Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Janvier 2010 Software aspects of aeronautical certification and static analysis tools Gérard LADIER Airbus / Aerospace Valley

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Janvier 2010 Software aspects of aeronautical certification and static analysis tools Gérard LADIER Airbus / Aerospace Valley"— Presentation transcript:

1 Janvier 2010 Software aspects of aeronautical certification and static analysis tools Gérard LADIER Airbus / Aerospace Valley ladier@aerospace-valley.comladier@aerospace-valley.com09/2010

2 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 2 Equipment Rules (JAR/FAR 25-1309 ) Essential equipment must be designed to perform its intended functions The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that : – The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and – The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable...

3 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 3 Means of conformance Software It is in generalnot feasible to assess the number or kinds of software errors, if any, that may remain after the completion of system design, development, and test. DO-178B/ED-12B, provides acceptable means for assessing and controlling the software used to program digital- computer-based systems

4 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 4 First principle We cant get clean water from a dirty pipe Evidences are requested on the pipe …

5 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 5 DO-178/ED-12 : evidences on the pipe … DO-178B/ED-12B is primarily a process-oriented document => Set of requirements on the processes (dev., verif, etc.) and their outputs The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable => Evidences on the fulfilment of these requirements vary depending on the software criticality level

6 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 6 Life cycle and processes Definition of separate processes that will be combined for a given project to describe its life cycle: – Planning process (organization/plans rather than scheduling) – Development process (specification, design, coding, integration) – Integral processes (verification, configuration management, quality assurance, certification liaison process). Define for each process: – The Assurance objectives – The means of achieving those objectives – The process input data – The process activities – The process products – The transition criteria, which must be met in order to proceed

7 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 7 Main common requirements on the developement processes Standards must be written and evidences of compliance with the rules should be provided Rules ? Dozen of documents Define precisely how to perform an activity (methods, means, constraints, expected outputs, etc. Each requirement or design item should be precise verifiable developed tracable consistent

8 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 8 Configuration management & Quality Assurance To assist in satisfying general objectives to: Control configuration of the software throughout the software life cycle Be able to replicate the executable object code Control process inputs and outputs during the software life cycle Provide baselines for review, assessment and change control Ensure problems management and change control Ensure archiving and recovery. To provide evidences that: Whats done is whats described in plans Transition criteria are reached A conformity review of the software is conducted Main characteristics : Independence Active role during the life cycle process

9 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 9 Tools qualification -1 Necessary when processes required by the rest of the document are eliminated, reduced or automated by the use of a deterministic software tool whose outputs are not verified. 3 qualification criteria depending on the risk associated to the tool usage : Criteria 1 : Development Tool Criteria 3 : verification tool Criteria 2 : Verification tool which could have an impact on the resulting software : used to justify the elimination or reduction of: Verification process other than that automated by the tool, or Development process which could have an impact on the resulting software

10 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 10 Tools qualification - 2 – Combination of the qualification criteria with the software level to give the Tool Qualification Level: Two distinct roles are defined : –The user –The developper He defines his needs (Tool Operational Requirements-TOR) and validate the tool in its usage context He defines his development specification (Tool Requirement-TR), develops the tool and provides the life cycle data Sharing of activities between these two roles are defined for COTS tools(11.3)

11 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 11 TQL 1, 2 et 3 : – TQL 4 ones + « implementation » requirements : Depending on the level of the final product software developed with the tool TQL 4 : –TQL 5 ones + «project management» requirements : TOR reviews (complete, accurate, and consistent) Definition of processes in plans Definition of the TR and verification / TOR Verification of the tool / TR et requirements coverage Configuration and change managements TQL 5 : –«contracting authority» requirements, mainly concentrated in the TOR : Table T-0 defining all the user requirements including the validation of the tool versus the need expressed in the avionics PSAC Plus one requirement : «Impact of known problems on the TOR » Tools qualification - 3 Qualification requirements :

12 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 12 Second principe A clean pipe may not deliver clean water Filters are piled to detect and eliminate impurities

13 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 13 Verification The most important section of DO-178/ED-12, in term of : volume : 13 pages of description ( ~ 5 pages for other processes ) Workload incurred (A380 : 4 lines of test for line of embedded code …) Basic principles: – Integral process => applies to all the development processes – Combination of : Reviews, Analysis Tests to detect and identify errors introduced during development

14 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 14 Reviews ? Analysis ? Tests ? Review : inspection of a product by an independant (level A) person; qualitative evaluation Analysis : detailed examination of a process, potentially done by a tool quantitative evaluation Test : running the software and comparison of actual outputs to expected ones –Functional test –NO TEST BASED ON CODE STRUCTURE –Functional & Structural coverage analysis Three major tools for bug-busters :

15 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 15 DO-178/ED-12 - The verification process Compliance: with requirements Conformance: with standards A-3.2 Accuracy & Consistency A-3.3 HW Compatibility A-3.4 Verifiability A-3.5 Conformance A-3.7 Algorithm Accuracy A-5.3 Verifiability A-5.4 Conformance A-5.6 Accuracy & Consistency A-5. 7 Complete & Correct A-3.1 Compliance A-3.6 Traceability A-4.1 Compliance A-4.6 Traceability A-4. 8 Architecture Compatibility System Requirements High-Level Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code (A-2: 3, 4, 5) (A-2: 7) (A-2: 6) (A-2: 1, 2) Low-Level Requirements A-5.1 Compliance A-5.5 Traceability A-5.2 Compliance A-6.5 Compatible With Target A-6.3 Compliance A-6.4 Robustness A-6.1 Compliance A-6.2 Robustness A7 Verification of verification (Functional & Structural coverage) A-4.9 Consistency A-4.10 HW Compatibility A-4.11 Verifiability A-4.12 Conformance A-4.13 Partition Integrity A-4.2 Accuracy & Consistency A-4.3 HW Compatibility A-4.4 Verifiability A-4.5 Conformance A-4.7 Algorithm Accuracy

16 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 16 Third principe Potentially opposite interests are at stake Independant authorities assess the process and product

17 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 17 The ED-12B/DO-178B - certification liaison Objective: ensure effective communication/understanding between the applicant and the certification authorities Means: – The Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, given to the Authorities as early as possible – Reviews carried out by the certification authorities software specialists as much as they want – Software Accomplishment Summary and Software Configuration Index.

18 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 18 Fourth principe All the interests but must be taken into account to build a recognized set of requirements DO-178/ED-12 is built and updated by all the concerned specialists and actors

19 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 19 Consensus on requirements Joint meetings between the RTCA SC-205 EUROCAE WG-71 Openness, consensus : – More than 1200 people registered on the WEB site – about 120 attendees in each meeting : aircraft manufacturers, engine makers, equipment suppliers, authorities, scientists and consultants – The final text has to be agreed by each of the attendees

20 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 20 DO-178C/ED-12C DO-178C ED-12C Supplement A Supplement B Supplement …...Supplement N Interface Spec DO-248C/ED-94C FAQ/DP/RATIONALE DO-278A / ED-109A The « core document » will be completed by supplements : Supplement –guidance used in conjunction with DO-178C/ED-12C that addresses the unique nature of a specific technology or a specific method. A supplement adds, deletes or otherwise modifies: objectives, activities, explanatory text, and software life cycle data in DO-178C/ED-12C. This structuring principle enables incremental future development of software requirements

21 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 21 The DO-178C/ED-12C : evolution of the content Major improvements are in the supplements : – Object Oriented technology – Model Based Development – Formal Method Technology – Tools Qualification In the core document : – Basically clarification and improvement in consistency and accuracy. – Except for the tool qualification part : Separation of the «why ?» part (>in the core doc) from the «how ?» part (>supplement) Significant evolution of the « why ? »

22 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 22 Formal Methods Technology supplement The FM introductory section insists on the interest of using FM for verification The FA (Formal Analysis) may completely replace : – Reviews & analysis (except for validation of « derived requirements ») – Conformance test versus /HLR et /LLR – Software integration tests – Robustness tests FA may help for the verification of compatibility with the hardware FA cannot replace HW/SW integration test The structural coverage objectives are achieved if it can be demonstrated that : – Each requirement is completely covered – The set of requirements is complete in regards of the attended function – There is no non expected dependences between output and input data – There is no dead code

23 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 23 Fitfh principe Only requirements are mandatory, not the means Building the « pipe » is to be dealt with by the suppliers

24 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Which industrial use for Static Analysis tools ? Today

25 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 25

26 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Not so frequent …

27 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel.

28 How to convince certification Authorities ? Example of the unit level proof of LLR Discussion with Cert. Auth. software specialists much before the actual use of the tool, to get a general feedback (go/no go) Demonstration of the soundness of the approach Definition of specific rules and standards Demonstration of the completeness of the properties Definition of LLR as pseudo-code + properties Smooth integration in the overall verif./traceability processes Detect and eliminate dead code Verify the executable code Qualify the tool (verification ++ tool)

29 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Which industrial use for Static Analysis tools ? Tomorrow …

30 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Tomorrow … 1 Proof of absence of Real Time Execution error : – ASTREE (ENS/ABSINT) For effective certification credit Precision of Floating-point calculus : – Fluctuat (CEA) : Abstract Interpretation based; analysis of C or assembly code Safe computation of the numerical (rounding) errors introduced by basic operators or input filtering code In use by Airbus for evaluation : – Research prototype for the C language – Pre-industrial prototype for the TMS320C33 assembly language

31 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Tomorrow … 2 Validation of the compilation – Lcertify (ENS) : Research activity in Airbus – Compcert (INRIA) : Industrial prototype available Efficient compilation of a complete subset of the A380 fly-by- wire software Other translation validation tools would be highly desirable (e.g. Scade -> C) Various analysis of C code : – FRAMA-C (CEA) : Plugin WP to succeed CAVEAT Plugin TASTER for syntaxic control (coding rules enforcement) Plugin for data flow/control flow verification, coming soon

32 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Special thanks … To the co-chairs of the fantastic formal methods SG of the DO- 178C joint committee: – Kelly Hayhurst (NASA) – Duncan Brown (Rolls Royce) To the Airbus Formal Methods dream team : – Famantanantsoa Randimbivololona – Jean Souyris – David Delmas And to Hervé Delseny from Airbus, who liaised both … Page 32 Made on http://www.wordle.net

33 © AIRBUS FRANCE S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Page 33 Made on http://www.wordle.net


Download ppt "Janvier 2010 Software aspects of aeronautical certification and static analysis tools Gérard LADIER Airbus / Aerospace Valley"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google