dedicated Cold Warrior. The strategy of containment employed under his administration was called “flexible response”. Its main elements were an increase in conventional forces, the enlargement of the nuclear arsenal, economic aid, covert action and negotiations with the Soviet Union. There were clear differences between Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s conception of containment. The cuts in conventional forces imposed by Ike were reversed by Kennedy. The number of combat-ready divisions increased considerably and the armed forces grew in size. Enlargement of both conventional an nuclear forces implied a substantial increase in military spending compared to Eisenhower’s policy of the New Look. Military spending grew by 13 per cent under Kennedy. The defense budget rose from $47,4 billion in 1961 to $53,6 in 1964. Kennedy also attached more importance than Eisenhower to economic aid as an instrument of containment. He wanted to remove the economic conditions which created the seed-bed for communism. In an attempt to alleviate poverty in Latin-America the Alliance for progress was founded in 1961 and $ 20 billion was set aside to promote living standards by reforms such as land redistribution. Covert action was also an important aspect of containment under Kennedy. In 1961 the CIA planned an invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles and subsequently implemented Operation Mongoose, whose objective was to destabilize Castro’s communist regime in Cuba and ultimately bring down the Cuban leader. A further important similarity between Ike and his successor was his willingness to negotiate with the Russians. During Kennedy’s presidency there were moments of crisis in US-Soviet relations but bilateral diplomacy continued and agreements were reached on specific issues.

51 KENNEDY The central purpose of “flexible response”
To expand the available means of countering communism. (The doctrine of “massive retaliation” left the president with very few options if the opponent did not give in to nuclear blackmail) To meet the assumption that the communist threat was more diverse than before To serve as a reaction to the new tactics of the communist powers and the expansion of the Cold War into new areas of the world (Khrushchev had promised that the Russians would champion wars of national liberation). The central purpose of the policy of “flexible response” was to expand the available means of countering communism. One of the inherent risk of Eisenhower’s doctrine of “massive retaliation” was that it left the president with very few options if an opponent did not give in to nuclear blackmail. The new strategy rested on the premise that the communist threat was now more diverse than it had ever been. As soon as Kennedy had entered the White House, Khrushchev had promised that the Russians would champion wars of national liberation. Flexible response was therefore a reaction to the new tactics of the communist powers and the expansion of the Cold War into new areas of the world.

52 KENNEDY Military spending
Grew by 13 per cent under Kennedy. The defense budget rose from 47.4 billion dollars in 1961 to 53.6 in 1964 The cuts in conventional forces imposed by Ike were reversed by Kennedy. The number of combat-ready divisions increased considerably and the armed forces grew in size.

53 KENNEDY Alliance for progress
Kennedy wanted to remove the economic conditions which created the seed-bed for communism In an attempt to alleviate poverty in Latin America the Alliance for Progress was founded in 1961 and 20 billion dollars was set aside to promote living standards.

54 KENNEDY Covert actions
In 1961 the CIA planned an invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles and subsequently implemented Operation Mongoose, whose objective was to destabilize Castro’s communist regime in Cuba and ultimately to bring down the Cuban leader.

55 KENNEDY Laos Civil war between Pathet Lao (communists) and the pro-western government installed by CIA. In 1961 Kennedy threatened US military intervention in the war. In 1962 an agreement was concluded but an unofficial war continued. Laos confronted Kennedy with the first Cold War crisis of his presidency. In Laos there was a civil war going on between the communist Pathet Lao forces and the pro-western government installed by the CIA. In 1961 Kennedy threatened US military intervention in the war. In 1962 an agreement was concluded but an unofficial war continued.

56 KENNEDY Vietnam 1. The Domino Theory
2. Kennedy increased economic aid to South Vietnam and dispatched additional military advisers but rejected advice to commit US ground troops 3. In 1959 the communists in the North had pledged themselves to the reunification of Vietnam by armed struggle. Formed National Liberation Front which was the political wing of the Vietcong 4. Kennedy’s response: A) Increased the number of US military advisers B) Authorized counter-insurgency operations against the communist guerrillas C) Pressed Diem (the president of South Vietnam) to enact reforms 5. In November 1963 CIA and Kennedy encouraged army generals to overthrow Diem because of rising unrest in the country. Vietnam Kennedy was adherent of the domino theory. He believed that the communist takeover of South Vietnam would expose the states of Indonesia and Malaysia to communist influence. Policy-makers were convinced that Vietnam was part of a larger struggle between the United States and the communist powers for hegemony in south-east Asia. Therefore the survival of an independent non-communist Vietnam was an article of faith. As an attempt to ensure that Kennedy increased economic aid to South Vietnam and dispatched additional advisers, but he rejected advice to commit US ground troops. At first communist opposition from within South Vietnam was the major threat to American interests. In the countryside South Vietnamese communists had organized themselves into guerrilla units called Vietcong by its adversaries. In 1959 the communists in the North pledged themselves to the reunification of Vietnam by armed struggle. Under instructions from Hanoi the southern communists formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1960 which was the political wing of the Vietcong. Kennedy’s response to the growing penetration of rural areas by the Vietcong was threefold. He increased the number of US military advisers, authorized counter-insurgency operations against the communist guerrillas in the south, and pressed Diem (the president of South-Vietnam) to enact reforms. In addition to increased number of military advisers the US military strategies was based on counter-insurgency measures which included “search and destroy” missions against Vietcong units in the countryside. The Americans also implemented the strategic hamlet program. Vietnamese civilians were “persuaded” to move into “strategic hamlets” in areas controlled by the South-Vietnamese army and the USA forces to remove them from contact with the Vietcong. Then US troops were sent into these cleared areas to “search and destroy” the Viet-cong. It was assumed that any Vietnamese who remained in such areas must be members or supporters of the Vietcong, so troops were encouraged to achieve a high “body count”. This strategy included spraying of defoliant such as Agent Orange in order to deprive Vietcong soldiers of cover in the jungle. The use of the chemical napalm also devastated large parts of the countryside. But the strategy was clearly failing. The resort to different tactics had not contained communism in South Vietnam. In November 1963 the CIA and Kennedy encouraged army generals to overthrow Diem because of rising unrest in the country.

57 KENNEDY Why did Kennedy get involved in the Vietnam war?
Was an adherent of the domino theory: the communist takeover of South-Vietnam would expose other Asian states to communist influence. Vietnam was considered as part of larger struggle between the US and the communist powers. The survival of an independent non-communist Vietnam was an article of faith.

58 KENNEDY US military strategies in Vietnam. The “strategic hamlet” program and “Search and destroy” missions After Vietnamese civilians had been “persuaded” to move into “strategic hamlets” in areas controlled by the South-Vietnamese army and the USA (to remove them from contact with the Viet Cong), US troops were then sent into these cleared areas to “search and destroy” the Viet Cong. It was assumed that any Vietnamese who remained in such areas must be members or supporters of the Viet Cong, so troops were encouraged to achieve a high “body count” Spraying of defoliant such as Agent orange in order to deprive Vietcong soldiers of cover in the jungle The use of chemical napalm.

59 KENNEDY The Berlin crisis 1961
In June 1961 Kennedy and Khrushchev held a summit in Vienna One of the key issues was the future of Berlin The Soviet leader wanted withdraw of Western forces from Berlin. Otherwise USSR would conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany which would terminate the post-war rights of the Western powers in Berlin and allow East Germany to close off air, road and rail corridors to West Berlin Kennedy stated that the presence of Western troops was non-negotiable The summit broke up without an agreement After the summit Khrushchev issued a six-month deadline for the withdraw of Western troops from Berlin Kennedy’s response was tough. Prepared the USA for war with the USSR In August the East German government began to seal off the eastern part of the city by fences which were later strengthened to form the Berlin Wall US and USSR tanks in Berlin moved into position. Serious confrontation between the two superpowers ensued until both sides agreed to withdraw Khrushchev abandoned his attempt to force the Western powers out of the city Berlin ceases to be a major issue in US-Soviet relations. In June 1961 Kennedy and Khrushchev held a summit in Vienna. One of the key issues at the summit was the future of Berlin. The Soviet leader wanted withdraw of western forces from Berlin. Otherwise the Soviet Union would conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany which would terminate the post-war rights of the Western powers in Berlin and allow East Germany to close off air, road and rail corridors to West Berlin. The purpose of Khrushchev’s demand was to halt the damaging exodus of refugees from East Berlin to the West. Kennedy stated that the presence of Western troops in the city was non-negotiable. The summit broke up without an agreement on Berlin or any other issue. After the summit Khrushchev issued a six-month deadline for the withdraw of Western troops from Berlin. Kennedy’s response was tough. He asked the Congress for an increase in defense spending, put 120,000 reservists on standby and called for a program to build fallout shelters in case of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In August the East German government began to seal off the eastern part of the city by barbed wire fences which were later strengthened to form the Berlin Wall. The Americans immediately dispatched a force of 1,500 men to Berlin to establish that access to the city remained open. Tension mounted when the US commander in Berlin moved tanks equipped with bulldozer bladed to the site of the Wall, while on the other side Soviet tanks moved into position. A classic Cold War confrontation ensued until both sides agreed to withdraw. After those events Khrushchev abandoned his attempt to force the Western powers out of the city. In October the Soviet Union withdrew its ultimatum for the withdraw of Western troops from Berlin and the status of the city ceased to be a major issue in US-Soviet relations.

60 KENNEDY The Bay of Pigs invasion
Kennedy inherited a secret plan by CIA to topple Castro 17 April 1961: The invasion at the Bay of Pigs by anti-Castro exiles equipped and financed by the Americans The invasion failed completely After that Washington attempted to weaken Castro’s regime by a program of covert action (Operation Mongoose), economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba, and military pressure. (American agents sabotaged petroleum installations on the island, while the CIA sank Cuban merchant vessels in the Caribbean) Castro’s response: Increased Soviet military support. Russia starts to deploy ballistic missiles on the island The aggressive policy of the United States towards Cuba was partly a cause of the Cuban missile crisis. The Bay of Pigs invasion Kennedy shared Eisenhower’s hostility to Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba. He inherited a secret plan prepared by the CIA to topple Castro. There was a large community of expatriate Cubans in the United States who had fled the island when Castro seized power. Equipped and financed by the Americans, these anti-Castro exiles were being trained to invade Cuba to overthrow the Cuban leader in a counter-revolution. The invasion force landed at the Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961 and was easily defeated by the Cuban army and air force. The United States still wanted to overthrow Castro but now had to resort to a different strategy. Washington attempted to weaken Castro’s regime by a program of covert action (Operation Mongoose), economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba, and military pressure. American agents sabotaged petroleum installations on the island, while the CIA sank Cuban merchant vessels in the Caribbean. Castro’s response was to request further military aid from the Soviet Union. By 1962 there were 42,000 Russian troops on Cuba equipped with short-range tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians also began to build sites for ballistic missiles on the island. The construction of missile sites was partly a response to Castro’s demands for additional protection. In this sense the aggressive policy of the United States towards Cuba was a cause of the Cuban missile crisis. Recently declassified sources suggest that the Russians wanted to install missiles on Cuba as a defensive measure to deter an American invasion. In addition to protecting Cuba Khrushchev also believed that the missiles would equalize the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States.

61 KENNEDY The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962
14 Oct: Kennedy saw U-2 photographs of missile sites and launch pads on Cuba 16 Oct: Kennedy assembled Ex-Comm group of advisers. Two alternatives discussed, A) Naval blockade of Cuba, B) Air strikes 22 Oct: Kennedy announced “Quarantine” on national television 24 Oct: Soviet ships carrying warheads turned back in face of blockade 26 Oct: Khrushchev sent his first telegram: removal of missiles in return for non-invasion pledge. U-2 shot down over Cuba 27 Oct Khrushchev sent his second telegram stating removal of US Jupiter missiles in Turkey as condition of withdraw of Soviet missiles from Cuba. US offered non-invasion pledge in return for dismantling of Soviet missiles. Robert Kennedy met Dobrynin and offered private assurance about later removal of Jupiter’s 28 Oct: Khrushchev agreed to withdraw missiles in return for non-invasion commitment The Jupiter’s were withdrawn in April 1963. On 14 October 1962 Kennedy examined U-2 photographs which offered incontrovertible evidence that launch pads for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were being constructed by the Russians on Cuba. He now faced the gravest crisis of his presidency because the missiles would give the Russians the capacity to strike cities deep within the United States and represented a major threat to national security. On 16 October the president gathered a small group of advisers around him to deal with the crisis. They were given the name of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex-Comm). The initial debate within Ex-Comm centered on two possible responses to Soviet actions: a naval blockade of Cuba or an air strike against the missile sites. Kennedy decided in favor of the blockade. The purpose of the blockade was to prevent warheads and other components necessary for the operation of the missiles from reaching Cuba. On 22 October the president went on national television to explain the American position to the public. He called the blockade a “quarantine”, since technically a naval blockade was an act of war. On 24 October the president received news that six Russian vessels had either stopped or turned back for the Soviet Union. For the moment war had been averted, but the crisis continued as the Russians had said nothing about the missile sites on Cuba. On 26 October Kennedy received a telegram from Khrushchev in which the Soviet leader offered to dismantle the missiles in return for an undertaking by the United States not to invade Cuba. The Americans did not respond immediately and what made the situation more complicated was that the very same day a surface-to-air missile brought down a U-2 over Cuba killing the pilot On 27 October, while the Ex-Com was still considering how to respond to Khrushchev’s first telegram, the Soviet leader sent a second message offering different terms for the removal of the missiles. He now attached two conditions to the withdraw of the missiles: a non-invasion pledge and the removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The same day a U-2 strayed into Soviet airspace but the Russians took no action apart from protesting. The president himself saw military action as a last resort. On his brother’s (Robert Kennedy’s) advice he ignored Khrushchev’s second message and responded to the first. The United States formally offered a commitment not to invade Cuba in return for the removal of the missiles. At the same time the President sent his brother to see Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, in order to assure him that the Jupiter’s would be taken out of Turkey without the knowledge of the American public. On 28 October Khrushchev accepted the offer. The Soviets started to remove the missiles from Cuba and the Jupiter’s were withdrawn from Turkey in April The missile crisis was over.

62 KENNEDY Consequences of the Cuban missile crisis
Kennedy gained politically and personally from the missile crisis US-Soviet relations improved after the crisis. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev now initiated a period of detente. A “hot line” between Moscow and Washington was set up Both superpowers supported a UN resolution prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space The most significant breakthrough, however, was the Test Ban Treaty agreed in June 1963 Operation Mongoose continued and plans to assassinate Castro. Consequences of the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy gained politically and personally from the missile crisis. But the most obvious effects of the crisis occurred in the sphere of US-Soviet relations. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev had been sobered by the experience of being on the brink of nuclear war and now initiated a period of detente. A “hot line” between Moscow and Washington was set up. A link between the two capitals allowed secure and rapid communications at the highest level in an emergency and reduced the possibility of accidental war. Both superpowers also supported a UN resolution prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. The most significant breakthrough, however, was the Test Ban Treaty agrees to cease atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons (underground testing was permitted). Relations between Cuba and the United States remained largely unaffected by the missile crisis. In June 1963 Kennedy ordered the resumption of Operation Mongoose. Acts of economic sabotage on Cuba, piracy against Cuban vessels and isolated coastal raids were orchestrated by the CIA. Plans to assassinate Castro also remained in place.

63 KENNEDY: AN ASSESSMENT
Succeeded in Berlin The Cuban missile crisis US-Soviet relations improved after 1962 The hot line and the test ban treaty Failed in The Alliance for Progress Bay of Pigs invasion Laos Vietnam. Kennedy and the Cold War: An Assessment. Kennedy’s handling of the Cold War was marked by both successes and failures. The safeguarding of the West’s position in Berlin was a considerable achievement. The Cuban missile crisis perhaps showed that Kennedy’s skill in crisis management was considerable. The missile crisis also revealed the merits of the strategy of flexible response. Confronted by Soviet missiles on Cuba, Kennedy had more cards to play than simply threatening the Russians with massive retaliation. At the time of Kennedy’s death US-Soviet relations were better than at any previous moment in the Cold War. The “hot line” and the Test Ban Treaty represented the true beginnings of detente. Kennedy also recorded some notable failures. The aims of the Alliance for Progress were noble but the aid that was sent was spent on arms and not on tackling the structural economic problems of Latin America which made the countries in the region vulnerable to communism Perhaps Kennedy’s worst single error was to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion as it was a pretext for the Cuban missile crisis. The case-fire in Laos prevented a potential confrontation between the superpowers in south-east Asia, but it did little to counter communism there. But Kennedy’s biggest policy failure probably occurred in Vietnam. American backing for a corrupt and unpopular leader and indiscriminate counter-insurgency operation in the Vietnamese countryside only increased support for the Vietcong and compounded the very problem the Americans were trying to solve.

64 From Cold War to Détente 1963-73
Overview In the 1960s Kennedy and Johnson continued to build up US strategic forces and expand its conventional forces Decline in the American influence at this term because of the Vietnam war but massive military buildup in the Soviet Union At the end of the term Richard Nixon tried to stabilize the US-Soviet relation by the policy of détente that included among other things arms control and opening to China. From Cold War to detente In the 1960s John F. Kennedy ( ) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963) continued to build up US strategic forces and expand its conventional forces to allow a more “flexible response” to possible communist aggression. Nevertheless US strategic superiority was eroding at this time in relative terms because of the Vietnam war and massive military buildup in the Soviet Union. At the end of the term president Richard Nixon ( ) attempted to halt the decline in US power through a policy of detente with the Soviet Union that included arms control, an opening to China, and a reliance on regional allies in the Third World.

65 Shifting power balances 1963-73
October 1963: The Limited Test Ban Treaty concluded. Did not stop the arms race. A) The US military buildup (MIRV) B) The Soviet military buildup. Strategic forces and conventional capacity The doctrine of assured destruction. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) Shifting power balances In October 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty went into effect. It prohibited testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space but underground testing was allowed. The treaty did not stop the arms race and military buildup continued on both sides. During the 1960s, the United States continued building up its strategic forces. Its nuclear stockpile peaked in 1966 at about nuclear warheads, while the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe almost tripled to during the 1960s. Also technical progress enabled the United States to build more accurate missiles, and, in the second half of the decade, to develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), multiple warheads on a single missile capable of being aimed at separate targets Between 1965 and 1970, Soviet military spending rose by around 40 percent. The results of the build-up were first evident in strategic weapons. The new generation of ICBMs began to be deployed in large numbers after In addition to build-up of strategic forces the Soviet leadership started an expensive expansion and modernization of their conventional capacity. The new military strategy also underlined the importance of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. It explains why in 1968 Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in order to crush the political reforms in the county as the Russian leaders believed that only communist regimes would respect Soviet security need. The invasion was justified by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine but it asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in other communist countries to maintain their “socialist” orientation. The re-imposition of control in Czechoslovakia might have been prerequisite for détente because it set limit on Eastern Europe’s freedom of action, limits without which the Soviets might not have risked détente. The Sino-Soviet split also effected the Soviet military strategy as the Soviet military had to devise defenses against Chinese nuclear weapons as well as those of the West. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, some US strategists began to downgrade the importance of numerical superiority and espouse the doctrine of assured destruction. Labeled mutually assured destruction (MAD) by its critics, the idea behind assured destruction was to convince the Soviets that an attack on the United States would result in nuclear retaliation and the assured destruction of both sides. This doctrine provided a conceptual basis for limiting strategic weapons since only a small number of nuclear weapons would be needed to cause unacceptable damage.

66 Turmoil in the Third World 1963-73
Instability and conflict in the Third World increased cold war tensions. The involvement of the superpowers exacerbated local and regional problems Latin-America The US response to the Cuban revolution was: (A) To promote economic development and political reform in Latin America through foreign aid (The Alliance of Progress); (B) To build up Latin America’s armed forces Soon the United States abandoned any pretense of favoring social and political reform and began to view military regimes in Latin America as bulwark against instability and revolutions. The 1960s witnessed rash of military coups in the continent Examples: (A) In Brazil the United States encouraged and supported the government’s opponents and welcomed its overthrow by military officers in the spring of 1964; (B) In 1965 the United States invaded the Dominican Republic when the local military proved unable to defeat a popular revolt aimed at reinstating the constitutionally elected president, whom the military had overthrown in 1963 The Middle East The primary US interest in the Middle East was oil and the region was important to Soviet security The United States and the Soviet Union found themselves supporting and arming different sides in the regional dispute In 1967: the six days war between Israel and the Arabs proved to be an important turning point in the Cold War as both superpowers moved closer to their respective allies Africa The Cold War continued to influence African development in for example South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal’s colonies (Angola and Mosambique) and Congo. Turmoil in the Third World During this period instability and conflict in the Third World increased cold war tensions. Likewise, the involvement of the superpowers exacerbated local and regional problems. Latin-America The US response to the Cuban revolution reflected two divergent interpretations of what happened in Cuba. One theory held that poverty, political repression, and lack of reform had caused the revolution. The other maintained that Castro had come to power because the Cuban army had collapsed. According to the first view, the way to prevent future Cuba’s was to promote economic development and political reform in Latin America through foreign aid as in the case of the Alliance of Progress. The second view maintained that the way to prevent communism from taking power was to build up Latin America’s armed forces. Soon the United States abandoned any pretense of favoring social and political reform and began to view military regimes in Latin America as bulwark against instability and revolutions. The 1960s witnessed rash of military coups in the continent. In Brazil for example the United States encouraged and supported the government’s opponents and welcomed its overthrow by military officers in the spring of In 1965 the United States invaded the Dominican Republic when the local military proved unable to defeat a popular revolt aimed at reinstating the constitutionally elected president, whom the military had overthrown in 1963. The Middle East The primary US interest in the Middle East was oil. On the other hand, the region was very important to Soviet security because of its proximity to the Soviet Union’s southern border. Due to their divergent interests in the Middle East, the two superpowers found themselves supporting and arming different sides in the regional dispute. In 1967 the six days war between Israel and the Arabs proved to be an important turning point in the Cold War as both superpowers moved closer to their respective allies. Africa The Cold War continued to influence African development. After the independence wave of the early 1960s the key issue in Africa was the future of Portugal’s colonies and the white-minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The United States also continued to intervene in the Congo, covertly financing white mercenaries supporting the pro-Western government.

67 Arms race; its development, causes and impact
The arms race became an integral part of Cold War conflict. Its costs posed severe economic strains on both the USA and the USSR. By the 1980s it was used as a deliberate method of bankrupting the enemy CAUSES OF THE ARMS RACE: External factors Internal factors THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS RACE. Arms race; its development, causes and impact The arms race became an integral part of Cold War conflict. Its costs posed severe economic strains on both the USA and the USSR. By the 1980s it was used as a deliberate method of bankrupting the enemy Causes of the arms race: External factors. The build up of arms by both sides was a response to the growing hostility between the superpowers after Arms were viewed as necessary to safeguard the interests of East and West. A unique feature of of this arms race was the development of the atomic bomb. Each power became convinced that their nuclear superiority was the only way of guaranteeing their defensive needs Internal factors. Those groups who benefited from armaments orders gained considerable power and influence and therefore resisted any attempt to cut the amount of spending on arms. In the USA the military-industrial complex was able to wield enormous control over US politics The impact of the arms race: Rather than reducing insecurity the arms race increased it. A dangerous cycle of action and reaction came into being. As the Cold War developed, the dangers inherent in the use of nuclear missiles became increasingly evident. This knowledge had the consequences that the strategy of nuclear threat no longer had the same impact by the 1970s when both superpowers possessed enough missiles to destroy the other and when systems had been developed to ensure a counter-strike was possible even after being hit first. The result was a situation referred to as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). The danger of initiating nuclear war restrained both the USA and the USSR from direct, armed confrontation. (Conventional wars in which the superpowers participated were kept localized and limited to avoid direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR as nuclear weapons forced each side to think twice before taking any measure to escalate war). The arms race also had an impact on conventional arms. If the devastation caused by nuclear weapons was too horrific to contemplate except as a last resort, the importance of conventional arms remained central to military strategy. Finally the constant pressure of matching US military capability had undermined the Soviet economy and was a significant factor in bringing about the collapse of the USSR and therefore ending the Cold War.

68 Vietnam and the origins of Détente 1963-73
US leaders feared that the loss of South Vietnam would initiate a “falling domino effect” By the early 1960s there was a growing US involvement in the civil war in Vietnam In March 1965 the United States began sending combat troops to Vietnam By 1968, the number of US troops in Vietnam had reached 535,000 Fear of Chinese intervention prevented the United States invading the North Vietnam The Soviets supported North Vietnam with generous military aid By the end of the decade, the strategic, economic, and political costs of treating Vietnam as a vital country in the global containment of communism were proving too great for the United States. The Vietnam war weakened the United States militarily and economically, fed doubts about US foreign policy priorities and fuelled anti-war movement at home The Tet Offensive by communists forces in early 1968 convinced president Johnson of the necessity to negotiate an end to the fighting. It also forced Johnson to withdraw from the presidential election the same year Richard Nixon (US president between ) claimed he had a secret plan to get the United States out of Vietnam. It appeared that his plan was part of an overall revision of US grand strategy that also included arms control, relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, and reductions in direct US military involvement in the Third World Nixon and Kissinger hoped that rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China would dilute their support for North Vietnam and force the communists to negotiate an end to the war The Soviets also wanted to improve US-Soviet relations. They believed that improved relations could stabilize the arms race, help them to solve their economic problems by increased trade with the West, create international recognition of the status quo in central and Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union as a global power and prevent US-Chinese alliance The Chinese were also ready to improve relations with the United States as a way to deter Soviet aggression Nixon’s and Kissinger’s attempt to link détente with progress toward settlement in Vietnam delayed both. It took them four years to negotiate US withdraw from the war. Vietnam and the origins of détente In the 1950s, the United States committed itself to guaranteeing the survival of a non-communist state in Vietnam south of the seventeenth parallel. US leaders feared that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would initiate a “falling domino” effect that would lead to communist control of all Southeast Asia. By the early 1960s the United States reacted to the growing communist threat in the region by sending increasing number of US troops to Vietnam. In March 1965 president Johnson began sending combat troops to Vietnam in order to prevent communist victory and by 1968, the number of US troops in the country had reached 535,000. While the United States observed few limits in its conduct of the war in South Vietnam, it stopped short of invading the North due to fear of Chinese intervention. In addition to that the fact that she Soviets supported North Vietnam with generous military aid made the United States unable to defeat the communist forces in the country. By the end of the decade, the strategic, economic, and political costs of treating Vietnam as a vital country in the global containment of communism were proving too great for the United States. The Vietnam war weakened the United States militarily and economically, fed doubts about US foreign policy priorities and fuelled anti-war movement at home. The Tet Offensive by communists forces in early 1968 convinced president Johnson of the necessity to negotiate an end to the fighting. It also forced Johnson to withdraw from the presidential election the same year Richard Nixon (US president between ) claimed he had a secret plan to end US involvement in Vietnam “with honor”. His plan to get United States out of Vietnam was part of an overall revision of US grand strategy that also included arms control, relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, and reductions in direct US military involvement in the Third World. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, hoped that rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China would dilute their support for North Vietnam and force the communists to negotiate an end to the war The Soviets also wanted to improve US-Soviet relations. They believed that improved relations could stabilize the arms race, help them to solve their economic problems by increased trade with the West, create international recognition of the status quo in central and Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union as a global power and prevent US-Chinese alliance The Chinese were also ready to improve relations with the United States. The Chinese leadership had become convinced that improved relations between these two countries were necessary as a way to deter Soviet aggression. Trying to link détente with progress toward settlement in Vietnam delayed both. It took Nixon and Kissinger four years to negotiate US withdraw from the war.

69 Superpower Détente (1969-73)
The process of détente: July 1, 1968: The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signed September 1971: Quadripartite Agreement signed At the same time: Willy Brandt (West German chancellor) starts his Ostpolitik July 1971: Kissinger secretly travels to PCR. In September the same year China takes its seat in the United Nations February 1972: Nixon visits China May 1972: The signing of the SALT I agreements during Nixon’s visit to Moscow. Marked the high point of a short-lived period of limited détente, or relaxation of superpower tensions. Superpower Détente ( ) Approaches of détente Soviet-American arms control negotiations which lead to the signing of the SALT I agreement in May 1972 began in late But even though the real process of détente did´n start until then the Soviets had been ready as early as the spring of 1968 to begin arms control talks with the United States. On July 1, 1968, the two superpowers signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a preventive move to limit the spread of nuclear weapons before reducing their own arsenal. The Soviets made West German adherence to the treaty a prerequisite for détente in Europe because they wanted to ensure that the country did not acquire nuclear weapons. In September 1971 the so-called Quadripartite Agreement was signed. It provided a legal basis for Western access to West Berlin and allowed the city to have close political ties with the Federal Republic of Germany. As West German foreign minister ( ) and later as chancellor ( ) Willy Brandt undertook the historic mission of normalising relations with the Soviet Union and other communist states. Brandt began by accepting geopolitical realities in central Europe. He recognized for example existing borders in central Europe as inviolable rather than unalterable. Brandt’s policy was called Ostpolitik. Its immediate results included a major reduction in tension in central Europe. Shortly after taking office the Nixon administration initiated contacts with the Peoples Republic of China. In July 1971, Kissinger secretly traveled to PCR to sound out Chinese leaders on the possibility of improved relations with the United States. In September the same year the United States raised only mild objections as the United Nations voted to admit the PRC and to award it China’s seat on the Security Council. In February 1972 Nixon visited China and the United States pledged to work toward a full normalization of relations with the PRC by 1976. The US opening to China helped bring Soviet-American arms control negotiations, which had begun in late 1969, to a conclusion. The reason was that Nixon’s visit to China put further pressure on the Soviets to head off a Sino-American strategic partnership. The signing of the SALT I agreements in May 1972 during Nixon’s visit to Moscow marked the high point of a short-lived period of limited détente, or relaxation of superpower tensions.

70 Superpower détente 1969-73 The SALT I agreement 1972
Agreement was reached on three matters: 1. The AMB (anti-ballistic missile) treaty. 2. The interim agreement. 3. The Basic Principles Agreement. In the SALT II accord agreement was reached on three matters. It curbed the destabilizing deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, set interim limits on offensive strategic nuclear weapons systems, and outlined a code of mutual restraint. The AMB (anti-ballistic missile) treaty. Limited each side to the deployment of no more than 200 anti-ballistic missiles at two sites to be reduced later to 100 missiles at one site. It also prohibited the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems. (Ballistic missile defense systems were destabilizing because they could reduce an adversary’s confidence in its ability to retaliate if attacked. This loss of confidence could increase incentives to strike first in crisis. ABMs could also stimulate the arms race if each side sought to overcome the other’s defenses by deploying more missiles). The interim agreement. Set limits on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), essentially freezing the strategic arsenals of both sides at existing levels. (The agreement permitted the Soviet Union to deploy 1,618 ICBMs and 950 SLBM launches while limiting the United States to 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. The agreement allowed the Soviets more launches because it excluded several areas where the United States had a large lead – strategic bombers, forward-based systems (US tactical and medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe and elsewhere that could strike Soviet territory) – and the national nuclear forces of the PRC, Great Britain and France. The interim agreement also did not address the issue of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles or MIRVs (multiple-missile warheads mounted on a single missile capable of being aimed at separate targets) where the United States had a large lead (US missiles carried far more total warheads, approximately 4,800 to 2,000 due to MIRV technology). The Basic Principles Agreement. Attempted to establish a set of guidelines for acceptable behavior that would minimize the likelihood of superpower confrontations. Both sides pledged to “do their outmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war”. (The Soviets saw the agreement as recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal superpower but the Americans preferred to rely on linking progress in arms control and East-West trade with Soviet behavior in the Third World as a way to limit Soviet influence).

71 Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Digression
Expanded trade with Eastern Europe, signed treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, recognized all borders in Europe, confirmed the division of Germany, and concluded a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia The immediate results of this politic included a major reduction in tension in central Europe Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe some analysts argued that by accepting the status quo, Ostpolitik bolstered communist control and delayed communism’s collapse. Other scholars contest this view and point out that the Soviets probably would not have accepted a peaceful end to their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe without the decade and a half of reduced tension that Ostpolitik fostered. Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. The so-called Ostpolitik is considered as part of détente. This policy was waged by the West German foreign minister ( ) and later a cancellor ( ) Willy Brandt who undertook the historic mission of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and other communist states. Brandt began by accepting geopolitical realities in central Europe. Under his leadership the Federal Republic of Germany expanded trade with Eastern Europe, established diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, signed treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, recognized all borders in Europe, and the frontier between East and West Germany, thus confirming the division of Germany into two states. Significantly the treaties recognized the existing borders as inviolable rather than unalterable, thereby allowing for change by peaceful means. The normalization process continued in 1973 with a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia. The immediate results of this politic included a major reduction in tension in central Europe Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe some analysts argued that by accepting the status quo, Ostpolitik bolstered communist control and delayed communism´s collapse. Other scholars contest this view and point out that the Soviets probably would not have accepted a peaceful end to their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe without the decade and a half of reduced tension that Ostpolitik fostered.

72 Causes and achievements of Détente
CAUSES OF DÉTENTE: The growing seriousness of confrontations between the superpowers caused the superpowers to rethink their strategies for conducting the Cold War. The result was the policy of détente in the 1970s which created an opportunity to reduce international tension by limiting the nuclear arms race A move towards Détente was stimulated by developments within the US and the USSR and initiatives taken by European leaders. Its cause was a growing awareness of the potential danger of confrontation leading to nuclear destruction The fear of war The needs of the USSR The needs of the USA The position of China European needs and “Ostpolitik”. Causes of Détente The growing seriousness of confrontations between the superpowers caused the superpowers to rethink their strategies for conducting the Cold War. The result was the policy of détente in the 1970s which created an opportunity to reduce international tension by limiting the nuclear arms race A move towards Détente was stimulated by developments within the US and the USSR and initiatives taken by European leaders. Its cause was a growing awareness of the potential danger of confrontation leading to nuclear destruction The fear of war: The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had highlighted the danger of superpower confrontation resulting in nuclear war. By 1969 the USSR had matched the capability of the USA for mutually assured destruction and the fear of future war continued to increase. The necessity of reducing the risk of future nuclear war pushed both East and West toward Détente The needs of the USSR: The mounting economic problems of the Soviet Union created a need to divert resources away from the military sector of the economy in order to improve the living standard of the citizens. Détente would provide the international background necessary to make this possible. The Soviets also saw Détente as an opportunity to stabilize the situation in Europe and their influence and control over the eastern block The needs of the USA: It was the US experience in the Vietnam War (the US failure to secure victory) that led to a re-evaluation of US power in the world. Nixon and Kissinger hoped that détente would offer them an opportunity to uphold the interests of the USA without the need for military intervention that might not succeed. More could be gained by negotiation than confrontation The position of China: Because of its disputes with the Soviet Union and its worry about its international isolation China saw accommodation with the USA as beneficial to its own interests as well as a snub to the Soviet Union European needs and “Ostpolitik”: Willy Brandt saw stabilization of European relations as essential to the interests of the continent as a whole. By reducing tension and establishing links between East and West, the divisions that had scared Europe since the early Cold War would be gradually eroded.

73 Achievements of Détente
Treaties such as SALT (1972) and the Helsinki Agreements (1975) have been seen as the central achievements of Détente. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) are also important SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty): Consisted of the ABM treaty, the interim agreement and the Basic Principle Agreement. A) The ABM treaty reduced the tension caused by the destabilizing impact of defensive systems. (With ABM systems in place the ability to retaliate if hit by a nuclear missile was uncertain and therefore encouraged each side to strike first). B) The Interim Treaty meant that limit were placed on the number of ICBMs and SLBM and it was an important step towards limiting nuclear arms. C) The Basic Principles Agreement extended the guidelines to be used by both sides to minimize the development of nuclear war The Helsinki Agreement: An agreement reached at a conference in Helsinki to discuss European security. At the conference the Warsaw Pact countries wished to secure US recognition of European borders established after Second World War and the US saw this as an opportunity to gain concessions from the Soviet government in return SALT II: It set equal limits for missile launchers and strategic bombers but left out cruise missiles where the US had a significant lead. Increasing conflict in the Third World led to the Senate’s rejection of SALT II in 1980 US-China relations: By 1972 relations between China and the US were good enough to allow Nixon to visit China as a guest of the government European Détente (Ostpolitik): Ostpolitik played a major role in reducing tension in Europe and contributing to Détente. Gave legal recognition and reinforcement to the division of Cold War Europe. Achievements of Détente Treaties such as SALT (1972) and the Helsinki Agreements (1975) have been seen as the central achievements of Détente. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) are also important. SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty): Consisted of the ABM treaty, the interim agreement and the Basic Principle Agreement. A) The ABM treaty reduced the tension caused by the destabilizing impact of defensive systems. (With ABM systems in place the ability to retaliate if hit by a nuclear missile was uncertain and therefore encouraged each side to strike first). B) The Interim Treaty meant that limit were placed on the number of ICBMs and SLBM and it was an important step towards limiting nuclear arms. C) The Basic Principles Agreement extended the guidelines to be used by both sides to minimize the development of nuclear war. The Helsinki Agreement: An agreement reached at a conference in Helsinki to discuss European security. At the conference the Warsaw Pact countries wished to secure US recognition of European borders established after the Second World War and the US saw this as an opportunity to gain concessions from the Soviet government in return. SALT II: It set equal limits for missile launchers and strategic bombers but left out cruise missiles where the US had a significant lead. Increasing conflict in the Third World led to the Senate’s rejection of SALT II in 1980. US-China relations: By 1972 relations between China and the US were good enough to allow Nixon to visit China as a guest of the government. European Détente (Ostpolitik): Ostpolitik played a major role in reducing tension in Europe and contributing to Détente. Gave legal recognition and reinforcement to the division of Cold War Europe.

74 Assessment and historical interpretations
Relations stabilized Armaments increased Many agreements ignored Détente did not reduce tensions Both superpowers took advantage of détente Historical interpretations Politicians on the American left: Détente positive step The post-revisionists: Détente meant less dangerous situation The American right: Détente was a sign of weakness. Assessment and historical interpretations Assessment The achievement of Détente was that the superpower relations had been stabilized and risks minimized. Yet on substantial matters little was achieved: armaments had increased during this period and many of the agreements signed were ignored, as in the Helsinki Agreement, or withdrawn later, as in the case of SALT II. In addition, Détente did not reduce tension in all areas of international relations. Europe was more stable, but tension between the USSR and China remained high. Conflict continued and even intensified in the Third World. Both the superpowers tried to take advantage of Détente. This situation was to produce a lot of renewed suspicion and mistrust that led to the breakdown of Détente in Détente was not the beginning to an end of the Cold War but rather its continuation through other means. Historical interpretations Politicians on the American left viewed Détente as a positive step in the reduction of tension and highlighted its stabilizing effect on international relations The post-revisionists emphasize that Détente was a method pursued by both superpowers in order to create a less dangerous and more useful international relationship The American right see Détente as a sign of weakness and of being “soft” on communism by allowing the Soviet Union to continue the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s was viewed as a result of the pressure of matching the USA in the arms race, and therefore Détente can be seen as prolonging the Cold War rather than as a realistic step towards bringing about its end.

75 From détente to confrontation 1973-80
Overview Following its high point in 1973, détente foundered as increased instability in the Third World and technological advances that threatened mutual deterrence interacted to intensify Soviet-American distrust. From détente to confrontation, Overview. Following its high point in 1973, détente foundered as increased instability in the Third World and technological advances that threatened mutual deterrence interacted to intensify Soviet-American distrust. During this period, the Third World experienced remarkable turbulence, including several radical revolutions. This instability created conditions that increased superpower rivalry.

76 Third World conflict during 1970s
During the 1970s, both superpowers often charged each other of taking advantage of détente to increase its influence in the Third World September 1973: Military coup in Chile (the socialist president Salvador Allende was removed from power) supported by the United States. The Soviet Union regarded US action in Chile as a betrayal of détente October 1973: The Middle East war between Egypt and Israel subjected détente to further stress. US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, used the crisis as an opportunity to win over the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, and increase US influence in the Middle East. Focused on excluding the Soviet Union from the peace settlement. The Soviets lost an ally The 1973 war led to an oil crisis in the West. The oil crisis evoked images of a weakened West. The Soviet Union benefited from higher oil prices The fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to communist forces in the spring and summer of 1975 evoked powerful image of American decline Conflicts in Africa further undermined détente. In February 1975 the impending end of Portuguese colonialism set off a civil war in Angola and the United States and Cuba (backed by the Soviet Union) supported different rival factions in the war. There was also a war between Ethiopia and Somalia in Even though Somalia had been an Soviet ally since 1960s the Soviet Union and Cuba supported Ethiopia financially and militarily and turned the tide of the war. Somalia turned for the United States for help. The United States and The Soviet Union swapped clients. US warned that Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa, an arena in the northeast corner of the continent close to the Middle East, could threaten Western access to Middle East oil. Viewed the developments as a Western defeat. Third World conflict during 1970s During the 1970s, both superpowers often charged each other of taking advantage of détente to increase its influence in the Third World. In September 1973 there was a military coup in Chile in which the socialist president Salvador Allende was removed from power. The United States was deeply involved in efforts to undermine and overthrow Allende. The Soviet Union regarded US action in Chile as a betrayal of détente as it raised questions about Americas adherence to the pledge of mutual restraint made in the Basic Principles Agreement. In October 1973 the Middle East war between Egypt and Israel subjected détente to further stress. US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, used the crisis as an opportunity to win over the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, and increase US influence in the Middle East. Following the fighting, US diplomacy focused on excluding the Soviet Union from the peace settlement. US efforts convinced Sadat that the United States was the key to a settlement and to turn to the Americans for economic and military assistance. The loss of Egypt was a serious blow to the Soviets in the region. The 1973 war led to an oil crisis in the West when the Arab members of the OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cut back production and embargoed shipments to the United States and the Netherlands in retaliation for their support of Israel. The oil crisis evoked images of a weakened West. The Soviet Union on the other hand benefited from higher oil prices as an oil producing country. The fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to communist forces in the spring and summer of 1975 evoked even more powerful image of American decline. The new communist governments in those countries were allied to the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. Conflicts in Africa further undermined détente. In February 1975 the impending end of Portuguese colonialism set off a civil war in Angola where three rival factions contended for power. Two of the factions (FNLA and UNITA) received aid from the United States and one (MPLA) received timely assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union. In spite of covert assistance from the United States the FNLA and UNITA were unable to defeat the Soviet and the Cuban backed MPLA. Americans feared that the Cuban presence in Angola could provide the Soviets with a base for the expansion of their influence in mineral-rich southern Africa. Similarly they warned that Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa, an arena in the northeast corner of the continent close to the Middle East, could threaten Western access to Middle East oil. Soviet and Cuban involvement in the horn of Africa grew out of dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden desert. Even though Somalia had been an Soviet ally since 1960s the Soviet Union and Cuba supported Ethiopia financially and militarily and this support turned the tide of the war. Somalia then turned for the United States for help and granted America access to its ports in return for US military assistance. In effect, the two superpowers had swapped clients, but some US observers viewed the developments as a Western defeat.

77 European détente during 1970s
Détente in Europe continued to make progress The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) led to the Helsinki Accord in August 1975 The final act consisted of three sets of “baskets” 1. Basket One 2. Basket Two 3. Basket Three The Helsinki Agreement played a positive role in breaking down barriers that divided Europe In 1977 the Soviets began deploying SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Europe. As a response NATO decided in December 12, 1979 to proceed with the planned deployment in Western Europe of US Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles. In contrast to relations in the Third World, détente in Europe continued to make progress. In August 1975, two years of negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) led to the Helsinki Accord. The final act consisted of three sets or “baskets” of agreement: 1. Basket One dealt with security issues and included; a) declaration on the importance of sovereignty and self-determination, the non use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The first basket also includes a number of confidence-building measures, such as advance notification of large scale maneuvers, designed to reduce tension. 2. Basket Two outlined ways to increase East-West cooperation in fields of economics, science, technology, environment, as well as trade. 3. Basket Three dealt with humanitarian cooperation and contained provisions relating to the free flow of people, information, and ideas. Some critics complained that the Helsinki agreements legitimized the boundary changes imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviets after the World War two. Nevertheless it played a positive role in breaking down barriers that divided Europe. In 1977 the Soviets began deploying SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Europe, an advanced mobile missile capable of carrying three independently targetable warheads. The Soviets regarded the SS-20 as a replacement for older, less capable systems The Western powers assumed that SS-20 would give the Soviets regional nuclear superiority and as a response NATO decided in December 12, 1979 to proceed with the planned deployment in Western Europe of US Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets complained that deployment of these missiles would greatly increase tensions and the risks of nuclear war. In spite of that NATO decided to proceed with the planned deployment. By the time NATO reached its decision, however, the overall future of arms control, and of détente, was in doubt.

78 Arms control during 1970s The SALT I agreement had held out the premise of an end to the arms race This opportunity was lost for several reasons: 1. Technological change: 2. The US attitude: 3. The US strategy of extended deterrence:) November 1974: The United States and the Soviet Union agree on the broad outlines of a SALT II agreement in Vladivostok Senator Henry Jackson criticized the Vladivostok agreement of arms control. The Carter administration proposes new SALT II agreement The Soviets rejected the US proposal It took two more years of negotiations before the two nations were able to reach agreement Meanwhile the US played the “China card”. Im June 1979 Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna. Arms control during 1970s. The SALT I agreement had held out the premise of an end to the arms race. This opportunity was lost for several reasons: 1. Technological change: Improved accuracy, greater number of warheads due to MIRVs, different structure of the US and Soviet nuclear forces (made comparison difficult), increased problem of verification, all contributed to an undermining of mutual deterrence. 2. The US attitude: The US continued to insist that the SALT process applied only to the central strategic systems of the two superpowers. This definition excluded US forward-based systems as well as the national nuclear forces of Great Britain, France, and the PRC. 3. The US strategy of extended deterrence: According to this view, the function of US strategic forces was not only to deter a Soviet attack on the United States but to deter possible Soviet advances elsewhere in the world. These problems made the process of moving beyond the SALT I interim agreement very difficult. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree on the broad outlines of a SALT II agreement at a meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974 between Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford, who had assumed office in August 1974 following Nixon’s resignation due to the Watergate scandal. The Vladivostok accord set equal aggregate levels of 2,400 missile launchers and strategic bombers with a sub-limit of 1,320 launchers with MIRV capability Senator Henry Jackson criticised the Vladivostok agreement of arms control. He thought that the agreement set too high limit on the number of launchers. In the United States this critic of arms control was too strong politically to ignore. In an effort to address these concerns, the Carter administration, shortly after taking office, proposed a new SALT II agreement that called for lower ceilings on the number of launchers allowed each side and deep cuts in the number of Soviet heavy missiles. Heavily committed to the Vladivostok agreement, the Soviets rejected the US proposal. Following this setback, it took two more years of negotiations before the two nations were able to reach agreement. In the meantime, the Carter administration sought to put pressure on the Soviet Union by playing the “China card”. The US opening to China had become an effort to enlist the PRC in a strategic partnership against the Soviet Union It was not until June 1979 that Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna. The treaty limited each side to 2,400 strategic launch vehicles until the end of 1981, and to 2,250 from then until the expiration of the treaty at the end of Within the overall limits, sub-ceilings limited each side to 1,320 MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles, 1,200 MIRVed land-based missiles and SLBMs, and 820 MIRVed land-based missiles. In addition to these numerical limits, the treaty restricted the Soviets to 308 heavy missiles and limited each side of warheads that could be placed on various types of missiles.

79 Continued conflict in the Third World during 1970s
January 1979: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. July 1979: The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. October 1979: A coup by reformist military officers in El Salvador. At the end of December 1979: The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Finished détente. The Soviet reason for the invasion. The Carter’s administration response was tough. “The Carter Doctrine”; January 1980. The Presidential Directive; July 1980. Continued conflict in the Third World during 1970s. In the beginning of 1979 there was an Islamic revolution in Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The fall of the Shah of Iran, an American ally since World War II, was a serious setback to the US position in the Middle East. In November 1979 a group of Khomeini supporters seized the American embassy in Iran and held fifty-three American hostages for over a year. This was viewed as further evidence of the decline of American power as the United States had viewed a pro-Western and stable Iran as essential to containing Soviet expansion inthe Middle East and maintaining Western access to the region’s oil. In July 1979, another long-standing US ally, Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua, was overthrown in a violent popular revolution. The revolution was led by a leftist group, the so-called Sandinistas. Even though the Soviet Union was not involved in the Nicaraguan revolution, and Cuba played only a limited role, conservative groups in the United States viewed the Sandinista victory as one for communism and a threat to US security. In October 1979 a coup by reformist military officers in El Salvador underlined the fragility of pro-US authoritarian regimes in Central America. Senior officers quickly regained control and death-squad activity increased. In response, several leftist opposition groups joined in an umbrella organization (FMLN) and started guerrilla war. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, along with the US response, finished détente and marked the beginning of a brief but intense period of Soviet-American confrontation. The Soviets feared that an opposition (supported by the US) victory over the pro-Soviet government could result in a radical Islamic regime taking power in Afghanistan and causing unrest in the Soviet Union’s Central Asian Republics. With détente already in deep trouble, the Soviets decided that the last damaging course was to send troops to Afghanistan. They viewed their intervention in Afghanistan as a defensive move to prevent a humiliating defeat of an ally and the emergence of a hostile regime on their border. The Carter administration responded by curtailing trade with the Soviet Union, urging a Western boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics to be held in Moscow, increasing military spending, and withdrawing the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration. The US also increased amounts of assistance to the Afghan resistance. The reason for this tough response was that the Americans saw the Soviet action as the culmination of Soviet geopolitical offensive initiated under the cover of détente. Specifically, the United States interpreted the Soviet occupation as part of an offensive plan to dominate the Persian Gulf region and deny its oil to the West. In January 1980, President Carter announced that “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. This statement was purposively patterned on the Truman Doctrine. Carter also moved to strengthen US military power. In July 1980, he approved Presidential Directive 59, which placed greater emphasis on counterforce targeting doctrine and authorized a massive increase in military spending. This action appeared to the Soviets as a rejection of mutual deterrence, the very foundation of détente.

80 The death of détente; summary and conclusion
The demise of détente demonstrated the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between arms control and overall Soviet-American relations. Improved relations in the early 1970s had provided an environment in which arms control could proceed successfully, while arms control agreements symbolized and strengthened improved relations. As Soviet-American relations deteriorated due to instability in the Third World, arms control also suffered. In addition, continued competition in the arms race contributed to mutual mistrust by raising concerns that the “other side” was taking advantage of détente to gain unilateral advantage in the Cold War. The demise of détente demonstrated the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between arms control and overall Soviet-American relations. Improved relations in the early 1970s had provided an environment in which arms control could proceed successfully, while arms control agreements symbolized and strengthened improved relations. As Soviet-American relations deteriorated due to instability in the Third World, arms control also suffered. In addition, continued competition in the arms race contributed to mutual mistrust by raising concerns that the “other side” was taking advantage of détente to gain unilateral advantage in the Cold War.

81 The rise and fall of the second Cold War, 1981-91
Overview January 1981: Ronald Reagan becomes US president ( ) Denounced the Soviet Union as an immoral “evil empire” Heightened the Cold War tensions. Approved massive increase in military spending, started huge military buildup, ended arms control negotiations with the Soviets and pursued aggressive policy to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World This “second Cold War” proved short-lived, however, as the Soviet Union began to pursue policies aimed at improving relations with the United States after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 With the Soviets making most of the concessions, the United States and the Soviet Union reached important arms control agreements in 1987 and after At the end of Reagan’s term communism in Eastern Europe collapsed. Overview Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan ( ), denounced the Soviet Union as an immoral “evil empire” and heightened the Cold War tensions. He persuaded the US congress to approve massive increase in military spending, started huge military build-up, ended arms control negotiations with the Soviets and pursued aggressive policy to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World. This “second Cold War” proved short-lived, however, as the Soviet Union began to pursue policies aimed at improving relations with the United States after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in With the Soviets making most of the concessions, the United States and the Soviet Union reached important arms control agreements in 1987 to be more later. At the end of Reagan’s term communism in Eastern Europe collapsed.

82 The new Cold War The Reagan administration intensified the military build-up and increased military spending enormously March 1983: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as Star Wars, Reagan’s aim was to: a) re-establish US military superiority, b) use the arms race to place great strain on the Soviet economy. c) increase US strength before engaging in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union INF negotiations (INF) Negotiations on strategic weapons (START) The new Cold War Reagan spent over 2 trillion dollars to build up US conventional and nuclear forces. His policies created a mushrooming US budget deficit. A key element in the build-up was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced by Reagan in March SDI was a technologically ambitious and extremely expensive plan to develop a nationwide ballistic-missile defense system that would deploy weapons in outer space to destroy enemy missiles in flight. Popularly known as Star Wars, SDI threatened to violate several US-Soviet agreements, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the ABM treaty of Many analysts regarded SDI as a dangerous and destabilizing attack on mutual deterrence, which was based on each side’s ability to retaliate against nuclear attack. It might give the United States the capacity and confidence to launch a preemptive first strike. The SDI would accelerate the arms race as the Soviets would increase the numbers of their missiles in order to overwhelm US defenses. Reagan’s aim was to re-establish US military superiority, which he believed had been lost during détente, regain the initiative in the Cold War and use the arms race to place great strain on the Soviet economy. The US military build-up was also part of an overall strategy of increasing US strength before engaging in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the deadlocked negotiations on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, the Reagan administration put forth what became known as the “zero option”. The United States offered to cancel plans to deploy Pershing II IRBM and Tomahawk cruise missiles in exchange for the Soviets dismantling all their intermediate-range missiles in Europe and elsewhere. The proposal excluded air- and sea-based US forward based systems and the national nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. There is evidence that the United States put forth the zero option in the expectation that the Soviets would reject it (as they did), thus clearing the way for the deployment of the Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. In the fall of 1983, NATO began deploying the missiles and the Soviets terminated the INF talks. Although opposed to the SALT II treaty, the Reagan administration decided in late 1981 to observe its provisions as long as the Soviets did likewise. In the meantime, the United States and the Soviet Union began new talks to reduce strategic weapons. The initial US proposal in the new negotiations, renamed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), required deep cuts in the Soviet Union’s land-based missiles, the heart of its arsenal, while allowing the United States to proceed with the planned modernization of all parts of its strategic triad. The Soviets rejected the US proposal and the talks remained deadlocked until the Soviets canceled them in November 1983.

83 The Third World Reagan followed a confrontational policy toward Third World regimes he deemed hostile and increased military and other assistance to pro-US Third World regimes El Salvador Nicaragua Grenada Afghanistan The Reagan Doctrine Angola Cambodia. The Third World Reagan followed a confrontational policy toward Third World regimes he deemed hostile. The United States also provided increased military and other assistance to pro-US Third World regimes. The initial focus of US policy toward the Third World during the Reagan’s administration was El Salvador. The United States settled for a massive increase in military and economic assistance to El Salvador to prevent leftist guerrilla forces to take power In 1981 President Reagan authorized the CIA to support covert activity in the Nicaragua in order to overthrow the Nicaraguan government by organizing and supporting a military force of Nicaraguan exiles known as contra-revolutionaries or Contras. When the US Congress prohibited all aid to the Contras in May 1984, the Reagan administration supported them illegally by selling arms to Iran and divert the profit to the Contras. This became known as the Iran-Contra Affair and its unveiling in late 1986 might have made Reagan more willing to reach arms control agreements with the Soviets Although US pressure on Nicaragua exacted a heavy toll, the Sandinistas remained in power. The United States was more successful in Grenada where a US invasion overthrew a leftist government in in October 1983. In Afghanistan the Reagan administration continued the support of the mujahedin’s resistance to Soviet occupation both militarily and economically. The invasion in Grenada, coupled with increases in support for the Contras and the Afghan resistance led to a codification of US policy toward the Third World which became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The heart of it was US support for anti-communist insurgents fighting against Soviet-supported governments In Angola the United States continued to provide military and economic assistance to guerrilla forces led by UNITA, which had been fighting the Marxist-led government of the country since The United States also sent aid to non-communist resistance groups in Cambodia, which were battling the government installed by the Vietnamese in 1978.

84 Reagan’s policy towards Poland, the Soviet Union and China
The United States provided extensive covert financial and other assistance to the Solidarity independent trade union in Poland. Because of unrest in Poland General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a state of siege on December 13, 1981 to prevent Soviet intervention and restored a degree of stability. In response the United States imposed a number of economic sanctions on Poland The United States also imposed a number of economic sanctions on the Soviets to punish them for pressure on Poland and to damage the Soviet economy. In June 1982, the Reagan administration expanded the sanctions to cover US equipment and technology for construction of a Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe, including equipment manufactured by European firms under US licenses. The major Western European nations protested the US action The United States and the PRC renewed strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union. China’s leaders desired access to US trade, technology, and credits and the United States needed their help in Afghanistan and Cambodia.

85 Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War
The problems in US-Soviet relations in the first half of the 1980s were intensified because of the deaths in quick succession of three Soviet leaders – Brezhnev in November 1982, Yury Andropov in February 1984, and Konstantine Chernenko in March 1985 March 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Took the initiative in the Cold War The heart of his policies was glasnost (open debate on government policies) and perestroika (economic restructuring) Gorbachev wanted to end the Cold war and democratic renewal in the Soviet Union. Both were necessary for economic transformation in his country. Gorbachev focused first on arms control. Thought that a limited number of nuclear weapons provided sufficient security against US nuclear attack April 1985: To show his good will Gorbachev suspended the countermeasures applied in response to the NATO INF deployments and halted further deployment of SS 20s November 1985: Gorbachev and Reagan met in Geneva and established good personal relationship January 1986: Gorbachev unveiled a plan for complete nuclear disarmament to take place in three stages by the year of Stage One proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces to zero, and did not mention British, French, and Chinese forces. Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War The problems in US-Soviet relations in the first half of the 1980s were intensified because of the deaths in quick succession of three Soviet leaders – Brezhnev in November 1982, Yury Andropov in February 1984, and Konstantine Chernenko in March In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union and immediately he took the initiative in the Cold War. The heart of Gorbachev’s policies was glasnost (open debate on government policies) and perestroika (economic restructuring). He wanted to end the Cold war to ensure democratic renewal and economic transformation in the Soviet Union. Both were necessary for his country to be able to remain internationally competitive. The Soviet leader recognized that military expenditures were crippling the Soviet economy. Gorbachev focused first on arms control. He thought that a limited number of nuclear weapons provided sufficient security against US nuclear attack. In April 1985, to show his good will, Gorbachev suspended the countermeasures applied in response to the NATO INF deployments and halted further deployment of SS 20s. In November 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan met in Geneva. Although the two leaders succeeded in establishing a personal relationship, they failed to reach any agreements. In January 1986 Gorbachev unveiled a plan for complete nuclear disarmament to take place in three stages by the year of Stage One proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces to zero, and did not mention British, French, and Chinese forces.

86 The Reykjavík summit in October 1986
Gorbachev’s proposals at the Reykjavík summit: 1. Proposed a plan to cut US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces in half. (Accepted US definition of strategic weapons). 2. Proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces to zero (accepted Reagan’s zero option) 3. Wanted to strengthen the ABM treaty from 1972 and confine the research of defenses to laboratories. The United States should quit the SDI program. Although the two leaders almost reached agreements on eliminating nuclear weapons entirely, Reagan’s dogged defense of SDI prevented any agreement as the Soviet leader insisted that agreement on SDI was a prerequisite for progress on all arms control matters. The Reykjavík summit in October 1986 In October 1986 Reagan and Gorbachev held a Summit in Reykjavík. In the Summit Gorbachev put forth three proposals: Proposed a plan to cut US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces in half. (Accepted US definition of strategic weapons). Proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces to zero (accepted Reagan’s zero option). Wanted to strengthen the ABM treaty from 1972 and confine the research of defenses to laboratories. The United States should quit the SDI program. Although the two leaders almost reached agreements on eliminating nuclear weapons entirely, Reagan’s dogged defense of SDI prevented any agreement as the Soviet leader insisted that agreement on SDI was a prerequisite for progress on all arms control matters.

87 After the Reykjavík summit
Following Reykjavík, Gorbachev dropped his previous insistence that agreement on SDI was a prerequisite for progress on all arms control matters and accepted the “zero option” proposed by the United States in 1981. December 1987: The Intermediate Nuclear forces (INF) Treaty signed in Washington December 1988: Gorbachev announced a 12 percent unilateral reduction in total Soviet conventional forces Change of Soviet strategy. After the Reykjavík summit Following Reykjavík, Gorbachev dropped his previous insistence that agreement on SDI was a prerequisite for progress on all arms control matters and accepted the “zero option” proposed by the United States in In April 1987, Gorbachev suggested that, in addition to eliminating all intermediate-range forces held by both sides, they eliminate a category of shorter-range intermediate forces. This proposal became the basis for The Intermediate Nuclear forces (INF) Treaty which was signed in Washington In December The INF Treaty marked the first arms reduction (as opposed to arms limitation) agreement of the Cold War. Building on this momentum, Gorbachev turned his attention to conventional forces. In December 1988 he announced a 12 percent unilateral reduction in total Soviet conventional forces. The cutbacks grew out of drastic revision of Soviet military strategy that replaced the previous objective of not losing a war with the West with the objective of preventing such a war. The new strategy also had important implications for Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Control of Eastern Europe was vital to Soviet security under the old strategy but the new Soviet security strategy no longer required maintaining a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Economic factors played an important role in this changed strategy.

88 The collapse of the communist Eastern Europe in 1989
By the end of 1989 every pro-Soviet communist regime in Eastern Europe had collapsed; in Poland, Hungary, East-Germany (November 9-10, the Berlin Wall, pr-eminent symbol of the Cold War division of Germany and Europe, was breached), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The collapse of the communist Eastern Europe in 1989 By the end of 1989 every pro-Soviet communist regime in Eastern Europe had collapsed. The chain of events started in Poland where a non-communist prime minister was appointed in August. In October the Hungarian communists split and the reformers formed a new party dedicated to democracy, legality, and socialism. On the night of November 9-10, 1989, the Berlin Wall, pre-eminent symbol of the Cold War division of Germany and Europe, was breached. The following month, the East German government ended the communist monopoly of power and announced free elections to be held in March The same day that the Berlin wall came down, the Bulgarian Communist Party deposed its longtime leader and promised reforms and free elections. In Czechoslovakia massive demonstrations and general strike led to the appointment of non-communist government on December 10. Only in Romania did the collapse of communist rule result in significant bloodshed. After massive demonstrations, military units beginning to support the demonstrators captured the Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. They were executed on December 25, and a National Salvation Front took power.

89 The development following the collapse of Eastern European communism
September 12, 1990: A treaty signed where the Soviets accepted German reunification as well as its membership in NATO October 3, 1990: The Federal Republic of Germany absorbed East Germany November 1990: NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty drastically reducing the size and armaments of their conventional forces in Europe (the CFE-treaty) ratified by the United States in November 1991 July 1, 1991: The Warsaw Pact formally dissolved At the same time Gorbachev was working to repair relations with the PRC December 1991: The Soviet Union disintegrated. The development following the collapse of Eastern European communism In September 12, 1990 a treaty signed where the Soviets accepted German reunification as well as its membership in NATO. On October 3, 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany absorbed East Germany. In November 1990 NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty drastically reducing the size and armaments of their conventional forces in Europe (the CFE-treaty). By the time the United States ratified the treaty in November 1991, the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist. It was formally dissolved in November 1991. At the same time Gorbachev was taking the momentous actions that resulted in the end of the Cold War in Europe, he was working to repair relations with the PRC. He reduced the number of Soviet troops in China’s borders, and removed Soviet troops from Mongolia. The momentous changes set in motion by Gorbachev ended the Cold War well before the Soviet Union collapsed. It disintegrated in December 1991.

90 End of the Cold War in the Third World
February 1988: Gorbachev announced his intention to pull all Soviet troops from Afghanistan February 1989: the Soviet Union withdraws its forces from Afghanistan Gorbachev successfully pressured the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia in two stages in 1988 and 1989 December 1989: An agreement provided for the withdraw of all foreign forces from Angola by mid-1991 1990: The Soviets began cutting back military assistance and withdrawing their advisers from Ethiopia and the Cubans withdrew their combat forces and advisers at the same time 1987: Peace effort led by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez ends the Cold War in Central America. The Sandinistas agreed to hold free elections in Nicaragua in February 1990. End of the Cold War in the Third World In February 1988 Gorbachev announced his intention to pull all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Negotiations resulted in a series of agreements that committed the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces by February 15, 1989 and the Afghan government fell in April 1992. Gorbachev successfully pressured the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. It happened in two in two stages in 1988 and 1989. In December 1989 agreements provided for the withdraw of all foreign forces from Angola by mid All Cuban troops left by June 1991. The Soviets began cutting back military assistance and withdrawing their advisers from Ethiopia in The Cubans withdrew their combat forces and advisers at the same time Although aided by the changes in Soviet policies, the cease-fire and settlement in Central America were primarily the result of a regional peace effort led by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez. Accepted by the region’s governments in 1987, the Arias peace plan became the basis for ending the Cold War in Central America. Under pressure from the United States the Sandinistas agreed to hold free elections in Nicaragua in February After they had lost the elections the Sandinistas accepted the results and turned over power to the victorious opposition.

91 Why the Cold War ended While most scholars agree that the Cold War ended when the leaders of the Soviet Union decided it was no longer worth fighting, the reason for the shift in Soviet policies are still in dispute. Two theories: 1. Reagan’s supporters and some scholars claim that the Soviets shifted to less confrontational policies in response to the US military build-up and political offensive. In this view, US actions raised the costs of confrontation and forced the Soviets into corner from which there was no escape save for surrender 2. Other scholars argue that the new generation of Soviet leaders that emerged in the 1980s had already concluded that the policies of their predecessors had been counterproductive and that continued conflict threatened their goal of overcoming the disastrous legacy of Stalinism, reforming their economy, democratizing their policies, and revitalizing their society. According to this analysis, US actions did not cause the changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies and might have delayed them by providing opponents of reform with arguments against better relations with the West and the relaxation of internal control. Why the Cold War ended While most scholars agree that the Cold War ended when the leaders of the Soviet Union decided it was no longer worth fighting, the reason for the shift in Soviet policies are still in dispute. The disagreement can be classified as following: Reagan’s supporters and some scholars claim that the Soviets shifted to less confrontational policies in response to the US military build-up and political offensive. In this view, US actions raised the costs of confrontation and forced the Soviets into corner from which there was no escape save for surrender. Other scholars argue that the new generation of Soviet leaders that emerged in the 1980s had already concluded that the policies of their predecessors had been counterproductive and that continued conflict threatened their goal of overcoming the disastrous legacy of Stalinism, reforming their economy, democratizing their policies, and revitalizing their society. According to this analysis, US actions did not cause the changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies and might have delayed them by providing opponents of reform with arguments against better relations with the West and the relaxation of internal control.

92 The Vietnam war ( ) Before the Second World War: Vietnam part of the French empire During the war: Vietnam taken over by Japan Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Mihn (a communist-nationalist movement) conducted a military campaign against the Japanese army After the war the French wanted to regain their colony but faced strong opposition from the Viet Mihn which was seeking Vietnamese independence At first the USA wanted Vietnamese independence but then decided to help the French stay in Indochina as the Cold War developed. The US government concluded that Ho was an instrument of international communism and believed that the “loss” of Indochina would have drastic results for south-east Asia (the domino theory) In 1950s US advisers already took part in military operation in Vietnam and by 1954 the USA was paying about 70 per cent of the French military budget in Indochina On 7 May 1954 the French were defeated by Viet Minh in the battle of Dien Bien Phu and decided to withdraw from Vietnam At a conference held in Geneva in July 1954 the opponents reached an agreement about a temporary division of Vietnam into North and South along the 17th parallel and that national elections to bring about reunification would be held within two years (the Geneva Accords) The USA did not sign the Accords and started to prop up South Vietnam to block communism from advancing from the North in what was effectively the start of US involvement in the longest war in history In 1956 the USA appointed leader of South-Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced that the national reunification elections would not be held Communists in the South, known as the Viet Cong, began to organize resistance and guerrilla warfare In 1959 North Vietnam announced its intention to reunite Vietnam In 1960 the Viet Cong formed the National Liberation Front which acted as its political arm. The Vietnam war ( ) Before the Second World War, Vietnam had been part of the French empire. During the war, Vietnam was taken over by Japan. Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Mihn (a communist-nationalist movement) conducted a military campaign against the Japanese army. After the war the French wanted to regain their colony but faced strong opposition from the Viet Mihn which was seeking Vietnamese independence. At first the USA wanted Vietnamese independence but then decided to help the French stay in Indochina as the Cold War developed. The US government concluded that Ho was an instrument of international communism and believed that the “loss” of Indochina would have drastic results for south-east Asia (the domino theory). In 1950s US advisers already took part in military operation in Vietnam and by 1954 the USA was paying about 70 per cent of the French military budget in Indochina On 7 May 1954 the French were defeated by Viet Minh in the battle of Dien Bien Phu and decided to withdraw from Vietnam. At a conference held in Geneva in July 1954 the opponents reached an agreement about a temporary division of Vietnam into North and South along the 17th parallel and that national elections to bring about reunification would be held within two years (the Geneva Accords). The USA did not sign the Accords and started to prop up South Vietnam to block communism from advancing from the North in what was effectively the start of US involvement in the longest war in history. In 1956 the USA appointed leader of South-Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced that the national reunification elections would not be held. Communists in the South, known as the Viet Cong, began to organize resistance and guerrilla warfare. In 1959 North Vietnam announced its intention to reunite Vietnam. In 1960 the Viet Cong formed the National Liberation Front which acted as its political arm.

93 Kennedy’s Vietnam war Kennedy adhered the domino theory
Increased economic aid to Diem and sent military “advisers” to South-Vietnam. Just before his assassination, Kennedy authorized the CIA to assist a group of South Vietnamese generals in a coup against Diem. On 1 November 1963, Diem was overthrown and he and his brother were murdered. Kennedy’s Vietnam war Kennedy adhered the domino theory and had come to regard Vietnam as indispensable for US security. Kennedy increased economic aid to Ngo Dinh Diem and sent military “advisers” to South-Vietnam. The number of these advisers rose from 2,000 in 1961 to 11,000 in 1962; by the time of his assassination in November 1963, there were 16,000 US advisers in Vietnam, equipped with 300 planes and 120 helicopters. Kennedy also allowed them to engage in combat and authorized counter-insurgency operations such as “strategic hamlets” program, and even “search and destroy” missions. Just before his assassination, Kennedy authorized the CIA to assist a group of South Vietnamese generals in a coup against the increasingly corrupt and inefficient Diem. This was because the USA had come to realize that the battle against communism also required political, economic and social reforms which Diem prevented. On 1 November 1963, Diem was overthrown and he and his brother were murdered.

94 Indochina’s (Vietnam’s) impact on the Cold War
The search for new alliances: Tensions over Indochina led the USA to create another NATO-type alliance for Asia. On 8 September 1954: the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was set up. The Soviet response to SEATO was to give its support to the non-aligned grouping of African and Asian states which had been set up at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Mao was alarmed by the announcement of the formation of SEATO. This was the reason for China’s attack on the offshore islands, Quemoy, Matsu and Tachen Islands ( and again 1958). This tension over SEATO and the situation in Asia led to worsening relations between the USSR and China. On 20 June 1959, this growing Sino-Soviet split resulted in the USSR suddenly withdrawing all its experts from China. Indochina’s (Vietnam’s) impact on the Cold War The search for new alliances: Tensions over Indochina led the USA to create another NATO-type alliance for Asia, in order to contain the spread of communism there. On 8 September 1954, the South East Asia Treaty Organisztion (SEATO) was set up. Its members were USA, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. These members of SEATO were united in seeing South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as strategically important. These countries agreed that they would intervene in states where communists were poised to take power by force. The Soviet response to SEATO and growing US influence in Asia was to give its support to the non-aligned grouping of African and Asian states which had been set up at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. This was a movement dedicated to finding a “third way” (neither capitalism nor communism) between the two sides of the Cold War. Mao was alarmed by the announcement of the formation of SEATO and calculated that the USA would now try to separate Taiwan permanently from mainland China. This was the reason for China’s attack on the offshore islands, Quemoy, Matsu and Tachen Islands ( and again 1958) which caused increased tension in Sino-US relations and USA threatened two times to use nuclear weapons against PRC. This tension over SEATO and the situation in Asia led to worsening relations between the USSR and China. Mao had asked Khrushchev for Soviet support for a Chinese offensive to regain the offshore islands but Khrushchev refused to provide any offensive military aid. This resulted in increased bitterness between the two communist powers. On 20 June 1959, this growing Sino-Soviet split resulted in the USSR suddenly withdrawing all its experts from China.

95 Johnson’s Vietnam war When Lyndon B. Johnson became US president he was determined to step up US involvement in the war in South Vietnam August 1964: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident Congress persuaded to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, March 1965: US bombers were flying regular massive bombing missions against the North (Operation Rolling Thunder) March 1965: Johnson sent some US ground forces to South Vietnam July 1965: Johnson ordered in 180,000 US troops 1968: The number of US troops in Vietnam was 540,000 January 1968: The Tet Offensive. Turned to be a turning point in the Vietnam war. March 1968: Johnson announced his decision not to stand for re-election as the Democrat candidate in the November elections Johnson called for peace talks with the North Vietnamese and negotiations began in Paris in May 1968. Johnson’s Vietnam war When Lyndon B. Johnson became US president he was determined to step up US involvement in the war in South Vietnam. He believed in the theory of containment and the domino theory. In August 1964 a US destroyer close to the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin, and so in North Vietnam’s territorial waters was attacked by North Vietnamese ships. Johnson used this Gulf of Tonkin Incident as an excuse to order the bombing of the North’s naval bases. Congress was then persuaded to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave the president the power to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force,” to defend the South. In March 1965 US bombers were flying regular massive bombing missions against the North (Operation Rolling Thunder) and the very same month Johnson sent some US ground forces to South Vietnam. Three months later, in July 1965, the President ordered in 180,000 US troops. This number was constantly growing and in 1968 the number of US troops in Vietnam was 540,000. In January 1968, during the Tet religious festival, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops launched a massive attack against many towns and US military bases across South Vietnam (the Tet Offensive). The Tet Offensive turned to be a turning point in the Vietnam war. Even though the Viet Cong failed to reach its aims the offensive showed that the USA was far from achieving a victory and this marked the beginning of reappraisal in the USA of its involvement in the war In March 1968 Johnson announced his decision not to stand for re-election as the Democrat candidate in the November elections. He also called for peace talks with the North Vietnamese and negotiations began in Paris in May 1968.

96 Nixon’s Vietnam war When Richard Nixon became US president he was determined to end the war. Nixon decided on a policy of Vietnamization of the war. Nixon’s method to get out of Vietnam was to promising improved US-Soviet relations. This policy was called détente Nixon also made an attempt to improve relations with China January 1973: Vietnamese peace talks in Paris between Kissinger (USA) and Le Duc Tho (North Vietnam), led to an agreement on ceasefire and the USA began to withdraw its remaining troops On 29 April 1975: The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army captured Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam). The same year the Khmer Rough took power in Cambodia and the Pathet Lao took over in Laos. Nixon’s Vietnam war When Richard Nixon became US president he was determined to end the war, but wanted a peace that would not humiliate the USA. Nixon decided on a policy of Vietnamization of the war. This involved putting more and more of the burden of fighting the war on the South Vietnamese army, by withdrawing US troops. In April 1969, the number of US troops in South Vietnam was 543,000 but by 1971, Nixon had reduced the figure to 157,000. Nixon tried to persuade the Soviet Union to put pressure on North Vietnam to agree to a compromise by promising improved US-Soviet relations. The USA offered to accept its eastern European sphere of influence and offer it financial and technical assistance. This policy was called détente. Nixon also made an attempt to improve relations with China in the hope that China would help the USA to get out of Vietnam without “losing face.” For that purpose Nixon allowed China to join the United Nations and visited PRC in February 1972. In January 1973 Vietnamese peace talks in Paris between Kissinger (USA) and Le Duc Tho (North Vietnam), led to an agreement on ceasefire and the USA began to withdraw its remaining troops. But the war continued and on 29 April 1975, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army captured Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam). The US president (Gerald Ford) could not do anything to help the South because his hands were tied by the Congress. The same year the Khmer Rough took power in Cambodia and the Pathet Lao took over in Laos.

97 Effect of the Vietnam war on US policy after 1975
The new policy of détente as regards the communist world Kissinger argued that the USA was focusing too much on communist activity in one area of the world at the expense of the total global balance of power Kissinger also saw the world had shifted from a bi-polar international situation to a multi-polar one US reluctance to commit its own troops to other developing-world conflicts which the USSR took advantage of. Effect of the Vietnam war on US policy after 1975 Nixon and his chief adviser, Kissinger, decided to pursue the new policy of détente as regards the communist world. Kissinger argued that the USA was focusing too much on communist activity in one area of the world at the expense of the total global balance of power. Kissinger also saw the world had shifted from a bi-polar international situation to a multi-polar one. The defeat in Vietnam also contributed to a US reluctance to commit its own troops to other developing-world conflicts which the USSR took advantage of.

98 Why did the United States fail to win the Vietnam war?
Some statements: The defeat was an inevitable consequence of the policy of gradual escalation imposed on the US military by a civilian government. The anti-war movement in the USA encouraged the failure of political will to pursue the war to victory by making a full commitment. The US military authorities relied too much on conventional methods of warfare and did not understand the nature of guerrilla war. The USA did little to win over the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. The USA also failed to understand the circumstances in Vietnam. Why did the United States fail to win the Vietnam war? Some statements. The defeat in Vietnam was an inevitable consequence of the policy of gradual escalation imposed on the US military by a civilian government. This policy convinced the Communists that the United States lacked the will to win in Vietnam and could be worn down. Each president did the minimum possible to avoid defeat because they were skeptical that the war could be won. Some scholars argue that the US military position would have been improved by a full-scale commitment at much earlier stage. The anti-war movement in the USA encouraged the failure of political will to pursue the war to victory by making a full commitment. What the movement did was to raise the profile of the central dilemma facing the USA: how far it should intervene in the affairs of another state to protect its own interests. The US military authorities relied too much on conventional methods of warfare and did not understand the nature of guerrilla war. US strategy relied on its superiority in military technology and never seemed to take account of the fact that the crucial issue with guerrilla warfare is that its success depends on gaining the support of the local population. The USA did little to win over the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. In the war the USA used napalm, defoliants and antipersonnel bombs. These, however, killed civilians and caused mounting opposition to US involvement and tactics in Vietnam The USA also failed to understand the circumstances in Vietnam and that caused the USA to take a series of increasingly bigger steps towards direct military engagement in Vietnam without awareness of their likely consequences. As each step failed the USA was drawn further into the conflict.

99 The nature of conflict during the Cold War
Ideological conflict: The cold war is often portrayed as a conflict between two competing ideologies: capitalism and communism The USSR symbolized communism (the ideology of Marxism-Leninism), involving a political system of one-party state and an economic system of state ownership The USA stood for liberal democracy, with its freedom of political expression, and capitalism with its emphasis on private ownership of the economy Many scholars are critical of the view that Cold War conflict was based primarily on ideological differences. They see the Cold War as a battle for supremacy between two powerful countries pursuing their own interests. Ideology was merely a tool with which to attack the opposing side.

100 Economic measures in the Cold War
In order to ensure that spheres of influence were brought firmly under their control, the superpowers used economic measures Restoring the economies of Europe after the Second World War was a powerful weapon of the USA against the spread of communism, as well as securing its own markets (the Marshall Plan) The USSR viewed Marshall aid as an instrument of capitalist interference and put pressure on its satellite states to refuse the offer. The establishment of Comecon in 1949 provided the hope that eastern Europe would receive financial assistance from the Soviet Union but it tended to work to the advantage of the USSR. It also helped the regimes of eastern Europe to impose Stalinist economic systems on their countries Economic measures also played a significant role in the Berlin Blockade of The West’s decision to introduce a new currency in the western sector of the city highlighted the recovery of economic confidence in West Berlin and the difference between the two systems in the city As the Cold War developed in the 1960s and 1970s offers of financial assistance became an important tool in securing the superpower’s influence in the Third World.

101 The superpowers non-cooperation during the Cold War
In 1945 the two superpowers were still talking to each other By 1947 superpower cooperation had broken down The degree of mistrust between them had caused each side to view the other as employing strategies of deliberate non-cooperation in order to secure their own interest. The superpowers came to the conclusion that non-cooperation was a more effective method of safeguarding their interests than negotiation The withholding of information was one aspect of non-cooperation (f. example Hiroshima) The Berlin crisis was a stark example of non-cooperation. The Berlin Wall was for example to become symbolic of the non-cooperation between the superpowers over Europe Tactics of non-cooperation were used elsewhere during the Cold War and played an important part in delaying and obstructing agreements that could have ended conflict at an earlier stage Non-cooperation was an effective method of avoiding reaching an agreement that necessitated unpleasant compromises. It was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had highlighted the dangers of non-cooperation that meaningful cooperation was partly resumed.

102 Propaganda Propaganda was viewed by both sides as important tool used to consolidate their control over their spheres of influence and ensuring loyalty at home. Actually propaganda took a central place in the conflict of the Cold War US propaganda: US propaganda focused on freedom as the basis of Americanism and attacked communism for the limits it seemed to impose on this In order to get its message through the US government established the United States Information Agency, radio stations (Voice of America and Radio Free Europe), the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, US libraries in foreign countries, the film industry, videos and so on Soviet propaganda: The Soviet authorities took measures to ensure that the ideas that the Soviet population was exposed to were restricted. Any sign of western influence were to be condemned and severely dealt with. The Soviet authorities laid down strict guidelines for literature and other arts in an attempt to purify them of western “bourgeois” influences”. As all Soviet media were under state control, the government was able to coordinate the information provided to its own population.

103 Espionage The use of spies became a central weapon in the battle for superpower supremacy. Espionage was used to gain information on the enemy Soviet agents played a vital role in passing important secrets to the Soviet authorities, (for example securing the information required to make the atomic bomb) Soviet espionage was organized by the KGB In the USA the CIA was established in 1947 in order to collect and analyze information on threats to US security. The successes of CIA included the overthrow of left-wing governments in Guatemala (1954), Iran (1953) and Chile (1973). The agency also developed successful intelligence gathering using the U2 spy plane and space satellites Perhaps the most serious failures for the CIA was its involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the incident when U2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in may 1960.

104 East-West relations between 1948 and 1962
In 1948 Cold War positions in Europe had been consolidated. Before 1950 the Cold War had been focused on Europe but after 1950, this changed. The main changes: 1. The development of globalism. 2. The nuclear arms race. 3. The “thaw”. East-West relations between 1948 and 1962 In 1948 Cold War positions in Europe had been consolidated. The Soviet blockade of Berlin had reinforced the division of Europe. Later it was confirmed by the establishment of NATO Before 1950 the Cold War had been focused on Europe but after 1950, this changed. The main changes are as following: The development of globalism: In the 1950s the conflict between the superpowers extended beyond the confines of Europe to other parts of the world, for example China, Korea, Vietnam and the Third World in general. The nuclear arms race: Both the superpowers had developed nuclear capability. The “thaw”: After 1953 there was an awareness that some form of East-West dialogue was needed.

105 East-West relations between 1948 and 1962
Issues which caused tension in the period 1. The “German problem”. 2. The rise of communism in the Far East. 3. European decolonization. 4. Soviet actions in limiting de stalinization. 5. The arms race. East-West relations between 1948 and 1962 There were some issues which caused tension in the period The most important are the following: The German problem: The status of Germany continued to be an issue that generated tension. The rise of communism in the Far East: For example in China, Korea and Vietnam. European decolonization: The process of European decolonization was to led to a power vacuum in large parts of the Third World and the superpowers were eager to ensure the other did not fill this gap. Soviet actions in limiting destalinization: This policy lead to demonstrations and riots in the USSR’s satellite states and increased international tension. The arms race: Both sides took action to ensure they did not fall behind in their capacity to wage war.

106 East-West relations between 1948 and 1962
The hostile stand-off between the superpowers changed after There was a move towards establishing a dialogue between the superpowers Factors that promoted a “thaw” in superpower relations between 1948 and 1955 1. The consolidation of positions. 2. The death of Stalin. 3. Khrushchev and Peaceful Coexistence. 4. The policy of Eisenhower and Dulles. (From the early 1950s, both the superpowers saw the necessity to reach an accommodation with each other of economic reasons and to avoid nuclear war). East-West relations between 1948 and 1962 The hostile stand-off between the superpowers changed after There was a move towards establishing a dialogue between the superpowers. The following factors promoted a “thaw” in superpower relations between 1948 and 1955. The consolidation of positions: The fact that, by 1949, the division of Europe into two armed champs had been established and consolidated gave relations between the East and West a degree of stability. The death of Stalin: Stalin’s death in 1953 provided an opportunity for the new Soviet leadership to change its approach to the West. We can name for example Beria’s proposal for reunified neutral Germany and Malenkov’s “New Course” (see page in the main textbook) and Khrushchev’s policy of Peaceful Coexistence. Khrushchev and Peaceful Coexistence: This was a theory that the two systems of communism and capitalism would have to accept the existence of each other but that the communist system would eventually win. The policy of Eisenhower and Dulles: In spite of the policy of “rolling back of communism”, the “New Look” and “massive retaliation”, both Eisenhower and Dulles were cautious and their actions were based on a reasonable approach to the situation they faced and Eisenhower was a great believer in personal face-to-face diplomacy. From the early 1950s, both the superpowers saw the necessity to reach an accommodation with each other of economic reasons and to avoid nuclear war.

107 East-West relations between 1948 and 1962
The achievements of the “thaw”? Resulted in a series of summits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev after 1953 which became part of the so-called “Geneva Spirit”. The “thaw” marked an improvement in relations between the two superpowers but caused a serious split between USSR and China. East-West relations between 1948 and 1962 The achievements of the “thaw”? The new policy resulted in a series of summits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev after 1953 which became part of the so-called “Geneva Spirit”. The fact that the two most powerful leaders in the world were talking to each other was a significant step forward in spite of the fact that those summits achieved very little. The “thaw” marked an improvement in relations between the two superpowers but caused a serious split between USSR and China. Overall, the “thaw” was a cautious and limited move towards establishing a meaningful dialogue between the USSR and the USA. Yet by 1955 the level of trust between the superpowers had not improved in substantial matters.

108 The crises between 1956 and 1962 and the nature of the Cold War
The period saw a series of important crises develop, which revealed the superficial nature of the thaw and created need for some form of rules by which conflict should take place and be limited. Those crises were the following: 1. The Hungarian rising, 1956. 2. Berlin, 3. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Assessment and conclusion. The crises between 1956 and 1962 and the nature of the Cold War The period saw a series of important crises develop, which revealed the superficial nature of the thaw and created need for some form of rules by which conflict should take place and be limited. Those crises were the following: The Hungarian rising, 1956: The Soviet response to calls for reform in Hungary was to invade the country and restore a government of its own liking. This affected the relationship between the superpowers but the West did little to intervene in the crisis that was seen to be within the Soviet sphere of influence. Berlin, : Twice in this period (1958 and 1961), Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the West that called for the removal of all occupying forces from Berlin and this dispute resulted in the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: This crisis was caused by Khrushchev’s action to install nuclear bases in Cuba. The impact of the Cuban Crisis on superpower relations was long lasting. The danger of nuclear devastation that were exposed by the crisis led to a recognition that relations had to be improved. And if ideological differences remained too deep to heal tension, then at least rules should be established for the conduct of conflict. The “hot line” telephone link and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 were the first steps towards the cooperation that developed in the 1970s into Détente. Assessment and conclusion, see page 158 in the main textbook.

109 The change of superpower rivalry between 1979 and 1991
Carter’s role in the Second Cold war. The Détente period finally broke down by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 It marked the beginning of the Second Cold War The superpower hostility can nevertheless be seen as early as 1976 during the US presidency of Jimmy Carter The reason was Carter’s inexperience in foreign affairs (the central weakness of his foreign policy was his inconsistency in choosing which advice to follow) and his emphasis on human rights which increased rather than reduced tension Carter reached agreement with Brezhnev on SALT II Treaty in June 1979 but he was under growing pressure from critics at home who thought that all negotiations with the Soviet Union were made at USA’s expense Accusations that the Soviets were increasing their influence in the Third World led Carter to increase supplies of arms to anti-communist groups and governments in the Third World The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 (because of the Islamic revolution in Iran the same year the spread of the Muslim Fundamentalists posed a threat to Soviet interests) marked the end of any further negotiation between the superpowers and killed Détente Carter was unwilling to let the USSR get away with an intervention in affairs of a foreign country. (Looked at the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to US oil interests in the Middle East which had already been affected by the Iranian revolution) His initial response was to withdraw the SALT II Treaty from the Senate, cut off trade contacts between the USA and the USSR and encourage a western boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 A sign of the developing tension and hostility was Carter’s decision to increase arms spending. Presidential Directive 59 authorized an increase in the US nuclear arsenal: the era of arms limitation was at an end. The change of superpower rivalry between 1979 and 1991 Carter’s role in the Second Cold war. The Détente period finally broke down by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 It marked the beginning of the Second Cold War The superpower hostility can nevertheless be seen as early as 1976 during the US presidency of Jimmy Carter The reason was Carter’s inexperience in foreign affairs (the central weakness of his foreign policy was his inconsistency in choosing which advice to follow) and his emphasis on human rights which increased rather than reduced tension Carter reached agreement with Brezhnev on SALT II Treaty in June 1979 but he was under growing pressure from critics at home who thought that all negotiations with the Soviet Union were made at USA’s expense Accusations that the Soviets were increasing their influence in the Third World led Carter to increase supplies of arms to anti-communist groups and governments in the Third World The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 (because of the Islamic revolution in Iran the same year the spread of the Muslim Fundamentalists posed a threat to Soviet interests) marked the end of any further negotiation between the superpowers and killed Détente Carter was unwilling to let the USSR get away with an intervention in affairs of a foreign country. (Looked at the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to US oil interests in the Middle East which had already been affected by the Iranian revolution) His initial response was to withdraw the SALT II Treaty from the Senate, cut off trade contacts between the USA and the USSR and encourage a western boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 A sign of the developing tension and hostility was Carter’s decision to increase arms spending. Presidential Directive 59 authorized an increase in the US nuclear arsenal: the era of arms limitation was at an end.

110 The change of superpower rivalry between 1979 and 1991
Reagan’s role in the Second Cold War President Ronald Reagan’s attacks on the Soviet Union were a major factor in the escalation of the Second Cold War He saw the USSR and communism as the embodiment of evil Reagan increased defense spending by 13 per cent in 1982 and over 8 per cent in each of the following two years Central to his arms build-up was the Strategic Defense Initiative announced in 1983 Reagan also took decisive measures to try to halt the growth of Soviet influence in the Third World by developing what became known as the Reagan Doctrine (assistance and military supplies to anti-communist insurgents as well as anti-communist governments, invasion of Grenada and so on) (Instability in the political situation of the Soviet union because of a succession of old and infirm leaders caused difficulties for the superpowers in reaching agreements).

111 Why the Cold War came to an end
Gorbachev’s new political thinking Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 He recognized the need for urgent reform of the Soviet system and understood that the domestic reform required a change in international policy This could be done only if arms limitation talks with the USA were reopened and military spending reduced Gorbachev’s new political thinking presupposed that confrontation between the superpowers were unproductive because it led to escalation in arms and retaliatory measures that increased insecurity Gorbachev’s new political thinking presupposed a re-evaluation of Soviet interference in the Third World Gorbachev’s new political thinking omitted the theory of international class struggle and focused instead on universal values of human rights to promote the interests of all peoples Gorbachev’s new political thinking meant that it was unnecessary to have eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence.

112 Why the Cold War came to an end
Gorbachev’s actions and the consequences of his new political thinking Gorbachev proposed phasing out nuclear weapons and offered a series of ever increasing concessions that took the US leadership by surprise At Washington in 1987 the INF agreement was signed leading to the scrapping of all intermediate-range ballistic missiles By 1988 Gorbachev announced his intention to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and reduce its forces in eastern Europe by half a million In 1989 communism in Eastern Europe collapsed and Germany was reunified the year after In 1991 the superpowers signed the START I Treaty and the Soviet Union collapsed.


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