Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

COCOM Sponsors: PACOM and NORTHCOM

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "COCOM Sponsors: PACOM and NORTHCOM"— Presentation transcript:

1 Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS)
COCOM Sponsors: PACOM and NORTHCOM Technical Manager: OSD Power Surety Task Force Asst Technical Manager: Department of Energy Operational Managers: PACOM and NORTHCOM Transition Manager: NAVFAC (proposed) Points of contact: Mr. Ross Roley, PACOM, and Dr. Bill Waugaman, NORTHCOM,

2 The Situation Defense Science Board Feb 08 - “Critical national security and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the electric grid.” May 09 - “Aurora threat revealed the possibility that sophisticated hackers could seriously damage the grid by destroying mechanisms downstream from the initial point of attack.” Feb 10 - “DoD will conduct a coordinated energy assessment, prioritize critical assets, and promote investments in energy efficiency to ensure that critical installations are adequately prepared for prolonged outages caused by natural disasters, accidents, or attacks.” References: The Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Security, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” February 2008. Powering America’s Defense, Energy and the Risks to National Security, by the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board, May 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010 heilmeier 2

3 What is the SPIDERS JCTD?
Reduce the “unacceptably high risk”* of extended electric grid outages by developing the capability to “island” installations while maintaining operational surety & security Demonstrate: Cyber-security of electric grid applying virtual secure enclave to SCADA Smart Grid Technologies & applications Secure micro-grid for sustained mission assurance and emergency support Integration of distributed & variable renewable generation and storage Demand-side management Redundant back-up power systems Results in: Assessment of VSE capability to SCADA networks First complete DoD installation with a secure, smart “islandable” micro-grid Template for DoD-wide installation & industry energy security High Priority for Three Combatant Commands *From Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Security, Feb 2008

4 Expected SPIDERS Outcome
STAIRWAY TO ENERGY SECURE INSTALLATIONS TRANSITION Template for DoD-wide implementation CONOPS TTPs Training Plans DoD Adds Specs to GSA Schedule Transition to Commercial Sector Transition Cyber-Security to Federal Sector and Utilities Year 3 CAMP SMITH ENERGY ISLAND Entire Installation Smart Micro-Grid Islanded Installation High Penetration of Renewables Demand-Side Management Redundant Backup Power Makana Pahili Hurricane Exercise Year 2 FT CARSON MICRO-GRID Large Scale Renewables Vehicle-to-Grid Smart Micro-Grid Critical Assets CONUS Homeland Defense Demo COOP Exercise Year 1 HICKAM AFB CIRCUIT LEVEL DEMO Renewables Hydrogen Storage Hydrogen Fuel Cell Energy Management VSE SCADA Test at Idaho National Lab VIRTUAL SECURE ENCLAVE (VSE) CYBER-SECURITY RIGOROUS ASSESSMENT WITH RED TEAMING IN EACH PHASE 4

5 SPIDERS Demonstration
and Assessment First year – Hickam AFB, HI and Idaho National Lab Circuit level micro-grid using existing hydrogen fueling station Integrates wind, solar, hydrogen storage, hydrogen fuel cell, energy mgt feeding water treatment plant for risk mitigation Virtual Secure Enclave validation on SCADA network at INL Successfully demonstrated on military C2 net environments Second year – Ft Carson, CO Larger smart micro-grid leverages 3MW of existing photovoltaics and $20M in recent electric upgrades Integrates PV, with vehicle-to-grid energy storage, diesel gens, energy mgt with VSE protecting task critical assets Third year – Camp H.M. Smith, HI Complete installation smart micro-grid with “islanding” capability Integrates advanced meters, demand side mgt, islanding hw/sw, renewables, energy mgt, battery storage and VSE Manageable size (20 bldgs) in high vis location

6 Schedule and Cost Program Total Hickam: Ft Carson: Camp Smith: Demos:
Major Tasks FY 2011 FY2012 FY2013 COST ($K) 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q Develop CONOPS/TTPs 1110 Demonstrations, Assessments, Analyses, Reports 5400 Smart Grid Design and Development 3000 Acquisition and Installation 12400 Cyber Defense 720 4220 System Integration 1750 Documentation 2400 Accreditation and Certification 576 Technical Advisor, Support, Travel 6495 Transition Planning 1200 Program Total 39271 INL SNL COOP MP Hickam: Ft Carson: Camp Smith: Demos: 6

7 SPIDERS Participants USPACOM, USNORTHCOM DOE, and DHS
DOE - 5 Nat’l Labs OSD Power Surety Task Force Military Services Defense Energy Support Center Local Utility Companies States of Hawaii & Colorado heilmeier 7

8 SPIDERS Cost Plan heilmeier 8

9 SPIDERS Funding heilmeier 9

10 SPIDERS Summary The ability of today’s warfighter to command, control, deploy, and sustain forces is adversely impacted by a fragile, aging, and fossil fuel dependent electricity grid, posing a significant threat to national security. The SPIDERS JCTD will address four critical deficiencies: Inability to protect task critical assets from loss of power due to cyber attack Inability to integrate renewable and other distributed generation electricity to power task critical assets in times of emergency Inability to sustain critical operations during prolonged power outages Inability to manage installation electrical power and consumption efficiently, to reduce petroleum demand, carbon “bootprint,” and cost The modern military needs to evolve its power infrastructure. New threats demand new defenses heilmeier 10

11 Quad Chart: SPIDERS JCTD FY11-13
Operational Problem: The ability of today’s warfighter to command, control, deploy, and sustain forces is adversely impacted by a fragile, aging, and fossil fuel dependent electricity grid, posing a significant threat to national security. OV-1: Operational Capabilities: Combined resilient, fault and attack tolerant smart grid hardware & software consisting of: Cyber security and smart grid equipment, renewable and conventional distributed generation, emergency generators, energy storage, intrusion detection, rapid forensic Technology: TRL Today FY13 Cyber Defense Energy Mgt Control & Ops Integration of Renewables Participants: User Co-Sponsors: USPACOM and USNORTHCOM Lead Agency: U.S. Navy OM: PACOM Asst OM: NORTHCOM TM: OSD Power Surety Task Force Asst TM: DOE XM: TBD Schedule: Acquisition FY11Q2 - 11Q4 Tech Demo FY11Q4 - 12Q2 Installation FY11Q2 - 12Q4 Integration FY12Q4 - 13Q2 Eval & Transition FY13Q3 - 13Q4 Transition: NAVFAC (proposed) Funding: U.S. Air Force - $2M verbal commitment U.S. Army - $20M Ft. Carson electrical upgrades U.S. Air Force - $20M Hickam hydrogen fuel station U.S. Navy - Joint project $10M PV array at Camp Smith funded by PPA PACOM/NORTHCOM – $1.35M invested in energy security and virtual secure enclaves DOE FEMP - $1.1M with Sandia National Lab and Oak Ridge National Lab heilmeier 11

12 QUESTIONS? heilmeier 12

13 Year One Deliverables Circuit Level Micro-Grid Demonstration
Incorporate existing renewables, diesel generators and energy storage Add fuel cell to backup local circuit Test micro-grid on an essential asset that has redundant power to simulate mission critical functions Validate VSE Cyber-Security Strategy on Testbed Simulation of Utility Electric Grid Management System Initial Camp Smith Activities Install Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Implement demand-side management Offsite simulation of Camp Smith’s secure, smart micro-grid Initial Ft Carson Activities Shared distributed grid tied backup generation Demonstrate micro-grid in command area Begin incorporation of PV renewable generation heilmeier 13

14 SPIDERS Core Technologies
TRL Today FY13 Cyber Defense Virtual Secure Enclave (pri 3, JT&E, CANDID JCTD) 7 9 Live Action Network Management Tool (pri 3, same) 8 9 Secure Distributed Monitors (pri 3) Cyber Security Situational Awareness (pri 3) 4 6 Energy Management Control and Operations Energy Management Customer Interface (pri 2) 6 8 Seamless grid synchronization (pri 3) Advanced Metering Infrastructure (pri 1) 9 9 Microgrid Energy Mgt System (pri 2 HECO prop) 5 8 Operator Interface (pri 3) Adaptive Relaying Design and Installation (pri 3) 4 7 Substation (HECO prop) & Distribution Automation 8 9 Renewable Energy Microgrid Integration Integration of Solar Photovoltaics (pri 2, NAVFAC RFP) 5 7 Integration of Wind Turbines (pri 2) Integration of Black Start Generator (pri 2) Integration of Energy Storage (pri 2) heilmeier 14

15 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS M POG
Mission: Use defensible smart microgrid to reduce vulnerability to energy supply disruptions, energy price volatility, unusual load increases, and heavy carbon bootprint. Operational requirements: Maintain 100% of critical load for over 72 hours in event of loss of grid power Integrate intermittent renewable energy day-to-day as well as in loss of grid power Perform centralized and/or automatic distributed demand-side shedding of load power for efficiency and incidents Cybersecurity through virtual secure enclave of the smart grid components System requirements: Automatic sensing and load balancing for efficiency, renewable integration, and incidents Accommodate a seamless real time test and evaluation capability Interoperability and non-interference with current utility, facility, and command infrastructure and communications systems User interface, monitoring, and control permission levels March 31, 2009 M POG

16 SPIDERS Top Level Capabilities and Metrics
Capability Task/Attribute Measure Metric Baseline 2009 Target Threshold 2010 Objective 2013 Comment Intelligent and secure electric grid providing efficient and reliable 24/7/365 power to military task critical assets ensuring uninterrupted nat’l defense Allows power to be used at maximum efficiency % reduction in energy use intensity MBTU/ksf ~56 55 (3%) 49-50 (12%) The baseline for each of the task/attributes applies to Camp Smith Cyberattack tolerant and rapid recovery total outage time occurrence/year, min/yr, load/occurrence no capability to meassure, poor capability to recover from cyber attack Can measure, recovery process 1-2 with loss of service, less than 20min/yr, less than 10%/occurrence Allow auto-islanding with full load support & community emergency energy support % Energy capacity relative to peak load % 50% (non-island) 50% operational auto-island for critical loads greater than 100% auto-island firm and renewable so this is why greater than 100% High Penetration of intermittant renewables (RE) % of total peak load cannot allow high % of RE ~20% allow 40% renewable during island Goal for JCTD is not to maximum out Camp Smith with renewables but to test the smart grid with some level of renewables Fault Isolation and Recovery # of customer interruptions, outage time (OLE) occurrences/yr , hrs/yr 5-10/yr, 16hr/yr 1-5/yr, 8hr/yr less than 1/yr, less than 1 hr/yr heilmeier 16

17 SPIDERS Desired Capabilities by 2013
Provide cyber defense of a smart microgrid network Establish a strategy of defense-in-depth using virtual secure enclaves and a sensor architecture Institute strong authentication and role-based access controls Intelligent and secure electric grid providing efficient and reliable 24/7/365 power to military task critical assets ensuring uninterrupted nat’l defense Allow power to be used with maximum efficiency Institute energy demand management systems Maximize asset utilization Make the DoD demonstration grid both fault and attack tolerant with rapid recovery after natural disaster or deliberate attack Enable islanding, protection of power supply & task critical assets Allow all sources of power to provide electricity to the grid Enable the high penetration, stability and security of renewable energy production Dynamic/adaptive protective relaying scheme CONOP and TTP Coordination and demonstration with utilities, military installations/organizations and others heilmeier 17

18 HECO Typical Daily System Load vs Capacity
Maximum Efficiency During Peak Load Peaking Units 5% Excess Capacity at 5:00 PM 8% Excess Capacity at 8:00 AM Note: Graph does not reflect excess spinning reserve equal to largest turbine in service 23% Excess Capacity at 3:00 AM heilmeier 18

19 Electric Grid Development
Early Urban Utilities; Like stand alone buildings Grid interconnections to allow power to flow between utilities Smart Grid adds in comms & intelligence Smart Grid as a ‘Human Body’ skeletal circulatory nervous Digital Information and Controls Technology Integrate “Smart” Appliances Dynamic Optimization Advanced Distributed Storage Distributed Generation Infrastructure Standards Renewables Integration Timely feedback to consumers Real Time, Automated, Interactive Control Technology Control options Source: Human body analogy: MIT and SAP Smart Grid attributes: NIST

20 Today’s Electric Grid Centralized One-way power flow
Regulated Monopoly Generation Distribution Inflexible demand Aging Infrastructure Manual operations Increasing renewables Lacks interoperability The electric grid today has changed very little from the grid created by Thomas Edison. A quick look at the grid architecture would be very familiar to him. Electricity is generated at very high voltage, typically about 20,000 volts, and then stepped up through transformers to 745,000 volts to be distributed on high-voltage transmission lines as alternating current (AC). Alternating current allows step up of voltage for high voltage, low current transmission, minimizing power loss. As transmission lines get close to the end user, step down transformers at substations reduce the voltage in progressive steps to meet the voltage required by the end-user, whether that be a major industrial facility or a residence. Power generation remains centered around a regulated regional monopoly in most cases, while distribution may be supported by local electric service companies. Bulk electricity generation and distribution is the ultimate speed-of-light “just in time” delivery. There is no effective large-scale storage of electricity. As consumer demand changes from moment to moment, the network must adjust instantaneously to redistribute the supply to meet the demand. If a piece of generating equipment fails, the system must adapt immediately to pick up the load throughout the network. The grid cannot currently adapt well to highly variable generating sources such as wind generators and solar arrays. 20

21 Electric Grid Regions and Interconnects
High Voltage DC Interconnect Canada Mexico The United States does not have one integrated power transmission grid. Instead, the nation has four integrated grids that include Canada and part of Mexico. Except for limited interconnections, these represent four separate grids. Each of the four contains a series of smaller regions that are largely defined by transmission constraints. Transmission constraints limit the utilities’ ability to move excess generator capacity that occurs in some areas to cover shortages that develop in other areas. (DOE “America’s Energy Infrastructure”, May 2001) High-voltage electrical transmission lines in the United States are divided into three separate grids that make up what is often called the national power grid. The three grids cover the contiguous 48 states and parts of Canada and Mexico and are known as the Western Interconnection, the Eastern Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection. The three grids operate independently for the most part but are connected in a few places by direct-current lines. All United States power utilities, except those in the states of Alaska and Hawaii, are connected to other power utilities through the national power grid. Dispatch centers maintain and control the flow of electricity over the grid, supplying electricity to meet the demand. ========================================================================= The main interconnections of the U.S. electric power grid and the ten North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions. Note: The Alaska Systems Coordinating Council (ASCC) is an affiliate NERC member. (Source: North American Electric Reliability Council) ECAR — East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement ERCOT — Electric Reliability Council of Texas FRCC — Florida Reliability Coordinating Council MAAC — Mid-Atlantic Area Council MAIN — Mid-America Interconnected Network MAPP — Mid-Continent Area Power Pool NPCC — Northeast Power Coordinating Council SERC — Southeastern Electric Reliability Council SPP — Southwest Power Pool WSCC — Western Systems Coordinating Council 21

22 Northeast Blackout of 2003 14 August 2003 starting at 3:41 PM EDT
55 Million People New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ontario and parts of Massachusetts Approx 48 Hours Cause: Overgrown tree branches near Eastlake, Ohio impacted High Voltage lines during high power demand period. The Northeast Blackout of 2003 was a massive widespread power outage that occurred throughout parts of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States and Ontario, Canada on Thursday, August 14, 2003, at approximately 4:15 p.m. EDT (20:15 UTC). At the time, it was the most widespread electrical blackout in history. The blackout affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states. More than 508 generating units at 265 power plants shut down during the outage. Six nuclear reactors in New York shut down. Three other nuclear plants shutdown in Ohio, Michigan, and New Jersey, for a total of nine reactors affected. In February 2004, the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force released their final report, placing the main cause of the blackout on the utility company’s failure to trim trees in part of its Ohio service area. ===================================================== The report said that a generating plant in Eastlake, Ohio (a suburb of Cleveland) went offline amid high electrical demand, and that strained high-voltage power lines located in a distant rural setting, which later went out of service when they came in contact with "overgrown trees". The Task Force also found that FirstEnergy did not take remedial action or warn other control centers until it was too late, because of a software bug in General Electric Energy's energy management system that prevented alarms from showing on their control system. Source: Natural Resources Canada - Canada-U.S. Power System Outage Task Force Interim Report 22


Download ppt "COCOM Sponsors: PACOM and NORTHCOM"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google