1. Why wargaming? Connections 2015 Peter P. Perla July 2015

2. Modern wargaming begins “This is not a game! This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole army.” —1824, General von Müffling Chief of the Prussian General Staff Regarding von Reisswitz’s Kriegsspiel 1

3. What von Müffling saw 2

4. What is a wargame? Vague definition: Any type of warfare modeling, including exercises, campaign analysis, computer simulation without players (CSWP) My definition (From The Art of Wargaming) A warfare model or simulation that does not involve the operations of actual forces, and in which the flow of events shapes and is shaped by decisions made by a human player or players 3

5. What is a wargame? More inclusive definition A model or simulation of conflict set in an abstract representation of the real world, in which players make decisions and respond to the changes caused by their decisions. 4

6. What is wargaming? An applied discipline embodying the creation, use, synthesis, and analysis of wargames To entertain, conduct research, explore concepts, and communicate information, education, and training for individuals and organizations 5

7. What is ops analysis? Ops analysis is (from Morse and Kimball) A scientific method of providing decision makers with a quantitative basis for decisions Key words –Scientific –Quantitative 6

8. Wargaming is NOT ops analysis Key words for analysis –Scientific –Quantitative Key words for wargaming –Decisions –Players 7

9. And players are people 8 “The Naval War College Staff and Class of 1923,” Photo Archives, Naval War College Museum, Newport RI

10. When wargaming worked 9 “Now the great secret of its power lies in the existence of the enemy, a live vigorous enemy in the next room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.” LT William McCarty Little 1887 From the Naval War College web site

11. 10 Decision-making, not decisions. "An adaptable process to follow and confidence in their decision-making abilities." Transformed tactics, strategy and technology. Succeeded through "cyclic osmosis" "Research laboratory for every detail of naval warfare." NWC games trained officers

12. 11 Games and Fleet Problems

13. 12 The cycle of research (1990) ExperienceExperiments

14. 13 The cycle of INNOVATION ExperienceExperiments

15. Human reason needs help 14

16. Wargaming and the 5 whats What we really know What we don’t know What we don’t know that we know What we don’t know we don’t know 15

17. Wargaming and the 5 whats What we really know What we don’t know What we don’t know that we know What we don’t know we don’t know What we know that ain't so 16

18. Essence of games People...... living stories by making decisions, in a context of...... competition or conflict (with them- selves, other people, their environment)... and plagued by uncertainty and complexity. 17

19. Why wargaming works Experience makes risk tangible, planning possible. Perception and understanding linked to acting. Games force players to act physically and intellectually—“more real” than standard narrative. Players invest themselves and take ownership of the “between worlds,” making it more real. 18

20. 19 Why wargaming matters Wargaming entertains—it stirs imaginations. Wargaming challenges—it sharpens intellects. Wargaming creates synthetic experience—it enlightens leaders.

21. Why wargaming matters Wargaming entertains—it stirs imaginations. Wargaming challenges—it sharpens intellects. Wargaming creates synthetic experience—it enlightens leaders. 20 Most importantly, wargaming saves lives.

22. Why wargamers must act SecDef, DepSecDef, SecNav memos Games can help address the most important questions. –Challenge critical assumptions and elicit innovative insights. –Raise unpleasant questions and suggest unthought of avenues to answer them. We are the experts; we must step up. 21

23. 22 The cycle of LEARNING ExperienceExperiments

24. How we move forward Partner with analysts and operators. Create better games—ones people “will remember playing.” Base them on solid foundations of experience and analysis. Create a “magic circle” for players to play, explore, and practice. 23

25. From the past to the future The object of wargaming “is to afford a practice field for the acquirement of skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans.” “When from a study of the experience of past wars, and of that of artificial wars checked up by suitable trials in the fleet … [enables] us to do the ‘RIGHT THING,’ ‘RIGHTLY APPLIED, ‘IN TIME,’ then, and only then, shall we fully realize the true meaning of the saying that ‘the best school of war is war!’” 24 William McCarty Little—1912

27. 26 Constructed narrative Narrative theory concepts of l’entre deux (between worlds) and suspension of disbelief. Narrative meanings go beyond facts; can form an image in the reader’s mind and cause the reader to react emotionally. Wargames are “constructed narrative” involving players as actors.

28. Understanding linked to acting Neuroscience indicates perception and understanding linked to acting. 27 The human brain is designed primarily to support taking action in the world; introspection is a secondary characteristic. Games force players to act both physically and intellectually, creating a “more real” environment than standard narrative.

29. Player investment Players invest in a game more of their own identities and conception of what is real than in a prosaic narrative. Investment has a more substantial impact on the participants than traditional narrative because players “own” the “between worlds,” and for them it becomes less fictional and more “real. Puts even greater premium on a solid foundation of fact and understanding to minimize the seductions of pseudo-realism, advocacy, and self-fulfilling prophecy. 28

30. McCarty Little “... If we want to spur up action, and the real necessity is not available, we must create an artificial one.” “what the jousting field was to the knight [practice], the war game is to the modern strategist” “The object of the naval war game is to afford a practice field for the acquirement of skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans.” “Now, we must not overlook the fact that the game is a convention just as is the chart or printed page, or indeed language itself; and if we wish to use either, we must learn to think in it. The war game is a cinematographic diagram; and it is as important to us to be able to read it, as to read a chart or a book.” “The principle of the concentration of the fleet, now generally accepted in our nay, was the direct result of a strategic game here at the College iin the summer of 1903. … But this view, which required but the time of one game thoroughly to capture the entire conference, took many a weary month before by mere argument it could convince all of those of our naval authorities who had not the privilege or opportunity of ‘seeing with their eyes.” 29

31. McCarty Little (2) “If we want to excite an interest in war on the chart, we must give opportunity to have it played, and opportunity for at least a reasonable number of people to become sufficiently expert to play games worthy of exciting interest. Fancy what it would be, if a yearly war game could be made to excite the same service interest as the West Point-Annapolis football match!” “In time of peace, the natural thought of the civilian is to a peace navy—there being no war to conduct, there is no compelling necessity for a war conductor, and, in absence of a compelling necessity the Department was organized without that element! “As in our history, war seems to have been the only thing that has had the requisite power to compel [the provision for war directing co-ordination], and as we cannot have actual war in time of peace, why not have recourse to artificial war? 30

32. McCarty Little (3) “ Success in any art may be regarded as the product of three factors: a—the right thing, b—rightly applied, c—in time. If either of these factors is zero, the result will be zero. The right thing rightly applied too late, the right thing misapplied, and the wrong thing, whether applied or not—neither of these combinations promises success. When from a study of the experience of past wars, and of that of artificial wars checked up by suitable trials in the fleet, we shall have discovered what is the ‘ RIGHT THING ’; when, by the practice of artificial war, we have so familiarized ourselves with the various theaters of war, the situations and their appropriate solutions that we can see the ‘ RIGHT THING,’ ‘ RIGHTLY APPLIED ’; and finally when, by persistent practice of artificial war, we shall have so trained our appropriate mental muscles (the mental processes), that the proper line of reasoning has become the line of least resistance, so that we shall think right even if we have no time to think at all—instinctively, actually quicker than though—thus enabling us to do the ‘ RIGHT THING,’ ‘ RIGHTLY APPLIED, ‘IN TIME, ’ then, and only then, shall we fully realize the true meaning of the saying that ‘the best school of war is war!’” 31

33. Wargaming and world wars British wargame in 1905 led to critical talks with French. Russians ignored 1914 wargame: Tannenberg disaster. German wargaming downplayed Belgian resistance. Japanese Midway wargame: what you know ain't so! –CVs lost to long range B-17 attacks "resurrected" by umpire based on experience of poor performance of level bombers. –He was right! –What they ignored was threat of surprise from carriers positioned to the northeast of Midway by U.S. players. –"Victory disease" and triumphalism based on past success. 32

34. Worldwide wargaming today Connections conference spread from U.S. to UK, Australia, Netherlands. UK MOD developing RCAT tabletop system. Emphasize "liveliness of the human alternative to costly and sterile computer sims." 33

35. A UK perspective “Wargaming is simply one more technique, one more complementary perspective, with which to try to come to grips with the intractable problem of understanding the dynamics of human conflict. Rather than providing reliable answers, it is best at highlighting neglected questions. Rather than offering secure predictions, it is most helpful when it produces flawed or unexpected outcomes, since these force users to re-examine the assumptions programmed into the model and think about how it could be improved.” 34 From Philip Sabin, "Wargaming in Higher Education: Contribution and Challenge," Arts and Humanities in Higher Education. Forthcoming.

36. DoD wargaming needs... To keep ahead of global wargame developments. To understand "innovation" and to integrate wargaming into the cycle of innovation. Expert advocates/advisors: CAPE-like office for Wargaming Applications and Research? Leadership support for and participation in professional wargaming activities (Connections). Its Wargaming Community to advocate for insights and issues from real wargames, and to call out non- wargames masquerading as such to cash in on current enthusiasm. 35