1. 양면게임이론(Two-Level Game)
기본시각
양면게임이란?
윈셋(win-sets)의 중요성
윈셋의 결정요인
사례분석
Robert Putnam (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". International Organization 42(3), pp. 427–460
[번역본: 로버트 퍼트남, “외교와 국내정치: 양면게임의 논리,” 김태현, 유석진, 정진영(편),『외교와 정치』(오름, 1995) pp ] 참조

2. 기본시각
International negotiations involve bargaining on at least two levels:
between or among national governments, and
between government leaders (or negotiators) and other domestic political actors
Successful negotiations require:
agreement between negotiators / countries on the basis of mutual benefit
capacity of each government to secure internal ratification of the agreement according to its relevant political processes

3. 양면게임이란?
Politics of international negotiations can usefully conceived as a “Two Level” game
Level I : International Level
International negotiations with the other party
Bargaining between negotiators from different countries, leading to a tentative agreement
Level II : National Level
Domestic negotiations with domestic constituents
Separate discussions within each party’s constituents about whether to ratify the agreement

4. 양면게임이란? Level 2 Game Level 2 Game Country “A” Country “B”
Governmental Leaders   Governmental Leaders
(Negotiators) (Negotiators)
| |
Level 2 Game Level 2 Game
Country “A” Country “B”
Political Leaders / sr. negotiator Political leader / sr. negotiator
Internal political / b’cratic actors Internal polit. / b’cratic actors
External political / societal actors External political / societal actors
(supportive / conditional / opposed) (supportive / conditional / opposed)

5. 윈셋(win-sets)의 중요성 Win-sets
The set of all possible agreements among negotiators that would obtain ratification by their respective constituents
"Ratification" generally refers to any decision-process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement
Reason I:
Larger win-sets make agreement more likely
The larger the win-sets are, the more likely an agreement will be reached
Agreement is possible only if the win-sets of each of the parties overlap

6. FIGURE 1. Effects of reducing win-set size
Reason 2:
The relative size of the respective Level II win-sets affects the distribution of the joint gains from international bargaining
The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be "pushed around" by the other party
A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage
FIGURE 1. Effects of reducing win-set size
Xm [ [ ] [ Ym
Y Y X Y3
 Max. possible Max. possible
gains for X gains for Y

7. 윈셋의 결정요인 Win-sets Level I Negotiators’ Institutions Strategies
Level II
Preferences &
Coalitions
Institutions
Level I
Negotiators’
Strategies

8. 윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 선호와 연합
The lower the cost of “no-agreement” to constituents, the smaller the win-set
Some constituents may face low costs from n0-agreement, and others high costs
The former will be more skeptical of Level I agreements than the latter
The size of the win-set depends on the relative size of the “isolationist” forces and the “internationalists”
Support for international agreements is greater in smaller, more dependent countries with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient countries

9. 윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 선호와 연합
Preferences of the constituents determine the size of win-sets
In cases in which the constituents share homogeneous interests, the win-set tends to become larger
The more the negotiator can win at Level I the better his possibility of winning ratification
In cases in which the interests of the constituents are more heterogeneous, Level I agreements are imposed unevenly on them and a non-agreement is more likely
The more politicized the issue, the smaller the win-set become
Most professional diplomats emphasize the value of secrecy to successful negotiations

10. 윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 정치제도
The size of the win- set depends on the Level II political institutions
Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win-set
a two-thirds vote vs. a simple majority
Japanese propensity for seeking the broadest possible domestic consensus before acting constricts its win-set
Domestic political practices can affect the size of the win-set
Strong discipline within the governing party increases the win-set by widening the range of agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect to receive backing

11. 윈셋의 결정요인 Level II 정치제도 `state strength´ and ` state autonomy´
The greater the autonomy of the central decision- makers from their Level II constituents the larger the win- set and the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreements
The stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the weaker its relevant bargaining position internationally

12. 윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략
The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators
A tactical dilemma:
The larger his win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-a-vis the other negotiator
Reducing own win-sets
Hand-tying strategy:
Making open promises to domestic constituents or
Making issues as politically sensitive by rallying support or opposition from one’s constituents
(예) 한미 쇠고기협상

13. 윈셋의 결정요인 Level I 협상자의 전략 Expanding own win-sets Side-payment strategy:
Providing compensatory payments to losers suffering from the agreement to encourage its ratification
(예) 2000, 2001년 한·중 마늘협상
Collusion strategy:
Act in collusion by exchanging concessions to ensure ratification mutually because each has an interest in helping the other to get the final deal ratified

14. 윈셋의 결정요인 Level I 협상자의 전략 Maximizing the other side’s win-sets
Synergistic linkage strategy:
Linking issues so as to change the utility functions of the other side’s constituents
Reverberation strategy:
Asking the other side’s constituents to lower expectations or change the image of issues
Much ambassadorial activity – wooing opinion leaders, contacting opposition parties, offering foreign aid
(예) 1997년 IMF-한국 구제금융협상
Cross-governmental lobbing or coalition:
NGOs’ activities and influence
(예) 대인지뢰금지캠페인(ICBL), 확산탄연대(CMC)

15. 윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략