1. Equality or What? Distributive Ethics

2. Suppose: We’ve decided on a notion of advantage (resources, primary goods, capabilities, etc). There are no prior claims to desert or entitlements (or everyone’s level is equal). We can affect people in different ways Some people are worse- and better-off. Which distributional pattern should we follow? Equality?, Priority? or Sufficiency?

3. Options Equality: Minimise differences between people. Utility: Maximise the average/total level of advantage Priority: ‘Benefiting people matters more the worse-off these people are’ (Parfit, 101) Sufficiency: No one should be allowed to fall below an established threshold.

4. Why equality? ‘I believe that equality is an important political goal […] But when I ask myself why I think it so important […] I find that my reasons for favouring equality […] and that most of them can be tracked to fundamental values other than equality’ Scanlon ‘The diversity of objections to inequality’, 202.

5. Deontic egalitarianism Humanitarianism: people shouldn’t suffer It’s bad if some are treated as inferior domination: inequalities give some an unacceptable degree of control over others Fairness: fair treatment requires (sometimes) equal treatment

6. Sufficiency No one should be allowed to fall below certain level. Frankfurt: Equality has no moral value. When people talk about equality, they (should) mean sufficiency. We should minimise the number of people falling below the threshold.

7. Sufficiency How to establish the threshold (Cf. Problems related to capabilities): –Avoid terrible suffering? 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty (less than 1.25USD per day (PPP). –Have a decent life? –Have a good life? What annual salary would YOU consider enough?

8. Sufficiency thresholds If the threshold is high 500. Minimising the number implies lots of people below. A B (x1000) (1) 501 350 (2) 475 475 Is it wrong to choose 2 rather than 1?

9. Or perhaps we could choose a very modest threshold: life/death cases, level of starvation, a live not worth living, etc. Threshold is 5, there are 40 units for 10 people. Egalitarianism will give 4 units to each = all die. We should give 5 to 8, and let 2 die ( 8 lives is better than no lives) Egalitarians could agree with that. Sufficiency has a reduced scope (life/death cases), and they would seek an egalitarian reason to decide who the 8 lucky are. Is it plausible to suggest less modest thresholds, which could get more people on board (again, think about basic capabilities)?

10. Two versions of sufficientarianism Modest: Sufficiency has priority over other distributive principles. Once everyone is above, then priority or equality are adequate. Strong: Sufficiency is sufficient for justice. No other distributive principles apply.

11. Strong Sufficiency Sufficientarians accuse egalitarians to be concerned with the gap between the rich and the super-rich (why does it matter that some drink £ 200 wine bottles and others drink £ 2,000 a bottle?) Assume a threshold of 50 Egalitarians reply that that sufficiency cannot cope with those just above the level (52) and the super rich (50,000,000). And this might be objectionable.

12. Vs strong sufficiency It’s odd to care about people being below the threshold, but not to care about: –How far below the threshold people are –How far above it they will be It’s (at best) an incomplete view.

13. Modest sufficiency It is attractive because we can set the threshold at an acceptable low level (basic capabilities or something akin), and then give absolute priority to those below. Once everyone is above, then other principles can function. It is compatible with both prioritarianism and modest egalitarianism.

14. Priority Priority addresses the worries about sufficiency. On this view, ‘benefiting people matters more the worse-off these people are’. (Parfit, 101). The worse-off you are, the stronger your claim to be benefited.

15. Prioritarianism Non-comparative view (as egalitarianism), is concerned with the absolute level of advantage. The question is not whether they are worse-off than others, but whether they are worse-off than they could be. Sometimes is egalitarian: Sometimes is not: A B A B (1) 100 150 (1) 150 200 (2) 110 120 (2) 170 300

16. Prioritarianism We could call Prioritarianism ‘non-relational egalitarianism’ or ‘decent inegalitarianism’ This, of course, depends on whether we endorse it or not!

17. Absolute prioritarianism Should the worse-off have absolute priority (cf. Rawls’s DP)? Size of benefits Number of affected A B A B x10000 (1) 100 150 (1) 100 110 (2) 99 300 (2) 60 130 Or, should we be moderate prioritarians? The worst-off have no veto.

18. but Why should we see relative disadvantage as irrelevant? –It is bad that someone is need –Is it not worse when someone is in need when others are not? –Reply: Equality

20. Equality: Some distinctions Equality might be a sub-product of other important principles: e.g. a utilitarian distribution with decreasing marginal utility is an equal distribution. This equality is a happy-coincidence. Deontic egalitarianism: Equality is instrumental to other goals. E.g. achieving the social basis of self-respect requires equality. Telic egalitarianism: Equality has intrinsic value (Inequality is in itself bad). –Derivative egalitarianism: Equality is a constitutive part of some other wider ideal. –Non-derivative egalitarianism: Equality is a ultimate value.

21. Pluralist egalitarianism Equality cannot plausibly be our only concern: A B D1 1 1 D2 100 100 We need more than a concern for equality. Perhaps introduce a utility principle: ‘It is better if people have more rather than less’.

22. Trade-offs Pluralist egalitarianism needs to balance losses in equality with gains in utility: A B (1) 150 150 (2) 199 200 (3) 101 200 (4) 140 200 Egalitarians might be ready to accept that (2) is better than (1), reject (3) as being worse than (1) but how do they assess (4)? Pluralist egalitarianism has no priory rules regarding the balances between equality and utility, it relies on intuition.

23. Eye-twin example For some genetic reason we all have twins. One is always sighted, the other is always blind. Is it wrong to operate all twins and pass one eye to the blind? A B 2 0 1 1

24. The Levelling-Down Objection Egalitarianism is concerned with reducing the gap between people. It is a relational view. How do A fares vis-à-vis B? Because of this feature it is open to the most powerful critique to egalitarianism. A B (1) 150 200 (2) 150 150

25. LDO Proponents of the LDO argue that equality has no value. ‘If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others’. Frankfurt ‘Equality as a Moral Idea’, 21.

26. Rebutting the LDO Is there an egalitarian way out? Strong egalitarians must bite the bullet and accept that 2 is better than 1. Moderate egalitarians can say that equality has pro tanto value, but it can be defeated by other considerations.

27. Temkin’s reply ‘I, for one, believe that inequality is bad. But do I really think that there is some respect in which a world were only some are blind is worse than one where all are? Yes. Does this mean I think it would be better if we blinded everybody? No. Equality is not all that matters’. (Temkin, L. Inequality, 282).

28. Assessing the L-DO If equality has only pro tanto value it can be defeated, while still keeping its value (its value is defeated but NOT cancelled). L-DO depends on the Person-Affecting Principle (Parfit), or the Slogan (Temkin): ‘One situation cannot be worse (or better) than another if there is no one for whom it is worse (or better)’. (Temkin, 132).

29. The Slogan and Proportional Justice Proportional justice: Saints Mass murderers (1) 100 150 (2) 100 50 Is there any respect in which (2) is better than (1) even though is not worse for anyone? Either reject the Slogan or give up views about proportional justice.

30. Rejecting the slogan The non-identity problem (Parfit 1984). Clara can choose to get pregnant at T1 or at T2 If she gets pregnant at T1, she will have a severely disabled child (but with a life worth living). If she waits till T2, the child will be healthy. Should she wait or not? But, pregnancy at T1 is worse for no-one?

31. Conditional Equality Equality can have conditional value Equality is valuable only if it doesn’t level down. On this view Equality has no pro tanto value, but conditional value. LDO cancels (rather than outweighs) the value of equality.

32. Does it matter that one is worse off than others? [I]f I am worse off than you, benefits to me are more important. Is this because I am worse off than you? In one sense, yes. But this has nothing to do with my relation to you. It may help to use this analogy. People at higher altitudes find it harder to breathe. Is this because they are higher up than other people? In one sense, yes. But they would find it just as hard to breathe even if there were no other people who were lower down. In the same way, on the Priority View, benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. Benefits to them would matter just as much even if there were no others who were better off. (Parfit 104)

33. A puzzle Slight impairment: ‘a condition that renders it difficult for one to walk more than 2 km’. Very severe impairment: a condition that leaves one bedridden, save for the fact that one will be able to sit in a chair and be moved around in a wheelchair for part of the day if assisted by others.

34. 1 person case 50% chance of you developing any of them. Choose a drug that will either: If you get the slight impairment it will restore your health. If you get the very severe impairment it will move you to Severe impairment: a condition in which one is no longer bedridden; rather, one is able to sit up on one’s own for the entire day but requires the assistance of others to move about (Slight to full health, or Very severe to Severe) Surveys show that people are indifferent.

35. Many persons case 100 people, 50% of whom will get the very severe impairment, and 50% will get the slight impairment. We can only treat 1 group. Each of them is indifferent (just like in the 1 person case) Who should get the drug?

36. Is the priority view off the hook? Quasi leveling down prioritarianism A B D1 50 300 D2 51 150 D3 52 53

37. Issues II So, what should we be? Egalitarians, sufficientarians, prioritarians, or a mixture of some of those? How far can we defend egalitarianism in the face of L-DO? Is the slogan plausible? Quasi levelling down prioritarianism?